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Abstract 
This thesis examines the policy of the People's Republic of China to the Second 
Indochina (or Vietnam) War. It looks at how Mao Zedong's perception of the 
United States' escalation of the conflict in Vietnam influenced both China's 
diplomatic and military response, and also Mao's own domestic campaign to 
transform Chinese society in the form of the Cultural Revolution. In the 1960s 
China sought to avoid war with the U.S. for both ideological and security 
reasons, yet offered large-scale support for Hanoi's war effort. China's military 
support fell as the prospect of a war with the Soviet Union loomed, and 
rebounded in the early 1970s when the threat had receded. 
Sino-Vietnamese discord in this period has been over-emphasised, for 
throughout the duration of the Vietnam War intimate co-operation characterised 
the relationship. The key change in Sino-Vietnamese relations came not from 
Hanoi's decision to enter into negotiations with the U.S., but in the wake of the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for which Hanoi exhibited fulsome support. 
From this point on differing Chinese and North Vietnamese interests in the 
occupant of the White House set Hanoi's and Beijing's tactics on divergent paths. 
This does not mean, however, that Beijing reduced its support for Hanoi's 
war effort as a result of Sino-American rapprochement. Henry Kissinger 
continually misinterpreted Chinese strategy and statements on the topic of 
Vietnam, and failed to understand the Chinese paternalism that underpinned 
much of Beijing's policy. Mao remained determined to see a complete American 
withdrawal from Indochina and substantially increased its military and economic 
aid. When an apparent stalemate was arrived at in mid-1972, only then did China 
intervene to counsel moderation and compromise at the negotiating table, hoping 
to have the war ended before Richard Nixon began his second term in office. 
3 
Table of contents 
Abstract ................................................................................... p. 3 
Table of contents .......................................................................... p. 4 
Introduction ................................................................................ p. 5 
Chapter 1: 1966-1968: China, Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution ........... p. 17 
Chapter 2: January 1969 - April 1971 : Strategic divergence, tactical accord .p. 69 
Chapter 3: April 1971 - January 1972: Making waves and damage control.p. 113 
Chapter 4: January 1972 - January 1973: Summit and Accord ................. p. 157 
Chapter 5: January - August 1973: The Search for Peace in Cambodia ....... p. 212 
Conclusion .............................................................................. p. 245 
Bibliography ............................. , ............................................. p. 256 
4 
Introduction 
Aside from the dramatic scenes in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s 
that heralded its end, the 1966-73 period witnessed two of the most significant, 
and contrasting, events of the Cold War: the United States' engagement in and 
disengagement from the war in Vietnam, and Sino-American rapprochement. 
These momentous shifts in the dynamic of global Cold War politics occurred 
against a background of unprecedented domestic turmoil in both the People's 
Republic of China and the United States of America, for which, in both nations, 
the American war in Vietnam was an important catalyst. As the U.S. began its 
military entanglement in Southeast Asia, Mao's China was carving out for itself a 
position of studied isolation in the world; the entire Chinese nation soon became 
caught in a wave of social disruption and dislocation that had at its heart Mao's 
vision of a China untainted by the twin evils of Soviet revisionism and American 
imperialism. The People's Republic of China was vilified in Europe and North 
America as a dangerous threat to world peace: a belligerent, adolescent state, 
angry at the international system and determined to export Mao's vision of 
violent Marxist revolution throughout the globe - particularly to the recently 
decolonised nations of Africa and Asia. Critics only had to look to China's 
southern frontier where Vietnamese communists, supported and encouraged by 
China, were engaged in a bloody conflict against the pro-American government 
of the Republic of Vietnam and, of course, from 1965 onwards the United States 
itself. In contrast to the communist leaders in the Kremlin, between 1965 and 
1968 Mao's China loudly and repeatedly opposed every move towards a 
negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War, claiming that such peace talks were a 
fraud designed to cheat the Vietnamese people and the global revolution of a 
great victory against American imperialism and neo-colonialism. Yet, by early 
1973 the American National Security Adviser was being hosted in the Chinese 
capital and congratulated on his success in negotiating a peace accord with North 
Vietnam that extricated the United States from the morass of the Vietnam War. 
Nothing could more definitively highlight the apparent volte-face in Chinese 
policy. 
In contrast to Richard M. Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's 
conceptualisations of linkage and triangular diplomacy in international politics 
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(which are well known at least on the protagonists' own terms) and the history of 
America's military intervention in Indochina, until recently only the broad 
contours of Chinese policy towards Vietnam and their connection to the process 
of Sino-American rapprochement were tentatively understood. The paucity of 
historical knowledge on this subject, while not unexpected, is glaring and 
alarming in equal measure. For most of the 1960s, the Vietnam War was the 
principal foreign policy focus and concern of Mao's China as well as of the 
United States. According to its own propaganda, Beijing viewed the result of the 
war in South Vietnam as a prism through which the destined end of the Cold 
War, the global revolution, and perhaps even history itself, would be foretold. 
Yet a decade ago historians were only just beginning to learn the extent of 
China's involvement in that struggle, and the precise nature of its assistance to 
the Vietnamese communists. Similarly, our understanding of how Mao Zedong 
and Zhou Enlai conceptualised the link between their opening to the United 
States and the war in Vietnam was largely based on the assessment of the primary 
American protagonists (Henry Kissinger in particular), and on the angry claims 
of betrayal that emanated from Hanoi in the wake of the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict of 1979. It is this unsatisfactory situation that this thesis seeks to remedy. 
The tale of China's involvement in the Vietnam War began to be told in 
1979, after the P.R.C. embarked on a punitive invasion of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. Hanoi's propaganda machinery went into overdrive, as chronologies 
of historic Chinese aggression against Vietnam flew off the presses, locating the 
recent Chinese invasion firmly within a framework of longstanding Chinese 
hostility towards and domination of the beleaguered and heroic Vietnamese 
I 
people. Mao Zedong, it was alleged, had held long-standing ambitions to re-
colonize Indochina for his People's Republic, while the plucky Vietnamese had 
managed to triumph against French imperialism and American neo-colonialism 
despite Chinese treachery and betrayal, firstly in Geneva in 1954, and later in 
Beijing in 1971-2. The former had seen the Viet Minh denied their victory over 
France, when they were forced to accept a partition of their country. In the case 
of the latter, it was alleged, China had backed the Vietnamese struggle when it 
1 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter S.R.Y. For. Min.], The 
Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over the Last Thirty Years [commonly and hereafter 
referred to as the White Book], (Hanoi: 1979). 
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suited Beij ing' s selfish and narrow interests, but later betrayed Hanoi's anti-
American resistance war through the process of Sino-American rapprochement. 
Hanoi claimed that the P.R.C. abandoned its support for an American withdrawal 
from South Vietnam, and attempted to pressurize the Vietnamese comrades into 
accepting the continuation of the "puppet" South Vietnamese state, in exchange 
for the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan and Beijing's admission into 
the United Nations. The claims were grist to the Vietnamese propagandists' mill, 
and satisfied the suspicions of many who felt betrayed by China's dalliances with 
Washington D.C. or were sympathetic to the seemingly ageless and unending 
Vietnamese struggle for territorial integrity and national independence. 
It was from the midst of these bitter mutual recriminations between 
Beijing and Hanoi that historians first learned of the extent of Chinese 
involvement in the Vietnamese communists' conflict with the United States. 
Although the presence in North Vietnam of a limited number of Chinese 
engineering and support troops had been public knowledge in the United States 
as early as January 1966, the number was believed to be around 50,000, and it 
was a fact that neither the U.S. nor Chinese governments wished to draw 
2 
attention to. Unsurprisingly, in 1979 neither did Hanoi make any mention of the 
fact that the People's Republic of China had actually dispatched some 320,000 
engineering, logistical and support troops to North Vietnam between 1965 and 
1968. This fact was only revealed in a series of Chinese responses published in 
late November, 1979. Not only did China reveal the true dimensions of the 
assistance it had afforded North Vietnam, but it supported its claims with a 
commentary from former Vietnam Workers' Party Politburo member Hoang Van 
Hoan, who had recently defected to China. Naturally, Beijing angrily denied the 
allegations that Hanoi had made against it, and charged that the roots of the 
deterioration in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship were Hanoi's hegemonic 
ambitions in Indochina, discriminatory policies towards ethnic Chinese, and a 
fundamental desire to act as a Soviet proxy in East Asia. This was all peppered 
3 
with more than a hint of indignation at perceived Vietnamese ingratitude. 
2 'China and Vietnam', 6 April 1967, Folder 14, Box 06, Douglas Pike Collection [hereafter 
DPC]: Unit 06 - Democratic Republic of Vietnam, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University 
[TVA-TTU]. 
3 See e.g., 'Yuenan kang Fa, kang Mei douzheng shiqi de Zhong-Yue guanxi' [Sino-Vietnamese 
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Felicitously for historians, the release of the details buried within these 
charges and counter-claims coincided with the publication of the first volume of 
4 
Henry Kissinger's memoirs, White House Years. This afforded western scholars 
the opportunity to compare the claims of the belligerents in Beijing and Hanoi 
with Kissinger's record of events, and John Garver impressively rose to the 
challenge in his 1981 monograph, ' Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-
5 
American Rapprochement'. The focus of Garver's enquiry was the veracity of 
the Vietnamese cries of 'betrayal', and using only the published sources available 
to him he made a relatively insightful analysis of the interplay between Sino-
American rapprochement and Beijing's Vietnam policy, concluding that while 
Beijing had not 'betrayed' Hanoi in 1970-73, Chinese policy had certainly 
embittered the Vietnamese "and made Hanoi more willing to implement policies 
after 1975 that were likely to antagonize China." Given the poverty of the sources 
available at that juncture, the accuracy of his conclusions is impressive, and this 
thesis provides much evidence to support Garver's 1981 instincts and analysis. 
However, Garver's article had a limited impact on the historiography of 
the Second and Third Indochina Wars. Works such as William Duiker's China 
and Vietnam: The Roots of the Conflict, and Daniel Papp's, Vietnam: The View 
from Moscow, Peking, Washington tended to examine the issues from the 
Vietnamese perspective and focused on either traditional Sino-Vietnamese 
6 
enmity, or treated Chinese foreign policy with and as high cynicism. The 
contention of the 1960s that Mao had been prepared to 'fight the United States to 
the last Vietnamese' lived on, bolstered by the assumption that from 1971 
onwards China began to run down its support for Hanoi's war effort. Hanoi's 
allegations against Beijing were often uncritically accepted, without reference to 
relations in the period of Vietnam's anti-French and anti-American struggles], Renmin Ribao 
[People's Daily], 21 November, 1979; 'Weishenme Yuenan tongyi hou Zhong-Vue guanxi ouhuai 
Ie?' [Why did Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorate after Vietnam's unification?], Renmin Ribao, 
26 November, 1979; Hoang Van Hoan, 'Vue-Zhong zhandou youyi de shishi bu rong waiqu' [It is 
impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship], Renmin Ribao, 27 
November, 1979. 
4 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1979) [hereafter 
cited as w.H. Y.] 
5 John W. Garver, 'Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement', Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 96, no. 3 (Autumn 1981), pp. 445-464. 
6 William Duiker China and Vietnam: The Roots a/the Conflict (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 
Studies of the University of Cali fomi a, Berkeley, 1986); Daniel S. Papp, Vietnam: The View from 
Moscow, Peking, Washington (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1981). 
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the Chinese rebuttals or scholarly analysis, particularly by writers on the 
American left who were picking over the bones of the Nixon presidency. The 
most significant of these was Seymour Hersh, who in 1983 published The Price 
7 
of Power. A sharp critique of both Kissinger and the first of the two presidents 
he served under, The Price of Power also painted a picture of the beleaguered 
Vietnamese communists, victims of great power triangular diplomacy and 
Chinese betrayal. As Hersh put it, "The two nations [China and the U.S.] were 
willing to deal cynically with each other and with the life and death of the 
8 
peoples of Vietnam." 
Unlike Garver's infinitely less punchy monograph, the impact of Hersh's 
work was to be felt for the best part of two decades, until the text of the 
Kissinger-Zhou talks became publicly available. Despite a complete lack of 
evidence for the claim, Seymour Hersh concluded that Kissinger and Zhou must 
have struck a deal over Vietnam in light of the perceived American surrender 
over the Taiwan issue; little thought was given to what Mao had also conceded 
on Taiwan. Hersh discounted Kissinger's assertion that there was no deal on 
Vietnam, and in order to support his narrative of hardnosed American and 
Chinese leaders callously trading the lives of innocent Vietnamese, he preferred 
to rely on the unlikely combination of the diaries of Albanian Communist leader 
Enver Hoxha and an oft-repeated claim that Zhou Enlai once told Kissinger's 
9 
one-time deputy, Alexander Haig, "not to lose in Vietnam". And yet, despite the 
lack of evidence to support the claims, Hersh's depiction of events resonated as 
historians documented other facets of the mendacity of the Nixon White House. 
Even as late as 1998, Jeffery Kimball's generally well-researched Nixon's 
Vietnam War partly relied on Hersh's imagined scenes of Sino-American 
10 
dealings on Vietnam. 
However, as this thesis demonstrates, where they related to Vietnam these 
critical conversations between the Chinese Premier and the American National 
Security Advisor contained little of the "marvels of realpolitik - 'hardball,' as 
7 Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit, 
1983). 
8 Ibid., p.378. 
9 Ibid., p.492. 
10 Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998), see 
e.g. pp. 284, 297. 
9 
11 
Nixon would put it" of which Hersh foretold. Mao and Nixon's strategic visions 
were sufficiently in tandem to obviate the need for serious horse-trading in the 
Zhou-Kissinger discussions - something that Kissinger himself drew attention to 
in his memoirs. And while White House Years was by no means the fraudulent 
cover-up that Hersh imagined, it presented an incomplete, at times inaccurate and 
occasionally somewhat schizophrenic version of the history of Sino-American 
rapprochement. It presented an overly parallelistic analysis of Chinese 
motivations, aims, and objectives in relation to Vietnam, which reflected 
Kissinger's contemporary interpretation that hinged upon concepts of great 
powers and interests. Yet, for two decades scholars largely relied on Kissinger's 
analysis of Chinese motives that largely speculated on China's Vietnam policy 
and its underpinnings. 
The first steps towards putting some documentary meat on these 
speculative bones came from two China-born U.S. scholars - Chen Jian and 
Qiang Zhai. Taken together, Qiang Zhai's 2000 book China and the Vietnam 
Wars, and Chen Jian's 2001 publication Mao's China and the Cold War greatly 
advanced our understanding of Mao's Vietnam policy; both brought a wealth of 
new infonnation about the depth of Chinese involvement in Vietnam, and the 
12 
extent of Beijing's support for Hanoi's war effort in the 1964-69 period. And 
while the fonner traced the story of Sino-Vietnamese communist co-operation 
from the earliest days of the P.R.C., the latter expertly located Mao's Vietnam 
policy in a broader context of modem China's international relations that centred 
around the interaction between Mao's vision of pennanent revolution and his 
foreign policy choices. With respect to the period in question in this thesis, Chen 
Jian demonstrated how Mao carefully exploited the Vietnam War as a means of 
radicalising Chinese society in pursuit of his Cultural Revolution; however 
Chen's work is lacking an examination of the role of the Vietnam War in 
necessitating and prompting that same Cultural Revolution. Furthennore, his 
treatment of Sino-American rapprochement largely focuses on bilateral issues 
(Taiwan in particular), thus leaving many questions about China's post-1969 
11 Hersh, Price of Power, p.378. 
12 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2000) 
[hereafter cited as CATVW]; Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 
2001). 
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policy towards Vietnam unanswered. Zhai, on the other hand, drives the Vietnam 
story on into the Nixon era; however his treatment of this period is severely 
hampered by a reliance on the memoirs of Kissinger, Nixon, and Alexander Haig, 
all of which contain serious distortions of Chinese policy and action. 
Two main sources have permitted me to re-examine these gaps in our 
understanding and to clarify some of the distortions. Firstly, the release by the 
United States National Archives of documentation from inside the Nixon White 
House has allowed an examination of how Kissinger and Nixon perceived 
Chinese interests and aims, and what actions they took to oppose or cater for 
these in relation to Vietnam; it also provides us with the complete record of the 
discussions that took place between the Chinese and American leaders. When 
placed alongside the new information that has emerged from within China over 
the past decade about the actions Beijing took in relation to Vietnam during this 
period, it became possible to construct a more complete understanding of Chinese 
policy that addressed the deficiencies previously noted. The bulk of this new 
information from within China is thanks to the work of the Chinese historian Li 
Danhui, who over the past few years has published or edited a series of 
monographs on China's Vietnam policy and its place in both Sino-American and 
Sino-Soviet relations. Without her research and scholarship it would not have 
been possible to write this thesis, and I am grateful to her for the assistance and 
13 
advice she has afforded me. 
lt is obvious that having to rely on secondary and published sources to 
learn the details of China's political and material contribution to Vietnam's war 
effort, however well-researched and well-written they may be, is unsatisfactory 
and no substitute to full and unfettered access to Chinese archives. Thus I have 
regrettably been forced to largely reconstruct the policy decisions made by the 
Chinese leadership on the basis of their application and outcomes; evidence from 
the discussions and processes that arrived at them is still sadly lacking, 
13 See e.g., Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su zai yuan Yue kang Mei wenti shang de chongtu yu maodun, 
1965-1972' ['Sino-Soviet Conflicts and Contradictions over the Issue of Assisting Vietnam, 
Resisting America', hereafter 'Zhong-Su chongtu yu maodun'], part 1, Dangdai Zhongguo shi 
yanjiu [Research in Contemporary Chinese History], vol. 7. no. 4 (July, 2000); Li Danhui, 
'Zhongguo dui Yue-Mei hetan de lichang, fangzhenji qi bianhua (1965-1968)' [The Changes in 
China's Standpoint and Policy towards Vietnam-U.S. Peace Talks, (1965-1968)], Dangdai 
Zhongguoshi yanjiu [Research in Contemporary Chinese History], supplement, December 2001; 
Li Danhui ed., Zhongguo yu yinduzhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], (Hong Kong: 
Tiandi Tushu Gongsi, 2000). 
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particularly in relation to the upper echelons of P.RC. officials. Nonetheless, Li 
Danhui has enabled the scholarship of modem China's foreign policy to make an 
enonnous advance with the publication of Yunnan yu Zhongguo yuan Yue kang 
14 
Mei (dang'an wenxian). Co-edited with Xiao Zuhou, an archivist at the Yunnan 
provincial archives, this ground-breaking book is the first ever volume of 
documents from the modem era to be published by a scholar not working under 
the aegis of a state or party organ. As with Li' s own published works I have been, 
of course, at her mercy with regard to what has been excluded from this volume; 
however it has provided new and fascinating insights into the functioning of 
China's 'Assist Vietnam Resist America' campaign, and is a landmark on the 
road to the free availability of sources from within the P.R.C.'s archives. 
Acknowledging these limitations, nonetheless this thesis seeks to examine 
China's Vietnam policy within its own Chinese context, as well as the broader 
international one. And while it is not about Sino-American rapprochement per se, 
a large portion of this study focuses on this for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
Mao's evolving perception of both the Soviet Union and the United States was a 
key factor in detennining P.Re. policies towards the war in Vietnam. Secondly, 
the Vietnamese perception of the nature of Sino-American relations played a 
crucial role in detennining the state of Hanoi's relationship with Beijing, which 
in tum influenced how the P.RC. handled its Vietnamese allies. And thirdly, 
much of our previous interpretation and understanding of China's Vietnam policy 
emerged from literature on the topics of Sino-American relations and America's 
own Vietnam policy; thus these assertions need to be directly addressed. 
This dissertation begins with an examination of Mao's domestic and 
international imperatives at the time of the American escalation in South 
Vietnam, i.e. the C.C.P. Chairman's visions of continuous revolution both at 
home and abroad, and the interplay between these and his Vietnam policy. It 
challenges the view that China's Cultural Revolution was a uniquely negative 
experience for North Vietnam and that China sought to keep the United States 
interminably bogged down in the Indochinese quagmire. Tactical issues, rather 
than strategic ones, separated Beijing and Hanoi during this period; however this 
14 Xiao Zuhou and Li Danhui, eds., Yunnan yu yuan Yue kang Me; (dang'an wenxian) [Yunnan 
and Assist Vietnam, Resist America (Archival Documents)], (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian, 
2003). 
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was irretrievably altered by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the North 
Vietnamese reaction to it. From this point on Chinese and North Vietnamese 
interests in the occupant of the White House put these two Asian communist 
states on divergent paths, though it remained in the interests of both to stay in 
close contact and co-operation. 
Events, however, conspired to make the maintenance of this relationship 
harder than either side desired, as shall be shown in chapter two. Occurring 
shortly before the death of Ho Chi Minh, the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 
meant that Beijing was forced to drastically cut back its aid to the D.R.V. at a 
time when China needed to demonstrate its continuing goodwill to the post-Ho 
leadership in Hanoi headed by Le Duan. The fluctuations in Chinese military aid 
during this period were not a crude punishment for Hanoi entering into 
negotiations with the United States, but rather a reflection of China's own 
security situation and the battlefield realities in both North and South Vietnam. 
These events were also concurrent with the first steps in the uncertain process of 
Sino-American rapprochement - a process Hanoi certainly did not approve of. It 
shall be shown, however, that ironically it was Nixon's expansion of the war into 
Cambodia and Laos that provided Mao the opportunity to calm ruffled 
Vietnamese feathers by demonstrating to the U.S. President that U.S. de-
escalation in Indochina was a precondition for Sino-American co-operation. 
Nonetheless, despite this there was still a growing tension between the policies 
the P.R.e. was pursuing in relation to Washington and Hanoi - two enemies 
engaged in a costly and bloody war. The question was then how was Beijing to 
manage this contradiction? 
As shall be seen in chapters three and four, the answer was to attempt to 
ensure that the speed of American withdrawal from Indochina accelerated in 
tandem with the quickening pace of Sino-American rapprochement. For Mao, the 
military humiliation of the United States was no longer necessary; a negotiated 
retreat from the Indochinese peninSUla would suffice. In pursuit of this Zhou 
Enlai put diplomatic pressure on Washington to give ground, not Hanoi, and 
simultaneously greatly increased China's arms supplies to the North Vietnamese 
so they could exert their own rather less subtle form of persuasion. Mao certainly 
hoped that a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War could be arrived at before 
a Sino-American summit, but it was Nixon who was going to have to make 
13 
compromises on the political future of Saigon, not the Vietnam Workers' Party. 
If Nixon refused to use the opportunity of the 1971 South Vietnamese 
presidential election to remove Nguyen Van Thieu from power, then Chinese 
guns and shells would play their role in the likely attempt to remove Thieu by 
force in 1972. None of this, however, was to interfere with improving relations 
with the United States, and despite protests from Hanoi the planning for Nixon's 
visit to China continued apace. The consolation for Hanoi, poor though it may 
have been, was that when Nixon arrived in the Chinese capital his hosts 
continued to urge him to get rid of Thieu in order to extract the U.S. from 
Indochina; Zhou Enlai was not, however, going to expend any political capital in 
securing this end. 
The reason for this was the general understanding in Beijing, Washington, 
and Hanoi that 1972 would be a crunch year in Vietnam because of the U.S. 
electoral cycle. Nixon's visit to China was merely a prelude to the two main 
events of the year: the by now inevitable communist offensive in South Vietnam, 
and the November U.S. general election. The full extent of China's military aid to 
North Vietnam in preparation for the offensive is only now becoming clear, as is 
the extent to which China mobilised its economy to help the Vietnamese 
comrades break the punishing blockade and bombardment of their coast and 
cities. However, Chinese patience with both Hanoi and Washington had its limits, 
and in July 1972 Zhou Enlai utilized his considerable diplomatic skills in an 
attempt to ensure that the war was brought to a conclusion before the November 
elections. Hanoi clearly believed that it was in its interests to conclude the war 
before Nixon received a renewed mandate, and that tactical outlook was probably 
shared in Beijing, even though China and North Vietnam once again had 
opposing interests in the result of the presidential election. The North Vietnamese 
sought to threaten Nixon's electoral prospects and extract the maximum 
concessions from him; Beijing wished to see him returned to office with a strong 
mandate so that he could focus attention on securing a normalization of 
diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. The result was that Zhou and Mao began to 
talk to Hanoi of the wisdom of compromising. 
One must be cautious, however, of over-estimating the importance of this 
Chinese intervention during the summer of 1972, or the degree to which Sino-
Vietnamese relations soured as a direct result. Hanoi was already minded to end 
14 
the war before the election (after the failure of the offensive), and in reality 
Beijing's preferred timetable was not met. It was not until January 1973 that the 
peace negotiations between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached a mutually 
acceptable conclusion, and by that point both Hanoi and Beijing had another, 
new, problem to deal with: an obdurate and detennined Khmer Rouge ally in 
Cambodia that had declared its detennination to carryon the struggle irrespective 
of events in Vietnam. Washington still hugely over-estimated Hanoi's influence 
over Pol Pot and the Khmer communists, and the situation in Cambodia posed the 
danger of threatening the delicate balance in Indochina. This thesis then closes 
with an examination of how Beijing, Hanoi, and Washington all spent the 
opcnmg months of 1973 unsuccessfully working towards the same goal of 
finding a negotiated settlement of the civil war in the Khmer Republic. Ironically, 
towards the end of the decade it would ultimately be events in Cambodia that 
precipitated the most grave of crises in Sino-Vietnamese relations, although much 
of the groundwork had been laid in the 1971-3 period. 
Until now we knew little of what China did in relation to Vietnam, even 
less of how it did it, and were largely confined to the interpretations of foreign 
contemporaries as to what was the motivation. It is my hope that this thesis will 
provide at least some new insight into these matters. 
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PAGE MISSING IN 
ORIGINAL 
Chapter 1 
1966-1968: China, Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution 
China's policy towards, and support for, the insurgency in South Vietnam that 
erupted in the late 1950s had been conditioned by a combination of Beijing's 
perception of the danger of American intervention in the region, and domestic 
political considerations. The P.R.C.'s support for Hanoi's policies and the 
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) had initially been tempered 
by a fear that it might provoke U.S. intervention and Beijing's preoccupation 
with the results of the Great Leap Forward. However, once the Kennedy 
administration began increasing the commitment of U.S. resources to Laos, South 
Vietnam, and Thailand, a newly assertive Mao increased China's support for the 
revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam as a means of countering the American 
'special war'. In the summer of 1962, China provided 90,000 rifles free of 
charge for use in the anti-Diem struggle in South Vietnam. It represented a 
significant increase in China's support for the revolutionary movement in South 
Vietnam, and marked a new leftward tum in Chinese foreign policy.! 
Mao had always been ideologically inclined towards support for the 
Vietnamese communists' struggle; after all, not only was Vietnam a country on 
China's doorstep with which it shared millennia of history, but the personal 
friendships, history and revolutionary struggles of the communist parties of China 
and Vietnam were intimately intertwined. There existed no better environment to 
demonstrate the external applicability of Mao's ideological and strategic 
innovation than in Vietnam. However, there was a continual interplay between 
the domestic political environment, external strategic threats, and the prosecution 
of Mao's ideological impulses in Vietnam. This chapter examines how the 
American escalation in South Vietnam influenced not only the extent of China's 
support for Hanoi's anti-American war, but also the necessity and timing of 
Mao's Cultural Revolution, for which the Vietnam War was a vital tool of mass 
mobilization. The Cultural Revolution, in tum, affected both Beijing's relations 
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with Hanoi, and its external threat perception, whereby China came to view the 
Soviet Union as its biggest threat, setting it sharply at odds with the leadership in 
Hanoi. As shall be seen, these changes would have profound effects on the 
subsequent evolution of China's Vietnam policy. 
Shock to the system: the paper tiger has claws 
The physical threat from the United States in South Vietnam escalated during a 
year that saw a series of reverses for Chinese foreign policy and its stand as the 
champion of the oppressed peoples of the world. Guerrillas operating against the 
government of Niger had admitted to receiving training in China, while Beijing 
had been implicated in the assassination of Burundi's Prime Minister. Beijing's 
representatives had been declared personae non gratae in no fewer than ten 
African states, and four African nations broke diplomatic relations completely 
with the People's Republic of China; while relations with other important African 
and Arab states - in particular Kenya and Egypt - had been seriously damaged. 
India strengthened its influence in the Afro-Asian movement and defeated 
China's ally Pakistan in a war over Kashmir. Along with Ho Chi Minh, China 
had singled out President Ben Bella of Algeria as the leading example of a 
national liberation leader, only to see him overthrown by his own movement in 
June. The tide of revolution had apparently been successfully turned by 
'imperialists and reactionaries' in the Congo and most worryingly of all in 
Indonesia, where the Indonesian Communist Party (one of the two Communist 
parties - the other being that of Japan - that Mao had identified as standard 
bearers of anti-revisionism in the event of revisionists taking control in China) 
had been largely exterminated. 2 By late 1965 only the· Albanian and New 
Zealand Communist parties were located firmly within the 'anti-revisionist 
camp,.3 
The combination of these setbacks and the exponential increase in U.S. 
troop levels from March to December 1965 shook Mao from his belief of little 
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more than twelve months earlier that "it is impossible for the United States to 
send many troops to South Vietnam.,,4 He had not believed that Johnson would 
attack North Vietnam directly. But by the close of 1965, U.S. troop levels in 
South Vietnam had already reached almost 200,000, the thunder from the U.S. 
Air Force (USAF) B-52s was still rolling, and there was little sign that the rate of 
escalation would slow down. In February Mao had told Soviet Premier Aleksei 
Kosygin that a more general war with the United States was possible in ten to 
fifteen, or perhaps even seven or eight, years' time.s The events of 1965 surely 
hardened Mao's conviction that a shorter time-scale was likely. Not only did 
China need to heighten its military and revolutionary preparedness, but the 
Vietnamese communists had to hold out long enough for the P.R.C. to steel itself, 
in case an emboldened United States, perhaps in collusion with the Soviet 
revisionists, struck out at the main revolutionary challenger to the global status 
quo. The cause was the inherently aggressive nature of capitalism, and while 
China sought to avoid a world war, Mao and Zhou Enlai were not, in the 
Chairman's words, "the leaders of the General Staff of the imperialists.,,6 China 
needed to be ready. For Mao, that state of revolutionary preparedness was to be 
achieved by the state through the 'Third Front' mobilization campaign, and by 
the Party and people through his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.7 
The values underpinning this were laid out for the world in an article 
penned under Lin Biao's name, entitled 'Long Live the Victory of People's 
War!'. It was viewed with alarm in Washington as a blueprint for Communist 
aggression that reminded policy makers of Mein Kampf, but its intended target 
audience was the Soviet revisionists rather than the United States. For Chairman 
Mao, who had long derided dependence on nuclear technology as a means of 
attaining victory, the survival of his revolution was not simply a physical 
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question but also a metaphysical one: the Chinese people, particularly the young, 
needed to experience struggle in the search for ideological integrity in order to 
remain true to the values of the revolution and to preserve its survival. At the 
core of Mao's new domestic mobilization project was struggle-criticism-
transformation in all spheres of the superstructure. As Mao had told Kosygin, 
when war with the imperialists came in ten to fifteen (or perhaps even seven or 
eight) years hence, it would require co-operation between China and the U.S.S.R. 
Thus, for the C.C.P. Chairman to prevent revisionism and capitulationism taking 
hold under these circumstances, a Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was now 
a key priority. 8 
By the end of 1965, Mao's growing domestic isolation was beginning to 
mirror the increasingly isolated position of China in the international arena. A 
change of direction from Mao's economic radicalism in the wake of the failure of 
the Great Leap Forward had led Mao to doubt the judgement of many of the top 
leadership of the C.C.P., including the President of the P.R.C., Liu Shaoqi, and 
General Secretary of the Party Deng Xiaoping.9 As Mao remarked in the summer 
of 1965, "[Revisionists] are not numerous, but they are influential."lo For Mao, 
Khrushchevism loomed on the previously red Chinese horizon. 
The central problem for Mao was that as the centre of the world 
revolution, which is how he had come to view China, the P.R.C. had the duty to 
preserve and protect his vision of revolutionary orthodoxy at home in order to 
ensure its survival and global success. Mao constantly made the connection 
between the Chinese revolution and a worldwide series of events, especially 
within the Communist bloc - specifically the potential slide from revisionism to 
social-imperialism and social-fascism. Mao's dispute with Soviet revisionism 
sprang from a fear that his life's work would be corrupted, that China would slide 
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back to the evils of capitalism and the world revolution would come to nought -
"revisionism will overcome Marxism, and, as a result, capitalism will be 
restored."!! To this end, Mao was prepared to antagonize and even break with, if 
necessary, communist parties which had up until that point been sympathetic to 
China's stand - among these the Vietnam Workers' Party (V.W.p.).!2 
As long as Moscow had ignored the unfolding struggle in South Vietnam, 
the Hanoi leadership had sided with China in the deepening Sino-Soviet dispute. 
In February 1965, the new leadership in Moscow indicated a more sympathetic 
attitude towards the Vietnamese revolution and was prepared to adopt a more 
active role in support of it. When Kosygin visited Beijing that month, the Soviet 
Premier proposed reconciling the Soviet and Chinese parties in order to form a 
united front to come to the assistance of North Vietnam. Mao was clear that the 
time was not yet right. As Edgar Snow observed a year later, "[F]or Mao to 
accept Soviet policy would mean to accept a compromise on Vietnam. 
Capitulation to Soviet pressure would be the equivalent to him of capitulation to 
the United States: sacrificing the revolution and China's national interests 
simultaneously; in short, the suicide of the C.C.P.,,13 For the Chairman, the 
equivalence between revisionism and imperialism was clear and categorical. 
'Peaceful coexistence with the West' was equated with surrender to the United 
States in South Vietnam: the abandonment of the revolution. Victory for the 
revolution could not be won at the negotiating table unless it had already been 
won on the battlefield; this was the C.C.P.'s own experience and was the 
experience that Mao felt would be born out on the battlefields of South Vietnam. 
Soviet support for a negotiated resolution to the Vietnam conflict was anathema 
to this. According to the C.C.P. Chairman's reasoning, since the Soviet 
revisionists had failed to prevent the outbreak of the fire of revolution in 
Indochina, they were now seeking to throw water on it through the fraud of peace 
talks. 14 
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In dialectic terms, as the focal point of all the contradictions in the world, 
Vietnam was something of a laboratory in which Mao wished to see the 
applicability of 'People's War' demonstrated outside of China, in which 
revolutionary violence would emerge victorious. As Zhou Enlai told Le Duan 
"Vietnam is the great standard-bearer representing the world's revolutionary 
peoples.,,15 That this great victory would take place on China's frontier, and 
would be delivered by a people most Chinese, including Mao, traditionally felt to 
be under their tutelage would serve as a glorification to and vindication of Mao's 
revolution. Although the Koreans and the Vietnamese fell outside the borders of 
the post-imperial Chinese state, Mao had believed that they, as well as the 
Tibetans, Mongols and other 'minority peoples', would be directed towards a 
bright socialist future by China's leadership. This made the Vietnamese 
revolution crucially important to Mao, and made the stakes personally high for 
him. Vis-a-vis the capitalist camp, if the United States could be defeated it would 
prove to be a heavy blow against imperialism, perhaps even the fatal one he had 
often foretold; while within the socialist camp Maoist orthodoxy (which was 
coming under increasing pressure from a renewed Soviet interest in Asia and the 
Third World) and its emphasis on the potential for limited national wars of 
liberation would be victorious over Soviet revisionism.16 
Events in Southeast Asia had not evolved quite as Mao had anticipated, 
however. The Chairman's analysis of events both globally and in Indochina had 
been predicated upon the belief that the United States was not only a 'paper 
tiger', but also one waning in might; this had been one of the main factors behind 
his calculation that a full break with the Soviet Union was viable. As late as 
December 1963 Mao was proclaiming to visitors that Britain and America's 
policy towards socialist countries was not one of military attack, but peaceful 
evolution. 17 This appraisal did not significantly change in the immediate 
aftermath of the firefight between the U.S.S. Maddox and North Vietnamese 
forces in the Gulf of Tonkin, when Mao gave his analysis of the unfolding 
situation to acting general secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party, Le Duan. He 
(Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002), p.32. 
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told his Vietnamese guest that "it seems that the Americans do not want to fight a 
war, you do not want to fight a war, and we do not necessarily want to fight a 
war ... because no one wants to fight a war, there will be no war.,,18 However, 
America's violent response to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, in the form 
of the landing of ground troops and the fury of the "Rolling Thunder" raids, had 
forced a recalculation. 
The Chairman's belief, dating at least as far back as the closing months of 
the Second World War, that the global revolutionary tide would prevent war was 
now shaken. For all his bluster about paper tigers, he knew well that China was 
not prepared for a war with the United States - economically or ideologically. 
Industrial production was too concentrated to effectively withstand heavy 
bombing from the undisputed might of the USAF, and, most perniciously, the 
bourgeois class within China had maintained a grip on Chinese society and 
culture that had proved surprisingly difficult to prise off. Under these 
circumstances, and whatever Zhou Enlai's protestations to the President of 
Pakistan that China was prepared for war both "militarily and spiritually", a war 
with the United States could well prove to be a catalyst to the revisionist, or even 
capitalist, take-over Mao had been brooding over. While China would not shy 
away from direct conflict with the United States if it was boldly confronted with 
it, the priority for the Chairman was to avoid such a war, at least until the chronic 
weaknesses in Chinese society had been overcome. 19 
The Chinese reaction to this new American threat was belligerence as a 
form of deterrence. The People's Republic of China sent a series of messages to 
the United States, via several different media including President Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan, Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, the British charge 
d'affaires in Beijing and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, outlining their 
response to the United States' escalation of the conflict in Vietnam. This 
message, whose import was emphasized by the variety of channels utilized by 
Beijing to ensure it was conveyed, had four points. Noting that China would not 
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take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States, Beijing nonetheless 
warned that it meant what it said and would honour its international obligations. 
Striking a note of defiance, Beijing declared that it was prepared for war, before it 
got to the core of the issue, warning America it should not consider bombing 
China as a means of exerting pressure. Bombing was an act of war, the message 
went, and once war commenced, it would have no boundaries. To further 
underscore China's solemn intent, at the same time as Zhou Enlai was 
transmitting the first instance of China's four point warning, Mao personally 
rescinded the 'Six Point Directive' that had barred Chinese fighter jets from 
engaging U.S.A.F. planes that intruded into Chinese air-space, saying "Since they 
are here, we ought to hit them firmly!,,2o In April 1965 three U.S. aircraft were 
shot down by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force. Mao still 
believed that the power of the paper tiger was declining, but his faith had been 
shaken; he knew only too well that an animal in its death-throes was at its most 
dangerous. Consequently China had to take precautions to prevent America 
lashing out at China, while arming the Vietnamese comrades to inflict the fatal 
blow.21 
The P.R.C. was not going to deal that blow in Vietnam: that was not the 
nature of People's War. Nonetheless, if U.S. ground troops crossed the line 
China had drawn in the sand at the 1 t h parallel, then Chinese intervention was 
promised; but how to ensure that the U.S. would heed the warning this time, 
unlike 15 years earlier in Korea, was a major preoccupation for Mao and the 
P.R.C. leadership. But this caution not to provoke a war with the United States 
was not simply about protecting China's national security. Rather, if the United 
States were to lash out at China, particularly through the use of nuclear weapons, 
the very position of ideological leadership that Mao had laid claim to for himself 
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and China would be destroyed, and the Khrushchevite revisionists, the "betrayers 
of People's War" would be proven correct. For reasons of ideology as well as 
national security, Mao had to strike a balance between supporting Vietnam and 
inviting an American attack.22 
Such was Mao's disdain for these 'fake Marxist-Leninists' that he refused 
to undertake joint actions with the Soviets that were ostensibly to assist the 
Vietnamese struggle. Following on from Kosygin's visit in February 1965, the 
Soviets requested that China permit 4,000 Soviet troops and other personnel to 
travel to Vietnam by rail through China; that one or two airbases (such as 
Kunming) be opened to Soviet MiG-21 s and an accompaniment of 500 troops; 
thirdly they hoped that the Chinese would open a permanent air corridor over 
their airspace for Soviet use in delivering aid to Vietnam; and finally that China 
permit the over-flight of 45 Soviet airplanes delivering urgently needed anti-
aircraft (AAC) materiel to the D.R.V. Whether the Soviets actually expected 
China to accede to these requests or whether they sought to sow discord between 
Hanoi and Beijing remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership 
rejected the Soviet requests, believing that such ulterior motives existed, and in 
some respects felt vindicated by the Soviet response. The Soviets were informed 
that China would transport the AAC guns to Vietnam by rail. Yet despite the 
alleged urgency that had accompanied the Soviet request for overflight rights, 
they still took a further week to deliver the AAC to the Chinese, who had them on 
Vietnamese soil in two days. If Mao needed further evidence of modem 
revisionist attempts to undermine Chinese sovereignty and the Vietnamese war 
effort, by their deeds the Soviets had once again betrayed themselves and the 
revolution. The enmity further intensified during the next few months when the 
Soviets began publicly accusing the Chinese of intentionally obstructing Soviet 
aid to Vietnam. Was the Soviet intention, the Chinese wondered, to provoke an 
American response through the appearance of a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese alliance 
openly at war with the United States?23 
Were the conflict in Vietnam to evolve into a more general war, Mao 
Zedong Thought would be bankrupt. Strategically, the only likely beneficiary of 
such a war would be the Soviet Union. Thus, in coming to the aid of North 
22 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', Peking Review, number 36, September 3,1965. 
23 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', part 1, pp.55-56. 
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Vietnam, China was forced to maintain a delicate balance between deterrence and 
provocation. As Allen Whiting observed, the manner in which China came to the 
D.R.V.'s assistance, "as a token of credible commitment, it increased the 
likelihood of esca~ation to the extent that the provocative role of the P.L.A. might 
outweigh its deterrent role. Yet despite this acknowledged risk, Beijing 
committed the force on behalf of Hanoi." Thus, for a year-long period from 
approximately February 1965 to March 1966, Mao had to ensure that this delicate 
balance had been struck in the Chinese campaign to 'assist Vietnam, resist 
America'. Once he was confident of this, only then he could proceed to 
launching his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.24 
Assisting Vietnam; resisting America 
"Struggle in order to strengthen socialist construction and assist Vietnam, resist 
America" was the editorial headline in the May Day 1965, edition of the Renmin 
Ribao, heralding the start of a national campaign of support for China's embattled 
southern neighbour. The very name of this campaign, however, revealed the 
relative caution of China's response to the threat from the south, and provides 
clear evidence of the contrast between Beijing's strategic thinking in 1965 and 
that of fifteen years earlier in Korea. On April 4th, copying the phraseology of the 
Korean War era, Renmin Ribao had made reference to 'resisting America, 
assisting Vietnam', a slogan that was repeated in the same publication on April 
6th and 7th, whereupon it disappeared; its connotation of a direct parallel with the 
Korean conflict was clearly a cause for concern among the Chinese leadership. 
By the time an expanded meeting of the Politburo took place on April lih to 
discuss a report on strengthening war preparations, the slogan had been switched 
to 'assisting Vietnam, resisting America'. The disappearance of the Korea-style 
phrase and after a hiatus the emergence of this new slogan was another signal to 
the United States that China did not view the situation unfolding in Vietnam as 
identical to Korea. In terms of Chinese domestic consumption, launching 'assist 
Vietnam, resist America' as an official slogan in a Mayday editorial served to 
underline the importance attached by the party leadership to this new 
24 Whiting, The Chinese Calculus, p.192. 
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mobilization campaign. Nonetheless, the leadership's caution was demonstrated 
by the Premier's advice: "at the moment we are supporting Vietnam's anti-
American struggle; we had better make Vietnam the principal. ,,25 
The landing of the Marines at Danang two months earlier had made 
Hanoi's situation much more acute and they desperately needed Chinese 
diplomatic and, more importantly, military support. However, the North 
Vietnamese leaders estimated that the risk of an American ground attack on the 
D.R.V. was small, though they were not complacent. Their basic approach was 
to further strengthen the struggle in the South and aerial defences in the North, 
while striving to limit both the ground war to the South and the American attacks 
on the North to within the scope of an aerial bombing 'war of destruction'. In 
light of this, Duan requested from the Chinese comrades, "volunteer pilots, 
volunteer soldiers ... [and] essential personnel in other areas".26 Liu Shaoqi spoke 
for the Chinese leadership when he told him that assisting Vietnam in the conduct 
of its struggle against America "is the binding duty of the Chinese people and the 
Chinese party." A few days later the c.c.P. Central Committee issued a directive 
calling on the entire Party, military and country to exert all efforts to support the 
Vietnamese anti-American struggle.27 
A little over a week later agreements were reached in Beijing in 
discussions between top Chinese and Vietnamese military leaders outlining the 
Chinese deployment in North Vietnam. Beijing's support for the Vietnamese 
struggle was confirmed one month later in a meeting between Ho Chi Minh and 
Mao Zedong in the Chinese Chairman's hometown of Changsha, Hunan 
province. The D.R.V. Chairman was a long-standing personal friend of the 
Chinese communist leadership, dating back to Paris in the early 1920s when he 
and Zhou Enlai had been contemporaneous members of the French Communist 
Party, and who as Asian proto-revolutionaries had held clandestine meetings in 
the Paris Metro. Following Ho' s return to Asia in 1924, he had taken up 
residence in Guangzhou, where he established the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth 
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'Memorandum from Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)" March 9, 1965, FRUS - Johnson, vol. II, 
document 192. 
26 Qu Aiguo, 'Yuenan zhanzheng', in Zhang & Niu, eds., Lengzhan yu Zhongguo, pp.355-6. 
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Association and where he continued his friendship with Zhou Enlai and Zhou's 
wife, Deng Yingchao, and even gave occasional lectures on the revolutionary 
situation in Vietnam at the Whampoa Military Academy. According to Ho's 
personal secretary, this trip to Guangzhou, Changsha and then on to Beijing, was 
ostensibly for the aging Vietnamese leader to rest and recuperate, and to be away 
from Vietnam to avoid ostentatious celebrations of his 75th birthday (he left 
Vietnam for China during the same period the following year). It was at Mao's 
invitation that the old comrade visited him in Changsha, where they dined and 
held a two-hour discussion (Ho is said to have been fluent in several Chinese 
dialects, so presumably there was no need for translation). As Ho had surely 
done with Zhou Enlai in Guangzhou some forty years earlier, the two men 
discussed the situation in Vietnam. It was their intent, Ho told his host, to 
transfer more forces from the rear (meaning North Vietnam) to the front (South 
Vietnam), and in this case logistical safeguards at the rear would be affected; this 
was where China could help. If China could undertake these works, it would 
release the men to go to the front. Mao agreed immediately, prompting Ho to 
quip, "It's too easy to arrive at agreements between US!,,28 
Mao agreed that the Chinese would assume responsibility for building six 
new roads in North Vietnam, following on from Liu Shaoqi's agreement with Le 
Duan to take responsibility for the construction, defence and repair of railways in 
the D.R.V.29 This pledge augmented agreements reached in Hanoi in late April 
between Chinese Vice Premier and Party Secretary of the Central-South Region, 
Tao Zhu, and Vietnamese officials. Among these agreements was a Chinese 
promise on road construction, including two roads to be built by the Yunnan 
provincial authorities: one from the Chinese border to Ha Giang, and another 
from Phong Tho to Lai Chau, in addition to two that were already under 
construction by the Chinese, probably as the result of an agreement signed on 
August 1st 1964. It seems probable that the V.W.P. decided to use the 
28 Memcon (extract), Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, May 16, 1965, 77 Conversations, pp.84-85; 
Li Jiazhong, ed. and trans1., Yuenan glloye Hli Zhiming [Ho Chi Minh: Father of Vietnam], 
(Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 2003), pp.253-255; Qu Aiguo, 'Yuenan zhanzheng', Zhang & Niu, 
Leng:::han yu ZllOngguo, p.356; Chen Jian, Mao's China, p.219. 
29 Memcon (extract), Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, May 16, 1965, Westad et aI., 77 
Conversations, pp.84-85. Other sources report that at this point Ho requested that the Chinese 
assist in the reparation of a total of twelve roads. Cf. Wang Xiangen, Yuan Yue Kang Mei shilll 
[A Factual Record of Assisting Vietnam, Resisting America], (Beijing: Guoji wenhua chuban 
gongsi, 1990) p.43. See also Zhai, CATVW, pp.133-4, Chen Jian Mao's China, p.222. 
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comradeship between Mao and Ho to bypass 'blockages' they had come up 
against in the Chinese bureaucracy in their attempts to negotiate the extent of 
Chinese aid, for it became clear that there existed disagreements between the 
Chinese and Vietnamese sides on the extent of the proposed road-building 
programme. In late May the Chinese leadership stated their preference for 
initially concentrating on five to seven roads (possibly that which had been 
agreed to by Tao Zhu in Hanoi), while the Vietnamese had upped their request to 
twelve roads to be worked on simultaneously - something that would require an 
additional 20,000 troops. When the two sides met, the D.R.V. delegation 
continued to request work on all twelve roads, to which the Chinese side agreed. 
An agreement was signed in Beijing on May 30th•30 
The final details of China's potential military involvement were thrashed 
out in meetings in Beijing in early June when Van Tien Dung and Giap visited 
the Chinese capital. Agreements were arrived at which set out the limits of 
Chinese involvement, and the triggers that would invite the escalation of the 
Chinese commitment: if the Americans contained the war within its current 
limits, then China would keep the supporting role that had been requested by the 
Vietnamese, sending road, rail and bridge engineering troops, and supporting 
anti-aircraft units; in the event of a South Vietnamese invasion of the D.R.V. 
supported by U.S. naval and air forces, China would then provide equivalent 
support to the People's Army of Vietnam (P.A.V.N.); and if U.S. ground troops 
were involved themselves in a ground invasion of North Vietnam, China would 
send in its own land forces to act as a strategic reserve for the Vietnamese allies. 
The discussions between Luo and Dung also turned to the feasibility of the 
30 'Yunnan sheng fu Yue gongzuozu guanyu Yuenan san sheng tongzhi tichu de yaoqiu he 
womende chubu yijian de baogao' [Report from the Yunnan provincial workgroup that visited 
y~e.tnam ~e~arding the re~uests o~the ~omrad~s from the three Vietnamese provinces and our 
InitIal opmlOns], May 23 ,1965, In XIaO & LI, Yunnan yu yuan Yue kang Mei, pp.42-43; 
'Duiwaijingweibangongting tong Yuenan zhengfujingji daibiaotuan huitanjianbao (di qi qi)' 
[Briefing on the meeting of the General Office of the Foreign Economic Relations Committee 
with the Vietnamese government economic delegation], November 5th, 1966, ibid., pp.170-172; 
'Yunnansheng jiaotongting guanyu baosong yuan Yue gonglu gongcheng jishu sheji, jiaojie 
zhengshu, j iancha yanshou ji jungong tubiao de baogao' [Report of the Yunnan provincial 
Transport Office on sending the 'Assist Vietnam' road construction technical plans, exchange of 
credentials, inspection approval and work completion charts], December 24th, 1966, ibid., pp.183-
4; Chen Jian, Mao's China, pp.222-3; Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, 'Wenhua da geming' zhong de 
relllninjiefangjun [The People's Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution] (hereafter Wenge 
jiefangjun), (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1989), p.422. In late 1966 the Vietnamese 
eventually requested that work be concentrated on seven roads, as the Chinese had originally 
proposed. 
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PLAAF entering the war on Hanoi's behalf, which had been, after all, the very 
first thing Le Duan had mentioned when asked what the North Vietnamese 
needed. The two military men considered three options: Chinese volunteer pilots 
would fly Vietnamese planes; Chinese pilots and planes could fly from 
Vietnamese airfields; or thirdly, the 'Andong model' of the Korean War could be 
resurrected, whereby Chinese planes and pilots would operate out of China and 
only refuel in North Vietnam, if necessary. According to Chen Jian, "Luo 
emphasized that the Chinese would enter op~rations In any of these f01111s 
according to the circumstances." 31 The Vietnamese would later claim that 
PLAAF forces were to be despatched before the end of the month.32 
However, this issue would prove to be a clear example of the finely-
calibrated nature of China's assistance to North Vietnam in striking the balance 
between effective assistance and rash provocation. According to the Hanoi 
government, on July 16t \ 1965, China reneged on its offer of some [01111 of aerial 
support for the D.R.V.; one is forced to conclude that it was decided that such 
operations would tip the balance too far towards provocation when compared to 
their deterrent capacity and tactical efficacy. In March of the following year 
Deng Xiaoping hinted at just such a rationale.33 This must surely have come as a 
disappointment to the Hanoi leadership, as it was contrary to the promises of both 
Liu and Mao; nonetheless given the extent of the support that China had agreed 
to provide to North Vietnam, the size of the fly in the ointment was surely not too 
large, as already on June 9th the first units of the Chinese People's Volunteer 
Engineering Force had crossed from Youyiguan in Guangxi province into 
Vietnam. They would prove to be the first of 320,000 Chinese troops who would 
be rotated into North Vietnam over a five year period, their maximum number 
peaking at 170,000 in 1967.34 
Foremost among the four main types of Chinese troops who entered North 
Vietnam were the road-building units present from September 1965 until 
February 1969, during which time they repaired or built seven roads with a total 
31 Chen Jian, Mao's China, p.219-220. 
32 Qu Aiguo, 'Yuenan zhanzheng', Zhang & Niu, Lengzhan yu Zhongguo, p.357; Zhai, CA TVW, 
fP.134-5; S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, p.33. 
3 Masaru Kojima, The Record o/the JCP-CPC Talks: how Mao Zedong scrapped the joint 
commllniqlle, (Tokyo: Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, 1980), p.10l. 
34 Qu Aiguo, 'Yuenan zhanzheng', Zhang & Niu, Lengzhan yu Zhongguo, p.357; Chen Jian, 
Mao's China, p.229; Zhai, CATVW, pp.l34-5; S.R. V. For. Min., White Book, p.33. 
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length of 1206 km, of which 606km was newly laid, as well as 305 bridges 
totalling 6854m in length. Perfonning a similar function to keep North 
Vietnam's rail network functioning in the face of American bombing were 
railway units that operated in North Vietnam between June 1965 and June 1970. 
They were responsible for repairing and building the railway lines as above, as 
well as the bomb damage on all four lines north of Hanoi. Protecting them were 
anti-aircraft units, the first of which entered Vietnam in August 1965. On the 
basis of an agreement signed between the Chinese and North Vietnamese 
governments on July 24, 1965, they were responsible for protecting the Bac Ninh 
to Lang Son section of the Hanoi-Youyiguan railway, the Yen Bai (later extended 
to Kien Tien) to Lao Cai section of the Hanoi-Lao Cai railway (which were the 
two vital rail links between Vietnam and China) as well as the defence of the 
construction of a new line between Co Phuc and Thai Nguyen, and providing 
general cover for the Chinese troops. According to Chinese statistics they 
engaged with the U.S. Air Force 2153 times, and shot down 1707 U.S. planes, 
damaging' another 1608. The final component of the logistical support was the 
Chinese defence engineering units in North Vietnam between June 1965 and 
November 1969, which were comprised of engineering, communications and 
artillery units. Some were involved in the construction of coastal and river 
defences, and laying submarine telecommunication cables and above-ground 
telecommunication wires, while certain units connected areas of the Northwest 
D.R.V., through which the Ho Chi Minh Trail ran, into the telephone network. 
They also worked on strengthening the defences of Hanoi and Haiphong against 
aerial bombardment, fortifying the provinces of the Red River delta, and 
constructing the Yen Bai airbase.35 
Two new leadership bodies were fonned at the top level to co-ordinate 
Chinese assistance to North Vietnam, one dealing with strategic matters, and the 
other concerning itself with more tactical and practical issues. The fonner group, 
initially led by Luo Ruiqing (and later after Luo's purge by Li Xiannian) was the 
'Leading Group on Vietnamese Affairs', whose role was to "carry out the central 
leadership's grand strategy, to make decisions and suggestions on matters 
associated with Vietnam, and to examine and determine if any new support to 
35 Qu Aiguo, 'Yuenan zhanzheng', Zhang & Niu, Lengzhan yu Zhongguo, p.359-369; Li & Hao, 
Wenge Jiefangjun, pp.415-427; Chen Jian, Mao's China, pp.221-225. 
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Vietnam was necessary." The second body came under the authority of the 
Central Committee and the State Council and was headed up by P.L.A. Deputy 
Chief of Staff Yang Chengwu. It contained representatives from a large swathe 
of the bureaucracy, including the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, as well as the Railway, Transport, and Material Supplies Ministries, the 
Commissions of Foreign Economic Affairs, State Economic Planning, and 
Economic Affairs, along with representatives from a number of different 
divisions of the p.L.A.36 
While the central working groups agreed the annual aid and assistance 
agreements, and directed large-scale military and economic aid to North Vietnam, 
much of the responsibility for implementation of the decisions taken at the centre, 
as well as more localized assistance, fell upon the provincial leadership of 
China's southern provinces. Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong exercised 
responsibility for economic assistance and co-operation with the Vietnamese 
border provinces: Yunnan dealt with Lai Chau, Lao Cai and Ha Giang; Guangxi 
was responsible for Lang Son and Cao Bang, while Guangdong assisted Quang 
Ninh; furthermore, Hunan co-operated with the province of Hoa Binh, which lay 
to the west of the Red River delta region. This co-operation had preceded the 
American escalation of the conflict in the summer of 1964, and further deepened 
in the wake of the launch of ROLLING THUNDER.37 
Tao Zhu, as head of the C.C.P. Central South Bureau, took charge of co-
ordinating the co-operation between the Chinese provinces and their Vietnamese 
counterparts, which took the form of both trade and aid, the parameters of which 
were set by the Central Committee, presumably the 'Group in Charge of 
Supporting Vietnam'. With a view to not upsetting the national economy, and 
keeping political control over the extent of China's economic aid, in June a 
directive was issued stating that "[A]ll items that relate to national defence 
36 Chen Jian, Mao's China, p.220 
37 See e.g. 'Yunnansheng renmin weiyuanhui dui 1964 nian Yunnan sheng yu Yuenan Laojie, 
Hejiang, Laizhou san sheng difang maoyi shang tan de yijian de pifu' [Response of the Yunnan 
Province People's Committee on opinions [expressed] on the local trade talks between Yunnan 
and the three Vietnamese provinces of Lao Cai, Ha Giang, and Lai Chau], May 261\ 1964, Xiao 
& Li, Yunnan yuyuan Yue kang Mei. pp.lO-15; 'Zhonggong Yunnan shengwei guanyu wo sheng 
fu Yue gongzuozu he Yuenan Laojie, Laizhou, Hejiang san sheng daibiaotuan huitan de huibao' 
[C.c.P. Yunnan Provincial Committee report on the talks between the provincial workgroup that 
visited Vietnam and the delegation from the three Vietnamese provinces of Lao Cai, Lai Chau, 
and Ha Giang], ibid., pp.47-50. 
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construction, or economIC and transport construction, as well as large-scale 
material aid, will be handled in an integrated manner through assignment of such 
items by the Central Committee to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Economics or 
Foreign Trade Ministries and the General Staff Headquarters of the Central 
Military Commission.,,38 Nonetheless, a huge range and variety of assistance was 
given to the Vietnamese by the four Chinese provinces in co-ordination with 
North Vietnamese efforts at economic decentralisation and provincial self-
sufficiency.39 The approved forms of assistance fell into three main categories: 
agriculture, irrigation, and industry. The range of items supplied to the 
Vietnamese provinces was vast, and ranged from entire factories to advice on 
improving apple yields. Among the items provided were a copper processing 
factory, agricultural machinery repair factories, and assistance in the construction 
of extensions to water turbine-pump and vehicle repair factories. In order to 
improve the future supply of imports the Chinese provinces supplied motor 
vehicles, hand-carts, and rubber-tyred animal carts, iron-clad barges and small 
transport vessels, as well as ship-building plans to enable the D.R.V. to expand its 
. 40 
own capaCIty. 
The North Vietnamese emphasis on developing self-sufficiency at the 
provincial level accorded with the Maoist emphasis on self-sufficiency as an 
essential component of People's War, so much of the Chinese aid was aimed at 
fostering long-term sustainability; thus Chinese experts, such as agricultural 
fishing, saltern and ceramics technicians travelled to the D.R.V. to educate their 
Vietnamese colleagues. In the agricultural sphere this took the form of the 
supply of various types of fertilizer, insecticides, soil laboratories, new and 
higher qualities of seeds (such as rice, soybean, peanuts, sugar-cane, Chinese 
kale, tea-tree, com, tobacco, green manure), and even the supply of cattle and 
pigs, presumably destined for state farms and breeding programs, along with 
veterinary treatment clinics to keep them healthy. This was accompanied by 
38 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu difang yuan wai wenti de qingshi de pifu' [C.C.P. Central 
Committee response to the request for instruction on the issue of local aid for foreign countries], 
December 12, 1965, ibid., pp.84-86. 
39 Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington. Hanoi. and the Making o/the Paris Agreement, 
(Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2002), p.ll. 
40 'Yunnansheng waishibangongshi guanyu Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan si sheng yuan 
Yue gongzuo qingkuang baogao' [Report of the Yunnan provincial foreign affairs office on the 
state of affairs of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan and Yunnan provinces' 'Assist Vietnam' work], 
August 11th, 1966, Xiao & Li, Yunnan yu yuan Yue kang Mei, pp.148-52. 
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agricultural machinery such as mini-tractors, sprinklers and threshers, tea rollers 
and grain presses.41 
However, of all the items supplied to the underdeveloped North 
Vietnamese border provinces, the most valuable to them were water-turbine 
pumps, and the construction of a certain number of hydroelectric power stations 
in the mountainous regions that bordered China's southern frontier. In the 
summer of 1966, Ha Giang province had been directed to establish hydro-electric 
production capacity, and requested that Yunnan help them to survey and plan the 
construction of six 50-100kw hydro-electric power stations. The Yunnanese 
authorities were reluctant to engage in the work, preferring to concentrate their 
efforts on the installation of the 100 water turbine-pumps they had already agreed 
to supply to the North Vietnamese provinces (40 of which were destined for Ha 
Giang.) Their objections were over-ridden, however, when Tao Zhu held 
discussions with his Vietnamese counterparts on the topic of the four southern 
Chinese provinces' aid. On the basis of the principles of these talks, an aid 
package from Yunnan costing nine million yuan, including the provision that 
Yunnan would help Ha Giang and Lai Chau to construct a 500-800kw hydro-
electric plant in each province, was agreed. The dire need for such a utility was 
emphasized to the Chinese when it was discovered that the Vietnamese were 
unable to use the machine tools' Yunnan had supplied to a Vietnamese 
agricultural machinery factory because the factory did not receive enough 
electricity.42 
Beijing offered its support to a beleaguered and endangered Hanoi 
through a combination of centrally-directed and province-level assistance 
programs. This on occasion produced friction between the occasionally reluctant 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.; 'Yunnansheng renmin weiyuanhui waishichu guanyu wo zai Yue Hejiang sheng nongye 
gongzuozu qingkuang fanying' [Reflections of the Yunnan Province People's Committee Foreign 
Affairs Department on the situation of our agricultural workgroup in Vietnam's Ha Giang 
province], June 2nd, 1966, ibid., pp.136-39; 'Yunnansheng renmin weiyuanhui waishichu dangzu 
guanyu Yue Hejiang sheng yaoqiu wo nongye gongzuozu sheji xiaoxing shuidianzhan de qingshi' 
[Request for instruction from the Yunnan Province People's Committee Foreign Affairs 
Department Party Group relating to the request from the Vietnamese province ofHa Giang for 
our agricultural workgroup to plan a small-scale hydroelectric power plant], June 4th, 1966, ibid., 
pp.139-40; Yunnansheng waishi bangongshi, shengrenwei waishichu guanyu Yunnansheng 
zhiyuan Yuenan Laojie, Laizhou, Hejiang san sheng gongnongye jianshe de qingkuang baogao' 
[Report from the Yunnan provincial Foreign Affairs Department and the provincial People's 
Committee on the state of affairs of Yunnan's assistance in the industrial and agricultural 
construction of the three Vietnamese provinces of Lao Cai, Lai Chau and Ha Giang], July 2nd, 
1966, ibid., pp.l40-41. 
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provmces, and the more generous Beijing, and provided the Vietnamese the 
opportunity to exploit these differences in order to achieve the maximum 
advantage for themselves. The issue of the hydroelectric power-stations was a 
point in case: by designating a border province as one which had a responsibility 
to increase electrical production, the Vietnamese provincial authorities could 
legitimately hope to approach their Chinese counterparts for assistance in the 
sprit of proletarian internationalism. And while the province, (Yunnan in this 
case) may only be willing to provide help on a small scale (if at all), Hanoi was 
able to bypass their objections by approaching Beijing directly and including the 
hydro-electric power issue within the larger framework of an aid package 
negotiated between the two national governments. 
Beijing, for its part, would not permit "items that relate to national 
defence construction, or economic and transport construction, as well as large-
scale material aid" to be handled by the provinces. By keeping high-value 
articles, as well as those relating to defence, under the control of the centre, Mao 
and Zhou were able to retain a degree of political control that would not be 
possible at the lower levels. At the same time, Beijing could ensure that overly 
enthusiastic provincial leaders, such as in Guangdong and Guangxi, would not 
agree to a degree of aid that might upset a carefully regulated planned economy 
in the midst of 'Third Front Construction'. This concern was replicated on the 
provincial level, where some local leaders (it appears in Yunnan in particular) 
worried that excess commitment to Vietnam would imperil their own Third Front 
Construction efforts. 43 
Along with assisting Vietnam to resist America, Third Front Construction 
was a parallel component of Mao's defensive strategy against the United States. 
The plan predated the American escalation of 1965 - in fact it even predated the 
Gulf of Tonkin incident in the summer of 1964. Like the assistance to North 
Vietnam, it served both defensive and deterrent purposes, though the scale and 
scope of its original intent suggested that it reflected Mao's view as expressed to 
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in February 1965 that war between China and the 
United States was unlikely for ten to fifteen years.44 Naturally, the events of the 
43 'Zhonggong zhongyang[ ... ] de pifu', December 12, 1965, ibid., pp.84-86. 
44 Memcon - Polish record, Mao, Kosygin et ai., February 11, 1965, courtesy of Selvage and 
Gnoiska. 
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spring and summer of 1965 necessitated a reappraisal of the Chairman's original 
prognostication, and as his official C.C.P. biography noted, "For the greater part 
of 1965, Mao Zedong talked a lot about the issue of war preparations". 45 
However, as Mao himself told Wang Dongxing in June 1965, "One cannot look 
at things so easily. There are some who think that when Third Front Construction 
is finished, then we will fight another war. Is [American imperialism] going to 
wait until you have finished the construction and then fight a war? It's possible 
it'll fight before construction is finished, or it's also possible that the construction 
will be finished and yet it won't fight a war at all. We have to prepare for both 
eventualities.,,46 
China and Vietnam had been pushed into even closer co-operation by the 
American decision to escalate and internationalise the conflict in South Vietnam. 
China pledged to stand by its smaller ally in resisting American 'aggression' and 
implemented a series of concrete actions designed to maximise its supporting role 
in the Vietnamese conflict, without triggering a widening of the war to directly 
include China itself. And whatever of subsequent Vietnamese claims to the 
contrary, there is no evidence to suggest that the Hanoi leadership recognised 
China's threat "not to stand idly by" to be anything other than a welcome 
deterrent to further American escalation, rather than a "green light" to the United 
States.47 And while it is possible that the Vietnamese were willing to tolerate a 
greater degree of risk of further confrontation than their Chinese comrades, by the 
late summer of 1965 Mao appeared increasingly confident that the combination 
of Chinese warning and concrete actions were sufficient to pre-empt the 
signalling failures that had characterized China's entry into the Korean War, 
while simultaneously equipping North Vietnam economically and militarily to 
resist American escalation broadly in line with the Maoist doctrine of self-
reliance. The Chinese leadership had believed at least as late as the end of March 
1965 that the U.S. possessed neither the will nor the capacity to commit land 
forces to Vietnam; rather, it was believed, Johnson would expand the air war all 
across North Vietnam and then to China before he would commit large numbers 
45 C.D.R.O., Mao Zedong zhuan, pp.1391-2. 
461bid. For a discussion of the background of the Third Front and Mao's attitude to the outbreak 
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of ground troopS.48 By late summer it appeared that the opposite was the case: 
the United States was willing to engage in another ground war on Asian soil, 
though its parameters were not yet quite clear. And although he continued to talk 
about the possibility of war, Mao must have felt increasingly confident that it 
would be confined to within South Vietnam's borders and that the United States 
did not intend to invade North Vietnam or attack the Chinese Communist state -
for he himself was already preparing to attack the Chinese Communist Party. 
And even were he wrong about American intentions, what would be of greater 
effect in putting pay to the revisionist myth of 'peaceful coexistence' than 
American imperialism launching a war of aggression against China? As the U.S. 
Consul in Hong Kong observed, "We are also tempted to conclude he would half-
welcome a U.S.-GRC [government of the Republic of China] invasion, believing 
his two old enemies could, before he dies, be drowned in the sea of Chinese 
manpower. .. [which] would also deal a mortal blow to the revisionism he sees 
affecting China.,,49 
Going it alone 
By mid-August 1965 Mao had begun to openly discuss the issue of revisionism at 
home - and in particular its presence among the leadership of the party. In early 
September, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the surrender of Japan, the 
perfidious influence of Khrushchevist revisionism on the global revolution was 
loudly condemned in 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!', published in Lin 
Biao's name, though actually written by a team of writers in the P.L.A. General 
Staff. In January Mao had requested that someone write a commentary on Soviet 
Marshall Vasily Sokolovsky's 1962 work Military Strategy, in which the Soviet 
former Chief-of-Staff had emphasized the central controlling role of the Soviet 
Red Army in the event of a war between the socialist countries and their foes. 
'Long Live the Victory of People's War' served as a repudiation of this thesis, 
48 'Minutes of Conversation Between the RCP leadership led by Nicolae Ceausescu and the CCP 
leadership led by Zhou Enlai', March 26,1965, ANIC, Bucharest, Romania, Fond CC 
Chancellery, 39/1965, pp.53-86. [This document was obtained and translated for CWIHP by 
Mircea Munteanu and presented at the international conference 'The Vietnam War, Thirty Years 
On: the Unanswered Questions and the Search for Documentary Evidence', Temple University, 
Philadelphia, June 20-21, 2005]. 
49 'Telegram from the Consulate General at Hong Kong to the Department of State', February 19, 
1966, FRUS-Johnson, vol. XXX, document 125. 
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through its emphasis on People's War and the necessity of self-reliance on the 
part of any revolution (a theme indeed taken up by the D.R.V. press in the wake 
of its publication). It sought to nurture the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese 
comrades and to persuade them of the negative consequences that would stem 
from listening to the "publicity [Khrushchevite revisionists] give to defeatism and 
capitulationism [which] tend to demoralize and spiritually disann revolutionary 
people everywhere,,5o This was particularly gennane in the late summer of 1965, 
as reports began to surface from Hanoi about the "hurt" caused by the American 
bombing, and an increasing proclivity towards entering into negotiations with the 
United States.51 
Furthermore, this article sought to explain the Vietnamese struggle 
against the Americans finnly within the realm of Mao Zedong thought and theory, 
and to claim for Chinese Maoism the eventual victory of the Vietnamese over 
American imperialism. Vo Nguyen Giap had refined People's War to suit 
Vietnamese circumstances and, as Mao had himself admitted to North 
Vietnamese leaders a month after the publication of this article, it was ten or 
twenty years since the C.c.P. Chainnan had written on the topic, and many of the 
situations facing the Vietnamese were new. However, by casting the net 
sufficiently widely so as not even to focus on strategy, let alone tactics, but 
instead to lay claim to the spirit of national liberation struggle, 'Lin Biao' handed 
the conceptual credit of the expected Vietnamese victory to Mao. 52 
The issue of domestic revisionism weighed on Mao's mind m equal 
measure. He began more frequently addressing his own party leadership on the 
dangers of revisionism and the need to rebel should revisionism surface within 
the leadership ranks of the C.C.P. A few weeks later the opening salvos of the 
Cultural Revolution were fired in the fonn ofYao Wenyuan's attack on Wu Han 
and his play Rai Rui Dismissed from Office, though as yet the extent of the 
campaign of cultural revolution that Mao was planning was not yet obvious. It 
marked the first step in Mao's campaign to remove his and Lin Biao's enemies 
50 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', Peking Review, September 3,1965. 
51 C.D.R.O., Mao Zedong zhuan, p.1393; Zhai, CATVW, p.145-6; 'Biweekly Report: Communist 
Statements Regarding Intervention in Vietnam and Possible Negotiations', 15 October 1965, 
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within the Party and military. The backdrop to this was clear concern among 
Chinese leaders concerned with foreign policy such as Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai 
that the North Vietnamese would get sucked into peace talks with the United 
States, and in this they were almost certainly reflecting Mao's own personal 
VIews. Hanoi's agreement to a Soviet-induced negotiation would not only 
deprive Mao of the Vietnam War as vehicle for domestic mobilization and 
martial emphasis; but Mao was also concerned that the United States would use 
the breakdown of a false peace offensive as a pretext for further expansion of the 
war. Thus the Chinese leadership sought to try and prevent this worrying 
possibility, and Mao further bided his time before making his next move against 
domestic revisionism. 53 
China reacted with horror and apprehension at the American bombing 
pause instituted less than three weeks later, which was accompanied by a 'peace 
offensive' on the part of the Johnson administration. On January 29th U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced the United States' 'Fourteen Points' for 
negotiating an end to the conflict in Vietnam. Contacts were initiated between 
the United States and North Vietnam directly in Rangoon, and indirectly through 
the governments of Hungary and Poland, along with the dispatch of a flurry of 
American emissaries to various world capitals. Recent research has indicated 
that the most significant of these peace probes was that conducted through the 
Polish channel, in which the Warsaw government dispatched a special envoy, 
Jerzy Michalowski, to encourage Hanoi to enter into negotiations with 
Washington on the basis of conversations held in Warsaw between the Polish 
government and President Johnson's ambassador-at-Iarge W. Averell Harriman.54 
The Polish envoy had not even managed to leave Warsaw before the Chinese 
attempted to thwart the American peace probe, when the Chinese ambassador in 
Warsaw denounced Harriman's proposals as lies and insisted there was no point 
in even discussing them with Hanoi. In order to preempt Michalowski the 
53 CD.R.O., Mao Zedong zhuan, pp.1394-6. 
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Chinese ambassador in Hanoi had followed hot on the heels of the Polish 
ambassador in seeking an audience with D.R.V. Premier Pham Van Dong in the 
wee hours of December 30th, before promptly setting off for Beijing the next 
morning. An editorial in the Renmin Ribao on New Year's Day castigated the 
American 'peace offensive' as "debauched", masquerading plans "to widen its 
aggressive war in Vietnam.,,55 
In truth, even before Dean Rusk announced the 'Fourteen Points' and the 
American 'peace offensive' began, the Chinese leaders had been very worried by 
a North Vietnamese proposal to announce that the unconditional cessation of 
bombing of the D.R.V. was a precondition for peace talks. In mid-December, in 
conversation with D.R.V. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh both Chen and 
Zhou addressed this issue, and expressed concern that were the Vietnamese to 
enter into talks with the Americans at this point it would be a tactical error. 
Comments by Zhou Enlai indicate that the Chinese were deeply concerned by 
this North Vietnamese suggestion that there could be talks between Hanoi and 
Washington if there was a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam (a position 
subsequently put forward by Trinh in January 1967). The tone of the Zhou-Trinh 
discussions seem to indicate that Hanoi was giving serious thought to the 
possibility at this time. It is also clear, though, from Zhou Enlai's comments that 
this was considered part of the political struggle, and that Hanoi's intent was to 
propose a bombing cessation in exchange for talks in the belief that the U.S. 
would not accept. What now worried Beijing was that Hanoi's bluff might be 
called.56 
Zhou's main worry was that the United States would indeed accept the 
North Vietnamese conditions and agree to enter into talks. "Vietnamese 
comrades consider that the U.S. will not accept the new conditions ... [W]hat will 
the situation be if they accept?,,51 Zhou was concerned about both tactics (being 
in a passive position) and strategy (succumbing to Soviet influence and 
negotiating a compromise). In this respect the situation was indeed as Edgar 
Snow observed a few months later, that acceptance of compromise on Vietnam 
55 Hershberg, 'Operation Lumbago', p.20. 
56 Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Nguyen Duy Trinh, December 18 & 19, 1965,77 Conversations, 
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would mean an acceptance of Soviet policy and a defeat for Chinese foreign 
policy; it would be a betrayal and repudiation of Chinese backing for the 
Vietnamese challenge to the United States in 1964 when Khrushchev had more or 
less left the Vietnamese to their own plight. And more than anything, from 
Mao's perspective, the global revolution needed a success story.58 
Vietnam aside, 1965 had proved to be a disaster for Chinese foreign 
policy, particularly in the developing world. Mao's brand of revolution was in 
retreat, yet right on China's doorstep there existed the opportunity not only to 
reverse the successes of the reactionaries, but to inflict a direct blow on the 
United States, if only the Vietnamese held their resolve and rejected the 
capitulationist arguments of the Soviet revisionists. Peace talks were a fraud 
designed to 'sell out' the Vietnamese at the hands of the Soviet Union, at a time 
when Hanoi and the N.L.F. held it within their grasp to force out the Americans 
through force of arms. Mao and Zhou feared that a compromise agreement 
would be forced on Hanoi if it fell into the 'peace talks trap', and thus were 
particularly worried that the U.S. might call Hanoi's bluff in late 1965 and agree 
to their conditions. "We sincerely hope that Vietnam's party and government 
would think further on this issue" he implored Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Otherwise, 
you may fall into the trap".59 
For China, the mediation of the Poles, Hungarians, the 'Fourteen Points', 
and the 'peace offensive' were all part of this trap, and although superficially it 
may appear that the Chinese attitude was one of obstructionism, there was a clear 
logic behind the Chinese actions in Warsaw, Beijing, and Hanoi. As shown, only 
a few weeks earlier, the Vietnamese comrades had discussed with Zhou Enlai the 
possibility of launching an attack on the diplomatic front, on the basis that they 
were not yet ready to move to the 'negotiating while fighting stage' and that the 
United States would not respond positively. If, as the Chinese certainly 
anticipated and hoped, they held to this position, then the failure of the Polish 
mission might indeed paint the Vietnamese as 'not being interested in peace' -
hence Wang Bingnan's ridicule of the concept of the Polish mission. Indeed, a 
CIA report later concluded that Hanoi was "concerned over the success of the 
58 Ambroz, Realignment of World Power, vol. 1, p.50. 
59 Memcon (extract), Chen Yi and Nguyen Duy Trinh, December 19, 1965, 77 Conversations, 
p.90; Li Danhui, 'Zhongguo dui Yue-Mei hetan de lichang', p.83. 
41 
U.S. peace effort in convincing world opinion of U.S. willingness to seek a quick 
and reasonable end to the war.,,60 At the same time, however, as ever wary of the 
influence of the 'Khrushchevite revisionists and their lackeys' and aware of a 
divergence of opinion as regards peace talks in the V.W.P. Central Committee, 
Chinese diplomats sought to rally the resolve of their Vietnamese comrades not 
to be fooled by the 'fraud', even to the extent of delaying Michalowski to ensure 
that they had the floor in Hanoi before him, lest Johnson use the failure of the 
peace initiative as an excuse for the expansion of the war.61 
Publicly at least, this was a major part of the rationale behind the Chinese 
condemnation of Johnson's peace probes. There is tentative evidence to suggest 
that war preparation activities took on a new intensity in January 1966, during the 
bombing pause. These became so acute that in February the U.S. Consul General 
in Hong Kong cabled Washington to recommend that the U.S. take measures 
"whereby dangerous ChiCom [Chinese Communist] delusions about our 
intentions could be corrected-perhaps at Warsaw and by public statements.,,62 
This recommendation was acted on at the highest level, when on March 16th 
Dean Rusk advocated in front of a congressional committee steps "to reassure 
Peiping [Beijing] that the United States does not intend to attack mainland 
China.,,63 The message was further driven home that same day in a more private 
forum, at the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, during which U.S. 
Ambassador John Gronouski emphasized that the Johnson administration had no 
intention of starting a war with China, nor did it feel hostility towards the Chinese 
government or people. He expressed the hope that the Vietnam question could be 
resolved peacefully, and that China could use its influence with the Vietnamese 
to transfer the struggle from the military plane onto the political one. 
Undoubtedly, word of these developments reached Chairman Mao in Shanghai, 
to where he had retreated in November, after the publication ofYao Wenyuan's 
article criticising Wu Han's Hai Rui Dismissed From Office.64 
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By March 1966, the Cultural Revolution was gathering momentum, and 
with it a renewed emphasis on the perils of revisionism; however, at this point the 
vexed question of joint action with the Soviets on assisting Vietnam raised its 
head again. Although in the spring of 1965 the P.R.C. had rejected the idea of 
Soviet over-flights and other measures that the Chinese leadership considered 
would violate Chinese sovereignty, they had managed to come to certain 
arrangements with the Soviet Union regarding the transportation of aid for 
Vietnam by rail across China. The situation was, however, characterised by 
disputes between the two sides, largely revolving around the Soviet inability to 
keep to the agreed delivery schedule and the officious response this provoked on 
the Chinese side. In March 1966, a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party, 
led by General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto, embarked on a three-country tour of 
East Asian communism to North Vietnam, China, and North Korea. While in 
China, the Japanese had long discussions with their hosts on the international 
situation during which differing interpretations of world trends came to the fore. 
Most notably, the Japanese pushed for the formation of a united front of socialist 
countries to aid the Vietnamese communists' struggle, taking up the call that had 
been issued by the leadership of the C.P.S.U one year earlier. However, for Mao, 
such a front was nothing more than a trap that would give legitimacy to the 
heterodoxy of the Soviet revisionists.65 
The J.C.P. had previously largely sided with the C.C.P. in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, and when the delegation came to Beijing in March 1966 they still held 
the view that the C.P.S.U. had a revisionist leadership pursuing policies of 
splitism and big country chauvinism. But while in Hanoi they had heard direct 
appeals from Le Duan and Ho Chi Minh about the need for socialist unity, and at 
the conclusion of their visit declared that "at the present the formation and 
expansion of a united front of the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism, for 
world peace and national independence, is an extremely important and urgent 
task." They resolved with the Vietnamese comrades to "do all in their power to 
make active contributions" to it, and in this manner pressed the issue on their 
return to Beijing from the North Vietnamese capita1.66 
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The Japanese delegation held further discussions with their Chinese hosts, 
headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping upon their return to Beijing, during 
which time Liu admitted that "If the Soviet Union is serious in countering the 
U.S. in Vietnam, we can act together with them", however this statement was 
tempered by frequent statements that the Chinese leadership did not believe that 
the Soviets were serious in this desire. The J.e.p. delegation then set off on 
March 11 th to visit Pyongyang, without any suggestion from "either side on 
issuing a joint statement or joint communique." Thus, the group was surprised 
when they arrived back in the Chinese capital, on what was intended to be merely 
a stop-over on their way back to Japan, that the Chinese side wanted to issue a 
joint communique, and that a meeting with Chairman Mao in Shanghai had been 
arranged for after its conclusion. On March 2ih, the text was agreed, and early 
the next morning the party set off for Shanghai to meet the C.C.P. Chairman, 
after which the communique was to be released.67 
There exists little in the available literature indicating the provenance of 
the idea of the joint communique; however the fact that it was connected to a 
meeting with the Chairman hints at a Shanghai connection, possibly through the 
medium of Mao's trusted ideologue, Kang Sheng. Indeed, it was Kang who 
accompanied the Japanese on the flight from Beijing to Shanghai, during which 
time busied himself correcting galley proofs of "a Renmin Ribao article that 
criticized 'Hai Rui's Dismissal From Office', the historical play; he was taking 
them to Mao for him to check, he said." The Chairman was limbering up to 
launch a simultaneous attack on revisionism both domestically and 
internationally, and from the moment of their arrival in Shanghai, Miyamoto felt 
that there was something rather strange afoot: Kang left them waiting at the 
airport for an hour while he and Zhao Yimin went to hold "preliminary talks" 
with the Chairman. Probably, in fact, this was to give Mao time to compose the 
"amendments" to the communique he was about to propose to his Japanese 
counterpart, which were duly presented to Miyamoto at the Chairman's residence 
shortly in advance of a meeting with him. As intended, they proved to be 
completely unacceptable.68 
The changes Mao demanded, in effect, completely altered both the tone 
67 Ibid., pp.160-3. 
68 Ibid., pp.l97 -8. 
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and substance of the text. The new version explicitly named the Soviet Union as 
the centre of modern revisionism that had to be struggled against, and rejected the 
idea of any united front that included the Soviets. Instead, Mao called for "the 
unity of revolutionary peoples of the world"; he demanded that international 
democratic movements "hold fast to the genuinely revolutionary line that reflects 
the aspiration of revolutionary peoples of the world". Most revealing of the 
Chairman's mindset was the longest passage he inserted into the text: "It is of 
utmost importance to resolutely oppose the thoughts of modem revisionism, 
which is a reflection of the anti-communist, anti-revolutionary and anti-popular 
thoughts of the bourgeoisie in and outside of our countries.,,69 
Mao was prepared to up the ante in his evolving plan to challenge 
revisionism at home and abroad, and this communique provided him with an 
opportunity to do so. In many respects it represented for the international arena 
what Hai Rui Dismissed From Office had done for China's domestic politics. 
Mao publicly repudiated his own party and its leadership in the presence of a 
foreign dignitary, and did so in a manner designed to fundamentally emphasise 
his rejection of what he viewed to be Soviet revisionism, and its pernicious 
influence within China. "This communique is lacking in courage: it is soft and 
powerless ... Those in Beijing agreed to it, too, I presume. (They are) too soft." 
Furthermore, he had acted in a manner deliberately designed to alienate in one 
fell swoop not only the Vietnamese Workers' Party, who clearly hoped for some 
kind of Sino-Soviet joint action, but also one of the handful of mainstream 
communist parties in the world that had stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the 
C.C.P. in the face of Soviet revisionism. The C.C.P. was going it alone, and Mao 
k· . h 70 was ta mg It t ere. 
The visit of the Japanese delegation and the clear messages from 
Washington about its lack of aggressive intent had provided the Chairman with 
the perfect opportunity to put on display all the dramatic effects at his disposal. 
Mao welcomed isolation, as well as revolution, chaos and rebellion at home and 
abroad; and it is no coincidence that he began a full-frontal assault on Peng Zhen 
and the Beijing party apparatus in the days that followed this encounter.7l The 
69 Ibid., pp.200-204. 
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view from Hanoi was something quite different: chaos was the very last thing the 
V.W.P. needed on the territory of its main overland supply route. Yet, despite 
this, not only did North Vietnam still need China, but the ideological 
underpinnings of Mao's mayhem struck a chord with many among the Hanoi 
leadership, except when it came into conflict with the needs of the Vietnamese 
struggle.72 
The American wind blowing up from Saigon had further emphasised the 
closeness of the 'lips and teeth' relationship between China and North Vietnam. 
China provided the military assistance it believed would have a positive and 
deterrent capacity without triggering an American response against China itself. 
Beyond military aid, China mobilized its border provinces and the machinery of 
central government to keep the North Vietnamese state functioning and viable in 
the face of American bombing, from improvements in apple fanning to the 
construction of railways and hydro-electric dams. North Vietnam would fight on 
until victory, and the reflected glory would shine on Zhongnanhai, not the 
Kremlin. Thus it was with irritation that Mao looked on at the Soviet Union's 
new-found interest in, and sympathy for, the predicament of the Vietnamese; 
confident in the utility of the Vietnamese' struggle for the global revolution, and 
in the inevitability of their victory, the Soviet 'Johnny Come-Latelys' posed a 
threat to both. Mao believed this threat had to be countered, even at the risk of 
aggravating the Vietnamese comrades, through the rejection of peace proposals 
that had Soviet fingerprints on them, or obdurately rejecting any fonn of joint 
action with the U.S.S.R. Revisionism in the international arena, just as at home, 
was a plague - potentially contagious through contact. 
Likewise, at home as abroad, the Vietnam War and the Cultural 
Revolution were inextricably linked: the fonner functioned as impetus, catalyst, 
and cover for the latter. However, Mao moved cautiously during this period, 
conducting his own policy of gradual escalation against his party, while closely 
observing the American actions in Indochina. Every time the United States 
escalated its involvement in Southeast Asia, Mao paused in his manoeuvres 
against those within the C.C.P. whom he viewed to be a threat to his 
revolutionary vision. And yet with every American escalation and the heightened 
72 Sophie Quinn-Judge, 'The Ideological Debate in the DRY and the Significance of the Anti-
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fear of attack it provoked in China, so too it made Mao's own next step easier, 
until such times as the country was gripped with war-fever, and an attack on 
dangerous revisionism within could be launched (only, of course, after Mao had 
received signals from Washington that no American attack from without was 
intended.) Thus a real though waning threat in the form of American imperialism 
was transposed onto an imagined one in the form of the Soviet Union and 
domestic revisionism. China would continue to support the battle in Vietnam 
against Mao's American enemies, but Mao was about to decidedly direct China's 
energies inwards. 
The effects of the Cultural Revolution on North Vietnam 
Mao's rejection of joint action with the Soviet Union clearly rankled with North 
Vietnamese leaders, including Le Duan, who was back in Beijing barely a 
fortnight after the uncomfortable meeting between Mao and Miyamoto (indeed 
Comrade B [Le Duan] recalled the incident as evidence of Mao's personal 
perfidy over a decade later after China invaded Vietnam in 1979), although Duan 
did engage in some flattery about the important role China was playing in 
combating "reformists" and "counter-revolutionaries." Even so, the leftward tum 
in Chinese polity and the emphasis on ideology and politics within the Chinese 
party and army had begun to filter down to P.L.A. troops serving in North 
Vietnam and provincial officials interacting with their Vietnamese colleagues; 
this began to introduce new tension into the relationship between Hanoi and 
Beijing, when already the sheer number of Chinese troops on Vietnamese soil 
was apparently causing concern in certain quarters of the D.R.V.73 
Deng Xiaoping, ever ready to cut to the chase, raised the issue in 
discussions with Le Duan, admitting that perhaps, as Chairman Mao had 
predicted, the Chinese "'had too much enthusiasm' in the Vietnam question." 
This was, Deng intimated, causing "suspicion from Vietnamese comrades." 
Deng had little time for diplomatic niceties between the two allies, and appeared 
irritated at circumlocution on the part of the Vietnamese guests. "Do the Chinese 
want to take control over Vietnam? ... [W]e don't have any such intention ... [W]e 
73 'Comrade B on the Plot of the Reactionary Chinese Clique Against Vietnam', Cold War 
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hope in this matter, if you have any problem, please tell us straightforwardly." 
Clearly affronted by the elements of traditional Vietnamese suspicion that were 
creeping into the relationship, Deng's response was the diplomatic equivalent of 
threatening to take his ball home with him. "I pose a question for you to 
consider: Do you need our military men or not? ... We don't know whether it is 
good for the relations between two parties and two countries or not when we sent 
100,000 people to Vietnam [sic]. Personally, I think it's better for our military 
men to come back home right after they finish their work ... the results are not 
what we both want.,,74 
Part of Deng's anger stemmed from the failure of the North Vietnamese 
to counter claims that were again emanating from Moscow that the Chinese were 
interfering with Soviet and Eastern European aid destined for the D.R.V. but 
which had to be transported across China by rail. The unfolding Cultural 
Revolution environment meant that the Soviet allegations had currency abroad. 
Le Duan's mealy-mouthed appraisal of the situation surely did nothing to 
massage bruised Chinese pride. "We hold that the Soviet assistance to Vietnam 
is partly sincere, so neither do we ask whether the Soviets [will] sell Vietnam out 
nor [do we] say the Soviets slander China in the matter transportation of Soviet 
aid. Because we know that if we say this, the problem will become more 
complicated.,,75 Thus the situation continued: not long after Le Duan was in the 
Chinese capital, the Soviet Defence Minister, Rodion Malinovski, complained to 
Hungarian comrades that China was trying to block the transit of aid. On May 
4t\ the Chinese Foreign Ministry felt compelled to issue a statement rejecting the 
Soviet claims, stating that China gave all materiel from the Soviet bloc gratis and 
priority transportation across Chinese territory, and had in 1965 alone moved 
over 40,000 tonnes as such. On June 19th, 1966, the North Vietnamese released a 
statement, condemning "Western media organizations" for broadcasting 
allegations about Chinese blockages of Soviet aid. These allegations were an 
"extremely despicable plot fabricated to sow discord" - words that would have 
been welcomed by Deng Xiaoping in April, but by June were probably viewed in 
74 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng and Le Duan, Nguyen Duy Trinh, 
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Beijing as being a little late.76 
As the Cultural Revolution took hold, however, and tensions between 
China and the Soviet Union grew, the "Western media organizations'" allegations 
began to take on a rather more factual basis. By the autumn of 1966 the party 
Central Committee and State Council were being forced to issue notices relating 
to how the conduct of the Cultural Revolution was interfering with rail 
transportation, but apparently to little effect. So serious was the disruption to the 
national rail system being caused by Red Guards that in June 1967 an order was 
sent down, bearing the imprimatur of the Cultural Revolution Small Group and 
the Central Military Commission, as well as the State Council and the Central 
Committee, strictly prohibiting obstruction or damage to the railways. By mid-
summer the railway system had been put under military control, indicating that a 
second denial of delays issued by Hanoi in February was designed more to save 
Chinese embarrassment than having any basis in fact. To compound matters, 
increasing violence between revolutionary groups in the summer of 1967, partly 
stemming from Mao's decision to "arm the left", reached its apogee in Guangxi, 
one of the Chinese provinces bordering North Vietnam and a key transit point for 
Chinese, and for that matter Soviet, aid passing through Pingxiang's "Friendship 
Pass" between the P.R.C. and North Vietnam. In November, when Beijing 
moved to try and resolve the state of near civil war that was developing in the 
province through a call for unity, one tactic employed was an appeal to the 
rebels' sense of proletarian internationalism. The 'Decision on the Guangxi 
Problem' reminded all concerned that "Guangxi is the front line of 'Assist 
Vietnam, Resist America', and the Vietnamese people take Guangxi to be their 
most reliable rear area"; the 'Decision' also linked making revolution with 
assisting Vietnam.77 However, there was little appetite in Hanoi for the sort of 
revolution that Mao was pursuing at home.78 
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In mid-1967 China once agam refused a Soviet request to fly over 
Chinese airspace in order to transport MiG aircraft to North Vietnam, and despite 
a new agreement in February 1968 between China and the Soviet Union on the 
transportation of Soviet military aid by rail across China, problems at the 
northern transfer points persisted and multiplied to the extent that by early 1969 
the Soviets accused the Chinese of not simply "blocking" Soviet aid, but of 
actually refusing to transport materiel destined for Vietnam. According to the 
Soviets, in a three month period over 500 wagons were dispatched to the Chinese 
border only to be sent back again; in March, with a new shipment on its way, the 
Chinese officials responsible found themselves too busy to meet with their Soviet 
counterparts. When their schedules finally freed up, the officials refused to 
accept the Soviet shipment under the pretence that the Soviets had not given them 
sufficient notification. Unsurprisingly, in the summer of 1969 as tensions and 
incidents along the Sino-Soviet border appeared as if they were going to lead to 
all-out war, traffic between the two nations destined for Vietnam was suspended 
by China, forcing the Soviets to open up an air corridor over Laos, Burma and 
India.79 
And despite all this, it is clear that the Cultural Revolution actually had 
some positive effects for the North Vietnamese through its emphasis on the 
political nature of 'Assist Vietnam, Resist America'; reluctant provincial officials 
were goaded into revolutionary and political action in circumstances that would 
otherwise have been simply a matter of economic relations on the inter-state and 
inter-provincial level. In parallel with their colleagues throughout China, 
beginning in the summer of 1966, Yunnanese provincial officials responsible for 
dealings with their Vietnamese comrades began to emphasise the importance of 
studying the works of Mao Zedong and political events. Concurrent to this many 
of the large-scale assistance projects for which the Vietnamese were seeking 
Chinese assistance - in particular hydroelectric projects, which were of particular 
importance to the Vietnamese comrades - received approval with a view to 
"giving prominence to Mao Zedong Thought." In 1967, transport workers on the 
ground in the D.R.V. also doubled their efforts - literally in some cases, 
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completing six months' scheduled work within three months - in order to "hold 
high the great banner of Mao Zedong Thought" and demonstrate to their 
Vietnamese comrades that the anti-revisionist line would yield their struggle 
greater results than their misguided dalliances with the Soviets.80 
And many among the Chinese people took the Vietnamese plight to their 
hearts. Almost as soon as the' Assist Vietnam, Resist America' movement was 
launched, the State Council was forced to issue instructions on how to handle the 
Chinese revolutionary masses' desire to assist the Vietnamese struggle, among 
whom many were sending money, gifts, and even food and commodity stamps. 
Appropriate procedures were established for the transmission of letters, money 
and gifts (though not stamps) to both North and South Vietnam according to the 
wishes of the sender (though if there was ambiguity the gift was to be sent to the 
South). However, such was the motivational power of the 'Assist Vietnam, 
Resist America' campaign that when it was compounded by the revolutionary 
fervour of the Cultural Revolution many Chinese civilians and Red Guards were 
inspired to make their own way to Vietnam in the hope of being able to join in 
the anti-American struggle. Not only that, but the D.R.V. embassy and 
consulates were being plagued by letters, telegrams, and even telephone calls, 
from 'volunteers' who hoped to join the fight; the problem became so acute that 
Chinese central authorities were forced to admit that it was interfering in Sino-
Vietnamese relations. By early 1967 the problem had become so serious that the 
North Vietnamese government was forced to complain about it to their Chinese 
counterparts, and in March of that year a notification was issued giving 
instructions on how to deal with such persons: they were to be reminded that 
crossing into North Vietnam on their own was disrespectful to Vietnamese 
sovereignty, and an illegal act. They best thing they could do to help Vietnam, 
80 'Yunnan sheng renmin weiyuanhui waishichu guanyu wo zai Yue Hejiang sheng nongye 
gongzuozu qingkuang fanying', June 2, 1966 in Xiao & Li, Yunnan yu yuan Yue kang Mei, 
pp.136-9; 'Yunnan sheng renmin weiyuanhui waishi bangongshi guanyu yuanzhu Yuenan Laojie, 
Hejiang, Laizhou san sheng de buchong qingshi' [Supplementary request of the Yunnan Province 
People's Committee Foreign Affairs General Office relating to assistance for the three 
Vietnamese provinces of Lao Cai, Ha Giang, and Lai Chau], April 10, 1967, ibid., pp.221-5; 
'Zhongguo Dian-Gui qiche yunshu dadui Kaiyuan lianluozhan yuan Yue gongzuo zongjie' 
[Summary of the 'assist Vietnam' work of the Yunnan-Guangxi vehicular transportation unit 
Kaiyuan liaison station], July 4, 1967, ibid., pp.245-54; 'Yunnan Sheng fu Laojie er dianli 
youshuizhan gongzuozu gongzuo zongjie' [Summary of the work of the Yunnan province 
workgroup that visited Lao Cai number 2 hydroelectric pump station], March 1, 1967, ibid., 
pp.204-5. 
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they were told, was to "return to their work-unit and make revolution; carrying 
out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to its end is also a positive 
contribution to the Vietnamese people's anti-American struggle for national 
I . " 81 sa vatlOn. For these Chinese transgressions both Mao and Zhou were 
embarrassingly forced to personally apologise to D.R.V. Premier, Pham Van 
Dong.82 
Perhaps predictably, "giving prominence to Mao Zedong Thought" soon 
gave way to outright hectoring and proselytizing from Chinese officials when 
dealing with their Vietnamese counterparts and actively 'assisting' in North 
Vietnam. Some of the more enthusiastic Maoists felt the Vietnamese comrades 
were not sufficiently appreciative of the Chinese efforts, nor of the inspiration 
behind them. More often than not this accompanied the valiant hard work that 
the Chinese support and transport troops performed in the D.R.V., thereby 
undermining their efforts in the eyes of their counterparts who were generally 
quite scornful of the methods, if not the aims, of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution'; occasionally this was accompanied by pointed Vietnamese reference 
to the mistakes of the Chinese-inspired 'Land Reform Campaign' of the 1950s. 
This reaction was not universal, however, and it appears on occasion young 
Vietnamese workers, probably unaware that the very fabric of Chinese society 
was being strained to breaking point by Mao's pet project, enjoyed getting caught 
up in the enthusiasm and apparently unshakeable faith of their C.R. inspired 
guests; indeed, in a country whose morale and fibre were being drained by an 
increasingly costly and bloody war, the certainty and clarity offered by those who 
religiously adhered to Mao Zedong Thought must have resembled the spiritual 
tonic of an old style revival meeting. And this, of course - young Vietnamese 
quite literally singing the praises of Mao Zedong as their great leader - was what 
the Vietnamese authorities desperately sought to avoid, and gave them yet 
another reason to be circumspect in their dealings with their northern 
. hb 83 nelg our. 
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It is clear that in concert with the deterioration in the P.RC.'s relations 
with practically every other country, the Cultural Revolution placed additional 
strains on Beijing's relations with Hanoi. Had the Cultural Revolution occurred 
at a time when there were not several hundred thousand Chinese troops on 
Vietnamese soil, the D.RV. leadership would have probably looked on with a 
degree of mistrust, and perhaps even disgust, though its effects on the bilateral 
relationship would have been limited. As it was, the "enthusiasm" expressed by 
the Chinese troops on the ground, and their assertion of the global relevance of 
"Mao Zedong Thought", heightened the traditional Vietnamese sensitivities about 
Chinese dominance - cultural as well as political. Furthermore, the "anti-
revisionist" struggle waged by Mao, and his refusal to countenance joint action 
with the Soviets, greatly frustrated the Vietnamese comrades, for whom Soviet 
missile technology was an increasingly important component of their national 
defence structure. And while the evidence seems to suggest that for most of this 
period the Chinese authorities did in fact assiduously undertake their duties and 
responsibilities to transport Soviet bloc materiel to the n.R.V., the attacks on 
these very structures of authority that Mao orchestrated and guided seriously 
hampered the capacity for external aid, upon which North Vietnam was 
dependent, to reach the n.R.V. 
Likewise, diplomatic relations between the two nations were hampered by 
the fact that the Chinese ambassador in Hanoi, like P.RC. ambassadors the world 
over, was recalled to Beijing to engage in the C.R Whatever differences of 
opinion Pham Van Dong and Le Duan may have had with the Chinese 
ambassador during his tenure (such as during the Michalowski incident), it is 
unlikely that they gave much credence to the allegation that he was a 
'Guomindang agent', given the context of the extreme radicalization of Chinese 
overseas diplomatic posts in the spring and summer of 1967 that caused 
numerous diplomatic crises, including on Vietnam's doorstep - in Cambodia and 
in Hong Kong.84 And it must have been with equal shock and incredulity that 
Hanoi learned of the pitched battles that were being fought in the summer of 
Xiao & Li, Yunnan yu Yuan Yue kang Mei, pp.204-5; 'Zhongguo Dian-Gui qiche yunshu dadui 
Kaiyuan lianluozhan yuan Yue gongzuo zongjie', July 4, 1967, ibid., pp.245-54; 'Yunnan sheng 
Qujing cichang peixun Yuenan Laojie taocijishu gongren de gongzuo zongjie' [Sununary of the 
work of the Yunnan province Qujing ceramics factory in training Vietnamese ceramics 
technicians from Lao Cai], March 27, 1968, ibid., pp.300-8. 
84 Westad et a!., 77 Conversations, p.162, n. 225. 
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1967 not in Vietnam, but on Chinese soil in Yunnan and in Guangxi - the very 
provinces that bordered the D.R.V. and which were so vital for the supply of 
North Vietnam's war effort. From Hanoi's perspective, while there would never 
have been a good time for such disruption, the timing could not have been worse, 
occurring just as Hanoi was making its preparations for the 'General Offensive-
General Uprising' (Tet Offensive). 
In international relations, just as m domestic matters, the Cultural 
Revolution was to have a destructive phase, after which there would be 
rebuilding on the basis of the "new things" that had sprouted. Despite this, 
however, the communist parties of China and Vietnam, like their very nations, 
had a relationship of such length and intimacy that while the external effects of 
Mao's Cultural Revolution were probably felt most acutely in the V.W.P., it was 
the very closeness of the fraternal links that made this so. A preponderance of 
Soviet military aid had not translated into dominant Soviet political influence in 
Hanoi. In fact, in the second half of 1967 the Vietnam Workers' Party carried out 
its own purge of elements who were considered to be 'pro-Soviet', and who were 
charged with passing on information to the Soviet Union about Hanoi's policies 
in advance of the launch of the Tet Offensive. North Vietnam's domestic polity 
took a leftward tum in this period, during which the hand of those known to have 
more ideologically radical outlooks, such as Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, and Le 
Duan, were strengthened. Some Vietnamese sources indicate that the V.W.P. 
"approved of Maoist policies and the ideas behind the Cultural Revolution, even 
though it disapproved of the methods used in China."s5 It is ironic then, that it 
would be these 'radicals' (in Vietnamese terms), in particular Tho and Duan, who 
would be at the forefront of forefront of Hanoi's politics when Sino-Vietnamese 
relations would reach breaking point a decade later. For the time being, however, 
just as it had been on several occasions in the past, the differences between Hanoi 
and Beijing, between the North Vietnamese leadership and a Chinese Communist 
Party now totally and completely dominated by the figure of Mao Zedong, were 
. I . 86 largely tactIc a , not strategIC. 
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"At a certain point negotiations can begin" 
The issue that was most central to the Vietnamese communists' war effort, and as 
has been seen was also of great interest and concern to the Chinese leadership, 
was when and under what circumstances Hanoi should enter into negotiations 
with the U.S. government. The North Vietnamese Communists were left in no 
doubt about the Chinese view of their April decision to open negotiations with 
the United States government. As early as December 1965, after Resolution 12 
(authorising the opening of negotiations with the United States) had been passed 
at the V.W.P.'s Twelfth Plenum, Zhou Enlai counselled North Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, that "we are not against the idea that when 
war reaches a certain point negotiations will be needed. But the problem is that 
the time is not yet ripe".87 This was a view China had consistently maintained in 
the intervening period. It is important to note, however, that not only had Beijing 
not ruled out the commencement of negotiations when appropriate, from at least 
as early as the autumn of 1966 the Chinese leaders had acknowledged the 
importance of 1968 as an opportunity to turn the war in Hanoi's favour through a 
more offensive strategy. Beijing did not expect the Vietnamese to fight an 
interminable war of attrition, and in 1967 Mao had urged Ho Chi Minh to move 
towards big-unit warfare in South Vietnam in anticipation of a 1968 dry season 
victory over the United States.88 
In response to Lyndon Johnson's 31 st March 1968 announcement of the 
suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th parallel in order to 
facilitate peace talks, on April 3rd the North Vietnamese responded positively, 
apparently without having informed their Chinese allies beforehand. 89 Hanoi 
proposed Warsaw as a suitable venue for initial contacts, after the Americans had 
rejected Phnom Penh; however the Chinese strongly censured their North 
Vietnamese comrades for these two acts of compromise, "From our experience, 
we see that negotiations must start when we have a stronger position, not a weak 
one... The situation showed that Vietnamese comrades find it easy to 
87 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Nguyen Duy Trinh, December 19, 1965, eds., 77 
Conversations, p.90. 
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compromIse. The world's peoples can't help thinking that you are facing some 
difficulties in your struggle.,,9o And while it is probable that the actual tactics 
used during the Tet Offensive were considered dubious in Beijing, it appears that 
it was a combination of wounded Chinese pride at not being informed 
beforehand, and genuine concerns about how Hanoi handled Johnson's offer of 
peace talks that elicited a negative response from Beijing, rather than strategic 
divergences. 
China's relations with North Vietnam deteriorated through the summer of 
1968, and took a sharp tum after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20th 
August, an event which shook the leaders of the P.R.C. On the 22nd, Mao met 
with senior party figures, including Zhou Enlai and the 'Four Marshals' (Chen 
Vi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen and Ye Jianying), to discuss their reaction to 
the invasion. The next evening, after consultations with the Romanian 
ambassador in Beijing and Chairman Mao, the decision was taken that that same 
evening Zhou Enlai would attend in person a reception in the Romanian Embassy 
for that country's National Day, where he would make a speech announcing 
China's reaction. The timing, in this respect at least, was fortunate: the degree of 
alarm felt in Beijing was surpassed only by that felt in Bucharest, so the 
Romanian embassy provided a 'socialist' public forum, at which all the Warsaw 
Pact nations' ambassadors would be present, where Zhou could express China's 
fury. Thus, on the 23rd August Zhou Enlai made the first public charge that the 
Soviet Union had become 'social-imperialist' and, in tandem, the Chinese media 
issued vitriolic denunciations of the events in Czechoslovakia. While Brezhnev's 
doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' would not be articulated for another few 
months, the implications for their own sovereignty seemed clear enough to the 
Chinese: the Soviets were now a greater threat to China's security than the 
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90 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, April 13, 1968, 77 Conversations, p.l22. 
9t C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, pp.252-3; Liu and Mastny, eds., 'Proceedings of the 
International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese-East European Relations from the 
1960s to the 1980s', in Zurcher Beitriige zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung [Zurich 
Contributions to Security Policy and Conflict Research], nr. 72, (hereafter cited as 'China and 
Eastern Europe'), p.111; Dillon, Burton & Soderlund, 'Who Was the Principal Enemy?: Shifts in 
Chinese Perceptions of the Two Superpowers, 1968-1969' in Asian Survey, Volume 17, Issue 5 
(May 1977), p.466. This study of the 'hostile symbols' used by China to describe the United 
States and the Soviet Union also noted that (by its measurements), in the wake of the invasion, 
Chinese hostility towards the Soviet Union was greater than that towards the United States at any 
time during the 1968-69 period. 
56 
The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, expressed extremely strong and 
swift support for the Soviet action, something that surely infuriated, worried and 
unnerved the Chinese. On 22nd August, before the Chinese had even formalised 
their position, Nhan Dan [The People] published the first TASS declaration 
justifying the InVaSIOn. This was followed by Hanoi radio and official 
newspapers in the D.R.V. describing the invading Soviet troops as pursuing the 
noble goal of protecting Czechoslovakia. Further positive comment was provided 
by the North Vietnamese spokesman at the Paris peace talks, Nguyen Le Thanh, 
who came out publicly in support of the invasion's goal of "strengthening the 
unity of the socialist camp".92 
The D.R.V. 's response to events in Czechoslovakia drew Chinese ire, and 
had the effect of further of making Beijing even more nervous about any 
'capitulationist' peace deal that might have come out of the Paris talks, and about 
the future course of North Vietnamese policy. As North Vietnam increased its 
support for the Soviet action, so too China increased the intensity of its invective, 
both towards the Soviets, and toward those "who cherish illusions about Soviet 
revisionism and U.S. imperialism". Zhou Enlai's charge (in the same speech) of 
September 2nd 1969 was that "it is high time [they] woke Up!,,93 This statement, 
demonstrating a willingness on the part of the Chinese leadership to acutely 
embarrass the North Vietnamese on their National Day, reflected the deep level 
of Chinese displeasure and unease. It does appear, though, that Zhou Enlai had 
adequately made his point, since Hanoi fell silent on the issue in the wake of this 
harangue. 
Despite this, on October 1 st, during National Day celebrations to mark the 
nineteenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the 
North Vietnamese dignitaries attending the festivities in Beijing found 
themselves ranked behind those of the Australian Communist Party (Marxist-
Leninist), reflecting the low esteem in which they were held in Beijing at that 
point.94 On the October 6th, Zhou Enlai cabled the Chinese charge d'affaires in 
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Hanoi to instruct him to infonn Premier Pham Van Dong that "due to domestic 
commitments" China would be no longer able to receive a North Vietnamese 
delegation that had intended to visit.95 An acrimonious meeting between North 
Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban and Zhou Enlai took place on 
October 9th, where Zhou suggested that the negotiations with the United States 
would lead to a mistake of similar proportions to the Geneva Accords of 1954, 
while it was also in this month that China began the withdrawal of some of its 
engineering troops and accompanying anti-aircraft battalions. Beijing's message 
was unambiguous: Hanoi could not expect China to continue its assistance in 
defending North Vietnam against American attack if the threat no longer 
existed. 96 Because of the events in Paris but particularly Prague, Beijing's 
relationship with Hanoi plummeted to its nadir. 
The growing tensions between the two parties came to a head in a spat 
between P.R.C. Foreign Minister Chen Yi and North Vietnamese politburo 
member and Paris negotiator Le Duc Tho. Chen criticised the North Vietnamese 
comrades on four issues: they had lost the initiative in accepting the peace talks 
in exchange for a partial bombing cessation; and secondly, by accepting 
quadripartite negotiations they had undennined the South Vietnamese National 
Liberation Front's status as the unique legal representative of the people of South 
Vietnam. Most significantly though, Chen Yi alleged that the North Vietnamese 
response would help Hubert Humphrey win the U.S. presidential election in 
November; and finally that they had accepted compromising and capitulationist 
proposals put forward by the Soviet revisionists. Clearly unhappy, Chen Yi 
concluded, "So, between our two parties and the two governments of Vietnam 
and China, there is nothing more to talk about. Nevertheless, as President Ho has 
said, our relationship is one of both comrades and brothers; we will therefore 
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consider the changes of the situation in November." 97 While heated, this 
argument was by no means the cynical "threat to cut off relations between the 
two Parties" later alleged by Hanoi.98 Tho, however, was in no mood to take 
such criticisms lying down, 
Le Duc Tho: On this matter, we will wait and see ... We have gained 
experience over the past 15 years ... 
Chen Yi: We signed the Geneva accords in 1954 when the US did not agree to 
do so. We withdrew our armed forces from the South to the North, thus letting 
the people in the South be killed. We at that time made a mistake in which we 
[Chinese] shared a part. 
Le Duc Tho: Because we listened to your advice. 
Chen Vi: You just mentioned that in the Geneva Conference, you made a 
mistake because you followed our advice.. But this time, you will make 
another mistake if you do not take our words into account.99 
Behind Chen's harsh words lay two factors underpinning Chinese unease at 
the tum of events in Vietnam and in Paris. As noted, the Chinese leaders had not 
only been offended by the failure of the Vietnamese to infonn them beforehand 
of their decision to open talks, but also had concerns about Hanoi's tactical 
response. More significantly, however, by September 1968 Beijing had been 
rattled by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese and 
Vietnamese comrades began to diverge on what would be the optimal outcome of 
the November U.S. presidential election. While Hanoi sought to use the elections 
to squeeze the maximum concessions out of the Johnson administration, it still 
preferred a Humphrey presidency to a victory for the well-known Republican 
'cold warrior' and fonner vice-president Richard Nixon. It now seems clear that 
Mao wanted to see a man in the White House who would take a strong stand 
against Soviet social-imperialism, and Nixon fitted that bill. Mao was voting for 
Nixon, but was concerned that the North Vietnamese concessions in Paris would 
allow Hubert Humphrey and the Democratic Party to snatch a victory on the back 
of increased optimism among the American public about an end to the war. Chen 
Yi's reference to reappraising the situation in November, after the elections, was 
the first hint of differing preferences in Beijing and Hanoi about who occupied 
the White House. 
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In the intense atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution, Vietnam had been held 
to be the focal point of all the contradictions in the world, i.e. the focal point of 
the struggle between imperialism and socialism, and the Chinese had often 
reminded their Vietnamese comrades that in their struggle what had not been won 
on the battlefield could not be won at the negotiating table either. lOo The military 
results of the 'General Offensive-General Uprising' had fallen well-short of the 
expectations of either Hanoi or Beijing. However, the Vietnamese comrades had 
grasped the psychological impact of Tet on the U.S. media and on American 
public opinion; Beijing hadn't. Hanoi had seized the opportunity to open contact 
with Washington, but the rapidity of the decision had caught Beijing off-guard, 
and undermined the P.R.C. by not giving Beijing's propaganda machine time to 
lay the groundwork to prepare its own public and international supporters for the 
advent of the 'fighting while negotiating' stage in the Vietnamese struggle. On 
top of this, the Chinese held that the concessions made by the North Vietnamese 
meant approaching negotiations in a passive position and without holding the 
upper hand on the military front; this would, ultimately, be damaging to the 
Vietnamese, and world, revolutionary cause. Moreover, China feared that 
Johnson and the Soviets would collude and, in furtherance of their own goals, 
between them force North Vietnam into settling for something short of victory, 
trading concessions on Czechoslovakia and South Vietnam. All of these factors 
combined to make Beijing irritated and edgy about the tum of events in Paris. 
Nonetheless, whatever of Chinese concerns about Hanoi's tactics, the events of 
this period did not represent a slackening in Chinese support for the goals of the 
Vietnamese comrades. 
North Vietnam's success was important for China for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, the Chinese leadership felt genuine empathy for the Vietnamese struggle, 
in a manner only replicated in the attention paid to Korean affairs. The concern 
extended beyond mere geopolitical calculations: for China, Vietnam and Korean 
were part of its 'cultural universe', nations whose destiny was tied to that of 
China on the basis of historical ties, and to whom China had obligations. The 
continued survival of the regimes in Pyongyang and Hanoi were not only 
important to Beijing in a geopolitical sense, but also in a moral one: the failure of 
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socialism in either of these two countries, or indeed a permanent rupture between 
Beijing and either nation, would be a failure of Mao's project and China's 
leadership role. These events occurred against a backdrop where Mao was 
attempting to rein in the more excessive claims of the Cultural Revolution years 
that China was the 'centre of world revolution', and that he himself was the 
"great teacher of the entire world's revolutionary peoples."IOI Beginning in early 
March the Chairman had begun excising Maoist propaganda from documents 
submitted to him for approval, and urged. his subordinates not to "impose on 
others", particularly other communist parties. And while Mao was now 
downplaying the leadership role he had previously claimed for China at the 
global level, for historic and cultural reasons that did not apply to Vietnam. 
Successful Soviet and American pressure on Hanoi to produce a compromise in 
Paris would represent both a blow to Mao and China, but also greatly aid Hubert 
Humphrey. Thus China resolved to have nothing to do with the Paris talks, and 
condemned them as a 'fraud'. 1 02 
As the momentum for serious negotiations in Paris gathered pace through 
early October, and the prospect of a negotiated settlement (and a Humphrey 
victory) became more real, Chinese concern and opposition grew in intensity. 
This then had the effect of forcing the North Vietnamese to become more closely 
aligned with the Soviets as a source of diplomatic support for their chosen course 
of action. On this issue, Beijing had become a victim of its own ideology and 
propaganda, and thus, by mid-October, the P.R.C. had backed itself into 
something of a comer. If the talks succeeded in the face of its militant 
opposition, then China would be even further marginalized internationally, 
Beijing's line would be badly discredited, and North Vietnam would be likely to 
move even closer to the Soviets, who were now an even greater threat to Beijing 
than they had appeared when the Paris talks had begun in May. The choices for 
Beijing were indeed stark. 
Two days after the tetchy meeting between Chen and Tho, Chinese radio 
made the first reference to the existence of the talks in Paris, indicating the 
beginning of a change in the Chinese attitude to the Paris talks. There was at the 
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same time a reduction in the coverage of the fighting in South Vietnam and the 
U.S. bombing of the North. During the week running up to the U.S. Presidential 
election on November 5th, coverage of Vietnam (and the Paris talks) dried up 
completely. Given the expectation that any deal was most likely to be brokered 
in the days just before the election (many expected Johnson to 'pull something 
out of the bag' to clinch the election for Democratic candidate Hubert 
Humphrey), Beijing's total silence was a reflection of the quandary it found itself 
in: if talks did fail, then the P.R.C. leadership's stance all along would have been 
vindicated; on the other hand, to continue condemning the talks as they reached 
success would further alienate North Vietnam and push them further into the 
arms of the 'revisionists'. Thus, silence reigned during the last days of October, 
and the first few days of November until, on November 3rd, Renmin Ribao [The 
People's Daily] published the full text of President Johnson's speech announcing 
the total cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, accompanied by the text of 
the D.R.V. government's response. The message inherent in this for the Chinese 
public was that the Chinese government had suspended judgement "until the talks 
make progress - or fail to do so": in essence that it was "for the Vietnamese 
themselves to decide.,,)03 
These were, in fact, the words used by Mao Zedong less than a fortnight 
later, after hearing a report on Zhou Enlai's meeting with North Vietnamese 
Premier Pham Van Dong. )04 Two days later, Mao himself told the visiting 
Vietnamese delegation "We agree with your slogan of fighting while negotiating. 
Some comrades worry that the U.S. will deceive you. But I tell them not to 
[worry]. Negotiations are just like fighting. You have drawn experience, 
understood the rules.,,)05 This meeting between Mao and Pham Van Dong on the 
1 i h November 1968 was an important and nuanced occasion for both sides. 
Mao's endorsement of the Vietnamese strategy was still caveated. It was he who 
turned the conversation to the Geneva Conference of 1954 (as previously noted 
still a sore point between the Chinese and Vietnamese comrades), noting how in 
1954 "the Soviets wanted to solve the [Vietnam] problem". Mao, while 
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somewhat embarrassingly not being able to "remember the whole story", 
admitted that an error had been made by compromising in 1954, as "the mood of 
the people in the South at that time was rising high"; furthennore, in his opinion, 
including in the agreement "a provision on the withdrawal of troops" to the North 
was a lost opportunity. As well as moving to improve relations with the North 
Vietnamese after several very stonny months, Mao was drawing a clear parallel 
with the current round of negotiations, and indirectly advising the Vietnamese on 
what they should and should not accept. 106 He also set about probing the resolve 
of the Vietnamese to continue the struggle, and their willingness to compromise 
on whether U.S. troops would be allowed to stay in South Vietnam. As was his 
wont, Mao was deliberately provocative: 
Mao Zedong: ... When the war broke out, the Americans came, at first as 
advisers, and then as combat troops. But now, they again say that the 
Americans in Vietnam are advisers. 
Pham Van Dong: It is impossible for them to be advisors. 
Mao Zedong: I, however, think that they will be advisors[ ... ] 
Muoi Cuc: [ ... ] Our blood has been shed for several years now. Why do we 
have to accept them to stay as advisors?[ ... ] 
Mao Zedong: It is good to think that way. It is imperative to fight and to talk 
at the same time. It will be difficult if you rely on negotiations to request 
their departure. 
After the nadir m the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in October, this 
meeting was also an opportunity for the North Vietnamese to improve relations 
with their 'big brother': it was, in fact, they who had requested the meeting with 
the Chairman. 107 Pham Van Dong went out of his way to point out almost 
immediately that the delegation contained two southerners, Nguyen Van Linh 
(Muoi CUC)108 and Le Duc Anh, who had been asked by the Central Committee to 
"accompany Comrades Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi to China to report to 
Chairman Mao, Vice-Chairman Lin Biao, and other Chinese leaders about the 
situation in the South." 109 The message here was one of reassurance for the 
Chinese that they were not going to sell out their southern compatriots, that is to 
say, follow the 'capitulationist' advice of the Soviet 'revisionists'. During the 
106 Ibid., p.139 
\07 Westad et aI., 77 Conversations, p.137 n.206. 
108 Nguyen Van Linh was actually originally from northern Vietnam, but had spent most of his 
life in the south. See Westad et aI., 77 Conversations, p.144 n. 210. 
109 Memcon (extract), Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, November 17, 1968, in Westad et a1. 77 
Conversations, p.14S 
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course of the conversation, Nguyen Van Linh was obsequious, telling the 
Chairman that the "victories gained in the South are due, to a great extent, to the 
assistance, as well as the encouragement, of the Chinese people and your 
[encouragement], Chairman Mao ... Our troops are very moved when they know 
"110 that Chairman Mao pays attention even to our health. 
Clearly, the Vietnamese were going to great lengths to conVInce the 
Chinese of their determination to see the struggle through to the end, as the 
Chairman advised. Mao sought to encourage the Vietnamese that their 'fighting 
while talking' strategy was appropriate for this stage in the campaign. For both 
sides, what made this new tone of respect and co-operation possible, and 
desirable, was the election of Richard M. Nixon to the Presidency of the United 
States less than two weeks earlier. Given Nixon's reputation as a 'Cold Warrior', 
his victory made the prospect of a quick negotiated settlement in Vietnam appear 
more remote, and thus continued Chinese support, both moral and material, was 
needed. Yet, despite his hardline reputation towards communism, Nixon had 
expressed a desire for a new form of relationship with China, most notably in his 
widely-publicised Foreign Affairs article of October 1967, thus raising the 
possibility of a new relationship between the P.R.C. and the United States in the 
face of a growing strategic threat to China from the Soviet Union. II I The new 
atmosphere created by Nixon's election, with its possibility for "new changes", 
was emphasised by Zhou Enlai in comments to a delegation from the People's 
Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea on the 30th of November 1968. 112 However, 
these new changes simultaneously created a new contradiction in China's foreign 
policy: how to continue to support North Vietnam and the N.L.F. 's struggle while 
pursuing improved relations with the United States. 
It is unlikely that Nixon was the preferred presidential choice of the 
D.R.V. leaders, but both Beijing and Hanoi were faced with a new international 
situation after the November general election. Nixon's publicly expressed desire 
to improve relations with China was at odds with his Cold Warrior reputation; 
and while Beijing would indicate its approval for the new president by rapidly 
seeking a resumption of the dormant Warsaw ambassadorial talks, Hanoi was 
110 Ibid., p.145-6 
III Richard M. Nixon, 'Asia After Vietnam', Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 1, (October, 1967). 
112 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p.267. 
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uncertain as to what the 'secret peace plan' that had become associated with 
Nixon during the electoral campaign would mean for its war. While Beijing and 
Hanoi had been united in their contempt for Lyndon Johnson, differing 
perspectives on the 36th President of the United States would become an enduring 
feature of their relationship. However with Johnson and Humphrey safely 
dispatched, a direct consequence of Nixon's victory was Mao's personal approval 
for Hanoi's 'negotiating while fighting' strategy. Mao's evolving strategic 
assessment of the United States continued to influence his position on both the 
Vietnam War and Hanoi's tactics for winning it. 
The u?expected American escalation in Vietnam had a defining influence on 
China's domestic polity and foreign affairs between 1965 and 1968. It presented 
both risks and opportunities for the P.R.C., and Mao in particular. From Beijing, 
the American actions in Indochina both reaffirmed the inherently unpredictable 
and belligerent nature of imperialism, and caused a re-examination of Mao's 
long-standing assertion that the United States was a 'paper tiger'. By raising the 
spectre of a Sino-American war, it undermined the rationale that had underpinned 
China's break with the Soviet Union, and raised two possible future scenarios: 
Sino-Soviet co-operation to withstand the United States, or U.S.-Soviet collusion 
to defeat China. In either case, for Mao a prerequisite was a New China steeled 
to withstand not just imperialist aggression, but also the regrettably baleful 
influence of Soviet revisionism. In preparation for this, both the C.C.P. and 
Chinese society needed to be further radicalized and revolutionized; its form was 
to take that of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
This next stage in Mao's continuous revolution could only be achieved, 
however, in the absence of a direct Sino-American confrontation. Not only was 
China not militarily prepared for such a clash, but by its very nature (and 
particularly in the event of the use of nuclear weapons) this conflict would have 
undermined Mao's contention that revolutionary war could be waged without 
sparking a world war. Thus China needed to strike a delicate balance between 
assisting the North Vietnamese war effort and defending theP.R.C.'s security on 
the one hand, and not provoking a war with the United States on the other. The 
result was the continuation of the Third Front Construction campaign at home, 
while beyond China's borders P.L.A. troops took responsibility for defensive and 
65 
logistical operations in North Vietnam, thereby freeing up equivalent numbers of 
D.R.V. troops to infiltrate the South. China also bank-rolled and armed the 
N.L.F., while supplying the North Vietnamese army with most of its small arms, 
as well as a huge array of miscellaneous items from mosquito nets and radios to 
rice and playing cards. Determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Korean War, 
Beijing also issued clear warnings to Washington to learn the lessons of the Yalu 
and take seriously its statements of what would trigger direct Chinese 
intervention: a land invasion of North Vietnam or any attack on China itself. 
These warnings were indeed heeded, and in early 1966 senior U.S. officials made 
a point of stating the United States' lack of aggressive intent towards China. 
Relatively confident that China was safe from attack, and that Hanoi was 
determined to continue the fight, by mid-March 1966 Mao was liberated to step 
up another gear his gradual escalation against his own party. His comrades' 
willingness to co-operate with the Soviets for Hanoi's sake now became a 
benchmark by which to measure revisionist tendencies. It appears that in all 
likelihood the 'joint communique' agreed between the J.c.P. and the C.C.P. was 
prompted by Mao or those closest to him so that he could demolish it. It gave 
him an opportunity to definitively isolate the C.C.P., even from a party that had 
been previously sympathetic to Beijing's position, and to directly target those 
within his own party he viewed to be 'soft'. By demonstrating that not even the 
plight of the Vietnamese was sufficient to merit Chinese co-operation with the 
Soviet Union, he signalled a high benchmark for those who might wish to prove 
their anti-revisionist credentials when the full force of the Cultural Revolution 
came to be felt. 
Such an attitude naturally dismayed the Vietnamese comrades, for whom 
Sino-Soviet joint action would have been an enormous boost in terms of both 
materiel and morale. But this mattered little to Mao, for whom the primary 
revolutionary focus was domestic. And besides, in his view, Chinese aid was 
genuine and without strings, unlike that of the Soviets; the assistance and 
sacrifices of the Chinese party and people would only by cheapened through 
association with the Soviet revisionists. So too were the Vietnamese 
disappointed at the chaos that began to take hold across China, most worryingly 
along its southern border provinces, as Mao's last great attempt at permanently 
remoulding Chinese society unfolded. Nonetheless, as with the Vietnamese Land 
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Refonn of the 1950s, certain left-leaning sections of the Vietnamese leadership 
approved of the intent behind the Cultural Revolution, if not the methods used to 
achieve it. As with most aspects of international affairs during this period the 
yardstick used in Hanoi to assess the 'correctness' of a fraternal party's policy 
was the effect that it had on Vietnam's own revolutionary endeavours. 
Hanoi certainly did not welcome the Cultural Revolution. Like every 
other nation bar Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was left without an 
ambassador of the People's Republic of China in its capital. Co-operation and 
co-ordination between North Vietnam's largest benefactors was practically non-
existent; where Chinese officials were forced to come into contact with their 
'revisionist' counterparts, it was only done at the request of the Vietnamese 
comrades and as a favour to Vietnam. Petty squabbles between Moscow and 
Beijing about who was to blame for delays in deliveries to North Vietnam 
projected an image of disunity and discord to the outside world. Chinese 
nationals constantly made illegal crossings of the Sino-Vietnamese border 
seeking a fight with the 'Yankee imperialists', while the staff of North Vietnam's 
embassy and consulates across China were snowed under by sack-loads of mail 
from Chinese well-wishers. 
Many of these problems arose from an 'excess of enthusiasm' in support 
of North Vietnam, which Mao had predicted and expertly exploited. So 
intimately tied to the Cultural Revolution was the Chinese people's support for 
Vietnam's plight that as the intensity of the fonner increased, so too did 
fanaticism for the latter cause. Chinese civilians were willing to lay down their 
lives for the sake of Vietnam's freedom, while over one thousand Chinese 
soldiers did just that. During the tough years of the late 1960s, ordinary Chinese 
citizens dug deep into their own pockets to help the resistance in South Vietnam 
and the beleaguered citizens of Hanoi and beyond. Provincial officials in their 
Kunming offices and Chinese troops on the ground in North Vietnam alike went 
the extra mile, worked harder and longer for Vietnam's cause than would have 
otherwise been the case without the revolutionary fervour that the Cultural 
Revolution had engendered. Yet, that very enthusiasm was viewed with 
suspicion and unease in Hanoi: the line between it and attempts at control was 
thin. Furthennore, for many of the Chinese rallying to Vietnam's cause, their 
exertions were not an example of proletarian internationalism, but rather a 
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demonstration of the power of China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and 
the supremacy of Mao Zedong Thought. Unsurprisingly, many Vietnamese 
balked at demonstrations of Chinese power and supremacy, no matter what 
fraternal form they took. Nonetheless, the two nations remained in close contact 
and co-operation, and Chinese support proved vital in North Vietnam's survival 
of ROLLING THUNDER for three years from 1965. 
But 1968 changed everything. For while Beijing was sceptical about the 
tactics adopted during the Tet Offensive, and was indeed affronted that Hanoi did 
not consult with it before it took the decision to open talks with the United States, 
it was the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of that year, 
and North Vietnam's reaction to it, that fundamentally changed the nature of the 
Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Beijing raged at Hanoi's fulsome response to the 
Soviet tanks that trundled into Prague, and the Chinese suspicion that Tet had 
been tactically unsound and that the Paris talks were hasty and premature turned 
into rampant paranoia that Moscow was pulling Hanoi's strings and forcing it to 
accept a compromise that was disadvantageous to the 'revolution'. From 
Beijing's perspective it appeared to be the worst possible scenario: Moscow was 
pressuring Hanoi to do a deal with Washington in return for American 
concessions elsewhere in the globe; the American presence would linger in 
Indochina, while the Soviet Union, now seemingly closer than ever to Hanoi, 
would grow stronger. For Mao it was an intolerable situation. Never one to shy 
away from embracing a co~tradiction, he wanted North Vietnam to continue its 
fight against the United States, and for those same United States to elect a more 
'hawkish' president who would take a firmer line with the Soviets, and perhaps 
even be open to improving relations with China. 
As the Chairman himself later admitted, he voted for the Republican 
candidate in '68, and in Richard Milhous Nixon he got his man. 
Nixon's arrival on the scene provided the impetus for both Beijing and 
Hanoi to mend the fences between them that had been broken during that year. 
Superficially the year's end seemed to bring the two nations closer together than 
at any point since early 1966, but the currents running under the surface were 
now beginning to move in differing directions. 
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Chapter 2 
January 1969 - April 1971: Strategic divergence, tactical accord 
The difficulties in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship that had been brought on by the 
Cultural Revolution had been compounded by the rapidly changing international 
arena in 1968. By the autumn of that year Beijing's relations with Hanoi had 
reached their nadir, from which point onward there would have to be an 
improvement. The increasing prominence of the Soviet Union's largesse and the 
damage caused by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution meant that the Chairman 
needed to act to improve relations with the Vietnamese comrades. In many respects 
in the early and mid 1960s the Vietnamese revolution had come to represent an 
opportunity to complete the unfinished business of Korea and deal a conclusive blow 
to American imperialism. And while the survival of the regimes in Hanoi and 
Pyongyang were of geostrategic concern to Beijing, the reasons for China's 
continued support were much more complex and grounded in a sense of China's 
position and role in the region that had only a tenuous connection to Marxism. By 
the end of the decade, several more complicating factors had entered into the 
equation. 
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R. was identified in 
ideological terms as a 'social-imperialist' country: a form of imperialism more 
nefarious than the neo-imperialism practised by the United States due to its 
perfidious pretence of socialism. If China were to improve its relationship with the 
United States it had the potential to strengthen both countries' abilities to withstand 
the Soviet challenge: something the Vietnam Workers' Party, embroiled in a bitter 
war against America and the recipient of large amounts of Soviet aid, would not 
welcome. By the dawn of 1969, therefore, once the destructive phase of the Cultural 
Revolution was over, an improvement in relations with North Vietnam was an 
inevitable and necessary step, not just for Beijing but also for Hanoi, who had been 
badly hurt by the losses of the Tet Offensive. During 1968, as a result of Beijing's 
unwillingness and inability to furnish the Vietnamese with everything they asked for, 
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China's aid to the D.R.V. was cut back, and by 1969 the Soviet Union had overtaken 
China as the main source of foreign aid to North Vietnam. However, after Richard 
Nixon's narrow election victory in November 1968, and cognizant of the likely need 
for Chinese aid for several years to come, the Hanoi leadership began to reach out to 
Beijing at a time when a reciprocal gesture was being made. This process was to be 
complicated, however, by Mao's changing appraisal of the international security 
environment. l The election of Richard Nixon to the presidency of the United States 
would fundamentally alter the dynamic between the People's Republic of China and 
the U.S. As 1968 drew to a close, bilateral efforts to improve Sino-Vietnamese 
relations had been accompanied by tentative moves from China that hinted at a more 
conciliatory attitude towards the United States. As we shall see in this chapter, this 
presented China with two divergent, and occasionally conflicting, foreign policy 
aims: to improve relations with the U.S.A. while maintaining the amity of North 
Vietnam. 
New beginnings 
In January 1969 in Washington D.C., Richard Milhous Nixon, President 
Eisenhower's Vice President and a man who had made his political reputation as an 
arch 'red-baiter', was inaugurated as the 36th President of the United States. His 
inaugural address, in which he stated his desire to improve relations with all 
countries of the world had been reprinted in official Chinese media organs such as 
Renmin Ribao and Hong Qi [Red Flag], as well as in local newspapers throughout 
China. The significance and unprecedented nature of this move was largely lost on 
the new leadership in Washington, however. Nonetheless, the new administration 
took deliberate steps not to associate Hanoi's war with Beijing but rather "never ... 
even hinted at, an anti-Chinese motive for our Vietnam involvement". In this respect, 
at an early stage in the Nixon administration, the problem of U.S.-China relations 
was being decoupled from that of the Vietnam War. However, as Nixon's newly-
I Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War: the Vietnamese Communists' Perspective, (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.24-6; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, p.2IS. 
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appointed National Security Adviser, the fonner Harvard professor and occasional 
foreign policy consultant to the Johnson administration, Henry Kissinger himself 
noted, Nixon was "somewhat schizophrenic in the early days" in tenns of the 
messages he was sending to Beijing, reflecting his own uncertainty, and the lack of a 
clear policy on the issue (as opposed to a general intent). Nevertheless, an early 
priority for the administration was to examine the possibilities and costs associated 
with an improved relationship with the People's Republic of Cllina? 
In order to explore the policy options associated with the new 
administration's China policy, Kissinger ordered 'N.S.S.M. [National Security Study 
Memorandum] 14: United States China Policy', which was completed three months 
later. In this document the attention paid to the relationship between improved 
relations with China and the situation in Vietnam did not stray beyond an 
unimaginative assessment that "Although North Viet-Nam and North Korea pursue 
largely independent policies, sometimes in conflict with those of the PRC, Peking 
has a major national security interest in their continued existence and would almost 
certainly intervene militarily if the communist regime of either country were 
seriously threatened." 3 The report also discussed, in brief, the effects that the 
removal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam, or indeed their maintenance there, 
would have on Sino-American relations, but only in a post-war context. Those 
strategising for the first private meeting of the Paris peace talks with the D.R.V. 
recognised that China may have some role to playas a guarantor of peace tenns, but 
they were unsure of what, if any, that role would be. "The question of the 
Communist Chinese role must be weighed carefully, as between the obvious 
difficulty of any Communist full participation in the final negotiating stages and, on 
the other hand, the difficulty of a settlement without any Communist Chinese role or 
endorsement. ,,4 Given the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, the fair assunlption 
was that China's attitude to the talks would be one of strong antagonism towards the 
2 Kissinger, WH.Y., pp.168-71. 
3 'NSSM 14: United States China Policy', 29th April 1969, NSC institutional files [hereafter 
NSCIF]IH-134, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives at College Park, Md., U.S.A. 
[hereafter NPMP). 
4 'A General Strategy and Plan of Action for Viet-Nam Negotiations (revised draft)', 21 st March 1969, 
NPMPINSCIF IH-0211S. 
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United States. Both of these documents, drawn up at outset of the Nixon 
administration, largely viewed the issues of the Vietnam War and Sino-American 
relations in isolation from each other. As Kissinger noted with dissatisfaction, they 
were treated "as if they existed in a vacuum. No reference was made to the global 
implications of Sino-Soviet tensions and the opportunities for us in the triangular 
relationship." This assessment was as true in relation to the war in Vietnam as it was 
to any other. 5 
In the first quarter of 1969 no-one, from the President down to the National 
Security Council staff, really explored the idea of attempting to make it in Beijing's 
interest to see the war in Vietnam ended. While Nixon hoped to make a move 
toward China at the first opportunity, and even though he felt it was of utmost 
importance, he was still unsure about how quickly it was achievable, or indeed, how 
to go about it. On the other hand, he was confident that the war in Indochina could, 
and should, be brought to a conclusion on a much shorter time-scale, although 
precisely how he was going to bring this about other than through what he perceived 
to be the force of his personality remains unclear. He resolved, he later wrote, "not 
to fall into the trap Johnson had fallen into, of devoting virtually all my foreign 
policy time and energy to Vietnam, which was really a short-term problem. I felt 
that failing to deal with the longer-term problems could be devastating to America's 
security and survival.,,6 This aside, it is also clear that until the eruption of the Sino-
Soviet border clashes few, if any, in Washington foresaw a drastic course-change in 
Chinese foreign policy, nor had they envisaged bringing the ending of the Vietnam 
War and a tentative Sino-American rapprochement into tandem.7 
5 Kissinger, WH. Y., p.178. 
6 Richard M. Nixon, RN: the memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) p.341. 
7 A partial exception to this statement is N.S.C. staffer Alfred Jenkins who in October 1968 noted that 
limited trade moves towards the P .R.C. "would reassure Hanoi that the rigidities of our stand do not 
flow from any doctrine of blanket hostility to Asian communism but relate to North Vietnamese 
aggression against South Vietnam." 'Paper Prepared by Alfred Jenkins of the National Security 
Council Staff, October 9,1968, FRUS -Johnson, vol. XXX, document 328. 
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1969: the view from Beijing 
Although the significance of the changes had not yet been noticed in Washington, 
and probably neither in Hanoi, Beijing's foreign policy was also undergoing a slow 
but major realignment in the early months of 1969. In the wake of the invasion of 
Cze~hoslovakia in August and the election of Nixon to the U.S. Presidency in 
November of the previous year, the Chairman had ordered the resumption of the 
Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, and when announcing the scheduling 
of the meeting for February 20th the Chinese media publicly mentioned the 'Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' in connection with the talks. This was the first 
mention of the 'principles' since the start of the Cultural Revolution, and U.S. 
officials took it as an indication that China may be preparing to return onto the 
international stage; President-elect Nixon accordingly instructed the State 
Department that the new administration would welcome a February meeting.8 
Mao had personally ordered the publication of Nixon's inaugural address, 
and although China cancelled the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw that had been 
scheduled for February 20th (after the defection to the United States of a member of 
the Chinese mission in the Netherlands) Mao continued with steps that would make 
possible a reorientation of Chinese foreign policy. Chen Yi had already submitted a 
report on the international situation to the Central Committee the previous December, 
hinting at possibilities for China to exploit contradictions between the Soviets and 
Americans, but without saying so explicitly. We cannot be sure whether Mao read 
this report or not, but the sentiments contained in it were certainly in concert with the 
strategic ideas Mao himself later pursued. On February 19th Mao personally asked 
the 'Four Marshals' (Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen and Ye lianying) to 
examine the international situation, under the leadership of Chen. lust before 
military clashes broke out between Chinese and Soviet forces on Zhenbao Island 
(Damanski in Russian) on March 2nd, the marshals were instructed to meet weekly, 
8 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Mei huanhe yu yuan Vue kang Mei: Zhongguo waijiao zhanlue tiaozheng zhong 
de Yuenan yinsu' [Sino-American Detente and Assisting Vietnam, Resisting America: the Vietnam 
Factor in the Strategic Adjustment of China's Foreign Policy] in Dangshi yanjiu ziliao, 2002, no. II, 
pp.4-5; 'Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State', November 25, 1968, 
FRUS - Johnson, vol. XXX, document 331. 
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and finished their first report on March 18th, and another one, specifically relating to 
the Zhenbao Island incident, was completed eleven days later. 9 
It is now clear that the violent clash at Zhenbao Island was a deliberate and 
premeditated 'self-defence counter attack' on the part of the Chinese forces, 
ostensibly designed to re-take Zhenbao Island, which the Chinese considered to be 
theirs, but also as a means of retaliating against what the Chinese perceived to be 
repeated Soviet provocations along the border over several years. The attack had 
been approved in mid-February by the Chinese General Staff and the Foreign 
Ministry (though its exact timing was left to commanders on the ground), and by 
Mao himself on February 19th - the very same day Mao instructed the Four Marshals 
to begin their research on the 'international situation'. And although the evidence 
currently available from China suggests that the Chairman was somewhat taken 
aback by the ferocity of the Soviet counter-attack, it is hard to discount the 
coincidence of Mao's approval of the attack and his instructions to the Four Marshals 
occurring on the same day (and very possibly at the same Politburo meeting), and 
also the significance of the upcoming Ninth Party Congress, scheduled for four 
weeks hence. 10 
It has been argued that because the Chinese assault on the Soviet border 
garrison i~self was limited and had limited objectives, and because the Chinese 
appeared to be largely unprepared for the strength of the Soviet reaction, then this 
attack was not part of a larger strategic plan; rather it was wholly connected to 
domestic political concerns and the upcoming congress, and there is a certain amount 
of evidence to support this. Mao did not believe that the clashes would spread, nor 
did he want excessive attention to be paid to them in the political report for the Ninth 
9 Zhang Baijia, 'The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy Towards the United States, 
1954-1970' in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining The Cold War: U.S.-China 
Diplomacy, 1954-1973, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), p.69; Chen 
XiaoJu, 'Chen Yi yu Zhongguo waijiao' [Chen Yi and Chinese Foreign Policy] in Zhang Tuosheng, 
ed., Huanqiu longei liangre: yi dai lingxiumen de guoji zhanlue sixiang [The Whole World Is the 
Same: The International Strategic Thinking ofa Generation of Leaders], (Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian, 1993), p.155; C.O.R.O., Mao Zedong zhllan, p.1541; Chen Jian, Mao's China, pp.245-6. 
10 Niu Jun, '1969 nian Zhong-Su bianjie chongtu yu Zhongguo zhanlue de tiaozheng' [The 1969 Sino-
Soviet Border Clashes and China's Strategic Adjustment] in Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu, 1999, no. 
I, p.7I; Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-
American Rapprochement', Cold War History, vol. I, no. 1 (August 2000), pp.24-8; C.O.R.O., Mao 
Zedong zhllan, p.1541. 
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Congress. He later gave instructions that a speech on the incident was not to 
emphasize preparations for war, but rather but should emphasize the outstanding 
political and psychological functions that the incident could serve. Moreover, the 
leadership believed that the Soviet mobilization was largely cosmetic. I I 
For Mao to successfully counter the threat that he perceived from the Soviet 
Union (which in his eyes was both ideological and geopo~itical), then this threat had 
to be demonstrated on both the ideological and geopolitical fronts in a mutually 
reinforcing manner. To this end, the attack on Zhenbao Island, while serving short-
term political goals, furthered the pursuit of the longer-term strategic ones. At the 
Ninth Congress, the elevation of the Soviet Union to the status of co-equal threat 
along with the United States represented the formalization of an analysis which had 
become concrete the previous summer after the August 1968 Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, though whose origins can be traced back to the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution, and perhaps as far back as 1964. As such, while the March 
1969 clashes were only intended to serve the limited political purpose of domestic 
mobilization (though one which was an essential component of a strategic 
realignment), the Soviet reaction in the late Spring and Summer of 1969, particularly 
along the extensive Sino-Soviet border in China's western Xinjiang province, 
confirmed the fears about 'social-imperialism' which had manifested themselves the 
previous August, and acted as a further catalyst in driving forward Sino-U.S. 
12 
rapprochement. 
It is in this context that the reports of the 'Four Marshals' take their 
significance. The fact that they were commissioned by Mao the same day as the 
Zhenbao Island 'self-defence counter-attack' was approved, and before the Ninth 
Congress, lends credence to the argument that, despite the initial localised nature of 
the clashes between China and the U.S.S.R., Mao was already thinking of opening 
up new strategic possibilities in tandem with, and as a part of, his desire to teach the 
Soviets a lesson. Between March and October, the four marshals held twenty-five 
II Niu Jun, '1969 nian Zhong-Su bianjie chongtu', p.72; Yang Kuisong. 'The Sino-Soviet Border 
Clash', p.30. 
12 See Chen Jian, Mao's China, pp.238-44; Li Xiangqian, '1964 nian: Yuenan zhanzheng shengji", 
Zhang & Niu, Lengzhan yu Zhongguo, pp.319-340. 
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seminars and submitted four reports, with three major conclusions. The first 
conclusion was that, due to the contradictions between them, war was much more 
likely to occur between the United States and the Soviet Union than between either, 
or both, of them and China. Second, they concluded, both superpowers still regarded 
Europe as their strategic priority, but the U.S.S.R. held China to be a greater threat to 
its security than America, thus making the Soviets the greater threat to the P.R.C. 
Their third conclusion was that given the United States was trying to tilke advantage 
of contradictions between the P.R.C. and the Soviets, and the U.S.S.R. was trying to 
exploit contradictions between China and the U.S.A., then so should China take 
advantage of the contradictions between the other two. The scene was being set for a 
major realignment in China's diplomatic strategy.13 
America's four year entanglement in Vietnam had demonstrated the 
weakness of American power and the Johnson administration had demonstrated no 
willingness to engage China in a direct military confrontation. The evidence of the 
summer of 1968 and the spring of 1969 had shown both cases to be quite the 
opposite with the Soviets. As such, by mid-1969 the C.C.P. Chairman's strategic 
analysis of the situation in Asia was veering even further away from that of the 
Vietnam Workers' Party. Tactics were no longer to be the main point of 
disagreement. 
Zhenbaodao: the impact on Hanoi 
Zhou Enlai demonstrated a renewed nervousness, post-Zhenbao Island, about Soviet 
influence on the peace talks the Vietnamese were pursuing in Paris with the new 
American government. In discussions with Vietnamese counterparts he reverted to 
the line that had predominated throughout most of 1968, stating that the Soviets were 
in collusion with the United States. In further talks a week later, at which North 
Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong was present, Zhou elaborated on the Chinese 
position, expressing concern about the negotiating stance the Vietnamese were 
13 Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash', p.30; Zhang Baijia, 'The Changing International 
Scene', Ross and Jiang, eds., Re-examining the Cold War, pp.69-70. 
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adopting in Paris, warning them that "We are somewhat concerned that you will be 
deceived by [the U.S. and the Soviets] The Soviets talk about peace and socialism, 
but what they really want to preserve is their interests", views echoed later in the 
visit by Li Xiannian in conversation with Le Duc Tho. 14 By expressing these 
concerns, the Chinese leaders demonstrated heightened fears of a u.S.-Soviet 
condominium in Vietnam, and the further encirclement of China. 15 
Soviet military intelligence also reported that a series of very high-level 
meetings that took place between P.R.C. leaders and senior members of the V.W.P., 
"after the Ninth Congress.,,16 The Soviets reported that Mao held talks with Le Duan, 
and that Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh had discussions with Lin Biao. We 
have no Chinese verification for these claims, but they were most likely part of the 
series of talks described above. The Soviets claimed that during the meetings the 
Chinese leadership criticized the North Vietnamese for supporting the Soviet 
"revisionist road" and sought reassurances that their fight would be continued to 
final victory, while at the same time expressing concerns about the effectiveness of 
the D.R.V.'s tactics in Paris. Neither were the V.W.P. leaders successful in 
obtaining a supplemental aid agreement for 1969 from the P .R.C. during this visit, 
despite the fact aid had already been cut by approximately 20% from its 1968 levels. 
China's supply of armaments (artillery pieces, shells, guns and bullets) were also 
down by an average of 42%, taking it back to the approximate level for 1967 
(although it should also be noted that Soviet military aid to North Vietnam also 
declined in 1969, in Ilya Gaiduk's analysis, as a result of reduced activity on the 
battlefield). As noted in the previous chapter, as Beijing and Moscow inched 
towards war in the summer of 1969 China stopped all transportation of Soviet goods 
across its territory - a move certain North Vietnamese told the Soviets they 
interpreted as an attempt to force them to break with the U.S.S.R. Zhou and Kang 
14 Memcon (extract), 'Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Thai, Phan Hung 
and Others in the COSVN Delegation', April 20 and 21, 1969, 77 Conversations, pp.156-7. 
IS Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Mei huanhe', p.6. 
16 'Sujun zongsanmoubujiancha zongju guanyu guoji xingshi diaocha gei sugong zhongyang de 
baogao' [Report from the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army to the 
Central Committee of the c.P.S.U. on its Survey of the International Situation], 15th August 1969. (I 
am grateful to Li Danhui for giving me a Chinese translation of this Soviet document. Unfortunately 
it does not contain the original archival reference). 
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Sheng's exhortations in April to their Vietnamese visitors to become more self-
reliant were well-grounded. Economic dislocation caused by the Cultural Revolution, 
and the lengthening shadow of a potential Sino-Soviet war meant that the 
Vietnamese could not depend on Beijing to continue supplying their war effort. 
Chinese actions, intentionally or not, were putting a squeeze on Hanoi. l? 
By the dying days of the summer of 1969 China was stuck in the position of 
having to maintain its own national security in the face of a very real and growing 
threat from the Soviet Union, while simultaneously supplying weapons and aid to a 
Vietnamese ally who was itself becoming on ever friendlier terms with the angry 
Russian bear. On August 28 th, Chinese provinces bordering Outer Mongolia and the 
Soviet Union were put onto a general mobilization status. At around this time Le 
Thanh Nghi led a North Vietnamese delegation to China to once again discuss 
China's aid to the D.R.V. for the following year. Unsurprisingly, at this juncture the 
Vietnamese received nothing more than moral support from their Chinese comrades, 
and according to the White Book they were pressed for firm assurances that the war 
would continue to final victory as a condition for continued aid. Indeed, under the 
circumstances the Chinese question is not at all surprising: "You want to continue 
fighting or make peace? China must know the answer when considering the question 
of aid."ls Fully cognizant of the Vietnamese proclivity for stockpiling Soviet aid 
they did not need (they often kept it on Chinese soil), whether Hanoi planned to 
make peace in the immediate future was a question of prime importance to a China 
potentially on the brink of war with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Chinese Central 
Military Commission felt that the P.L.A. was so underfunded that it requested a 
defence spending increase of a whopping 34%. Unfortunately for Hanoi, China's 
own military needs had to take precedence: in the first six months of 1969 Beijing 
had only managed to fulfil 31.4% of its promised assistance to Hanoi; Chinese 
logistical troops continued to be withdrawn from North Vietnam as they finished 
their assignments; and Beijing continued in its reticence to sign an aid agreement for 
17 Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, p.215; Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-Mei hejie yu 
zhongguo dui yue waijiao, (1968-1973)' [Sino-American Rapprochement and China's Vietnam 
Policy], in Li Danhui, Zhongguo Yu Yinduzhina Zhanzheng, p.224; Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', 
part 2, pp.28-29. 
18 S.R.Y. For. Min., White Book, p.37. 
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the year ahead. China's own exigencies, though largely self-inflicted, threatened to 
greatly undermine the improvement in relations that had been forged since 
November 1968. 19 
A timely death? 
An important turning point in Sino-Vietnamese relations, with both immediate and 
long-term implications, came in early September, when the D.R.V. President and old 
revolutionary Ho Chi Minh died, aged 79. Ho's longstanding personal links with 
China had undoubtedly been a moderating influence in Hanoi's relationship with 
Beijing, even though Ho's own personal power had greatly diminished as the 1960s 
wore on. Nonetheless, without him the potential for North Vietnam to become more 
closely aligned with the Soviet Union increased. The frequency of Ho's visits to 
China in later years, particularly when his health was suffering, was testament to his 
affection for Vietnam's northern neighbour and ancient erstwhile overlord. Over the 
previous few years Ho had spent many periods of convalescence in China, and the 
Chinese leadership had been aware of the seriousness of his condition for several 
months before his death; at the request of the Vietnamese comrades Beijing had 
dispatched several teams of top Chinese doctors to nurse the dying Ho, some of 
whom had been personally received by Zhou Enlai before their departure to Hanoi?O 
In his life, Ho Chi Minh had managed to walk a delicate balancing act 
between China and the Soviet Union in a manner unrivalled by any other leader in 
the Communist world. In a bitter irony, his decline in health paralleled the state of 
Sino-Soviet relations; in the wake of the extremely serious armed clashes in Xinjiang 
in August, Ho's condition became critical. On August 261\ the Central Committee 
of the Vietnam Workers' Party sent a telegram to their Chinese Communist Party 
19 Niu Jun, '1969 Nian Zhong-Su bianjie chongtu', p.72; Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, 
p.28; Liu & Mastny, 'China and Eastern Europe', p.67; Bamouin and Yu, Chinese Foreign Policy 
During the Cultural Revolution, (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998), p.90; 'Sujun 
zongsanmoubujiancha zongju [ ... ] de baogao', n.16 above. Chinese anti-aircraft units had withdrawn 
from North Vietnam by March 1969, while engineering and road-building units completed their 
withdrawal in November. Railway construction and repair units would remain until June 1970. See 
previous chapter. 
20 C.D. R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, pp.306, 310. 
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counterparts requesting that China send another team of doctors to tend to the ailing 
Ho. Once again, a testament to the importance being placed on their task, Zhou 
Enlai received them before they left for Hanoi. On the 31 st of August, the Chinese 
sent another medical team to Hanoi, this time led by the renowned doctor Wu Jieping, 
with instructions from Zhou Enlai that as soon as they returned to Beij ing they were 
to report to him, no matter what time of the day or night. Wu and his colleagues 
returned to Beijing on the 2nd September, and conferred with the Chinese Premier. 
Though the prognosis clearly must have been bleak, it was decided that Wu and his 
team would return to Hanoi with more medicine and equipment in an attempt to save 
Ho Chi Minh. Their efforts proved to be fruitless however, and the D.R.V. President 
died the next day.21 
While there can be no doubt that the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party held Ho Chi Minh in esteem and affection, and that the medical teams sent to 
Hanoi were genuine efforts at attempting to save the life of an old comrade, as ever, 
political realities too played their part in the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi 
in this period. Without Ho Chi Minh, Beijing's influence in Hanoi was undoubtedly 
weakened, further aggravating the tensions that had entered into the relationship as a 
result of the reduction in Chinese aid stemming from the acute Sino-Soviet tensions. 
Beijing was now forced to reach out to Hanoi, since there would be no more 
significant nor poignant occasion to remind the Vietnamese comrades of the ties that 
bound their two parties than in the shadow ofHo Chi Minh's death. And somewhat 
ironically, not only did Ho's funeral provide an occasion for an improvement in 
Sino-Vietnamese relations, it also afforded the opportunity to relax tensions along 
the Sino-Soviet border as well.22 
That is not to say, however, that the simmering Sino-Soviet tensions that had 
recently almost boiled over into full-scale war were absent from the funeral of the 
late Vietnamese leader, and China's difficulties with the U.S.S.R. spilled over into 
the manner in which they mourned Ho Chi Minh. Chinese premier and C.C.P. 
politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Enlai led the official Party delegation 
21 Ibid., pp.316, 319. 
22 See Gilks, The Breakdown, p.46; Zhai, CATVW, p.174. 
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to Hanoi to mourn Ho, arriving on the morning of the 4th September, accompanied 
by politburo member and Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, Ye 
Jianying, and Wei Guoqing, Central Committee member and Chairman of the 
Guangxi Autonomous Regional Revolutionary Committee. The inclusion of Wei in 
this initial party was significant: Guangxi was one of the Chinese border provinces 
contiguous to Vietnam, and Wei had commanded the Chinese military advisory 
group which had aided the Vietminh in their war against the French; his presence, 
along with that ofYe Jianying, emphasized the continuity in China's support for the 
Vietnamese revolutionary struggle. Zhou had meetings with all the senior members 
of the V.W.P. leadership, including Le Duan, Ph am Van Dong and Truong Chinh, 
during which he expressed the great sadness that was felt by the entire Chinese Party, 
government, army and the whole Chinese people, at the death of President Ho. Zhou 
eulogised Ho's nationalist credentials and his contribution to the international 
proletariat, but significantly he flew back to Beijing that same evening (though the 
next day he also led the official delegations of all the organs of the party, state and 
army to the North Vietnamese embassy to again mourn Ho.) It was left to vice-
premier, Li Xiannian, to lead the government delegation to Hanoi on September 8th 
to attend the funeral. 23 
The apparent cause of Zhou's return to Beijing was the increasingly arduous 
duties being thrust upon him as a result of the war panic that was infecting the C.C.P. 
leadership in the wake of the clashes in Xinjiang. Throughout China's urban areas 
people were urged to begin stockpiling rations and digging shelters in case of a 
nuclear strike by the Soviet Union, and P.L.A. forces were put on a war footing. It 
was, ironically, Ho Chi Minh who managed to temper the sense of impending doom, 
not quite from beyond the grave, but certainly from within it. It was his express 
hope, as stated in his will, that "our Party will do its best to contribute to the 
restoration of unity among the fraternal Parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism 
and proletarian internationalism, in a way which conforms to both reason and 
23 Zhai, CATVW, p.174; Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, p.29; 'Ho Chi Minh: Funeral 
Guests', unknown source, September 17th, 1969, Folder 18IBox 06IDPC Unit 06/TV A-TTU. 
81 
sentiment.,,24 The Soviet Premier, Alexey Kosygin, attended Ho's funeral service in 
Hanoi, and via the Vietnamese and Li Xiannian he conveyed to Mao and Zhou that 
he was willing to meet with Zhou in Beijing on his way back to Moscow. While the 
words of Ho were certainly very far from Mao's mind when he gave his approval to 
the Soviet proposal, a positive consequence of this decision for Sino-Vietnamese 
relations was that it appeared to be in conformity with the dead Vietnamese leader's 
wishes.25 
The talks between Zhou and Kosygin did not solve any of the contentious 
issues that existed between the two countries, but they did go some way towards the 
easing of tensions. On the border issue, both sides agreed on four principles: firstly, 
that the status quo was to be maintained; secondly, that they would avoid armed 
clashes; thirdly, that in disputed areas both sides' militaries would avoid contacts; 
and finally that should bilateral disputes occur, they should be resolved through 
contacts between the border defence departments. The Chinese leadership in Beijing, 
however, did not believe that the Soviets were acting in good faith, and became 
convinced that as with the Japanese at Pearl Harbour, the dispatch of an apparent 
peace envoy actually presaged a surprise attack. When it did not arrive on China's 
National Day, October 1 S\ the Chinese politburo pinpointed the arrival of a Soviet 
delegation on October 20th to negotiate the border issues as likely cover for a surprise 
attack. So sincere was their belief in this that almost the entire Party, government 
and military leadership evacuated the capital in advance of the arrival of the Soviets. 
Those who stayed, including Zhou Enlai, moved to an underground bunker. On 
October 1 ih, to Mao's unbridled fury, Lin Biao issued 'Order Number One', which 
among many other drastic measures put the P.L.A. into forward positions and forced 
the evacuation of many urban areas. This ran counter to P.R.C. attempts to reduce 
tension with the Soviets, such as October's sharp reduction in the number of 'hostile 
symbols' aimed at the Soviet Union in official media organs, taking them to their 
lowest level since July 1968. And when, of course, the Soviet negotiators arrived in 
24 President Ho Chi Minh's Testament: appeal and last tribute of the Central Committee of the Viet 
Nam Workers' Party, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969), p.8. 
25 Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash', p.37. 
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the Chinese capital they brought with them little more than a change of shirts and 
h . d" 26 t elr IscusslOn papers. 
What is most interesting about this period, is that in the midst of this war 
panic the P.R.C. government found the time to sign the long-delayed Sino-
Vietnamese aid agreement for 1970, and took measures to strengthen Sino-
Vietnamese relations and improve the efficacy of China's material aid to the D.R.V. 
On the 26th of September in Beijing, less than three weeks after the funeral of Ho and 
only a few days before China's National Day celebrations (the first suspected date 
for a Soviet attack), the long-awaited agreement was signed by Li Xiannian and Le 
Thanh Nghi, under what Hanoi considered to be surprisingly generous terms. "The 
Nhan Dan editorial of 26th September recounted China's assistance since the war of 
resistance against the French, and hailed the recently signed agreement as 'a new, 
brilliant expression of the increasingly consolidated and developed friendship and 
militant solidarity between the fraternal Vietnamese and Chinese peoples. ",27 In late 
September Mao himself, in a meeting with Pham Van Dong, present in the Chinese 
capital to attend the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic of 
China, proposed that the four Chinese provinces (Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and 
Hunan) that had assumed responsibilities for providing direct assistance to certain 
provinces in the D.R.V. establish Vietnam Assistance Leadership Groups to fulfill 
the function of 'Vietnam Assistance Bases'. Zhou Enlai also held three sets of talks 
with the D.R.V. Premier during this visit. Clearly the business of government and 
inter-state relations was continuing, irrespective of the fears of a Soviet attack.28 
It is important to note, however, that despite Vietnamese gratitude for the 
apparent Chinese largesse, the amount of military aid given to the North Vietnamese 
in 1970 was, in fact, the lowest of any year since 1964. What is even more curious 
is the sudden drop-off in the number of bullets supplied to Hanoi by Beijing in 
26 Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao shi [A Diplomatic History of the 
People's Republic of China), vol. 2 (1957-1969), (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), p.275; 
Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969', pp.39-41; C.D.R.O., Mao Zedong Zhllll1l, 
pp.1564-5; Dillon, Burton & Soderlund, 'Who Was the Principal Enemy?', p.469. 
27 Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, pp.30-1. 
28 P.R.C. Foreign Ministry, Zhou waijiao huodong, pp.540-6; C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, 
pp.324-330; Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', p.31; Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-Mei hejie', Li Danhui, 
Zhongguo Yu Yindllzhina Zhanzheng, p.227. 
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comparison to the other main armaments the Chinese supplied to the D.R.V. (guns, 
artillery pieces and artillery shells).29 
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Quite how such Vietnamese enthusiasm could be engendered by what is 
clearly a further sharp drop in Chinese military aid is difficult to explain, unless one 
considers the strange and new imbalance in the proportion of bullets (and to a much 
smaller extent, artillery shells) that would remain for the rest of the duration of the 
Vietnam War. One possible, though admittedly speculative, explanation for both of 
these phenomena is that as part of the aid package, China transferred wholesale to 
North Vietnam the capacity for the Vietnamese to manufacture their own bullets 
(and shells), in a manner similar to that which had been carried out by the border 
provinces with regard to the manufacture of agricultural machinery etc. And while 
there is no reference to this in the documents that have become available from the 
Yunnan archives, armament manufacture would have been under central government 
control and beyond the scope of the provincial authorities. 
Whatever the cause of the Vietnamese delight, it is clear that there was a 
marked improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations in the months following the death 
of Ho Chi Minh. If confirmation had been needed of China's acute need to break 
free of the diplomatic isolation Mao had thrust upon it three years earlier, then the 
six months between March and September 1969 provided it in abundance; Ho's 
disappearance from the scene in Hanoi served to highlight it, and probably reignited 
Mao's ruminations on his own mortality and legacy. And although the C.C.P. 
Chairman had planned to comprehensively rebuild China's foreign relations from 
1969 onwards once the 'destructive phase' of the Cultural Revolution had been 
concluded, and part of that process would be a relationship with the Nixon 
administration different from that with its predecessor, the border clashes with the 
U.S.S.R. escalated to a degree he had neither foreseen nor predicted. It was clear 
that Mao needed Nixon; the question was did he have anything to offer the new 
American president? The most obvious response was, of course, in Vietnam. But 
rather than moving to ease the pain of the broken limb that Indochina represented for 
America by leaning on Hanoi, Mao's strategy would be quite the opposite: he aimed 
to help Hanoi amputate it as quickly as possible. 
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Starter signals and initial contacts 
In the background to this fluid situation within the communist world, President 
Richard Nixon and his foreign policy team had been paying close attention to the 
violent confrontation between the Chinese and Soviets in the spring and summer of 
1969. Taking the incidents at Zhenbao Island as their cue, they began to recognise 
that an opportunity was now opening up for improved relations between Washington 
and Beijing. Presidential approval was given to Senator Mike Mansfield's attempts 
to get a visa to visit China; Mansfield's request was duly passed to Zhou Enlai in late 
August by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia. The lifting of the ban on travel to the 
People's Republic of China followed, intended to be a public gesture of the new 
policy in Washington. 3D 
By late July, Nixon had embarked on a world tour, "during which he intended 
leaving visiting cards for the Chinese at every stop. Nixon began at once spreading 
the word of our readiness to open communication with Peking." In Southeast Asia, 
Nixon indicated that America opposed Brezhnev's proposed 'Asian collective 
security system', words which will have gone some way towards un-forming the 
impression of U.S.-Soviet community of interest in containing China, an impression 
Nixon had inopportunely created in March through comments on the 'Safeguard' 
missile programme. In both Bucharest and Lahore Nixon conveyed the message that 
he believed "Asia could not 'move forward' if a nation as large as China remained 
isolated" and asked his hosts to act as intermediaries in conveying the message to 
Beijing. Both Presidents Yahya Khan of Pakistan and Ceau~escu of Romania agreed 
to convey the American views to their Chinese counterparts, 'at the highest level,.3! 
Just as it had provided an opportunity for a breakthrough in Sino-Soviet 
contacts, so too the funeral of Ho Chi Minh provided a forum for one of Nixon's 
intermediaries to make their point to their Chinese interlocutors. On his way to 
Hanoi to attend Ho's funeral, and on his return to Bucharest, the Chairman of the 
Romanian Council of Ministers, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, stopped in Beijing for talks 
30 Kissinger, WH. Y., p.l80; C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, p.312. 
31 Kissinger, WH. Y, pp.lSO-l. 
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with Zhou Enlai. During these discussions with Maurer, Zhou reiterated the Chinese 
had a policy of non-interference in the U.S.-D.R.V. Paris talks, while he hinted at 
differences of opinion between Hanoi and Beijing, he stressed that what was 
important was the war situation on the ground, and that China would continue to 
support the Vietnamese war effort.32 Zhou placed the impetus on the United States 
to demonstrate the bona fides of their desire to improve bilateral relations, and that, 
in line with imperial Chinese traditions, it would have to be the barbarian envoy who 
would come to Beijing, not the other way round. 
The Chief-of-Staff of the Pakistani Army was present in Beijing at the start of 
October for the celebrations for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's 
Republic of China, where he also had talks with Zhou. The Pakistanis had been 
instructed to convey Nixon's message "only at the highest level", and it is likely that 
this happened when General Abdul Hamid Khan held talks with Zhou on October 2nd • 
In the course of the discussions on the international situation (not specifically Sino-
U.S. relations), Zhou drew attention to places of tension that had existed in the world 
since the early 1950s, and emphasized that China had experience of 'talking while 
fighting' with the Americans in Korea. When listing the areas of global tension, he 
named areas which had been divided or partitioned: Korea, Berlin, China, Vietnam, 
the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. What is noteworthy, however, is that 
while Zhou emphasized that the obstacle to Chinese unity was the fact that the 
Americans hadn't withdrawn from Taiwan, he noted that Vietnam "was a special 
situation" because they were fighting in the South, but not in the North. Zhou's 
message to his Pakistani interlocutor was once again hidden behind a veil of 
diplomatic language, but it was there nonetheless: Taiwan was the key to an 
improvement in Sino-U.S. relations; Vietnam, though an area of tension, was 
'special', and thus, by inference, not insurmountable.33 
Presumably as a consequence of this meeting, Pakistani Air Marshal Sher Ali 
Khan visited Kissinger in Washington D.C. on October 10th, during which he 
expressed the opinion that Nixon's general message of a willingness to improve 
32 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, pp.319-320. 
33 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p.326. 
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relations with China was insufficient, and that President Yahya Khan "needed 
something more specific to convey when Zhou Enlai came to Pakistan." And while 
Kissinger has written that the ensuing 'minuet' between the Americans and Chinese 
was "so stylized that neither side needed to bear the onus of an initiative", by the 
time Kissinger had met with Sher Ali Khan, he had already approved the initiation of 
a bold initiative towards China. On September 9th , the American National Security 
Advisor instructed the American ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, to approach 
the Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw at the first social function they both attended 
and convey the message that the United States was ready for serious talks, 
presumably in the forum of the Warsaw ambassadorial-level talks that had been 
postponed since January 1968. The opportunity was not to present itself for several 
months, however, and in the interim Beijing and Washington continued their 
signalling to each other. 34 
Air Marshal Khan had departed Washington with instructions that his 
President was free to convey to the P.R.C. Washington's decision to withdraw from 
the Taiwan Straits two destroyers that had been on permanent, though largely 
symbolic, patrol there. This was accompanied shortly afterwards by the U.S. 
Consul-General in Hong Kong's enquiries about the fate of two Americans who had 
been arrested in February in Chinese territorial waters. These gestures were 
accentuated by a telegram from the Chinese embassy in Pakistan, almost certainly 
detailing the content of Nixon's conversation with the Pakistani Air Marshal. Zhou 
Enlai passed the message on to Mao, noting that "the trend of Nixon and Kissinger is 
worth keeping an eye on ... 35 In response to the enquiry, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Beijing internally approved the release of the two imprisoned Americans, 
and recommended that the news be conveyed to the American ambassador in Poland, 
indicating Beijing's willingness to resume the Warsaw channel of communication; 
but Zhou chose to wait for a more concrete gesture from Washington before acting 
on the recommendations. He did not have to wait too long. 36 
34 Kissinger, W.HY., pp.186-7. 
35 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, pp.334. 
36 Kissinger, W.H Y., pp.186-7. 
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On December 3rd Ambassador Stoessel in Warsaw seized an opportunity 
presented to him at a fashion show in the Yugoslavian embassy in the Polish capital, 
and attempted to transmit to a startled and fleeing Chinese charge d'affaires the 
message that the U.S. government was prepared for serious talks. Undeterred by the 
flight of Lei Yang, who had not been briefed for such a contingency, Stoessel 
delivered the message to his interpreter, and it was hurriedly passed to Beijing where 
Zhou brought it to the attention of Mao. Zhou told Lei (the ambassador having been 
recalled to Beijing during the Cultural Revolution) to respond positively to the 
American initiative, and on December 4th Mao gave his personal approval to the 
Foreign Ministry proposal to release the two Americans and to convey the news to 
the Americans via their ambassador in Poland. Contact between the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of China had been re-established.37 
One cannot say for certain whether the timing was connected, however on 
December 11 th, the same day that the Chinese Politburo met to discuss the 
withdrawal of the Soviets from the Sino-Soviet border talks 'to take a rest' and 
return to Moscow, in Warsaw Ambassador Stoessel was invited to the Chinese 
embassy for discussions - the first time any such invitation had been issued since the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China. During the meeting the resumption 
of the Warsaw talks was discussed, and it was agreed that there should be another 
meeting before the New Year to discuss the issue further. The next day Zhou 
instructed the Pakistani ambassador to China to convey the message that the official 
Warsaw channel should be used for any communications. Zhou further emphasized 
that while China would approach the meetings on the basis of the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence, its standpoint was that all American military forces must 
withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and he hoped the Pakistani President 
would make this very clear to the Americans. During this conversation, Zhou noted, 
presumably for the attention of Nixon, that the Warsaw channel, though dormant, 
had not been closed. Nixon did not need to "circuitously play games", although he 
was of the opinion that "it remained to be seen how the great the results [of this 
37 Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, 'Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber and Diplomatic Probe in 
Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks seen from the Chinese Perspective', in Ross and 
Jiang, Re-examining the Cold War, p.195; C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol.3, pp.336-7. 
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channel] will be".38 In the words of the Chinese diplomatic historian Zhang Baijia, 
"Beijing wanted to see how effective the Warsaw channel would be." 39 
On January 8th Lei Yang and the American ambassador held an informal 
meeting at the U.S. embassy and agreed to hold their first official meeting on 
January 20th • Zhang Baijia has written, "Zhou Enlai still harboured considerable 
doubts about Nixon's intentions and thus approached resumption of the 
ambassadorial talks with great caution. Taiwan had been the key problem in the 
earlier Sino-American talks, but the United States had then had little to say about the 
issue. For China, a resolution of the Taiwan problem could not be avoided, because 
it was the precondition for normalisation of Sino-American relations.,,4o This was 
emphasised in a communication received in Washington on January 15th , but with an 
added twist, 
Kissinger: The Ambassador in Kabul had an interesting contact with the 
Chinese Ambassador through the Yugoslavian Ambassador. He suggested that 
talks begin in Warsaw then talk could begin about talking elsewhere. One 
interesting thing he said - Vietnam has no bearing on China-U.S. relations. 
President: Whole new attitude on that. 
Kissinger: We have to withdraw from Taiwan. In Vietnam we have to 
withdraw eventually .... The Chinese push is withdraw from Vietnam as soon as 
possible and should not be raised in Warsaw. It has no bearing on U.S.-China 
relations. Very interesting. 
President: Yes.41 
The meeting between Lei and Stoessel took place five days later. At this 
135th meeting of the Warsaw talks Stoessel reiterated the fact that the United States 
was willing to send an envoy to Beijing, or accept one in Washington, to have more 
thorough discussions. Lei replied that if Washington was interested in holding 
meetings at higher levels or through other channels they should then present more 
specific proposals. The Chinese replied at the next meeting, on February 20th, that 
they would be willing to receive a representative of the President in Beijing for 
38 P.R.C. Foreign Ministry, Zhou waijiao huodong, p.546. 
39 Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, pp.338-9; Kissinger, w.H. Y., pp.188-9, 191; Zhang and Jia, 'Steering 
Wheel, Shock Absorber and Diplomatic Probe', in Ross and Jiang, Re-examining the Cold War p.195. 
40 Zhang and Jia, 'Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber and Diplomatic Probe', in Ross and Jiang, Re-
examining the Cold War, p.196. 
41 Telcon, The President/Kissinger, 6: 1 0 p.m., January 15th, 1970, NPMP/Kissinger telcons/8/3. 
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exploratory discussions on the basic issues in Sino-American relations, and once 
again expressed their desire to improve relations with the United States on the basis 
of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. However, this proved to be the last 
ever meeting of the Warsaw talks. The situation in Indochina became even more 
complicated with a coup in Cambodia, and a subsequent upturn in fighting in 
Vietnam: Beijing's hopes that the war in Vietnam would not be widened, and that 
Indochina could be passed over as an irritant in Sino-American relations, had been 
dashed.42 
The war expands 
On March 18th, Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk was deposed as head of state 
while abroad and replaced by the pro-American general Lon Nol. The former 
Cambodian head-of-state arrived in Beijing the next day, where he was greeted at the 
airport by a party headed by Zhou Enlai. And while the Chinese Premier warmly 
welcomed the prince, he surely wished that his royal guest were arriving under 
different circumstances. The new situation in Cambodia had greatly complicated the 
nature of the war in Indochina, and brought the prospect of a pro-American 
government in Phnom Penh moving against the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
communist forces in the north and east of the country, bringing with it the possibility 
of further expansion of the war across Vietnam's borders. In the morning, Zhou and 
Sihanouk held talks during which Zhou advised the Cambodian Prince not to return 
to his homeland, to which Sihanouk agreed. Later that afternoon, a politburo 
meeting was convened to discuss the situation in Cambodia and a request made from 
Sihanouk to hold a press conference and issue a statement. The politburo decided to 
assist Sihanouk's activities, and to make preparations in case the Chinese embassy in 
Phnom Penh was trashed or overseas Chinese in Cambodia arrested. The decisions 
were approved by the Chairman.43 
42 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, p.348; Chen Jian, Mao's China, p.251; Kissinger, w.H. Y., 
pp.689-92. 
43 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, p.356; P.R.C. Foreign Ministry, Zhou Waijiao Hllodong, 
p.549; Zhai, CATVW, p.187-8. 
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Further talks about the situation in Cambodia continued over the next two 
days with both Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese Premier Ph am Van Dong who 
had flown to Beijing specifically to discuss the events in Phnom Penh. At a meeting 
with Sihanouk on the 22nd, Sihanouk shared with the Chinese premier a draft of an 
appeal he was intending to make to the Cambodian people, calling on them to rally 
behind him. Zhou commented positively on the speech and reiterated China's 
support for him, and the next day Sihanouk announced to the press his five point 
statement proposing the establishment of a Royal National Union Government of 
Kampuchea (more commonly known by its French acronym, GRUNK), a National 
Liberation Army, and the National United Front of Kampuchea (also more 
commonly known by the French, FUNK). Sihanouk's statement was printed in full 
the next day in Renmin Ribao although it was not, as yet, accompanied by any 
official commentary. On the 25 t \ the government of the D.R.V. expressed its full 
support for Sihanouk's statement; the Chinese government, as yet did not. That 
same day, however, Zhou sent a report on the Cambodian problem and the situation 
in Indochina to Mao and Lin Biao, proposing a 'three countries, four sides' 
(Cambodia, Laos and the two Vietnams) meeting in Nanning or Guangzhou, in 
support of a proposal by Sihanouk to issue an anti-American united declaration in the 
name of the same four parties. Mao approved the suggestion, and the level of 
support being offered Sihanouk further increased a week later when, on April 3rd, 
Zhou informed him that he intended to publicly endorse his March 23rd 
announcement in two days time, while on a visit to North Korea. 44 
The Chinese reaction to Sihanouk was one of tentative support, tempered by 
past experience of the Cambodian prince's volatile and mercurial personality. He 
had successfully ducked and weaved his way through both war and peace in 
Indochina for two decades, successfully keeping his country out of the conflicts that 
had afflicted Laos and Vietnam since independence from France. Given this, the 
Chinese leadership opted to exercise caution in their dealings with him. Zhou made 
China's attitude clear to Pham Van Dong in a meeting between the two in Beijing on 
44 Philip Short, Pol Pot: the history of a nightmare, (London: John Murray, 2005), p.198; C.D.R.O., 
Zhou En/a; nianpu, vol. 3, pp.356-9; S.R.Y. For. Min., White Book, p.44; Zhai, CATVW, pp.189-190; 
Gilks, The Breakdown, pp.55-6. 
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March 21 S\ when he told the North Vietnamese premier, "We should support 
Sihanouk for the time being and see how he will act. We should support him 
because he supports the anti-American struggle in Vietnam... We will also see 
whether he really wants to establish a united front to oppose the U.S. before we 
support him.,,45 Given the fluidity of the prince's political inclinations, the P.R.C.'s 
support for him was conditioned on the re-affirmation of his continued support for 
the anti-imperialist struggle, on a basis acceptable to China. And given Sihanouk's 
presence on Chinese soil, diplomatic humiliation, particularly in the eyes of the 
world revolutionary movement, would have followed premature support for the 
Cambodian prince; the stakes were not as high for the Hanoi leadership, who also 
needed to overcome traditional Cambodian suspicion of, and hostility towards, all 
things Vietnamese. Thus, while Hanoi offered immediate and fulsome support for 
the prince, Beijing opted not to close off other possible channels to Phnom Penh until, 
as Zhou outlined to Dong, such times as Sihanouk proved himself. 
As a result of Beijing's wariness of Sihanouk, Zhou continued to keep 
channels of communication open to the Lon Nol government in late March, in an 
attempt to use its diplomatic leverage to persuade him to tolerate the Vietnamese 
communist sanctuaries in the east of the country, and to permit the continued supply 
of Chinese weapons and rice to them via the port of Sihanoukville (a practice Lon 
Nol had grown personally rich upon). If Lon Nol could be persuaded to continue as 
before, (and there were financial incentives for him to do so), Zhou and Mao were 
not averse to co-operating with him in a continuation of Sihanouk's policies but 
without Sihanouk; as Zhou had commented on the Cambodian general in 1967, "If 
we spend some money on him, he can be exploited for some time."46 And while Lon 
Nol's blood had been condemned by the Chinese premier as "feudal [and] 
capitalistic", the fact that that same blood was said to have been Chinese cannot but 
have counted in his favour in Beijing. Thus Beijing trod carefully through the 
minefield of Cambodian politics in full awareness of the unpredictability of all three 
45 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, March 21,1970,77 Conversations, p.158. 
46 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Ph am Van Dong, April 10, 1967, in ibid., p.lO!. 
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major parties - Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and Pol Pot - until such times as Zhou Enlai felt 
certain he had found a reliable partner (by Cambodian standards). 47 
Much has been made of China's backing of Sihanouk while simultaneously 
exploring contacts with Lon Nol, and some have argued that that these actions were 
designed primarily to "improve its position vis-a-vis Hanoi".48 However, while 
China certainly was keen to retain influence in Cambodia, the case for Sino-
Vietnamese competition at this stage must not be overstated. The Hanoi leadership 
had also discussed the utility of negotiating with the new regime in Phnom Penh, but 
had concluded that "negotiations would not bring about any results, because [Lon 
Nol and Sirik Matak] would eventually fight against US.,,49 Hanoi, however, had 
very little diplomatic leverage with which to negotiate with the new Cambodian 
government; Beijing, on the other hand, through military aid and road transport fees 
paid to Phnom Penh for materiel shipped to the Vietnamese communists, did. Hanoi, 
too, was also prepared to play for time in Cambodia, though they were largely 
dependent on the actions of the other players. Having little faith in the outcome of 
negotiations with Lon Nol, the best way for the D.R.V. to achieve an outcome 
favourable to them was to publicly, swiftly, and firmly back Sihanouk in an effort to 
overcome his suspicion of them, and to create momentum behind his co-operation 
with the Khmer Rouge.50 
Beijing certainly adopted a more circumspect approach to Sihanouk than did 
Hanoi, but this must not be taken as evidence of wildly different analyses or goals. 
While we are still not sure at what point in April Beijing broke off discussions with 
Lon Nol, and despite the fact that it only finally severed diplomatic relations with 
him on May 5th, it is highly improbable that China could have back-tracked from 
Zhou's April 5th public declaration of support (approved by Mao and the entire 
politburo) for Sihanouk's proposed national unity government. China remained 
cautious, however, until the Cambodian prince actually formed this government; 
when he did so (under Chinese instruction), on May 5th, China recalled its diplomats 
47 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Le Thanh Nghi, June 5, 1973, in 
ibid., p.186. 
48 Gilks, The Breakdown, p.54. 
49 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, March 21,1970,77 Conversations, p.160. 
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from Phnom Penh (admittedly one full month after Hanoi had done so) and 
recognised the new government-in-exile. It was merely a formality, however, for the 
GRUNK had already joined the government of North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam 
(P.R.G.) in late April at the Conghua hot springs resort, in Guangxi, China, for the 
Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. 51 
For the Indochinese revolutionary parties to be meeting under the Chinese 
aegis and pledging their united resolve to defeat American aggression represented a 
great diplomatic coup for Mao and Zhou, not just against the United States, but also 
against the Soviet Union, which had opted to recognise the Lon Nol government in 
Phnom Penh. So important was the Conference to the Chinese leadership that its 
planning received the attention of not just the Premier, but also of Chairman Mao 
and Vice Chairman Lin Biao, as well as the rest of the politburo. Zhou arrived on 
April 25t \ the second day of the two-day conference, in order to celebrate its success, 
and to hold talks with the main participants (Ph am Van Dong, P.R.G. Chairman 
Nguyen Huu Tho, Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong, and, of course, 
Sihanouk). Zhou again expressed the total support of the Chinese government and 
people for the joint declaration issued by the conference, and emphasised the 
unbreakable front formed by the peoples of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, who 
could "rest assured that in the common struggle against U.S. imperialism, the 
Chinese people will always stand by their side. "Together we unite, together we 
fight and together we will win victory. ,,52 A statement in support of the conference 
was also added to the official Chinese May Day celebrations' slogan.53 
Before May Day arrived, however, the situation on the ground in Cambodia 
became even more complicated, with the announcement by the American 
government of its incursions into Cambodia. A flurry of meetings took place in the 
days that followed, reflecting the seriousness with which the Chinese viewed this 
new tum of events. Mao himself (accompanied by Zhou Enlai) met with Sihanouk 
51 Short, Pol Pot, pp.201-2. 
52 Signal Victory of the Militant Unity of the Three Indo-Chinese Peoples, (Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1970), pp.90-91. 
53 C.O.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, pp.363-4. 
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on May 15" and in a meeting on the 2nd of May Sihanouk informed Zhou that he was 
soon to announce the establishment of the GRUNK, under the leadership of the 
national front. The next day officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade met to discuss the question of supporting Sihanouk, and on May 4th 
the Chinese government issued a statement strongly condemning the American 
invasion, and reiterating its support for the Conghua declaration. On May 5th, in 
Beijing, Sihanouk announced the establishment of the GRUNK, whereupon Zhou 
personally went to the Cambodian prince's residence to express the Chinese party, 
government and army's congratulations to him and to formally recognise his new 
government as the sole legal government of Cambodia. 54 
Neither the Chinese nor the North Vietnamese had sought an expansion of 
the war throughout all of Indochina, and had for several years been working to 
prevent the Khmer communists from taking up arms against Sihanouk's government. 
Both North Vietnamese and Chinese leaders had been in agreement that the best way 
to further the revolutionary cause in Indochina was in a process of stages, and the 
liberation of Vietnam must precede a revolution in Cambodia. To have acted 
otherwise would have meant the end of Sihanouk's passive acquiescence to the 
supply of the Ho Chi Minh trail through the east of his country, and the supply and 
sale of arms through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. Now that this had come 
to pass, full-scale war in Cambodia was inevitable - something that had the potential 
to grievously retard the war effort in South Vietnam, and would certainly increase' 
American involvement in the region and interfere with the burgeoning Sino-
American rapprochement. It was, however, the actions of the pro-American 
Cambodian Prime Minister that caused this to pass, rather than those of the 
Cambodian communists. Nonetheless, it was this latter group who would prove to 
be the ultimate beneficiary. Lon Nol's coup released them from the shadows of their 
Vietnamese comrades and gave them international legitimacy behind the figure-head 
of Sihanouk, and established the Khmer Rouge as independent actors on the 
Indochinese stage. It was an event that would prove to have lasting consequences for 
China's relationship with Vietnam. 
S4 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p.365. 
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In the meantime, however, Zhou Enlai had been able to unite the four 
revolutionary 'governments' of the three Indochinese peoples under a Chinese 
banner. The coup against Sihanouk was an unexpected though useful tum of events: 
the turmoil in Phnom Penh had caught the Soviets flat-footed, and they continued to 
recognise the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, putting them at odds with Hanoi 
as well as Beijing. From the Chinese perspective, the P.R.C. and North Vietnam had 
been brought into close co-operation at an opportune time, given the relative poverty 
of Chinese aid to Hanoi in 1970, while the Indochinese Peoples' Summit was a 
welcome answer to Brezhnev's Asian collective security proposals. Conversely, 
however, the Cambodian incursions represented a rebuffal of Mao's overtures to 
Nixon and a setback in his quest to counter the Soviet threat. It was also something 
of a personal rejection for the C.c.P. Chairman, who after all had 'voted for Nixon' 
in 1968 in the belief that he would counter Soviet pressure, not expand the war in 
Southeast Asia. An angry Chinese response was to be expected. 
Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs! 
The events in Cambodia completely altered the strategic picture in Indochina and 
caused a major reassessment of the burgeoning Chinese contacts with the United 
States. Prior to the American incursions into what was now the Khmer Republic, 
Beijing's message to Washington was that that while the war in Vietnam, as it 
currently stood, would not necessarily be an impediment to improved Sino-U.S. 
relations, a further expansion of the war into Cambodia would be. Thus, when 
Nixon ordered incursions into Cambodia on April 29th to eliminate Vietnamese 
Communist strongholds there, China took measures to show that improved relations 
between the P.R.C. and the United States were not to be had at any price. Initially, 
however, the Chinese reaction was relatively cautious, and Beijing restrained itself to 
issuing stem warnings about flagrant U.S. provocation, and expressions of support 
for the Indochinese Peoples' Congress. Mao personally expressed his concern about 
the tum of events in Indochina to visiting North Vietnamese comrades, and reiterated 
his belief that the most important factor in getting the Americans out of Vietnam was 
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military force. If the war could be ended with a communist victory, then a 
contentious issue would be removed from Sino-American bilateral relations, 
something that was clearly also on the Chairman's mind during this conversation 
with Le Duan (who was in Beijing on his way back to Hanoi from Moscow), and he 
addressed many rhetorical points to an invisible Nixon - "You invade another 
country, why is it wrong for us to back that country?" The paradoxical nature of the 
policies China was beginning to pursue was clearly weighing heavily, as he 
concluded, "We do not need to fear ... You have occupied our Taiwan Island, but I 
have never occupied your Long Island."s5 Mao felt personally indignant at Nixon's 
expansion of the war, and his presumption that he could have both an improvement 
in Sino-American relations, and expand the war on China's doorstep. 56 
On May 16th the Chinese leadership decided to postpone the next round of 
Warsaw ambassadorial talks that had been scheduled for the 20th • However, to 
emphasise the conditional nature of continued contacts, and that the Chinese would 
not abandon their Indochinese comrades, it was also proposed that Mao should issue 
a statement reiterating Chinese support for the Indochinese peoples' struggle and for 
Sihanouk's government; it was also decided to organise a mass rally in Tiananmen 
Square for the 21 st which would be attended by Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou and recently 
deposed head-of state Sihanouk. These acts were designed to test the United States' 
reaction, and its seriousness about improving relations with China.57 
The cancellation of the talks, announced on May 18th , gravely concerned 
Nixon, particularly as the operations in Cambodia coincided with hints of progress in 
Sino-Soviet border talks. Kissinger reassured the President that the Chinese 
response, bellicose as it was, was the best that could have been hoped for under the 
circumstances; the President, however, was clearly worried about the implications 
for his China policy, and instructed Kissinger to "open that channel to Paris again 
right away".58 The President's attitude changed somewhat, however, when he read 
55 Memcon (extract), Mao Zedong and Le Duan, May 11, 1970, 77 Conversations, pp.164-5. 
56 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p.365. 
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the text of the short declaration, issued in Mao's name, of May 20th, entitled "People 
of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!" 
Zhou, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda drafted and redrafted the declaration over 
a period of several days before sending it to the Chairman for his approval, and had 
then even been shown to Sihanouk for his opinion; it was a very nuanced message, 
notably deviating from the line of the 9th Congress in singling out the U.S.A. for 
defeat, and not naming the Soviet Union. This did not, however, represent a 
reduction in the Chinese assessment of the threat from the Soviet Union; it was, 
rather, a declaration of the futility of the American involvement in Indochina, and an 
exhortation to withdraw. It was, in many ways, the annunciation of Beijing's 
fundamental analysis of the American predicament in Indochina, and was one that 
would be oft repeated (in less strident tones) in subsequent direct talks.59 
The message for Nixon was clear: improved Sino-U.S. relations were 
contingent on the realisation of a continued de-escalation of American involvement 
in the war in Indochina, with a view to total U.S. disengagement. The Chinese sense 
of affront also surfaced in Mao's statement, which took pains to draw attention to 
Nixon's own troubles, "with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad ... a 
paper tiger, now in the throes of its deathbed struggle... [W]ho actually fears 
whom?,,60 Inherent was the assertion that the U.S. needed China as much as China 
needed the United States, and that Nixon should not take Mao's co-operation for 
granted. Even before any high-level contacts had taken place, the Chairman was 
laying out to the President the terms under which business could be done. 61 
Nixon's immediate reaction to this statement was one of belligerent posturing, 
and he ordered "every element of the Seventh Fleet not needed for Vietnam moved 
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into the Taiwan Strait. 'Stuff that will look belligerent. I want them to know we are 
not playing the chicken game.'" However, Kissinger's analysis of Mao's statement 
that it was "remarkably bland" served to dissuade the Commander-in-Chief of the 
appropriateness of his orders.62 And for all he claimed that he didn't want to playa 
game of 'chicken', nonetheless it was Nixon who blinked first. Taking up the 
instructions about the Paris channel the President had given before the publication of 
'People of the World Unite', on June 15th Major General Vernon Walters, the U.S. 
Defence Attache in Paris who had been responsible for keeping secret contacts with 
the North Vietnamese there, was instructed to deliver a message to his Chinese 
counterpart, indicating Washington's desire to open another, private, channel for 
communications. Dissatisfaction with the public nature of the Warsaw meetings was 
a sentiment shared in Beijing, and after the invasion of Cambodia the Chinese 
leadership became convinced that only high-level direct talks would have any utility, 
and only when Nixon played bal1.63 
Nonetheless, Beijing was unresponsive to Nixon's Parisian overtures. 
Undeterred by the silence from the other end, the United States ploughed on with its 
own goodwill gestures and signalling, relaxing a variety of trade restrictions that had 
been in place against China; still though, the Chinese leadership made no further 
response throughout the summer of 1970. This was partially intended to serve as a 
rebuke to Nixon for Cambodia, but also because Mao was also preoccupied with 
domestic affairs: for most of the summer of 1970 a showdown between Mao and Lin 
Biao dominated the Chinese political landscape. Mao later alleged to Nixon that Lin 
had opposed Sino-American rapprochement; whether this was true and contributed 
to the slowing of contacts is unknown but unlikely. Nonetheless, with Lin 
dispatched, at least in political terms, at Lushan, Mao could once again turn to 
address the issue of Sino-American relations and, despite Mao's best efforts, the 
62 Kissinger, WH. Y, p.695-6. 
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inseparable issue of the war in Vietnam. Nonetheless, Mao would continue to treat 
the issue of Vietnam in isolation from his policy towards the U.S.64 
Despite the Chairman's desire to pursue rapprochement with the United 
States to counter the Soviet threat in the north, his desired outcome was still to see 
the Americans removed from China's southern frontiers. What the new 
circumstances dictated, however, was that China abandon its previous position, 
which demanded that the Americans be driven into the South China Sea by force of 
arms, and now be prepared to see the Americans withdraw as the result of a 
negotiated settlement. However, as the Chairman had repeatedly reminded his 
Vietnamese colleagues during the 1960s, they were not going to win at the 
negotiating table what they hadn't already won on the battlefield. To assist the 
Vietnamese in this endeavour during the summer of 1970 the Chinese took a much 
more proactive approach in their assistance to Vietnam. American focus on 
interdicting supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail (of which the Cambodian 
incursions had been a part), particularly heavy and sustained aerial bombing, were 
hampering the communists' supply routes into South Vietnam. In talks with Pham 
Van Dong in September 1970, Zhou made a self-criticism in front of his Vietnamese 
counterpart, remarking, "Comrade Mao has often reminded us of understanding your 
difficulties and helping you to solve them, of considering these difficulties ours 
because our relations are the ones between the front and the rear... [W]e have 
basically to satisfy your demands. We have also reviewed some issues that have not 
been brought up by you ... The Great Rear has to help the front.,,65 Though Chinese 
military aid to Vietnam in 1970 was the lowest of any year since 1964, the Chinese 
began to seek ways to increase its efficacy in the face of an intensified U.S. aerial 
interdiction campaign, as well as increasing the volume for the year ahead. 
Reflecting the reduction in threat from the Soviet Union, the increase in military aid 
64 John Holdridge, Crossing The Divide, (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 
p.41; Kissinger, W.H. y, pp.496-8; Chen Jian, Mao's China, p.253; William Burr, The Kissinger 
Transcripts, (New York: The New Press, 1999), p.61. 
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was huge, and from 1970-71 military aid was restored back to approximately the 
levels enjoyed by Hanoi in 1968.66 
Sometime in the summer of 1970 the head of the External Economic Liaison 
Committee of the c.c.P., Fang Yi, was sent by Zhou Enlai to visit Vietnam to assess 
how to more effectively assist North Vietnam in the face of intensive American 
bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail, and how to restore the infrastructure that had been 
built by China and destroyed by American bombing. At this same meeting, Zhou 
went on to comment to Dong that "The report by comrade Fang Yi about his recent 
trip to Vietnam is a good document to learn about the situation in Vietnam. We are 
bureaucratic.,,67 His recommendations were approved by the Central Committee, but 
significantly did not extend to dispatching Chinese engineering or anti-aircraft troops 
back to Vietnam. However, Mao felt free to mention the Chinese support troops, 
though by now withdrawn, in conversation with Pham Van Dong in late September, 
which hints that this may not have been a contentious issue between the two nations 
and that the withdrawal was in fact, as Chinese authors have written, by mutual 
consent once their assigned projects were completed.68 
Chinese aid was still struggling to get through though, in the face of USAF 
ordinance and the closure of the port of Sihanoukville by Lon Nol; as a result Zhou 
dispatched another work group, this time led by the Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Trade, Li Qiang, to go to Vietnam, and even visit the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in order to 
help the Vietnamese overcome their supply difficulties. Li personally reported his 
conclusions to the Chainnan who himself made some practical suggestions as to how 
the situation could be improved, including ordering research into dried foods and 
portable mosquito nets for the Vietnamese comrades. Zhou Enlai also personally 
ordered that loads from China should not exceed a weight limit of twenty kilograms 
since most of the porters were women. As a further gesture of China's commitment 
to their cause, some oil-pipeline construction projects within China were postponed 
in order to supply Vietnam with the actual pipes to help them overcome the losses of 
66 Chen Jian, Mao's China, p.136. 
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oil they were sustaining from American bombing, actions which helped contribute to 
a ten-fold increase in oil supplies over the 1970-71 period.69 
By mid-September, Mao was once again able, and willing, to tum his 
attentions to the United States. The corollary of this was increased reassurance for 
North Vietnam's diplomatic strategy. On September 19th , Zhou commended Pham 
Van Dong on the experience the Vietnamese had gained in the diplomatic struggle, 
and complimented Nguyen Thi Binh and Xu an Thuy on their negotiating abilities.7o 
In a significant conversation four days later, Mao, SUbtly, linked the three issues of 
the North Vietnamese negotiating skill, Chinese assistance to Vietnam, and the 
American desire to come to Beijing for talks, 
Mao Zedong: Why have the Americans not made a fuss about the fact that more 
than 100,000 Chinese troops help you build railways, roads and airports although 
they knew about it? ... They should have made a fuss about it...If they did this, 
what would they do later? The Americans want to go to Beij ing for talks ... we 
replied that if they wanted to go to Beijing, [they should] just go. Later they did 
not dare to go ... I see that you can conduct the diplomatic struggle and you do it 
well ... At first we were a little worried that you were trapped. We are no longer 
worried. 71 
There were several messages in this for Dong: first, the P.R.C. had sent Chinese 
troops to North Vietnam, despite the fact that America would know about it. This 
proved China was not afraid of confrontation with the United States in assisting 
Vietnam, and had risked a lot to do so: it is the Americans who are afraid~ Second, 
just as the North Vietnamese had proved successful in negotiating with the 
Americans and had not capitulated at the negotiating table, nor would China. Finally, 
the Americans were seeking to come to Beijing for talks, not the other way round: 
China has nothing to fear from talking to America, and nor should North Vietnam. 
Mao concluded the meeting with praise for the Vietnamese, "You are fighting very 
well on the battlefield. Your policy for the diplomatic struggle is correct. We must 
. h t,,72 gIve you w at you wan. 
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The events in Cambodia in 1970 had strengthened Mao's hand. Not only had 
the revolutionary parties in Indochina been pushed together by America and her 
allies into a compact under Chinese tutelage, but the failure of the Cambodian 
incursions had demonstrated the weakness of Nixon's strategy in Southeast Asia. 
And while the Sino-Soviet border negotiations had yielded no results, the threat of 
war had dissipated. Domestically China was recovering from the worst ravages of 
the Cultural Revolution, while Mao had successfully dealt with a perceived political 
challenge from Lin Biao. If Nixon wanted to revive the stalled process of 
rapprochement, he was going to have to make the first move. 
Back channels, open doors, and false starts 
By late September 1970, Mao had been stung by Nixon's invasion of Cambodia, and 
was determined that it was Nixon who was going to have to make the running to 
advance Sino-American relations. The global and domestic reaction to Nixon's 
invasion of Cambodia had been overwhelmingly negative, and the killing of four 
students by National Guardsmen at Kent State University on May 4th had given new 
momentum to the domestic anti-war movement. At the end of June the Senate 
passed the 'Cooper-Church amendment', which prohibited military aid to, and US 
military activity in, Cambodia; in mid-July Nixon's Secretary of State had passed 
comment that the Cambodian incursions had been a 'non-success' and in early 
September the 'McGovern-Hatfield amendment' (setting a deadline for U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam on December 31 st 1971) received the support of thirty-nine 
members of the United States Senate. It was probably with all this American 
domestic turmoil over Indochina in mind that the Chairman expressed his 
satisfaction at the North Vietnamese negotiating strategy. Encouraged by Nixon's 
troubles Mao decided that the Chinese government would sit on its hands and wait 
for an overture from Washington. It appears, nonetheless, that the Chairman was 
supremely confident that such a move would eventually come from Nixon, and in 
preparation for it the most prominent American friend of Communist China, the 
author Edgar Snow, was invited onto the podium with Chairman Mao at the National 
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Day celebrations on October 1 st. A photograph was taken of the two men together, 
but it was not published; the Chairman wanted to keep it and publish it at a more 
appropriate juncture, when it was hoped its message would have more impact. 73 
Nixon did not keep the Chinese waiting for long, for by the start of October 
the Americans were scrambling to find a channel through which to re-open dialogue 
with Beijing. On September 27th, Kissinger enlisted his friend, the Frenchman Jean 
Sainteny, into attempting to make private contact with Beijing. At the start of 
October, the American President pointedly commented in an interview with Time 
magazine that "If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China.,,74 
Towards the end of the month, Nixon personally asked Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan to pass the message to Beijing that they were willing to send a high-level 
envoy to China for talks. The next day, he made the same point to visiting 
Romanian President, Nicolae Ceau~escu, and later that evening sent a more public 
signal when he used the words "People's Republic of China" - the first time they had 
ever been publicly uttered by an American President - at a banquet for the Romanian 
dignitaries. 75 
On November 5th, Zhou had talks with Edgar Snow, in which he emphasized 
that Taiwan was the primary issue in Sino-American relations, and that all other 
problems were of a secondary nature: words which the Vietnamese comrades would 
surely have found disturbing. Zhou went on to add that China's door was "wide 
open".76 Five days later that door got the push it needed when the Chinese Premier 
personally received Yahya's message from Nixon. Over the next three days the 
Pakistani President had three more private meetings with Zhou, and one meeting 
with Chairman Mao. On the 14th of November, Zhou gave Yahya the P.R.C.'s reply, 
which echoed the comments made to Snow a few days earlier and carne with the 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman's seal of approval: Taiwan was an indivisible part of 
Chinese territory, and the key issue in Sino-American relations; but if the American 
side really had the desire and means to resolve the issue, then the Chinese 
73 Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp.510-514; C.O.R.O., Mao ledong zhllan, p.1628. 
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government would welcome a special representative of President Nixon's to Beijing. 
Pakistan was designated as the appropriate channel for their response, even though 
on November 21 st the Romanians delivered the same message from Nixon, and were 
given an almost identical reply to pass on.77 
Washington received the Pakistani message on December 9th in the form of a 
verbal note, read o,ut by the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States. The content 
of the message closely resembled the original message given by Zhou to Yahya, 
though in a somewhat abbreviated form. Significantly, the verbal message received 
by Kissinger was not so adamant in its emphasis on the fact that Taiwan stood in the 
way of Sino-American diplomatic relations, hinting at a certain degree of Pakistani 
'finessing' of the message. Washington passed its reply on to the Pakistani 
Ambassador one week later, and immediately tried to link the Taiwan question with 
that of Vietnam. The message concluded by stating that "the meeting in Peking 
would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps 
designed to improve relations and reduce tensions between our two countries. With 
respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United 
States Government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East Asia and 
the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish." 78 With this began Kissinger's 
attempts to lever Beijing into pressurising Hanoi to end the war on conditions more 
favourable to the United States by linking it to the question of Taiwan. In twelve 
months the situation had been reversed: at the start of 1970 China had grabbed the 
American President's attention with the statement that the war in Indochina was not 
an impediment to improved relations; by the year's end the Americans were 
. k't 79 attemptmg to rna e 1 so. 
In the meantime, Mao was making preparations to demonstrate the 
seriousness of China's response though an interview with Edgar Snow, on December 
18th • In this interview, Mao told Snow that he "would be happy to talk to [Nixon], 
either as a tourist or as President". What the interview didn't touch on, however, 
77 Ibid., pp.409-II, 415. 
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was Vietnam, even when Snow mentioned the war as a cause of social unrest in 
America. The corollary of Mao's renewed practical interest and support for the 
Vietnamese war effort was a creeping diplomatic silence on the subject: in line with 
the message Nixon had received in January, Beijing wanted to keep Indochina as an 
issue peripheral to Sino-American relations.so 
Mao had initially told Snow, however, that their conversation was not for 
publication, but for "scholars and researchers".81 Later, though, the American was 
given a verbatim transcript of the conversation, but was instructed not to publish it 
for several months: the Chairman was making the assumption that the C.LA. would 
have the intelligence to pick up on his message before it made it to print. As a stamp 
of the authenticity of the interview, and the seriousness with which Mao intended its 
contents to be taken in Washington, on Christmas Day 1970, the photograph of 
Edgar Snow with Mao on Tiananmen Gate was published on the front page of 
Renmin Ribao. The picture was meant to grab the attention of Washington's China 
watchers and draw attention to his conversations with Snow. For emphasis, it was 
accompanied by the caption: "The Great Teacher of the Chinese people, Chairman 
Mao, recently met with American friend and distinguished personage Edgar Snow, 
and had cordial and friendly discussions with him." The significance of the 
photograph and caption went unnoticed in Washington. Kissinger noted that the 
Chinese overestimated Washington's subtlety and the message did not get to the 
Nixon administration for several months. It mattered little though, because on 
January Ith Zhou's message via Bucharest arrived, echoing Mao's comments to 
Snow, and reinforcing that delivered via Pakistan. In the week after Yahya's visit 
the Chinese had decided to up the stakes substantially and invite Nixon himself. It 
was a decision that was going to have a long-term detrimental effect on Beijing's 
relationship with Hanoi.82 
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Upon reading the message Nixon decided that "we may appear too eager. 
Let's cool it - wait for them to respond to our initiatives."s3 It would prove to be a 
much longer wait than either Nixon or Kissinger had bargained for: the joint South 
Vietnamese-American invasion of Laos from January to March temporarily 
suspended the process. Sino-American rapprochement was on hold again, and 
despite Mao's best efforts once again one of the main causes lay in Indochina.84 The 
first stage of the offensive began on January 29th • On February 4th , as Kissinger noted, 
the Renmin Ribao issued "an eloquent denunciation of the operations in Laos. But 
just as in the preceding year over Cambodia, it carefully avoided personal attacks on 
Nixon." To emphasise this point, that same day, the Chinese Deputy Foreign 
Minister passed a message to the Norwegian Ambassador in Beijing for transmission 
to Washington stating that "China was aware of a new trend on American policy. 
The Indochina war made it impossible to resume the Warsaw talks ... but sooner or 
later the Chinese would want to sit down and talk". However, there would be no 
further movements between the two sides until after the incursions had ended in late 
March.85 
In some respects, the pause in progress provided the Chinese with a useful 
respite during which time they could lay the groundwork to alleviate the undoubted 
shock, at minimum, that Hanoi would feel as a result of a visit to China by Nixon. 
As far back as the previous November Mao had personally intervened when the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry proposed that the Chinese Red Cross donate two million 
yuan to the South Vietnamese Liberation Red Cross for disaster relief: the Chairman' 
increased the donation to five million yuan. That same month, the Foreign Trade 
Ministry sent orders that aid commitments to Vietnam for the coming year should be 
met as quickly as possible.86 
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While the South Vietnamese operations in Laos were ongoing, on February 
Ith Zhou hosted a North Vietnamese economic delegation, led by D.R.V. Vice-
Premier Le Thanh Nghi, during which Nghi invited the Chinese Premier to visit 
North Vietnam, an invitation that Zhou accepted. Three days later, "what the 
Vietnamese communists themselves had then acknowledged as a very generous 
package of supplementary economic and military aid to Hanoi", worth around 15 
million yuan was signed.87 On March 3rd the Politburo met to discuss aspects of 
Zhou's impending visit to Hanoi, and resolved to strengthen China's course of action 
in assisting Vietnam. It served as a strong public declaration of continued support 
for the Vietnamese struggle. To further emphasize this statement of intent, a senior 
Chinese delegation visited Hanoi from March 5th to 8th, led by Zhou Enlai, but also 
including Ye Jianying, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the C.C.P. 
Central Committee, the director of the Armament Department of the P.L.A. 's 
General Logistics Department, Yuan Huaping, and a Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the 
P.L.A., Qiu Huizhuo. The prominence of military men in the delegation indicates 
that a strong show of solidarity with the Vietnamese war effort was intended, and 
was surely connected to both the events in Laos and the Sino-American opening.88 
While in Hanoi, Zhou addressed a mass rally at which he used Mao's name to 
publicly reaffirm China's support for Vietnam. The Vietnamese comrades were 
clearly nervous, however, and urged Zhou to spearhead a 'world-wide People's 
Front' that would include the Soviet Union to oppose the U.S. and other imperialists, 
but the Chinese premier was, unsurprisingly, unwilling to enter into such a 
movement. We do not know whether Zhou's speeches in Hanoi merely hinted to 
their Vietnamese comrades, though without specifically mentioning it, the 
contradictions that would lie ahead as China continued to pursue rapprochement with 
the United States, though given the tone of Zhou's conversations with Pham Van 
Dong it seems clear that the Vietnamese had some idea of the goings-on between 
Washington and Beijing. Zhou went to great pains to emphasise that "peoples' 
revolutionary struggles cannot be sacrificed for the sake of relations between 
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governments. Only traitors do that." In another significant section of his speech, 
while explaining the dangers of entering into a United Front with the Soviets, he 
emphasised that "a country's foreign policy is the product of history; whether it has 
a rapprochement with a particular country sooner or whether it has it later, it is all 
the product of history and it cannot use the problems or successes of any other 
country to serve its own foreign policy".89 By evoking an image of the Soviet Union 
conducting such a policy, and condemning it, Zhou was giving assurances, in 
advance, that China's future course of action vis-a-vis the United States would be 
honourable. It is unlikely, however, that the comrades in Hanoi were convinced. 
They were surely able to sense that an unstoppable momentum was building behind a 
Sino-American detente, and feared for the consequences.90 
Thus, as April began, China and the United States were tantalisingly (or from 
Hanoi's perspective, worringly) close to a breakthrough. Lam Son 719 had ended, 
without success, and American troops had left Laos. China's terms for improved 
relations were being realised, and now all that was required was a major gesture to 
move the process forward. The unlikely environment of the World Table Tennis 
Championships would provide that opportunity, and a new era in Sino-American 
relations would dawn; however, for China another new challenge was also only just 
beginning. China had to avoid completely losing the faith of the Vietnamese 
comrades, and prevent them from moving further into the orbit of the Soviet Union, 
a move that would seriously undermine China's security, perhaps in a manner even 
more dangerous than the threat the Americans had posed in South Vietnam. China's 
relationship with America was to change fundamentally; the challenge was to 
prevent the same happening to the relationship with Hanoi. 
The Cultural Revolution had pushed Chinese society to the brink of catastrophe, 
forcing Mao to call a halt to its activities. The irony was that by the time his effort to 
purge China of revisionism was winding down, the revisionist threat to the P.R.C. 
was more acute than ever. The domestic fight against perceived, or perhaps even 
89 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp.580-1; CO.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianplI, vol. 3, pp.441-2 
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imagined, revisionists had created ever-increasing tensions along the Sino-Soviet 
border, beyond which lay the very real power of the 'revisionist' Soviet Red Army, 
whose strength, and willingness to use it, had been demonstrated in central Europe in 
the summer of 1968. Mao's reaction, in the wake of Nixon's election victory, was to 
embark on a dual policy of attempting to improve relations with both Hanoi and 
Washington, a process that was accelerated by the crisis caused by the Sino-Soviet 
border clashes in the spring and summer of 1969. And while the tensions in Sino-
Vietnamese relations that had been created by the Cultural Revolution began to 
dissipate, they were to be almost immediately replaced by friction caused by Mao's 
decision for rapprochement with the United States. This tension was to become an 
enduring feature of Sino-Vietnamese relations for the next few years, and one which 
prompted Mao to take remedial measures to counter, such as increasing aid ~o Hanoi. 
The necessity of such measures was emphasized by the death of Ho Chi Minh, 
who in many ways embodied the longevity and intimacy of the Sino-Vietnamese 
alliance. The political dynamic in Hanoi would be greatly altered by his passing, and 
it was imperative for China to demonstrate a continuity of solidarity for the 
Vietnamese revolution in Ho's absence. Beyond this immediate factor, Mao's 
decision to seek an improvement in relations with the United States was also an 
important causal factor behind the huge increase in Chinese support for Hanoi. But 
this was more than simply a sweetner to encourage the V.W.P. to swallow the bitter 
pill of Sino-American rapprochement; while Mao had come to believe that Nixon 
was de-escalating American involvement in Indochina, he wanted to ensure that the 
United States left the area rapidly and permanently, without leaving any tail behind. 
Although superficially at odds with his policy of rapprochement, the Chairman's 
assessment of how best to achieve this was to heavily arm the D.R.V. It was 
unlikely, Mao felt, that Nixon would entirely surrender at the negotiating table 
America's position in South Vietnam unless it had been forced upon him on the 
battlefield - unless, of course, the American President could be convinced that the 
improvement in Sino-American relations obviated the need for any such continued 
presence. Furthermore, the path to Sino-American rapprochement would be eased 
by the conclusion of the Vietnam War: a North Vietnamese victory would not only 
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enhance China's position relative to the United States, but would also greatly reduce 
Hanoi's hostility to such a move, ensuring that China did not end up with a Soviet 
satellite on its southern frontier. 
Thus, Mao's America and Vietnam policies were set on parallel tracks, each 
in isolation from the other. The only point where they converged was when Nixon 
appeared to reverse the general trend in his policy by temporarily escalating the 
conflict and spreading it to Cambodia and Laos. At each instance Mao froze 
contacts with America until such times as the trend towards withdrawal restarted, 
whereupon the Sino-American rapprochement resumed. After Nixon's Cambodian 
incursions the Chairman waited for the Americans to restart the process, though he 
had already prepared his response in the form of the Edgar Snow photograph. It was 
the C.C.P. Chairman himself who would make the first bold public move to restart 
the process through 'ping-pong diplomacy' - but only after the failure of Nixon's 
strategy had been demonstrated in Laos. Mao's 'ping-pong' decision, made from a 
position of strength, meant that the speed of the rapprochement was to greatly 
accelerate in the months ahead, but it would be left to Zhou Enlai to manage the 
tricky issue of explaining China's new strategic design to Hanoi. 
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Chapter 3 
April 1971 - January 1972: Making waves and damaee control 
After a chance encounter between two players on the Chinese and American table-
tennis teams at the World Table-Tennis Championships in Japan, Mao took the bold 
decision to invite the American team to China for a series of exhibition games. It 
was a masterstroke, for it kick-started again the rapprochement process, while 
simultaneously preparing the Chinese people for the diplomatic revolution that was 
in the making. It also functioned as a 'soft landing' that helped to pave the way with 
China's Vietnamese comrades, who needed as much preparation as the domestic 
Chinese audience, but who would also require much more convincing of the 
desirability of improved Sino-American relations. l 
Mao's continuous revolution was being transferred, in a rather novel and 
surprising way, into the diplomatic arena by making peace with the arch-imperialist 
who sat in the White House. Given the previous twenty years' Chinese rhetoric, this 
was indeed a diplomatic revolution, though its consequences were as yet uncertain. 
There was no doubt that Nixon and Kissinger would have hopes for rcaping 
dividends in their Vietnam strategy as a result of the new relationship that was .being 
forged with China. The task for Mao and Zhou was to manage these American 
expectations in such a manner that it did not harm the rapprochement process, while 
simultaneously demonstrating to Hanoi that China was not engaging in any form of 
"swindle" of Vietnam of the sort Mao had feared the Soviets would agree to during 
the Cultural Revolution, and which to the Vietnamese would undoubtedly rekindle 
the bitter memories of 1954. 
Ping-pong diplomacy 
The American response to 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' was the relaxation of the 
American trade embargo on China (a move that Nixon was on the verge of making 
1 Chen Jian, Mao's China, pp. 257-262. 
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anyway); this was announced on the day that Zhou Enlai received the American 
table-tennis players in the Great Hall of the People, in the heart of the Chinese 
capital. A head of steam was building behind the two countries' moves towards each 
other, only further emphasized by comments Nixon made on April 16th, when he 
repeated his statement that he hoped to see China some day. Despite the President's 
outward optimism, however, two anxious weeks followed for Nixon and Kissinger, 
during which they heard nothing from Beijing. As a result, on April 26th a courier 
was dispatched to Paris with a letter for Jean Sainteny, a French former diplomat 
whom Kissinger knew personally and who had contacts with the Chinese 
Ambassador in Paris.2 
Nixon and Kissinger had no need to worry, however, because on April 21 5t 
Zhou Enlai had sent his own message, traveling in the opposite direction. A week 
after receiving the American table-tennis team in Beijing, Zhou had requested that 
the Pakistani President convey a message to President Nixon; because it had to be 
couriered it took a week to reach Washington D.C., passing Kissinger's letter to 
Sainteny traveling in the opposite direction. The message noted Nixon's message of 
January 5th , and continued that "Owing to the situation at the time, it has not been 
possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the U.S.A. to the 
Premier of the People's Republic of China". In a characteristically understated 
fashion, Zhou was reminding Nixon of the problems that his expansion of the 
Vietnam War into Laos had brought to the process of Sino-American rapprochement; 
implicit was also the message that any further such misadventures could not but 
further delay the process of rapprochement. However, unlike previous messages, 
this message from Zhou did not maintain that the purpose of any American visit 
would be to discuss their withdrawal from Taiwan; rather, it noted that "[if] the 
relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored fundamentally, a solution 
to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high-
level responsible persons of the two countries." Having postponed Sino-American 
rapprochement due to the expansion of the war into Laos, in their enthusiasm for its 
resumption the Chinese had acceded to Nixon's December demand that talks would 
, 
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not be limited to discussions of the Taiwan question. Events had demonstrated that 
to protest that Indochina was unconnected flew in the face of reality. Beijing had 
understood that the U.S. envoy was not prepared to appear like a supplicant at the 
Dragon Throne; more significantly, however, an expanded agenda dangled in front 
of Nixon the opportunity to 'discuss' the Vietnam War with the Chinese leaders. 
The message went on to reaffirm the "willingness of the Chinese government to 
receive publically [sic] in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S (for 
instance Mr. Kissinger) .... or even the President himself, for a direct meeting and 
discussions.',3 The Paris courier was intercepted before he could fulfill his task.4 
If Zhou Enlai had intended to excite the White House's optimism that 
rapprochement with China might bear it fruit in Vietnam, it certainly worked. 
Kissinger was buoyed by the whole situation, and felt that it portended well for his 
attempts to negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam, telling the President, "We've 
done it now, we have got it all hooked together .... I have not said this before but I 
think if we get this thing working, we will end Vietnam this year. The mere fact of 
these contacts makes that.',5 The President was a little more hesitant than Kissinger 
to believe that "everything is beginning to fit together", however he was convinced 
that his moves in Laos had strengthened his hand in dealing with the Chinese: "The 
people over two to one thought it had failed and yet here comes the Chinese move", 
enthused Nixon, little realising that it was the very failure of the invasion of Laos 
that had emboldened Mao.6 
Having received the positive response he had hoped for, Nixon set to work on 
maximising political advantage by ensuring that no Democrats would visit China 
before he did. The next day the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, Agha Hilaly, 
was called in by Kissinger to transmit a message onward to the Chinese, stating that 
"President Nixon is very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and 
3 'Message from Premier Zhou Enlai dated April 21, 1971', NPMP/NSC/I031/1. 
4 H.R. Haldeman diary entries for Apri112, 14, 17, 19,20,23,1971, The Haldeman Diaries CD ROM 
(Santa Monica, CA: Sony, 1994); Kissinger, WHo Y., pp. 709-713; letter, Haig to Walters, April 27, 
1971, NPMPINSCII 031/1; C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 452; Memorandum of record from Col. 
Richard T. Kennedy, December 16,1970, NPMP/NSC/I031/1. 
S Telcon, 'The President/Mr. Kissinger, 8.18 p.m., April 27, 1971 " NPMPINSC/I 03111. 
6 'Peking Seeking a Tripolar World', in the Washington Post, July 22, 1971, NPMPINSC/I 03611; 
Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power, (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 369. 
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not to let any politician come into the picture until a government-to-government 
channel is established".' A more substantive reply from the Americans followed on 
May 10th, in which Nixon accepted Zhou's suggestion that he visit Beijing "for di'rect 
conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China", and as a 
preparatory measure proposed a meeting between Kissinger (to whom he had 
eventually awarded the preparatory trip to Beijing) and Zhou Enlai or another high-
level Chinese official. While agreeing that it take place on Chinese soil, the 
President, hoping to prevent his emissary from visiting Beijing before him, suggested 
that it would be preferable were the meeting to take place "at some location within 
convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of 
China." It reiterated the American position that the visit would "begin a preliminary 
exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest," among which Vietnam was an 
obvious priority for the U.s. side. The note continued, "Dr. Kissinger will be 
prepared to come from June 15 onward." Furthermore, the President went to great 
pains to emphasise the secret nature of Kissinger's visit, in direct opposition to 
Zhou's invitation to receive him publicly in Beijing.s 
As further evidence of his bona fides, on May 20th Nixon, via his ambassador 
in Pakistan (who had been taken into Nixon and Kissinger's confidence for the 
purpose of planning the secret trip to Beijing), passed on a message for transmission 
to the Chinese, emphasizing to them that the breakthrough on SALT negotiations 
with the Soviet Union that had been announced that day was in no way directed 
against the People's Republic ofChina.9 China's response arrived on June 2nd, in the 
form of a hand-written note, transcribed by the President of Pakistan, welcoming 
Nixon to Beijing for direct discussions at some point in the future. While 
emphasising the primacy of the Taiwan issue, it went further than the previous 
missive from Zhou by specifically acknowledging that "each side would be free to 
raise the principal issue'of concern to it." There could have existed in Beijing little 
doubt as to what was the principle issue of concern to the U.S. Likely concerned that 
7 'Extract ofmemcon dated May 5, 1971', NPMPINSC/l 031/2. 
8 Undated and unsigned message from Nixon to Zhou (May lOth 1971), NPMPINSC/I031/I. 
9 National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, document 24, 
http://www,nsarchive,org 
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another unanticipated tum of evens in Indochina could once agam halt the 
rapprochement process, the message suggested June 15th to 20t\ the earliest possible 
date suggested by Nixon and less than two weeks away, as the date for Kissinger's 
own visit to the Chinese capital. lo For while Beijing was determined to separate the 
issue of the Vietnam War from Sino-American relations, it could not ignore any 
further escalation of the war. Unsurprisingly, such a short schedule was impossible 
to implement given the President and his advisor's desire for absolute secrecy; after 
the transmission of a further note via Pakistan, the dates of July 9th to 12th were 
agreed upon. An emissary of the President of the United States of America was 
going to Beijing, where he and Zhou Enlai would be free to raise the issues of 
principal concern to them. Taiwan and Vietnam were clearly going to top the agenda; 
what remained to be seen was whether there would be a trade-off between the two. II 
Making waves 
Nixon's insistence on secrecy caused no small amount of suspicion and unease in 
Beijing, and certainly complicated Chinese relations with Hanoi. Had Kissinger 
been able to come publicly to Beijing, Zhou would have at least been able to inform 
his North Vietnamese counterparts in advance, and while it would not have totally 
assuaged their fears about what Beijing was up to with Nixon, it may have gone 
some way toward reassuring them that the Chinese were not going to sell them out to 
the Americans. However, it was impossible to inform the Vietnamese comrades of 
Kissinger's secret visit beforehand, as their anger could well have manifested itself 
in the form of a leak, thereby undercutting Beijing's reliability as a partner in the 
eyes of Nixon. On the other hand, if the North Vietnamese were to find out about 
Kissinger's visit from a source other than the Chinese leadership, then Beijing's 
relations with their comrades in Hanoi would be even further traumatised. Thus, by 
10 'Message from Premier Zhou Enlai to President Nixon, May 29, 1971', NPMPINSC/I031/1. 
Intriguingly, Kissinger appears to have edited the original message written by President Yahya to 
remove all references to his own invitation to 'Peking' and replaced them with the more generic 
'China' - presumably out of fear that Nixon would further insist that Kissinger's meetings take place 
somewhere other than in the Chinese capital. Cf. w.H. Y., p. 727. 
II Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 727-8; handwritten note, Hi1aly to Kissinger, June 19, 1971, 
NPMPINSCII 031/1. 
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acceding to Nixon's demands for secrecy, it was in Beijing's interest that it be 
maintained by all parties concerned. 
The First Secretary of the VWP, Le Duan, passed through Beijing in early 
May returning from the 24th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow, and while there held 
talks with Zhou Enlai. The Chinese Premier praised the victories of the three 
Indochinese peoples, and mentioned the victory in the 'Route 9 Battle' (the U.S. 
supported invasion of Laos) in particular as having hastened the defeat of the 
Americans. He also pledged continued support for the struggle of all three 
Indochinese peoples. Clearly disconcerted by the 'ping-pong diplomacy', though as 
yet unaware of the diplomatic earthquake in the making, Le Duan was unconvinced 
and his remarks pointed, reminding the audience, and Zhou, that the fraternal and 
comradely reception that the Vietnamese receive in China was because they "share a 
common goal." That the Chinese and Vietnamese parties, Le Duan went on, should 
share the same views was an important factor in driving American imperialism out of 
Indochina, and an important factor "in the struggle to oppose Japanese militarism.,,12 
By evoking the spirit of common enemies, Le Duan hoped to remind his Chinese 
hosts of a common bond; his language, however, was couched more in terms of 
national interest than ideology. Sensitive to Vietnamese concerns about their moves 
toward Washington, and perhaps stung by Le Duan's words, Zhou wrote a report of 
his talks with Le Duan and forwarded it to Mao and Lin Biao. However, on the same 
day that the Chinese Premier was hosting the First Secretary of the Vietnam 
Workers' Party, he also participated at a meeting to discuss areas where Renmin 
Ribao's coverage of the war in Vietnam was deficient - particularly where it was 
vulgar and unreasonable, and was occasionally absolutist. A more temperate tone in 
Beijing's coverage could be expected from now on. The ideological dogmatism of 
the Cultural Revolution was badly out of step with China's new foreign policy needs; 
flexibility was now required, and would be extended to Vietnam. 13 
12 Guo Ming et al.. eds., Xiandai Zhong-Yue guanxi ziliao xuanbian, 1949-1978 [A Selection of 
Materials on Modem Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1949-1978], (Beijing: Shishi, 1986), vol. 3, pp.777-
9. 
!3 CD.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, pp. 456-7; Gilks, The Breakdown. p. 71. 
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Almost a week later, on May 17th , via the Chinese ambassador in Islamabad, 
Zhou received Nixon's fonnal response to the invitation to send an emissary to 
Beijing, but another week lapsed before any fonnal meetings were held to discuss 
the Chinese response. By the time a core group of Foreign Ministry officials met on 
May 25th to discuss Nixon's acceptance, the third note from the American president 
in the space of less than four weeks had arrived (infonning the Chinese of progress 
in u.S.-Soviet SALT negotiations). The next day the contents of all four messages 
were put before the Politburo, at Mao's suggestion, in order to discuss China's 
response, and to plan for both the preliminary meeting with Kissinger, and the 
subsequent summit with Nixon himself. Mao was clearly confident of success. The 
discussion largely centred on the issue of Taiwan and made the resolution of the 
Taiwan issue the sine qua non for the talks' success, and eight principles were drawn 
up that were to fonn the basis of China's position in the talks. 14 
Topping the list was, unsurprisingly, the demand that "All American anned 
forces and special military installations must be withdrawn from China's Taiwan 
province and the Taiwan Straits area by a set date. This is the key question in the 
restoration of Sino-American relations." Secondly, the principles went on to declare 
that the liberation of Taiwan was an internal affair in which external intervention 
would not be tolerated, but that the P.R.e. would "strive to liberate Taiwan using 
peaceful means, and our efforts towards Taiwan shall be in earnest." The third 
condition relating to the restoration of Sino-American relations was opposition to 
"activities that involve 'Two Chinas' or 'One China, One Taiwan' ... If the United 
States wishes to establish diplomatic relations with us, it must recognise the People's 
Republic of China as the sole legal government that represents China." 15 
Significantly, these conditions relating to Taiwan, while being at the forefront of 
Chinese concerns, had to be met only in advance of the full nonnalization of 
14 Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-Mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhonggllo yll Yindllzhina zhanzheng, p. 230; Wang 
Taiping, Zhonghlla renmin gonghegllo waijiao shi, [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of 
China], vol. 3 (1970-1978), vol. 3, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1999) p. 353; C.D.R.O., Zholl En/ai 
nianplI, vol. 3, p. 478. 
IS Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-Mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhonggllo yu Yinduzhina zhanzhcng, p. 230; Wang 
Taiping, Zhonghlla renmin gonghegllo waijiao shi, vol. 3, p. 353; Gong Li, "Chinese Decision 
Making and the Thawing of U.S.-China Relations", in Jiang and Ross, Re-examining the Cold War, p. 
345. 
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relations; "if the three previous conditions remain unmet, then China and America ... 
can establish liaison structures in both sides' capitals.,,16 
, 
Zhou Enlai was being given a lot of leeway to make use of in his discussions 
of Taiwan with Kissinger. The same was not to be said of the other more minor 
issues that the Politburo anticipated might surface in the talks. In fact, these 
instructions that were to form the guidelines for Zhou's talks with Kissinger were 
much more strident in their discussion of the issues of the United Nations, trade, and 
Indochina. The Politburo declared that "We shall not actively raise the issue of the 
United Nations", but if the U.S. did China's position was unequivocal that there 
could be no '''Two Chinas' or a 'One China, One Taiwan' arrangement." Likewise 
China would not actively raise the issue of trade, but "If the Americans mention it, 
then talks may proceed once the principle of American withdrawal from Taiwan has 
been resolved." The Chinese adopted a lofty attitude towards these areas of bilateral 
interest - trade and the United Nations - leaving it to the Americans to pursue them, 
should they so desire; discussions on them, however, were made subordinate and 
linked to the issue of Taiwan. The war in Indochina, dealt with in the final point, 
was not. 17 
Point eight stated that, "The Chinese government maintains that American 
armed forces must withdraw from the three countries of Indochina, from Korea, 
Japan and the relevant countries of Southeast Asia, in order to maintain peace in the 
Far East."ls. The issue was left to stand on its own with Beijing simply repeating its 
well-known position; the acceptance or rejection of the Chinese stance would, 
however, determine nothing. A modus vivendi on the issue of Taiwan would prove 
to be the key to success - this is immediately clear from the milder tone adopted in 
relation to American withdrawal from Indochina. Similarly, a Politburo report 
drawn up by Zhou Enlai finished by addressing the impact Beijing's rapprochement 
with Washington would have on the war in Indochina and the Paris peace talks. It 
16 Rather confusingly, the fifth of the eight principles refers to "the three previous conditions". 
Presumably this refers to articles 1, 2 and 4, since article 3 relating to the peaceful liberation of 
Taiwan was not a condition but a statement of intent. 
17 Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-Mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng, p. 230; Wang 
Taiping, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, vol. 3, p. 353; Gong Li, "Chinese Decision 
Making", Jiang and Ross, Re-examining the Cold War, p. 345. 
18 Ibid. 
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concluded that Sino-American talks "may make waves for a time, but when [the 
issue] has been talked through, it will be helpful to the Indochinese war of resistance 
and the Paris talks because Nixon already knows that the focal point of U.S.-Soviet 
competition for hegemony lies in the Middle East and Europe, and does not lie in the 
Far East. If Sino-American talks move forward in progress, this will certainly be 
helpful to [American] troop withdrawal and the Paris talks". Just like the final of the 
eight principles, which appears to be something of an afterthought rather than 
forming part of a set of principles that were to govern Sino-American discussions 
and (in a display of the sort of chauvinistic tendency that the North Vietnamese 
feared), this section dealing with the implications of Sino-American rapprochement 
for the Vietnamese war effort appears to have given little in-depth consideration to 
any dividend that Nixon could gamer through his opening to Beij ing. Most minds at 
the meeting were focused on Taiwan, and whatever time was given over to 
discussion of the concerns of the Vietnamese comrades, the conclusions were 
entirely Sino-centric: since the Americans went into Vietnam to block China, the 
rapprochement could only speed up the pace of an American withdrawal. 19 
Taiwan thus remained at the heart of the Chinese dialogue with the United 
States and formed three basic conditions for the successful normalization of 
diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of 
America. Significantly, however, the bar was not being set too high - clearly 
indicative of a strong Chinese desire to see the talks succeed. In fact, the Politburo 
was pre-empting the probability that in the short term Nixon would be unable to fully 
accede to China's three key conditions, but it was prepared to accept liaison offices 
as a substitute (though temporary) for full diplomatic recognition. However, while 
these principles would form the bedrock for the commencement of Sino-American 
dialogue, it was Mao who was firmly in charge of foreign policy, rather than the 
Politburo. While the May 26th meeting did layout a basis for conducting 
negotiations, as will be seen, they were not China's final fallback position, which 
could be changed on the Chairman's instruction. This meeting and the drawing up of 
these eight points was more importantly a means for Mao and Zhou to carry the 
19 Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-Mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhonggllo yll Yindllzhina z/ul1/zheng, p. 231. 
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Politburo with them along the uncertain path that lay ahead. When Mao was sent a 
brief summary of the evening's events by Zhou Enlai, the Premier informed him that 
"after [Zhou's] report has been deliberated on by everyone [in the Politburo]" he 
would forward it on to Mao and Lin Biao; the Chairman annotated the message, 
noting that "[to do it] this 'way is good".20 
Nonetheless it appears that the potential implications for Sino-Vietnamese 
relations weighed much more heavily on the minds of Mao and Zhou than they did 
on those of the rest of the Politburo. On the day after the Politburo meeting, Zhou 
forwarded to Mao the record of, and his report on, his talks with Le Duan a fortnight 
previous, despite the fact that he had already sent these to the Chairman at the time. 
The Premier was clearly concerned that Mao may not have initially read his report. 
He need not have worried, however: the Chairman (with perhaps a hint of 
indignation) wrote on the back of these materials, "Already examined in detail. ,,21 
An analysis prepared by Kissinger's staff that attempted to predict Chinese 
aims for his visit to Beijing correctly anticipated the main thrust of the 'eight points' 
drawn up by the Politburo as the basis for discussion. Unsurprisingly, though with a 
certain degree of understatement, Kissinger's Scope Paper predicted that "Taiwan 
remains an issue at the top of their list of disagreements with the U.S., but while they 
have spoken lately about the U.S. getting its military forces out of the area of Taiwan 
(in fact, they have actually employed the word 'eventually' in this connection), they 
have not chosen to highlight the U.S.-R.O.C. [Republic of China/Taiwan] political 
relationship and might be willing to accept its continuation under present 
circumstances". Discussion of other Chinese aims included an American 
"acknowledgement of the importance of China in world affairs", "some form of non-
aggression treaty or agreement under the rubric of 'peaceful coexistence"', but 
"Above all, affirmation of the foregoing in a summit meeting for which President 
Nixon will visit Peking". In this discussion of China's primary aims, the war in 
Vietnam was wholly absent.22 
20 C.D.R.O., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, p. 235. 
21 Ibid., cf. C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p. 456 
22 Briefing Book-'Polo I'-'Summit', NPMPINSCII 03111. 
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It was rather the opposite, however, when it came to Kissinger's own 
objectives as he saw them, for Vietnam was at the forefront of those. He declared in 
the paper prepared for the President that his "purpose in general terms will be to get 
the point across to the Chinese that we will indeed expect them to pay a price for 
what they expect to achieve, particularly the summit, and to work out the parameters 
of the quid pro quo". Top of this wish-list of American aims were "indications firm 
enough to be taken as assurances that the Chinese will use their influence on the 
North Vietnamese to move them toward a peaceful and acceptable settlement of the 
Vietnam War". Taiwan was relegated to secondary importance, but the objective 
that Kissinger set himself was equally as ambitious, namely a modus vivendi on the 
issue of Taiwan that would allow the United States to develop relations with Beijing 
"while we at the same time retain our diplomatic and mutual defence treaty with the 
ROC [Republic of China]". Having achieved these objectives, the National Security 
Adviser would then suggest to Zhou Enlai that he would also be responsive to their 
main items of concern and be prepared to go to the summit. Kissinger was going to 
play hardball with the Chinese Premier, only agreeing to a summit when America's 
basic demands had been met. Or at least that was the plan.23 
The exchange of letters that led to Kissinger's secret trip clearly brought 
great hope to the White House. Nixon had been signalling to Beijing and sending 
out feelers from even before he assumed office, but until the spring of 1971 the 
Chinese response had been restrained and, influenced by Nixon's military strategy in 
Indochina, punctuated by long periods of silence. China's insistence that Taiwan 
was the only issue on the agenda for a visit from an American envoy had been 
replaced by an agreement to discuss each side's concerns, and Vietnam featured 
prominently among Nixon's. The Chinese had also acceded to his demands for 
secrecy. The impression in the White House was the Chinese were "bending over 
backward to set up a meeting", and that that would translate into pressure on Hanoi 
to end the war in 1971.24 It would prove to be a forlorn hope. The Vietnamese war, 
while no longer by its existence an impediment to Sino-American relations, was not 
23 Ibid. 
24 Haldeman Diaries, entry for June 3'd , 1971. 
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about to be abandoned by Mao. As outlined in the eight points, an American 
withdrawal from Indochina was still the desired Chinese outcome; on each occasion 
when Nixon had changed tack and escalated the war, the rapprochement with China 
had stalled. Mao and China had invested money, effort, prestige and Chinese lives to 
ensure the Americans left the Indochinese peninsula; what had changed was that the 
c.c.P. Chairman no longer demanded they do so with their tails between their legs. 
For Mao, Nixon could negotiate his way to a withdrawal if he wished, but a total 
withdrawal it must be all the same. Whether this was enough for Hanoi was quite 
another matter. 
Quid pro quo? 
When the talks between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger got underway in Beijing on 
9th July, Taiwan was placed at the top of the agenda by the Chinese side, and Zhou 
lost no time in laying out the basic conditions that had been agreed upon by the 
Politburo. After responding in kind to a general opening statement made by the 
American National Security Adviser, the Chinese Premier stated candidly that the 
U.S. "must recognize the P.R.c. as the sole legitimate government of China and not 
make any exceptions ... Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory." He then 
stated the Chinese demand that the United States "must withdraw all its armed forces 
and dismantle its military installations on Taiwan and in the Taiwan Straits within a 
limited period." Kissinger's response was a procedural one, but one designed to 
reinforce in the Chinese Premier's mind the 'linkage' between the issue of Taiwan 
and that of Indochina, asking whether it was the intent that each side should state 
their own primary concern first, while reserving their answers for later, or whether 
the Premier wished to proceed with the issues one at a time. Zhou, as ever the 
gracious host and skilled negotiator, deferred to his American guest, "You can say 
whatever you like. You could speak first on the Taiwan question or Indochina, or 
together, because you may think they are linked." The Chinese side, it was made 
d'd 2S clear from the outset, 1 not. 
25 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., July 9, 1971, NPMPINSCIl032/3. 
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As with his negotiations with the Vietnamese in Paris, Kissinger divided his 
presentation on Taiwan into military and political aspects. Emphasizing the general 
trend in the Administration's policy towards Taiwan, he pointed out that Nixon had 
already removed a squadron of air tankers from Taiwan and reduced the size of the 
American military advisory group by twenty percent. He then made the point that 
two-thirds of the American forces on Taiwan were related the war in Indochina, and 
(offering to show the Chinese side the exact number of U.S. troops stationed on the 
island) declared that this majority portion would be removed "within a specified 
brief period of time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to 
begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve". Kissinger 
clearly laid out to his host the link between the evacuation of U.S. troops from 
Taiwan, and the settlement of the Vietnam War. On the political aspects of the 
American relationship with Taipei, Kissinger's statement that the United States was 
not advocating a 'Two Chinas' solution or a 'One China, One Taiwan' solution 
accorded with the fourth of the eight Politburo points, and was surely greeted with 
satisfaction by Zhou Enlai. The Premier was disappointed not long after, however, 
when after further discussions on Taiwan Kissinger was even more frank. "I must be 
honest with the Prime Minister", he confided, "there's no sense deluding ourselves. 
There's no possibility in the next one and a half years for us to recognize the P.R.C. 
as the sole government of China in a formal way ... " As evidence of his 
dissatisfaction, when Kissinger made it to the end of his sentence Zhou quickly 
turned the subject around, "You want to talk about Indochina." The Premier, a much 
more experienced negotiator than his American counterpart, sought to demonstrate 
that linkage was a 'two-way street' .26 
The war in Indochina dominated the rest of the day's discussions. Zhou had 
earlier noted the fact that American expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970, and 
then into Laos in early 1971, had delayed the rapprochement process, and in his 
opening statement on the topic Kissinger reiterated that while such actions were not 
directed against the P.R.C., similar actions having "unfortunate consequences" for 
Sino-American relations would be an inevitable consequence of the continuation of 
26 Ibid. 
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the war in Vietnam. He then went on to discuss the issue in terms of 'Big Power 
politics'. Hoping to flatter the Chinese sense of national prestige, he noted that "we 
look at the problem from the perspective of world peace, but the North Vietnamese 
and the NLF have only one foreign policy problem, and that is Indochina", leaving 
the statement suitably ambiguous as to who constituted the "we". In this context 
Kissinger also chose to resurrect the ghost of the 1954 Geneva Conference. Aware 
of Zhou's personal sensitivity in relation to the events of 1954 (in particular Dulles's 
refusal to shake his hand), this discussion gave Kissinger a platform from which to 
spell out the differences between Nixon's approach and that of the Eisenhower 
administration. "We know that after a peace is made we will be 10,000 miles away, 
and they will still be there. So it is in our interests to make a peace that they will 
want to keep. We do not want the war to start again.,,27 
Kissinger then spelt out the four basic points of the American negotiating 
position that he had offered to the Vietnamese in Paris on May 31 st - a fixed date for 
withdrawal, an Indochina-wide ceasefire, a release of all prisoners, and respect for 
the Geneva accords. What was impeding a rapid settlement of the war, Kissinger 
went on, was Hanoi's refusal to agree to a cease fire across Indochina, and their 
insistence that Thieu be removed from office, citing honour a principal reason why 
the U.S. could not accede to Hanoi's demands. By presenting the American offer in 
such reasonable terms, Kissinger clearly hoped that Zhou would convey this message 
to his Vietnamese comrades and urge them to accept the American conditions. 
Unashamedly making a pitch for Chinese assistance in resolving this matter, 
Kissinger concluded his statement on the war by telling his Chinese counterpart, 
"The President has asked me to tell you that we believe the time for peace has come. 
It is not up to us to tell you what, if anything, you can do. We believe that the end of 
the war in Indochina will accelerate the improvement in our relations.,,28 
Zhou Enlai's response was a subtle but firm rejection of Kissinger's appeal. 
In his efforts to recruit the Chinese, Kissinger had recalled the Geneva Conference 
and sourced the origins of North Vietnamese suspicion and recalcitrance in 1954. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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This prompted a remarkably frank admission of culpability on the part of the Chinese 
Premier, who told Kissinger, "I believe that, in my opinion, for the Vietnamese 
people to feel that they were deceived during the first Geneva Conference is not 
groundless .. .1 think now that if at that time we had been more cool-headed, we could 
perhaps have forced [former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles] to sign the 
agreement, saying we would not sign unless the U.S. did... Chairman Mao has 
spoken of this many times with our Vietnamese friends." Keen not to let the 
American detect dissent between Beijing and Hanoi, Zhou then added (not entirely 
accurately), "our Vietnamese friends do not blame us for this. But we could have 
done more at the time" Zhou Enlai was accepting, both personally and on behalf of 
his country and in the presence of an emissary of the President of the United States, 
responsibility for (America's) non-implementation of the Geneva Accords.29 
As well as admitting partial responsibility for the failure to implement the 
nation-wide elections stipulated under the Accords, Zhou also admitted that "Two 
thousand years ago China committed aggression against [the Vietnamese] and ... 
was defeated by two ladies, two women generals ... I went personally to the grave of 
these two women generals and left wreaths of flowers on the graves to pay my 
respects for these two heroines who had defeated our ancestors who were 
exploiters." He also emphasised his own personal friendship and admiration for Ho 
Chi Minh. By admitting guilt for errors in the past, he was also sending a message 
that China would not engage in similar behaviour again, subtly rejecting Kissinger's 
'Big Power' pitch. Given the American's attempt to highlight common Sino-
American interests in concluding th.e war speedily, Zhou played with him when he 
noted that "There is a common point between us in that both of us have respect for 
the greatness and the courage of the Vietnamese people.,,30 
Zhou Enlai took pains to emphasise the longevity of the Vietnamese people's 
struggle, and the fact that although China had supported them all along they had 
never sent any (combat) troops into Vietnam; the Premier made the equally 
important point that nor had the Vietnamese asked them to dispatch any. The 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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message Zhou was conveying to the American National Security Advisor was not 
just that the (North) Vietnamese are strong and independent and would not give up 
their struggle against the United States, but also that the issue was a purely 
Vietnamese one. He summarised the Chinese position as consisting of two points: 
firstly that "all foreign troops of the United States and the troops of other countries 
which followed the United States into Indochina should be withdrawn. The second 
point is that the peoples of the three countries of Indochina should be left alone to 
decide their own respective fates." He found no disagreement on these two points 
from his American interlocutor, though, of course, whether North Vietnamese troops 
in South Vietnam were foreign or not was an issue the two men did not see eye-to-
31 
eye on. 
During dinner, Zhou addressed the political aspects of the war in Vietnam; 
something which Kissinger had largely avoided. The Premier adopted a more 
combative tone than he had previously, and threw his full weight behind the 
demands the North Vietnamese were making in their negotiations with Kissinger. 
Zhou rejected an Indochina-wide ceasefire, and advocated the removal of the 
governments in Phnom Penh and Saigon, "either through democratic elections or by 
overthrowing them." Later, referring to the South Vietnamese President, Zhou asked 
Kissinger, "Why must you want to leave a tail on this matter and be unwilling to give 
it up?,,32 He continued, "If you, while planning to withdraw, want the Vietnamese to 
undertake obligations tantamount to recognizing that Thieu will remain or be in a 
coalition government, then that is a conditional withdrawal on your part. At the 
same time, you are maintaining the rule of Lon Nol/Sirik Matak in Cambodia ... 
They cannot accept that." This prompted Kissinger to spell out in unambiguous 
tenns what was to become known as the 'decent interval solution', something he had 
only alluded to before. He rejected Zhou's calls for American participation in the 
overthrow of Thieu, but assured the Premier, "If the government is as unpopular as 
you seem to think, then the quicker our forces are withdrawn the quicker it will be 
31 Ibid. 
32 Mao would later refer to the continued American presence on Taiwan as a 'tail'. He characterized 
losing it as being part of the evolutionary process by which the Americans would evolve from apes 
into humans; the Vietnamese 'tail' must also have fallen under this rubric. See also Chen Jian, Mao's 
China, p. 267. 
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overthrown. And if it is overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene." 
Intrigued, Zhou probed further, inquiring about levels of American support for 
Saigon during the withdrawal, and their insistence on a ceasefire throughout 
Indochina. Kissinger replied that aid would have stipulated limitations and, crucially, 
that the ceasefire throughout Indochina would not be indefinite. "We can put a time 
limit, say 18 months or some period." Having successfully probed the American 
National Security Advisor to the point where he had spelt out what a 'decent 
interval' would be, Zhou desisted. "We cannot consider these specific matters. We 
V· ,,33 are not letnamese. 
Both the Americans and the Chinese had a strong interest in achieving a 
summit visit from Nixon, and in negotiating it sought concessions from the other on 
the areas of interest that were most important to them: the war in Indochina for the 
Americans, and Taiwan for the Chinese. Kissinger's statements on Taiwan appeared 
to satisfy most of the Politburo's basic principles governing progress in Sino-
American relations. When Zhou reported the day's proceedings to Mao, the 
Chairman seemed pleased with the American statements on the future of Sino-
American relations and the status of Taiwan. These now made the war in Indochina 
the most pressing issue in their bilateral relations. Mao told Zhou, "the United States 
should make a new start and ... let the domino fall. The United States must withdraw 
from Vietnam. We are in no hurry on the Taiwan issue because there is no fighting 
on Taiwan. But there is a war in Vietnam ... We should not invite Nixon to come just 
,,34 for our own purposes. 
The next day's discussions were dominated less by Taiwan and Indochina, 
and focused on the broader issue of peace and security in Asia, including discussions 
on the Soviet Union, India-Pakistan, Japan and Korea; nonetheless, the issue of the 
Vietnam War was frequently raised in relation to these other issues. Zhou subjected 
Kissinger to a lengthy monologue, more strident in tone than the previous day's 
discussions, explaining to Kissinger his interpretation of the general situation in Asia. 
Resurrecting the geopolitical analysis that prevailed during the peak of the Cultural 
33 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., July 9, 1971, NPMPINSC/l 032/3. 
34 Chen Jian, Mao's China, p. 267. 
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Revolution, Zhou discussed the possibility that the United States could unite with the 
U.S.S.R. and Japan to divide China up, a mode of discourse almost certainly entered 
into under the instruction of the Chairman. In such a circumstance, Zhou told 
Kissinger, "We must be prepared to resist for a protracted period by people's warfare, 
engaging in a long-term struggle until final victory." Moving swiftly from China's 
struggle to that of their southern comrades, he went on, "I believe that this is the 
same case with the V!etnamese people and Indochinese people - they think in similar 
terms." Returning to Kissinger's oft-repeated theme of American honour, Zhou 
urged him to "withdraw all your armed forces lock, stock, and barrel and withdraw 
all other foreign forces and do so on your own initiative. That would be the greatest 
honour." He turned Kissinger's warning of the previous day back on him, charging, 
"if the war flares up again in that area, the consequences will be even worse and you 
will be even more unpopUlar. You mentioned 'incalculable consequences'. These 
consequences are not incalculable for the Indochinese people, but only for the U.S. 
I ,,35 peop e. 
Kissinger's hopes for a quid pro quo on Vietnam were being dashed by the 
Chinese Premier, who had upped the tempo, volume, and rhetoric as his discussions 
with Kissinger wore on. The American had, probably much more quickly than Zhou 
or Mao had anticipated, satisfied China's basic demands with regard to Taiwan. And 
although Kissinger had made it clear that there was no realistic timetable under 
which Sino-American relations could be normalised before the beginning of a second 
term in office for Nixon, this was a reality that Mao seemed prepared to accept. So 
somewhat ironically then, given China's previous attempts to isolate the issue from 
their contacts with Washington, Indochina was thrust to the forefront as the most 
urgent, though not the most crucial, issue in Sino-American relations (which 
remained Taiwan).36 But rather than extracting a commitment, spoken or unspoken, 
from Zhou Enlai that he would use his influence in Hanoi in exchange for a summit 
35 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et a!., July 10, 1971, NPMPINSC/I 03213. 
36 This was the precise characterization given to these two issues by Zhou Enlai during Kissinger's 
subsequent visit to Beijing in October, and one repeated by Nixon in his personal notes as he prepared 
for his meetings in Beiijng. See memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et a!., October 21, 1972, 
NPMPINSC/I 03412; Jeffrey Kimball, Vietnam War Files, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2004), p. 200. 
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with Nixon, Kissinger had made a commitment to Zhou that an I8-month ceasefire 
in Indochina would be a sufficiently 'decent interval' after which the United States 
would not re-intervene in the internecine warfare of the Indochinese peoples. Zhou's 
message was clear: 'the United States must withdraw fully and completely from 
Indochina, but Beijing would not involve itself in the process. How long such a 
withdrawal would take, "that is for you to negotiate with the people of Vietnam and 
not for us to speak on their behalf' Zhou told his guest. "Our hope, however, in this 
problem is that you will leave completely and not leave behind any tail, including 
any technical advisors. And, secondly, the demand of the Vietnamese that the 
regime fostered by you be removed, as to how to remove it, this also is for you to 
discuss with the Vietnamese, and we won't interfere." 37 
As Kissinger departed, Zhou Enlai went so far as to wish Kissinger well in 
his upcoming negotiations with Le Duc Tho; but he also took pains to ensure 
Kissinger had well understood the Chinese stance. "I hope that your trip to Paris will 
see some development, and we will tell our Vietnamese friends about this part of our 
discussions after the announcement [of Kissinger's visit] is made ... I believe that 
you are quite clear as to our stand. We support [P.R.G. Foreign Minister] Madam 
Binh's seven point proposal. We hope your withdrawal will be most complete, 
thorough, and also honourable ... I hope your negotiations in Paris will be good for 
you" offered Zhou, adding, "and that you won't leave a tail behind." Kissinger 
acknowledged that China's stance had been understood - "There's no danger of 
misunderstanding the Prime Minister", he replied. 38 
Kissinger arrived back in Washington via Tehran and Paris to understandable 
excitement. A summit visit from the 36th President of the United States to the capital 
of the People's Republic of China had been agreed in principle. Mao and the 
Chinese leadership had set the bar sufficiently low, and exercised enough flexibility 
on Taiwan to make Kissinger's visit a success. For the United States' part, Kissinger 
had affirmed the 'One China' principle, and gave indications of a willingness to 
break with the Republic of China on Taiwan at some point in the future. That was 
37 This section was highlighted by Nixon in the copy of the Kissinger-Zhou conversations he received. 
Memcon, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger July 10,1971, NPMP/NSC/I032/3. 
38 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., Thematic--Indochina, NPMP/NSC/I 032/2. 
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sufficient for the C.C.P. Chairman for the time being. Mao and Nixon, Zhou and 
Kissinger; all four had wanted a summit. The very issues that made such a meeting 
necessary or desirable, such as Taiwan and Indochina, were temporarily cast aside in 
pursuit of the meeting itself. For the time being style had taken precedence over 
substance; form had subjugated function. It was a very Chinese arrangement. 
The most contentious issue had turned out to be Indochina. Before arriving 
in Beijing, Kissinger had expected a quid pro quo on Vietnam in exchange for a 
summit. In his summation of the talks for the President, Kissinger concluded that 
"Zhou Enlai was as forthcoming as we could have hoped. His attitude throughout 
reflected the ambivalence of Peking's position. For ideological reasons, he clearly 
had to support Hanoi. On the other hand, it was apparent that he did not wish to 
jeopardise the chances for an improvement in our relations". In short, Kissinger was 
still optimistic that his linkage of the Indochina conflict with Sino-American 
relations had borne fruit, and that the Chinese would intervene to speed up a 
negotiated settlement. The National Security Advisor stated confidently to the 
President, "This means [Zhou Enlai] will talk to the North Vietnamese and may be 
. fl ,,39 
able to exert some In uence. 
It is easy to see how Kissinger, carried away by the excitement and historical 
significance of his visit, believed he would reap a far bigger Vietnam dividend from 
his trip to Beijing than he ever actually did, or indeed was ever likely to. 
Encouraged by apparent movement by the North Vietnamese in negotiations on June 
26th in Paris, it is not difficult to see how he hoped that the Chinese would intervene 
to encourage their allies in Hanoi to settle. Zhou Enlai significantly probed 
American intentions in Indochina on the first day of discussions, but appears to have 
been reprimanded by Mao for going into too fine detail, and subsequently drew back 
in later discussions, reiterating China's intention not to intervene. While he rejected 
Kissinger's attempts to draw China into a 'Big Power' understanding on the subject, 
Zhou's presentation on the subject of Indochina demonstrated the curious mix of 
lofty detachment and emotional involvement that characterised Chinese attitudes 
39 Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, 'My Talks with Zhou Enlai', July 14, 1971, 
NPMPINSC/I032/2. 
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towards the war at this time, and was one that the American National Security 
Advisor struggled to understand.40 
It was Kissinger who first mentioned the Geneva Conference of 1954, but 
Zhou's emotional response should have conveyed the message that as a result of 
those very events China had an even greater responsibility towards the Vietnamese. 
By reminding Kissinger that he had paid homage at the shrine of the Truong sisters 
who had led a rebellion against imperial Chinese rule, Zhou had drawn attention to 
the long history that both joined and divided China and Vietnam. However, his 
purpose was not to emphasise the traditional antagonism that existed between the 
two nations, but was to demonstrate the independence of (North) Vietnam from 
'New China', and the abandonment of Chinese imperial pretensions and control. 
Ironically, however, underpinning all this was a very paternalistic sense of special 
Chinese responsibility towards the Vietnamese that stemmed from the very same 
history that Zhou sought to disassociate 'New China' from. China bore partial 
responsibility for the fact that Vietnam was partitioned and currently at war with the 
United States, and as part of China's 'cultural universe' the success or failure of the 
Vietnamese revolution was partly China's responsibility. Kissinger's willingness to 
ascribe Chinese support for Hanoi as being merely ideological overlooked the long 
and complicated history between the two nations and peoples, and gave him undue 
hope for a settlement of the Vietnam War. 
Furthermore, given the intimate and complicated nature of the· Sino-
Vietnamese relationship, after his July visit Kissinger appears to have given little 
thought to the amount of leverage the Chinese leaders actually had available to them 
to pressure Hanoi, had they chosen to do so. Precisely because of their millennia-old 
history, the Vietnamese were particularly sensitive to perceived Chinese 
'imperialism', 'chauvinism' or 'treachery'. If China were to alienate North Vietnam, 
the result would be to drive them into the arms of the Soviets, where they would be 
wafIllly received. This would undermine one of the main rationales behind China's 
rapprochement with the United States: to relieve Soviet pressure on China's frontiers. 
China's actions had the potential, as Kissinger identified, to massively demoralise 
40 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., Thematic--Indochina, NPMP/NSC/I 032/2. 
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Hanoi, and as such Zhou Enlai was going to need all the diplomatic skills at his 
disposal to minimise the demoralisation, and attempt to prevent it turning into 
resentment. It was certainly with this in mind that Zhou Enlai flew to Hanoi on July 
13th to, as an NSC staffer had put it, perform some hand-holding. 
Zhou faced no easy task, for the memories of Geneva in 1954 were still alive 
in Hanoi. However, the Chinese leadership, demonstrating the Sino-centrism that so 
concerned the Vietnamese, believed that their contacts with the United States would 
actually help the Vietnamese cause. Containing communism in Asia, in particular 
that of the more radical Chinese bent, had originally led America into the 
Indochinese quagmire. Now that the two nations were inching towards an 
understanding, it was believed in Beijing, the strategic worries that had underpinned 
American involvement in the region no longer existed. Mao and Zhou had joined 
Kissinger and Haldeman in believing that the war in Vietnam could be concluded by 
the end of 1971; unfortunately how they foresaw that happening could not have been 
more at odds. Whereas the Americans hoped for, and expected, Chinese pressure on 
Hanoi to come to terms, the extent to which China involved itself would largely be 
limited to Zhou's verbal blasts at Kissinger about the redundancy of American policy 
in the region. What's more, if Kissinger and Nixon refused to be persuaded by 
argument, Mao and Zhou had opted to accompany the Sino-American opening with a 
massive injection ~f Chinese military and financial aid into the D.R.V. that over the 
next three years would account for almost 45% of the total aid China furnished the 
Vietnamese communists between 1950 and 1975. And yet despite this, Hanoi's 
suspicions would be difficult to allay, no matter how much Zhou would reassure 
them of Chinese probity, nor how many Chinese canons were given to North 
V. 41 letnam. 
41 Memcon, (extract), Le Duc Tho and Ieng Sary, September 7, 1971, 77 Conversations, p. 178; Wang 
Taiping, ed., Zhonghlla Renmin Gonghegllo waijiao shi, vol. 3 p. 51. 
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42 Aftershocks 
The diplomatic earthquake that would be produced by the news of Kissinger's secret 
visit to Beijing was going to shake the world, and there would be few places where 
the reverberations would be felt more strongly than in Hanoi. After Kissinger's 
departure, the Politburo met to discuss the changes that could arise as a result of the 
Sino-American talks, and undoubtedly the impact on the Vietnamese comrades 
featured in this discussion. Probably as a result of the decisions made at this 
Politburo meeting, it was decided that Zhou Enlai would embark on a hectic three-
day diplomatic tour in order to personally inform the leaders of China's closest 
regional allies about the Kissinger talks. Two days later, he flew to Hanoi to inform 
the North Vietnamese of Kissinger's visit and the planned summit with Nixon before 
it was made public on the 16th • We know that during the discussions with Le Duan 
and Pham Van Dong, Le Duan accused Zhou of having removed the element of 
surprise from their tactics against the United States, "[T]he visit of Kissinger is 
designed to forestall these surprises", but one must presume that many more unhappy 
comments were made by the Vietnamese during this visit. What little else we know 
of these conversations comes from the Hanoi government's post-Sino-Vietnamese 
War White Book, deliberately conceived to demonstrate Chinese perfidy. Yet even 
this publication seems to indicate that the Chinese Premier was fairly candid with the 
Vietnamese comrades in his description of his talks with Kissinger. The White Book 
claims that Zhou told the comrades in Hanoi that Indochina was the most important 
42 A clear understanding of the events of the summer and autumn of 1971 are vital for analysing the 
extent to which China acquiesced to Nixon and Kissinger's linkage plan. Unfortunately, even by the 
standards of Sino-Vietnamese relations, 1971 is a particularly sparse year in terms of sources. The 
record of the events of this period have been largely based on the 1979 Vietnamese government 
pamphlet The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over the Last Thirty Years (commonly known as 
the White Book), published in the wake of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in that year. In recent 
years the opportunity has arisen to compare the contents of this work with 77 Conversations Between 
Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977. While 77 Conversations is 
clearly an incomplete record and its provenance remains a secret, it does provide a more full account 
of some of the discussions and events recorded in the White Paper; such a comparison demonstrates 
that while the quotations contained within the White Paper appear to be based in fact, the 
propagandistic goal which it wa~ meant t? serve h~s led to seriou~ misrepresentations and distortions, 
and thus it needs to be treated WIth a partIcularly hIgh degree of cIrcumspection. The following 
section will deal wi th the events of the latter half of 1971, after Kissinger's visit to Beijing, and where 
necessary draw attention to the account of the White Book. 
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issue discussed in his talks with the American, and in many respects it was, for 
Kissinger had at an early stage in the talks with Zhou satisfied most of the Chinese 
demands relating to Taiwan. He had disassociated the U.S. government with recent 
comments that the status of Taiwan was undetermined, explicitly rejected American 
support for Taiwanese independence or a 'Two Chinas' policy, promised that two-
thirds of the American forces stationed on Taiwan would be withdrawn at the end of 
the Vietnam War (with further reductions as Sino-American relations improved), and 
. told Zhou that he could expect the United States to grant full diplomatic recognition 
to the People's Republic of China (which would require the severance of relations 
with Taiwan) in the second term of a Nixon presidency.43 
Although Kissinger did not go so far as to satisfy the Politburo's first basic 
principle (that the Americans set a specific date for the withdrawal of all their forces 
from Taiwan) he had conceded enough that the Chinese were content to defer these 
more contentious issues for the sake of getting a summit; for the rest of the 
discussions, Indochina had certainly been the dominant and most pressing issue. 
Thus, Zhou's statement, as reported in the White Book, that "As far as China is 
concerned, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Viet Nam is problem No. 1 
[sic], and the question of China joining the United Nations comes second" should be 
read in the context of Zhou trying to reassure the Vietnamese comrades that China 
was not going to engage in a trade-off with America in order to get a Security 
Council seat, rather than, as the White Book claims, an example of China "wanting to 
make use of the Viet Nam question for the settlement of the Taiwan issue first.,,44 
The White Book also claims that on July 18th, the "Chinese side 
communicated to the Vietnamese side a four-point programme of the United States" 
that involved a U.S. troop withdrawal and P.O.W. release over a twelve month 
period starting August 1st, 1971; an Indochina-wide ceasefire; the retention of a 
number of U.S. technical personnel in South Vietnam for reasons of 'face'; and the 
American desire not to abandon Nguyen Van Thieu or Sirik Matak. The implication 
43 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, p. 469; memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Duan. July 13, 
1971, 77 Conversations, p. 177; S.R.Y. For. Min., White Book, pp. 40-1; memcon. Zhou & Kissinger, 
July 9,1971, NPMPINSC/I032/3. 
44 S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, pp. 40-1. 
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behind this is that the Chinese were commending such a programme to the 
Vietnamese, and that is how many historians have interpreted it.45 These cel1ainly 
were the four bases of a settlement that Kissinger had outlined to Zhou, but it is very 
unlikely this was an official commendation of them on China's part, for Zhou had 
rejected them in person with Kissinger. It is possible that, in an effort to reassure 
Hanoi that there was nothing underhand or untoward being negotiated between 
Kissinger and Zhou, the North Vietnamese were passed a summary, or the minutes, 
of the Zhou-Kissinger talks. Aware of Vietnamese sensitivities and nervousness 
about Sino-American rapprochement, to have attempted to persuade Hanoi to settle 
the war on America's terms, less than a week after Kissinger had been in Beijing, 
would have been a move of such clumsiness that it is impossible to imagine a 
diplomat of Zhou Enlai's skill and experience performing it. Frightening the 
Vietnamese horses at this juncture would have been completely counter-
d . 46 pro uctlve. 
Zhou returned to Beijing from Hanoi on the morning of July1411\ and held 
further talks with North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh who, one 
must assume, accompanied Zhou back to Beijing. The next morning Zhou set off 
again and flew to Pyongyang to hold talks with the North Korean leader Kim II-Sung 
(in White House Years Kissinger erroneously claims that Kim Il-Sung had actually 
been in Beijing at the same time as him; in fact, the guest Zhou was hosting was the 
Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Secretary, Kim Jung-ril). Upon his 
return from Pyongyang, he and Ye Jianying then went to give Prince Sihanouk 
advance warning of the statement that was to be issued the following morning, 
informing the world of Kissinger's visit and the planned summit with Nixon - a 
diplomatic earthquake that shook the world.47 
Hanoi's initial official response was a thunderous July 19th editorial in Nhan 
Dan entitled 'The Nixon Doctrine Is Bound to Fail'. Although it didn't announce to 
the North Vietnamese people that Kissinger had been to Beijing, nor inform them 
45 E.g., see Ang Cheng Guan, Ending the Vietnam War, p. 78. 
46 S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, pp. 40-1. 
47 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp. 596-7; C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, p. 469; 
Kissinger WH Y, p. 751; Chen Jian, Mao's China, p. 368 n. 132. 
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that the Nixon had accepted an invitation from the Chinese to visit, North 
Vietnamese fury and fear of a repeat of 1954 was evident. It denounced Nixon's 
efforts to "achieve a compromise between the big powers in an attempt to make 
smaller countries bow to their arrangements." Hanoi's resolve to thwart this was 
also displayed, "The days when a big power could bully a smaller country has also 
ended for good.,,48 Zhou noted that "the article displays the Vietnamese comrades' 
anxieties and appraisal [of the situation]" so he sought to republish it in full in 
Renmin Ribao as a sign of China's "open and above board manner", but this was 
blocked by Zhang Chunqiao, one of the 'Gang of Four'. On July 21 St, the Chinese 
news agency, Xinhua, did however carry the text of a D.R.V. Foreign Ministry 
statement that included the charge that the United States was attempting to bring 
pressure to bear on Hanoi by means of "insidious tricks" that were designed to sow 
discord among socialist countries.49 
Over the next few weeks Hanoi's polemicising against Nixon, and implicitly 
the Chinese leaders, became more intense. An August 3rd alticle in the army 
newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People's Army] comprehensively indicted not just 
the American President, but "all who would moderate their 'struggle' against the 
United States or shift the focus of that struggle from the 'main enemy. ,,, The article, 
written by Chien Thang [The Victor], stridently rejected the Chinese downgrading of 
the American threat, declaring that "the target of the revolution in a given historic 
period is an objective reality which one can neither invent nor recognize or reject as 
one wishes." 50 Hanoi's sound and fury reached its peak in a Nhan Dan 
'Commentator' article on August 22nd, falling in the period between the celebration 
of the anniversary of the August Revolution and the D.R.V.'s national day on 
September 2nd• As reported by the Vietnam News Agency, Commentator alleged 
that a "very perfidious move of the President's is to spray the toxic gas of 
chauvinism into opportunists' heads in a bid to playoff socialist countries against 
48 Quoted in Gilks, The Breakdown, pp. 75-6. 
49 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, p. 469; see also Zhai, CATVW, p. 198. 
50 'The D.R.V. and the US-Chinese Rapproachment' [sic], August-October 1971', Folder 04/Box 
07/DPC Unit 06/TVA-TTU. 
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one another and sow schism among the communist and workers' partics."sl After 
mid-September the condemnation fell away; assuranccs given in Beijing to a 
Vietnamese delegation led by Hoang Van Hoan, the former D.R.V. ambassador in 
Beijing and the most prominent pro-Beijing figure in Hanoi (who ultimately defccted 
to China), may have contributed to the more mellow Vietnamcse tone.S2 
During this period the Chinese media largely ignored the Vietnamese 
polemics; instead they worked towards calming Vietnamese suspicions, though the 
emphasis shifted towards support of the P.R.G. 's seven point pcace proposal, partly 
to counter Soviet charges that China had facilitated Nixon's failurc to publicly 
respond to Mme. Binh's initiative. The Chinese also had to work towards distancing 
the P.R.C. from remarks made by the Australian Labor Party leader, Gough Whitlam, 
who had held talks with Zhou Enlai on July 5th and announced on July 14th that 
China was now supportive of a new Geneva Conference, on condition that the 
British and Soviets relinquish their co-chairmanship and it was enlarged to involve 
more Asian countries. If Whitlam's statement was accurate, nevertheless the 
Chinese moved to distance themselves from it. On August 3rd , a Renmin Ribao 
commentator article lent its support to an angry denunciation of the idea from Prince 
Sihanouk. On the 1 ih, Zhou himself told a journalist from the Yugoslav paper 
Vjesnik that there was no need for a new Geneva conference and that the Vietnam 
question must be settled between Vietnam and the United States; finally, in a 
September 2nd editorial to celebrate North Vietnam's national day, Renmin Ribao 
again endorsed the P.R.G's July 151 proposal, and condemned the United States for 
not making a public reply and "spreading words about the convening of a Geneva 
conference". These statements may also have gone some way towards reducing the 
level of polemic coming out of Hanoi. 53 
Nonetheless, despite Hanoi's decision to tum down the volume of its anger 
towards Beijing, the Kissinger visit had put Le Due Tho on the back foot in his 
negotiations in Paris. When Tho and Xuan Thuy had held a secret negotiating 
51 Ibid. 
52 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao hllodong, p. 602. 
53 Zhai, CATVW, p. 198; 'The D.R.V. and the US-Chinese Rapproachment' [sic], August-October 
1971', Folder 04/Box 07IDPC Unit 06ITVA-TTU; P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao Ill/oelong, p. 602. 
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session with Kissinger in Paris on the afternoon of July 12th, Zhou had not yet set off 
for Hanoi to drop the bombshell of the American visit on the Vietnamese comrades; 
unaware of the media frenzy that would erupt in three days' time after the 
announcement of Kissinger's Beijing sojourn, it was with an irony he was unaware 
of that Xuan Thuy opened the session with the observation, "Your [Kissinger's] 
recent trip aroused great publicity." Nonetheless, since the Vietnamese negotiators 
did not yet know of Kissinger's talks in Beijing, the American National Security 
Advisor accrued no direct advantage at the negotiating table, though he did have a 
psychological one. Irrespective of Sino-American progress, Kissinger found the tone 
of the session "very positive", and Thuy and Tho "serious and constructive", and the 
major differences between the two sides had been narrowed down largely to Nguyen 
Van Thieu's future as President of South Vietnam. Progress in Paris was being made 
despite the moves in Sino-American relations, not because of them. S4 
An integral part of the Vietnamese communists' strategy had been the July pt 
publication of the P.R.G.'s seven point peace plan, designed to generate domestic 
pressure on the Nixon administration, and which had been publicly backed by the 
Chinese media. However, in the private negotiations taking place between Kissinger 
and his Hanoi counterparts, Tho and Thuy had effectively dismissed it as a basis for 
negotiation and focused instead on the nine point programme they themselves had 
put forward. At the conclusion of their July 12th meeting, Tho and Kissinger had 
agreed to reconvene in two weeks' time, but it appears that shortly thereafter Le Due 
Tho had planned to postpone the next session to return to Hanoi for consultations. 
The news of Kissinger's visit to Beijing was surely the cause; not only did it call for 
a reappraisal of their strategy, but it also severely hampered their tactics by diverting 
American media attention away from Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's seven point proposal 
and onto the opening to China. 
The Americans had anticipated such a cancellation - in fact they would have 
welcomed it, believing that Kissinger's secret visit had created "an international 
framework in which it will be harder for Hanoi to justify continued warfare and 
54 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai Nianpu, vol. 3, p. 472;Kissinger, WH. Y, p. 1027; memorandum for the 
President from Henry Kissinger. 'My Meeting with the North Vietnamese, July 26, 1971', July 26 
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tension.,,55 Washington had drawn hope from reports of Zhou Enlai's visit to Hanoi 
and the belief that he "may have used some influence to encourage a settlement." 
But in a move calculated to demonstrate Vietnamese ambivalence to the 
breakthrough in Sino-American relations Le Duc Tho stayed in Paris to hold his 
meeting with Kissinger. According to the American National Security Advisor's 
report to the President on the July 26th session, the Vietnamese only made indirect 
references to his talks with the Chinese, pointedly advising him that there was no 
'''magical way' of settling the Vietnam problem, and that only participants could end 
the war", something they failed to do in this set of negotiations. Hanoi's resolve, it 
d 56 appears, had been hardene . 
This round of negotiations had achieved no breakthrough because Nixon 
would not accede to Hanoi's condition that Thieu be removed as President of South 
Vietnam (either by ballot or bullet), nor would Tho drop the demand. In fact, rather 
than helping Kissinger to force Hanoi's hand, he advised the President that "The 
shock of your impending Beijing visit probably complicated their decision".s7 With 
the talks stalled, Tho returned to Hanoi, presumably for further Politburo discussions 
on the newly complicated situation. It was in this context that he met with Zhou 
Enlai in Beijing on August 1st• Their talks, including a luncheon banquet, lasted 
several hours, during which time Zhou's exposition to Tho seems to have covered 
the whole sweep of issues that he had covered in his talks with Kissinger, including 
"issues relating to Indochina, Taiwan, the United Nations, Japan and Chinese 
assistance to Vietnam", as well as Sino-American relations, while Tho updated the 
Chinese on the Paris talks. The Chinese Premier undoubtedly used the opportunity to 
clarify the situation for the Vietnamese negotiator, and possibly calm some of the 
'waves' that the Politburo had anticipated the Zhou-Kissinger would temporarily 
cause for the D.R.V. At this time, however, North Vietnam lost interest in the talks· , 
Le Duc Tho was absent from two further secret negotiating sessions in Paris in late 
SS Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Dick Smyser and Winston Lord, 'Your Next Meeting with the 
North Vietnamese', July 15th, 1971, NPMPINSC/854/1. 
S6 Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 'My Meeting with the North Vietnamese, 
July 26 1971', July 26, 1971, NPMPINSCIl 039/2; memcon, Le Due Tho, Xuan Thuy, Henry 
Kissinger et a!., July 12, 1971, NPMPINSC/I 039/2; Kissinger, WH. Y., p. 1025. 
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August and early September 1971, thereby ensuring that no progress would be made 
in the peace talks. Hanoi was clearly reassessing its options.58 
Despite the unintentional blow China had dealt to Hanoi's diplomatic 
strategy, Beijing continued to offer strong support, both diplomatically and 
materially, to both Hanoi and the P.R.G. On September 17'h Zhou Enlai held talks in 
Beijing with Nguyen Thi Binh and two days later hosted a grand banquet for her and 
her delegation. This came just a few days after the C.C.P. was shaken to its core in 
the biggest crisis it had experienced since the foundation of the P.R.C.: on September 
13th a plane carrying Lin Biao, apparently fleeing to the Soviet Union, crashed in 
Outer Mongolia after the alleged discovery of a plot to assassinate Mao. However, 
as during the war scare in the autumn of 1969, the business of government carried on 
as usual, particularly where it concerned Vietnam, and on September 27th a new aid 
agreement for 1972 was signed in Hanoi by Chinese Deputy Premier Li Xiannian. 
This brought to seven the number of agreements and supplemental agreements that 
China had signed with the D.R.V. in 1971 alone, with a total value of 3.6 billion 
yuan. The Chinese leaders may have caused Hanoi to rethink its diplomatic strategy, 
but if the Vietnamese comrades concluded that renewed emphasis on the military 
struggle was needed, Beijing was not going to be found wanting in its support.59 
These very public declarations of Chinese support for the Vietnamese 
communist cause came as Beijing was making preparations for another visit by 
Kissinger to the Chinese capital (this time openly). The purpose was, naturally, to 
sweeten the pill of Sino-American rapprochement for the Vietnamese comrades, and 
to prevent a swing towards the Soviet Union on their part. But it also went further: 
American withdrawal from South Vietnam still remained a key Chinese communist 
objective as well as a Vietnamese communist one. If the terms of a withdrawal could 
not be successfully negotiated, then the collapse of the South Vietnamese 
government would hasten the retreat; and there would be no American tail left 
behind. Nonetheless, this by no means meant that there was unanimity of view 
between Beijing and Hanoi in their assessment of the United States. China was 
58 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 472. 
59 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 484; P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp. 604-5; Shen 
Zhihua 'Zhong-Mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng, pp. 232-3. 
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beginning to take the Nixon Doctrine seriously, as demonstrated by Zhou Enlai's 
interest in July in Nixon's 'Kansas City speech'. American military power in Asia 
was on the wane, as Li Xiannian pointed out in his speech in Hanoi: the United 
States was an imperial power "which once swaggered like a conquering hero [but] is 
now heading toward decline and downfall at an accelerated tempo"; significantly, he 
avoided personal abuse of President Nixon. The North Vietnamese, on the other 
hand, characterized the Nixon Administration as "stubborn and wicked". Hanoi 
remained unconvinced of the wisdom of Mao's manoeuvres.60 
In a similar fashion, Soviet President Nikolai Podgornyi visited Hanoi the 
week after Li Xiannian in order to sign a new aid agreement with the North 
Vietnamese; however he also clearly hoped to exploit Vietnamese discomfort over 
Nixon's planned visit to Beijing and bring the Vietnamese over to their side in their 
dispute with the Chinese. It was a fruitless exercise for the Soviets, and Podgornyi's 
efforts were doubtlessly undermined by his announcement to the Vietnamese 
comrades of Nixon's planned visit to Moscow in May 1972. It is reported that the 
North Vietnamese did not protest at the time of the Soviet President's visit. Since 
Hanoi was seeking increased aid from both Beijing and Moscow in anticipation of an 
offensive in 1972, (one which they knew would probably bring about hard retaliation 
from Nixon), under these circumstances antagonising both China and the Soviet 
Union over their foreign policy choices would have been potentially very dangerous. 
As Le Duc Tho had told senior Khmer Rouge member Ieng Sary shortly after his 
arrival in Beijing a few weeks beforehand, "We should be independent in thoughts, 
promote international solidarity and solidarity with the Soviet Union and China ... If 
we take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the situation will become more 
1· d ,,61 comp lCate . 
The North Vietnamese leadership was quite predictably disturbed by the 
revelation of Nixon's planned visit to Beijing. And while the general trend in 
Chinese policy towards the United States had been clear since the advent of 'Ping-
60 Quoted in Gilks, The Breakdown, p. 77. 
61 Ibid.; Westad et aI., 77 Conversations, p. 178; Stephen J. Morris, The Soviet-Chinese- Vietnamese 
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pong diplomacy', the speed of the progression in Sino-American rapprochement 
surely sent a shudder down the collective spine of the V.W.P. politburo. Traditional 
Vietnamese suspicions about their great northern neighbour, and memories of the 
experiences of Geneva seventeen years earlier were rekindled and for a while vented 
in the Hanoi press (and even acknowledged by China). However, Chinese verbal 
assurances of continued support were matched by deed, and the amount of aid 
Beijing was sending southward to support the war effort reached unprecedented 
levels. Just as Hanoi had presented Mao with a fait accompli in April 1968, the 
c.c.P. Chairman had reciprocated in 1971. The North Vietnamese leadership were 
going to have to reassess their strategy in light of the new developments, but there 
was little they could to alter the strategic environment they now found themselves in; 
and all Beijing could to do to demonstrate its continued support for the Vietnamese 
struggle was to keep the money and guns flowing into Hanoi. 
Ending the war before the summit 
Despite the lack of progress in the Paris peace talks in the late summer and early 
autumn of 1971, Kissinger's secret visits to Paris permitted him to hold further face-
to-face discussions with prominent Chinese leaders, this time in the form of the 
Chinese ambassador to France, Huang Zhen. Facilitated by Major General Vernon 
Walters, the American military attache in Paris who conveyed messages to the 
Chinese ambassador's residence, this had become the main channel of 
communications between Beijing and Washington. It was agreed in this forum that 
Kissinger would return to Beijing to have further discussions preparatory to Nixon's 
own visit, including a decision on the exact date of the presidential arrival. With 
regard to the war in Indochina, the American objective was now less ambitious than 
it had been prior to Kissinger's July trip; since the summit had been agreed on in 
principle in July without any evidence of a quid pro quo of Chinese pressure on 
Hanoi, the hope was now for "constructive Chinese influence on Hanoi to make a 
reasonable settlement. Short of that we want their continued benevolent abstention 
on our efforts in Paris and willingness to see, and help guarantee, a negotiated 
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settlement to the war.,,62 Zhou's self-admonishing comments about the Chinese role 
in the 1954 Geneva Conference had also been taken on board by the American 
policy-makers. There was recognition that aside from China's own strategic 
interests in seeing the war ended and American troops withdrawn, the Beijing 
leadership felt a sense of responsibility towards Hanoi, and they believed "they let 
. Hanoi down in 1954 and do not want to be in the position of pressuring their 
proletarian friends.,,63 Nonetheless, hope remained that the Chinese would still be a 
positive force in helping bring about an end to the conflict in Indochina.64 
Kissinger was back in Beijing from October 20th_26th • The vast majority of 
the time that the American National Security Advisor spent in the Chinese capital 
was taken up by negotiations over the form and content of the joint declaration that 
was to be issued at the conclusion of Nixon's visit (what would come to be known as 
the 'Shanghai Communique') and discussion of technical arrangements for the 
summit. Inevitably, though, several hours were devoted to a discussion of the war in 
Indochina. The Americans had anticipated that the Chinese "want our forces 
withdrawn, and ... don't particularly care about the political solutions" and this was 
largely borne out by the tenor of the discussions between Zhou and Kissinger. In 
comparison to the issue of Taiwan, Zhou once again labelled the war in Indochina as 
being a "relatively more urgent issue" and it was clear that the pressing issue for the 
Chinese on this matter was the withdrawal of American troops. Zhou noted 
somewhat reproachfully that "your troops have not withdrawn totally and the date of 
final withdrawal has not been set". Later in conversation, Zhou asked for specifics 
about the fullness of the American withdrawal, and whether it would be a total 
withdrawal without any 'tail' left behind. Clearly he was concerned that Kissinger 
had not taken on board his message of July.65 
Kissinger told his Chinese host that at the end of the American withdrawal, 
which would take place over five months, there would only be an American military 
attache left in Saigon and that Thieu would resign as President of South Vietnam 
62 'Polo II Briefing Book', part 2, NPMP/NSC/1034/3. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Kissinger, WHo Y., pp. 768-9. 
65 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., October 21,1971, NPMP/NSC/I034/2. 
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with elections scheduled to take place one month later. The fate of Nguyen Van 
Thieu had remained the sticking point in the Paris negotiations, though Zhou did not 
express any strong opinion on it reflecting China's general ambivalence towards the 
future political dispensation in Saigon. Instead, Zhou appeared more concerned 
about the prospect of Lon Nol remaining in power in Cambodia. Zhou and Mao 
wanted a role for 'their man' Sihanouk in Phnom Penh, but Cambodia remained a 
conflict secondary to the one in Vietnam, and would not be settled until after it. And 
its settlement was inching closer - in one way or another. 1972 was an American 
presidential year; a fact that, just as in 1968, would focus minds in Hanoi and 
Washington. The huge amounts of military aid flowing into North Vietnam from 
both the Soviet Union and P.R.C. (including almost 2 million Chinese artillery shells, 
8,000 artillery pieces (including heavy mortars), and 80 tanks in 1971, with a further 
220 to follow in 1972) made it clear that Hanoi was going to attempt at least one 
more big military push and achieve by its own efforts what the United States had 
thus far refused to do: remove Thieu from office.66 
Under these circumstances, adopting a completely 'hands-off approach to 
the Vietnamese-American negotiations suited Beijing's own diplomatic objectives 
perfectly: China was able to provide diplomatic and military support to its ally, while 
at the same time maintaining a posture of non-interference that satisfied Hanoi's 
demands on that score. Thus Zhou had advised Kissinger of the advisability of 
complete disengagement from Vietnam, and of the necessity (for Hanoi) of getting 
rid of Thieu, without having to invest much diplomatic capital, and without pushing 
the issue so that it became an impediment to Nixon's arrival in Beijing and a 
successful summit. The Spring Offensive stood a reasonable chance of knocking out 
Thieu and his government; Mao and Zhou knew this, and were assisting it. 
While admitting to an implicit Chinese ambivalence, Zhou expressed 
sympathy for Hanoi's angst on the issue ofThieu's future role in South Vietnam. He 
predicted that Kissinger would have to go the extra mile to "untie the knot" in the 
negotiations. Zhou had evidently taken Kissinger's prior exposition of a 'decent 
66 Ibid.; Li and Hao, eds., Wengejiefangjun, p. 416; Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-mei hejie', in Li Danhui, 
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interval' solution at face value and believed that Nixon would eventually be forced to, 
in Mao's words, "let the domino fall". Later in conversation, Zhou adopted a stance 
of Sino-centric moral superiority, deigning to tell Kissinger of "the mental state [the 
Vietnamese communists] are in. They are in a state of war, of being submitted to 
aggression. They are not like China ... we still recognize the times have changed and 
we should look to the future. But you cannot rebuke the 14 million people of South 
Vietnam who are suffering in the extreme misery at the present for not accepting 
anything they do not feel is safe". It appears Zhou Enlai and the Chinese leadership 
had more confidence in the inevitability of a communist victory in South Vietnam 
than the Vietnamese comrades did.67 
If Kissinger found Le Duc Tho's negotiating style frustrating, it was also 
causing a few headaches for Mao and Zhou. While the Chinese Premier chided the 
American government for not having publicly responded to the P.R.G. 's seven point 
peace proposal, the diplomatic rouse that Hanoi had played on Nixon, through the 
P.R.G.'s publication of its seven points, was also having a negative impact on 
Beijing. Because Le Duc Tho had told Kissinger that his own privately tabled nine 
points were the more significant and were those to be negotiated, Washington had 
not issued a public response to Mme. Binh's seven points, and therein lay China's 
dilemma: Moscow had been making hay at Beijing's expense because of 
Washington's silence. Zhou practically implored the American negotiator to give a 
public answer, noting the United States had not responded since the proposal had 
been put forward barely a week before Kissinger visited Beijing. "Especially after 
you returned from China," Zhou noted, " the U.S. has refused to take such a position, 
and this makes the people of the world more unhappy ... Some people are saying that 
it goes without saying the United States in coming to China is wishing to put the 
Vietnamese people aside in this matter." Zhou listened attentively as Kissinger 
outlined the United States' position, and professed ignorance of the latest American 
proposal that had been put forward by Kissinger in a negotiating session with Xuan 
ThUY on October 11th. For this, he blamed the Soviets, and hinted that the visit of 
67 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., October 21, 1971, NPMPINSCIl03412. 
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Soviet President Nikolai Podgornyi to Hanoi had put further distance between 
Beijing and Hanoi.68 
In later discussions between the Chinese and American sides on the drafting 
of the Shanghai Communique the problematic issue of the public seven points versus 
the private nine points again reared its head. In the initial draft of the communique 
put forward by the Chinese, the Chinese side had stated that "the Chinese 
Government fully supports the seven-point proposal for the peaceful resolution of the 
Viet Nam question put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of South Vietnam". Kissinger pointed out to Zhou that he did "not see how 
it can make any sense" for the Chinese to support publicly a program that the North 
Vietnamese themselves had eschewed. His motivation was complex; clearly it 
would benefit Nixon domestically and help to isolate Hanoi internationally if the 
Chinese could be persuaded to drop such phraseology. At the same time, it was true 
when he told Zhou that "if we [the American government] make public the secret 
negotiations we [the United States and the People's Republic of China] will both 
look ridiculous." In the end Kissinger did not pursue the issue, simply concluding 
that "if you want to maintain this phraseology now, knowing what the record enables 
us to make public, I will not object." Although the exact wording was somewhat 
altered in order to deflect some of the criticisms Zhou had earlier outlined, the final 
draft of the communique, (issued on February 27th, 1972) did include Beijing's "firm 
support" for the seven-point proposal, despite the fact that on January 25 th, Nixon 
had indeed made public the secret negotiations and Hanoi's nine points. In many 
ways this served the purposes of the Chinese government well, as it helped foster 
internationally the perception of its 'non-interference' in the Paris peace talks. 
Overall, the issue of the war in Indochina did not prove to be a particularly knotty 
problem when negotiating the language to be used in the communique. Beijing 
made efforts to tone down its language on the Vietnam War so as not to cause undue 
offence to American ears, while at the same time sought to maintain its own position 
as a backer of the revolutionary movements in Indochina.69 
68 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., October 20, 1971, ibid. 
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As Kissinger noted in his report on the visit for the President, the discussions 
"were generally similar to those we held in July". The Chinese urged the Americans 
to set a specific withdrawal date, and expressed a hope that the issue of Vietnam 
would be resolved by the time President Nixon made his trip to Beijing; at the same 
time, though, Zhou specifically stated that the visit would not depend on it. As for 
the future political dispensation within South Vietnam, Zhou expressed no opinion, 
though did repeat that Kissinger and Nixon should seek the solution to the Vietnam 
problem in Hanoi, and not in Beijing. For his part, Kissinger "made a somewhat 
more emphatic pitch than July for Chinese help with Hanoi", though he seemed to 
accept that it would probably serve little good. In his memo to Nixon he concluded, 
"We cannot expect Peking to lean hard on its friends. We can expect it to help tip 
the balance for a negotiated settlement if the other objective realities move Hanoi 
toward a bargain". All this was a substantial step back from the quid pro quo that 
Kissinger had anticipated prior to his July visit to Beijing. And just because the 
National Security Advisor noted that Beijing seemed unwilling to help, this did not 
translate into him actually believing it; rather it made all the more bold in his 
attempts to elicit Chinese help.7o 
Three days before their meeting in Paris, scheduled for November 20th, Hanoi 
announced that Le Duc Tho was ill and would not attend, though Xuan Thuy would 
be available. Understanding that without Tho meaningful progress was impossible, 
on the 19th Major General Vernon Walters communicated to the North Vietnamese in 
Paris that the meeting would not be taking place. Clearly infuriated, Kissinger made 
his most overt attempt yet at persuading Beijing to exert pressure on the North 
Vietnamese, hoping that when n.R.V. Premier Pham Van Dong visited Beijing a few 
days hence Zhou would lean on him on America's behalf. On November 20th, 
Walters passed on to the Chinese embassy staff in Paris a message for Zhou Enlai, 
"in view of the fact that a North Vietnamese delegation is shortly visiting Peking ... 
The United States government is taking seriously your views that Indochina is an 
urgent issue for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East and it would help to have 
NPMPINSC/1034/4. 
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this issue substantially settled before the President's visit to the People's Republic of 
China". Kissinger outlined the events in the talks process that had occurred since the 
new American peace proposals of October 11 th, and finished with Kissinger's 
November 19th message to Hanoi that they would "wait to hear North Vietnamese 
suggestions for a new date" for talks. Kissinger hinted at repercussions for Sino-
American relations, and resurrected the corpse of 'Great Power' understanding that 
Zhou believed he had laid to rest in July. The message continued, "[T]he People's 
Republic of China, as a great country, will recognize that we cannot permit ourselves 
to be humiliated, no matter what the possible consequences for other policies." It 
had become clear that Hanoi was not going to negotiate an end to the war in 1971, as 
Kissinger and Nixon had initially hoped and expected, but would seek a military 
solution some time in 1972. Kissinger'S failure to extract a quid pro quo from the 
Chinese on the issue of Vietnam was coming back to haunt him, and he was now 
reduced to making increasingly unsubtle pleas for Chinese diplomatic intervention.71 
That very same day, November 20th, 1971, a North Vietnamese party and 
government delegation, led by Ph am Van Dong visited Beijing. Their Chinese hosts 
fanfared the visit, and a large picture of Pham Van Dong was placed on the front 
cover of Renmin Ribao to mark the event, along with a special editorial, all clearly 
designed to reassure the Vietnamese, and a potentially puzzled domestic audience, of 
China's continued support for the struggle being waged beyond her southern borders. 
The communique announced at the end of the visit yielded a pledge to support the 
seven-point solution put forward by the PRO and emphasised its two basic points: a 
condemnation of Vietnamization and demand for a total U.S. withdrawal from 
Vietnam; and a demand that the U.S. government "respect the South Vietnamese 
people's right to self-determination, withdraw support from, and relinquish all its 
commitments to the Fascist Nguyen Van Thieu clique, stop using this clique to 
oppose the South Vietnamese people, so as to pave the way for the formation in 
Saigon of a new administration favouring peace, independence, neutrality and 
d ,,72 emocracy . 
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Despite the outward declarations of solidarity, however, it is clear that 
differences existed between the Chinese and Vietnamese comrades, and that they 
were voiced during the private discussions between Pham Van Dong, Zhou Enlai and 
Mao Zedong. Dong's plea to the Chinese to cancel Nixon's visit was understandable, 
if unrealistic. During the course of the visit Mao is reported to have commented to 
Dong that "Where the broom cannot reach, the dust is not swept away" and this has 
been interpreted as Mao "arguing for Nixon." However, these comments were 
apparently made within the context of an oration by Mao on how "The Taiwan 
question is a long-term one.,,73 It was precisely Mao's point that China was putting 
aside the 'liberation' of Taiwan in order to help reduce Sino-American tensions, and 
to help bring about a resolution of the most pressing of issues in the Far East: the war 
in Indochina. When probing his interlocutors' intentions, Mao liked to be 
provocative, and gauge from their response the sincerity of the reply; this was the 
game in which he was engaged with Ph am Van Dong.74 
In early January, General Alexander Haig visited Beijing to finalise the 
outstanding details relating to Nixon's visit, and make another bid for Chinese help 
in ending the war. Originally, it was intended that he would not meet Zhou Enlai, 
but instead conduct his discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei. 
However, he requested an audience with the Chinese Premier, at Kissinger's behest, 
to discuss the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan crisis of December, and to give Zhou an 
assessment of recent events in South Asia. The key part of this assessment was to 
note a "precipitous shift in [Soviet] policy to adopt one in which they would now 
seek to encircle the P.R.C. with unfriendly states." Among the reasons cited for this 
belief was "increased Soviet material support for Hanoi." He told Zhou, "We [the 
American government] have concluded that the continuation of the war in Southeast 
Asia can only give Moscow an opportunity to increase its influence in Hanoi and 
further the encirclement of the People's Republic." He also attempted to portray any 
forthcoming Vietnamese communist offensive as being of assistance only to 
Moscow, characterising it as "forging another link in the chain which is designed to 
Dong's China Trip', November 26,1971, NPMPINSC/1036/2. 
73 S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, p. 42. 
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constrain the People's Republic ... [W]e are convinced of and dedicated to the 
proposition that the viability of the People's Republic of China should be 
maintained." The subtext of this statement was that through its actions to prevent an 
Indian attack on West Pakistan, the United States had helped block the encirclement 
of China by the U.S.S.R.; it was now China's turn to do likewise, and prevent a 
North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam in 1972. Quid pro quo redux.75 
Zhou admitted that he could not reply until he had reported to Chainnan Mao 
and consulted with other colleagues, but that aside, he rejected Haig's presentation 
on Soviet strategic thinking, and on Vietnam. He told the American visitor that 
"Soviet meddling in the South Asian continent and in Indochina, in my opinion, is 
not due to a change in the strategic policies of the Soviet Union but rather a 
necessary consequence of reaction on the part of the Soviet Union" towards Sino-
American rapprochement. Although his tone was restrained, he blamed Nixon's 
December bombing of North Vietnam south of the 20th parallel for giving the Soviet 
Union "an opportunity to increase its influence and its force" in North Vietnam, 
while in South Vietnam and the rest of Indochina "the U.S. bombing has increased 
the Soviet influence and tension in this area." American bombs had fallen on North 
Vietnam just a few weeks before Nixon's visit to Beijing. And while Soviet missiles 
were put into action, Chinese anti-aircraft guns were back within the P.R.C. 's own 
borders. Nixon was not making things easy for the Chinese.76 
Zhou sought and received Mao's approval for the reply to Haig's oral 
message, which was delivered on the evening of 6th January. It was uncompromising 
in tone. It rejected the American assertion that there had been a change in Soviet 
strategy; instead it contended that the Soviet machinations in India and Pakistan were 
"a continuation, under new circumstances, of the consistent Soviet policy of 
contending for hegemony." When it came to Indochina, Zhou accused the United 
States of having "wantonly bombed" North Vietnam, and rejected the American 
"self-justification" as "untenable". Still throwing China's weight behind the P.R.G's 
seven points, Zhou lauded them as a reasonable proposal, telling Haig that there was 
7S Memcon. Zhou. Haig et aI., January 3rd 1972, NPMPINSCIJ 037/3. 
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"no reason for [the United States] to refuse to accept" them. He laid the blame for 
the failure to reach a peace deal in Paris at the feet of the Americans, and warned 
Haig that "As victims of the war of aggression, the Vietnamese people have the right 
to take every necessary action in self-defence. China firmly supports their struggle." 
He then charged that U.S. policy had actually "created obstacles to ... the withdrawal 
of troops and to [America's] efforts to obtain release of the POWs." He ended with, 
from the Chinese perspective, the most serious charge: it had also "brought an 
unfavourable element into the visit of the President of the United States to the 
bl ' fCh' ,,77 People's Repu IC 0 mao 
Haig's attempt at a rebuttal echoed the parallelism of Kissinger's 'Great 
Power' pitch, but was devoid of even the most basic subtlety that his boss had 
managed to include. He noted that the problem lay with the North Vietnamese and 
that in the long run "our perception of the convergence of the interests of the United 
States and the People's Republic of China in the area of Southeast Asia is the 
ultimate truth." This received a further tetchy elaboration from Zhou Enlai. The 
Chinese Premier put it quite bluntly, "our current opinion has been, quite simply, that 
the United States is in the wrong." He acknowledged that it was not Nixon who had 
sent the troops into Vietnam, but predicted that if America didn't complete its 
withdrawal quickly and completely, and continued "to find various excuses to drag 
on in a messy way [America] will end up losing the initiative." Zhou demonstrated 
sensitivity to the attention being drawn in the Moscow media to the fact that Haig 
had special responsibility for Indochinese affairs, although Zhou noted that it was 
because of that responsibility he was speaking "with special earnestness." Zhou's 
exasperation eventually came right to the surface. "And if you want some news, I 
can tell you a bit that if you do not leave that place, then Southeast Asia which does 
have the possibility of being turned into an area of nonalignment will become an area 
of contention between the two superpowers. We are very clear about that. And then 
Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the subcontinent, the Indian Ocean, 
Southeast Asia will be linked together".78 
77 Memcon, Zhou, Haig et aI., January 6th 1972, NPMPINSC/l 037/3. 
78 Ibid. 
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Zhou was clearly disappointed that it appeared the war in Vietnam would not 
be brought to a conclusion before Nixon's visit to China, for he knew that it 
portended a massive North Vietnamese offensive in the dry season of 1972. The 
Chinese leaders were guilty of their own form of 'Great Power' thinking, but it was 
of a very different form to that of Kissinger. Mao and Zhou's expectation had been 
that since America's involvement in Vietnam had originated in a fear of China, then 
the burgeoning Sino-American rapprochement had obviated the need to continue 
supporting the South Vietnamese regime. Were Hanoi to fail in its objectives once 
again, while China was embarking on a relationship with the United States, there 
could develop such bitterness towards China that Beijing could lose all influence 
there. Military action by Hanoi in 1972 would only increase its ties to the Soviet 
Union, who supplied technically advanced military hardware that China could not. 
The only way to prevent this was for America to be forthcoming in negotiations, or 
for the 1972 offensive to achieve success. Therefore, from China's perspective there 
was nothing honourable about maintaining Nguyen Van Thieu in office: in fact, the 
longer he remained in power the more difficult China's relationship with Hanoi 
would become, and the blame for this was laid at Nixon's feet. 
Sino-American relations had moved forward in 1971 at a startling pace, and probably 
no-one had been more stunned by the developments than the Politburo in Hanoi. 
The invasion of Laos by South Vietnamese forces had stalled the process of 
rapprochement, but had also simultaneously validated it: it had demonstrated the 
futility of the American position in Indochina, and by doing so had strengthened 
Mao's hand vis-a-vis Nixon. A bold gesture had been needed, and Mao took 
advantage of a chance encounter in Nagoya to make one. Taiwan remained the key 
issue in bilateral relations, but Mao and the rest of the C.C.P. Politburo adopted a 
flexible attitude towards the problem that allowed it to, essentially, be kicked into the 
long grass. This had the effect of leaving the resolution of the war in Indochina as 
the most pressing problem in Sino-American relations - all the more surprising a 
tum of events given Beijing's attempts throughout 1970 to divorce Vietnam from an 
improvement in its relationship with Washington. 
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And yet despite the urgency that China now placed on the resolution of the 
Vietnam War (i.e. a total American withdrawal from Indochina) Zhou Enlai 
simultaneously disassociated China from Hanoi's war and adopted a stance of 'non-
interference'. But disassociation did not equate with disinterest or disengagement 
from Hanoi; China's long history with Vietnam made that impossible. One of the 
most striking features of these conversations is the lack of formal communist 
ideology underpinning Zhou Enlai's explanations to Kissinger as to why the Chinese 
government could not, and would not, intervene with Hanoi. Rather, he mainly drew 
from the deep well of shared history between his country and Vietnam, in both 
ancient times and modem, setting out a uniquely Sino-centric analysis of North 
Vietnam's predicament, and the nature of Chinese assistance to Hanoi. Rather than 
being based on a common adherence to Marxism-Leninism (though it played a part) 
Zhou indirectly explained to his interlocutor that China's continued backing for her 
smaller ally was rooted in Vietnam's place in China's 'cultural universe', and in a 
Chinese acknowledgement that they had let down their Vietnamese 'little brothers' at 
the Geneva Conference of 1954, which had seen the country partitioned. Likewise, 
Zhou's frustration with America's continued involvement in South Vietnam 
stemmed from a Sino-centric analysis of the purpose of American intervention. But 
Kissinger's realpolitik had little room for such notions, and thus he failed to come to 
terms with Zhou's message, interpreting it in terms of ideology and equivalent 'Great 
Power' notions of national interest. 
By the autumn of 1971, Mao and Zhou clearly believed that the United States 
intended to withdraw from Indochina, and were hopeful that it would be achieved 
before Nixon's summit visit. The American President's stubborn refusal to let the 
domino fall was engendering frustration in the Chinese capital. When it became 
clear that the future of Nguyen Van Thieu was the sticking point in the negotiations, 
and that the North Vietnamese were determined to have at least one more attempt to 
remove him by force of arms, China's impatience with the United States became 
heightened. Beijing continued to increase its level of aid to Vietnam, both military 
and economic. In the worst example of the 'Great Power' parallelism that permeated 
the N.S.C. in this period, Alexander Haig interpreted Zhou Enlai's frustration with 
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the American position as being a coded entreaty to hang on in Vietnam and avoid 
defeat. He also later claimed, in the words of his interviewer, that in January "Zhou 
indicated the Chinese aid to Vietnam was the minimum required to prevent a 
deterioration of relations between Beijing and H·anoi".79 On both counts the record 
tells quite another story. The value of Chinese aid agreements to Vietnam in 1971 
amounted to over 3.6 billion yuan; a level that was far beyond the minimum to 
maintain Vietnamese amity, though admittedly one that it was best the United States 
[ 80 was unaware 0 . 
To North Vietnam's great satisfaction, in late 1968 China had adopted a 
policy of 'non-interference' towards Hanoi's conduct of peace negotiations with the 
United States; the Chinese were now pursuing this policy to an extreme degree. 
Throughout late 1971, the P.R.C. hoped peace would be agreed, but at the same time 
was furnishing Vietnam with huge amounts of aid to continue their war effort - as 
ever hoping for the best while preparing for the worst. From Beijing's perspective 
the Vietnam War had become the Vietnamese' war; Hanoi could pursue its own 
diplomatic strategy, but the corollary was that Beijing would not let that strategy 
interrupt its own plans or interfere with its own diplomacy. Thus, irrespective of 
what was happening in Paris or Vietnam, Nixon was coming to Beijing. 
79 Ross, Negotiating Co-operation, p. 49; see also Zhai. CATVW. p. 199. 
80 Shen Zhihua. 'Zhong-Mei hejie'. Li Danhui. Zhongguo yu Yindllzhina zlul11zheng. pp. 232-3. 
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Chapter 4 
January 1972 - January 1973: Summit and Accord 
Nixon's impending visit to Beijing was a personal triumph for Mao. Despite the 
continuation of the war in Indochina, Washington and Beijing had managed to 
come to a modus vivendi on the issue: Kissinger would press for Chinese 
intervention with Hanoi, and Zhou Enlai would rebuff him. Nonetheless, Beijing 
had indeed hoped that the war in Vietnam might be concluded in advance of 
Nixon's visit to the Chinese capital, but they had placed their hopes on 
concessions from Washington, not from Hanoi. The Chinese leaders had 
believed that the Sino-American rapprochement would ultimately facilitate the 
end of the war by undermining what they believed to be the main rationale that 
had led the Johnson administration into the Vietnamese morass: fear of 'Red 
China'. This analysis was a manifestation of the unique Sinocentric 'Great 
Power' thinking that the Vietnamese comrades were so suspicious of, but it was 
never grasped on the analytical level in Washington where the 'Domino Theory' 
had long-since been overtaken by calculations about credibility, honour, and the 
dirty business of electoral politics - factors which were of little concern to the 
c.c.P. Chairman. 
While expressing Beijing's general ambivalence towards the future of 
Nguyen Van Thieu as President of South Vietnam, Zhou Enlai had emphasized to 
Kissinger the implacability of the Vietnamese communists' position on this issue: 
it was Washington, not Hanoi, who was going to have to give ground on this 
issue for the war to be ended in 1971. The result, from Beijing's perspective, 
would be a win-win scenario for China and the U.S.: America's Indochinese 
nightmare would be ended (honourably as Beijing saw it), allowing it to tum its 
attention to countering growing Soviet power elsewhere, while China would be 
able to demonstrate to a presumably grateful Hanoi that success was to be had by 
remaining in the Chinese, not Soviet, orbit. Frustratingly for Zhou and Mao it 
was in a form of 'Great Power' thinking of an entirely different order that 
Kissinger engaged, whereby respect for a fellow-power's honour and interests 
meant that pressure should be brought to bear on Hanoi to concede failure and 
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stop short of its objectives; American honour and the electoral cycle demanded it. 
These two perspectives failed to be reconciled in 1971. 
What Nixon's electoral requirements shared with Mao's strategic 
dilemma, however, was the need for a foreign policy success, and this allowed 
the failure to see eye-to-eye on Vietnam (as well as on Taiwan) to be overlooked 
in pursuit of a meeting of persons, if not minds, in Beijing. For the time being 
the Vietnam War was to remain a major irritant but not an insurmountable 
obstacle in Sino-American relations. Nevertheless, both Washington and Beijing 
realised that this position was not tenable in the longer term, and that in 1972 
something was going to have to give. 
No trading principles 
The first hint that 1972 was going to prove to be a make or break year in several 
areas of East Asian international relations emerged on January 25th • Frustrated 
by the lack of progress in the Paris peace negotiations, and irritated by the ability 
of the Vietnamese communists to manipulate public opinion by means of their 
differing public and private negotiating positions, Nixon went public with the 
secret negotiations that Kissinger had been undertaking with Le Duc Tho. The 
text of Nixon's speech was forwarded to the Chinese and Soviet leaderships. An 
accompanying note was also transmitted to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. 
The communication noted that by informing the Chinese of the American eight-
point proposal, which Kissinger had declined to disclose during his October visit 
to Beijing, "This action completes each of the commitments made by Dr. 
Kissinger to the Prime Minister with respect to the conflict." Zhou Enlai had on 
several occasions rejected the suggestion that they would intercede with Hanoi, 
so it was surely with surprise that the Chinese Foreign Ministry read the 
conclusion to the note, which clearly·referred to the People's Republic of China. 
"The United States believes that all concerned countries have an interest in 
helping end this war and that its proposals mean that no country need trade in 
principles in promoting this objective." American underestimation of Chinese 
sensitivity on this subject was typified by the salutation that concluded, "The note 
is sent in the spirit of frankness and mutual understanding which have 
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characterized our exchanges thus far."! Quite on the contrary, it exemplified a 
continued lack of understanding of the Chinese position? 
Zhou Enlai's response was largely a reiteration in more strident terms of 
the previously stated position. Surprise and indignation were expressed at the 
American mention of "commitments", while the American eight-point peace 
proposal was condemned as "a fraud for dragging out the war and ... in effect an 
ultimatum demanding that the Vietnamese people submit." It reminded the 
Americans that "The Chinese people will not flinch from even the greatest 
national sacrifice in giving resolute support to the Vietnamese people." (The 
warning was somewhat pro forma, given that both sides knew that the long-
understood trigger for provoking "the greatest national sacrifice" from China (an 
American invasion of the D.R.V.) was all but an impossibility; it did, however, 
serve to reiterate the long-standing Chinese commitment to the North Vietnamese 
and their struggle.) The Chinese side also angrily, and correctly, pointed out that 
the paragraph of the note asserting that "its proposals mean that no country need 
trade in principles" in actuality did mean that Kissinger "wants us to abandon 
principles and exert pressure on the Vietnamese side on behalf of the United 
States. This is absolutely impossible." The Chinese note concluded by 
acknowledging the frankness that had characterized the Sino-American 
exchanges, "and it is exactly in this spirit that we are applying [sic] to you.,,3 
Unsurprisingly there was no reference made to mutual understanding.4 
The Chinese note was indeed "tart", as Kissinger described m his 
memoirs, however the American response was anything but as "sharp" as 
Kissinger portrayed it.s The U.S. side hurried to clarify the situation, declaring 
that "pending publication of its eight points, the U.S. side could not divulge the 
details of its proposals to the People's Republic of China but that it would inform 
it of the details as soon as appropriate. Thus, the term 'commitment' in this 
context connotes a unilateral promise rather than reciprocal obligation.,,6 This 
explanation satisfied the Chinese Ambassador to Paris, Huang Zhen, through 
I Undated and untitled message, NPMPINSC/849/3. 
2 Kissinger, WH. Y, pp. 1103-4. 
3 Undated and untitled message, NPMPINSC/849/3. 
4 Memo, 'To General Haig from General Walters', January 30, 1972, ibid. 
5 Kissinger, WH. Y, p. 1104. 
6 Wire, 'To Major General Walters from Brig. General Haig', January 31,1972, 
NPMPINSC/849/3. 
159 
whom it was transmitted to Beijing. 7 But despite having defused the issue, 
Kissinger failed to comprehend the underlying issue that had caused Beijing's 
irritation, and still hoped that the Chinese desire to see the Vietnam War ended 
before Nixon's visit to Beijing would entice them into the role of intermediary. 
A few days later the United States sent another note via Gen. Walters, noting that 
Le Duc Tho may be visiting the Chinese capital just before President Nixon. 
"[I]f Special Advisor Le Duc Tho expresses an interest in a private meeting, Dr. 
Kissinger would be prepared to discuss the situation in Indochina in the spirit of 
generosity and justice." Given the content and tenor of Zhou Enlai's previous 
pronouncements on Vietnam, the request was either stupid, audacious, or both. 
Much like the previous note, it concluded in a rather self-contradictory fashion, 
and declared that "This is not a request for action by the Chinese side and is 
simply for its information. No reply is expected."s It was a rather wishful 
statement; a reply followed five days later in which Zhou Enlai reiterated the fact 
that "China supports the just struggle of Vietnam, but will definately [sic] not 
meddle in the Vietnamese-US negotiations." Accompanying this message was 
another, noting the American affirmation that there existed no reciprocal 
obligation between the P.R.C. and the U.S.A. with respect to Indochina. The 
Chinese pedantry contained within the note highlighted Zhou Enlai's sensitivity 
on the subject. "[N]or was it mentioned that the Chinese side would be informed 
of the details of this plan as soon as appropriate." Each side was determined to 
have the last word: once again no reply was required.9 
This almost farcical exchange of notes in the three weeks leading up to 
Nixon's trip to China reveals the confusion that lay at the heart of the N.S.C.'s 
understanding of Beijing's position on Indochina. A final American clarification 
(though not required) disingenuously claimed that the United States was not 
attempting to enmesh Beijing, and accused Beijing of perceiving "an exaggerated 
significance which was never intended."IO Kissinger's hints at misplaced Chinese 
sensitivities on the subject would have carried more credibility had this incident 
not just followed hot on the heels of what even Kissinger later admitted was a 
7 Memorandum for record, 'Subject: 38th Meeting with the Chinese in Paris', February 1, 1972, 
ibid. 
8 Memo, 'To General Haig from General Walters', February 11,1972, ibid. 
9 Memo, 'To General Haig from General Walters', February 15, 1972, ibid. 
10 Memo, untitled, February 16,1972, NPMPINSC/849/3. 
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very blatant attempt to "enmesh" China. I I Fully aware that there was no chance 
of Mao canceling the summit unless the war gravely escalated, Kissinger had 
become emboldened in his efforts to get some Chinese assistance on the matter. 
Given the high degree of sensitivity prevalent among the North Vietnamese about 
great power chauvinism and a repeat of Geneva 1954, the idea that Le Duc Tho 
would meet with Kissinger in the Chinese capital was certainly fanciful. And 
despite protestations to the contrary, the American side's allegation that its peace 
proposal "means that no country need trade in principles" was a clear inducement 
to the Chinese to promote Nixon's eight-point plan to Hanoi. 12 China's 
detennination to remain divorced from the U.S.-D.R.V. peace negotiations (or to 
at least maintain the fa9ade) was made clear in Beijing's continued expressions of 
support for the N.L.F. 's seven point proposal, despite the fact it was now public 
knowledge that this was not even a basis for negotiations in the Kissinger-Tho 
talks. Kissinger'S notes, like his Vietnam strategy, annoyed Zhou Enlai but they 
would not affect Beijing's American policy. 
In contrast, but of equal importance to the content of the notes is the tone 
in which these messages were delivered by Ambassador Huang Zhen, one of the 
P.R.C.'s most experienced and trusted diplomats. Whenever an acrimonious 
message was being read out or handed over Huang Zhen appeared embarrassed; 
when this was out of the way, the short and uncomfortable exchanges were 
prefaced and followed by "hearty handshakes and back pats", "persiflage", 
joviality" and a great amount of cordiality and tea. \3 This told the other half of 
the story. The Chinese were enjoying their new relationship with the United 
States and intended moving it on irrespective of what was taking place in 
Vietnam. They wished to see the war there ended before Nixon came to Beijing, 
but the extent of their involvement in this was to encourage the Americans to sign 
up to the P.R.G.'s seven points. This in itself was a charade however; the Beijing 
leaders knew that Hanoi was going to press ahead with what became known as 
the 'Spring Offensive', for they had partly financed it and had supplied North 
Vietnam with large anns shipments in advance of it. Under these circumstances, 
II Kissinger, w.H. Y, p. 1104. 
12 Undated and untitled message, NPMPINSC/849/3. 
13 Memorandum for the record, '37th meeting with the Chinese in Paris', undated, 
NPMP/NSC/849/3; memorandum for the record, 'Subject: 38th meeting with the Chinese in Paris', 
February I, 1972, ibid; memorandum for record, 'Subject: 41 st meeting with the Chinese in Paris', 
February 11, 1972, ibid. 
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adopting a completely 'hands-off approach to the Vietnamese-American conflict 
suited Beijing's own diplomatic objectives perfectly: China was able to provide 
diplomatic and military support to its ally, while at the same time maintaining a 
posture of non-interference that satisfied Hanoi's demands on that score. Such a 
stance of studied non-involvement would also prove extremely useful during the 
anticipated communist offensive in Vietnam expected for a few months hence. 14 
Thus Zhou advised Kissinger of the advisability of complete 
disengagement from Vietnam, and of the necessity (for Hanoi) of getting rid of 
Thieu, without having to invest much diplomatic capital, and without pushing the 
issue so that it became an impediment to Nixon's arrival in Beijing and a 
successful summit. There was little point. The Spring Offensive stood a 
reasonable chance of, at the very least, putting Hanoi in the driving seat in the 
Paris negotiations. Mao and Zhou knew this, and were assisting it. Under these 
circumstances, adopting any posture that would further antagonize Hanoi would 
only run counter to China's longer term objective of not 'losing' Vietnam to the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Spring Offensive, and the threatened harsh 
American reprisal, would place enormous pressure on the Soviet Union: they 
would be forced either to cancel Nixon's visit, or to receive him while bombs 
were raining down on Hanoi. At the same time Hanoi's logistical needs would 
force closer co-operation between Beijing and Hanoi and make the North 
Vietnamese more dependent on Chinese amity. Contrary to popular belief, the 
Spring Offensive suited China's purposes well. 
The North Vietnamese leaders closely guarded their secrets, and it is 
unlikely that the Chinese leaders knew the exact date of the planned offensive, 
though they could have been in no doubt that it was in the offing. Hanoi also had 
to take the timing of Nixon's visit into account, as demonstrated by the request of 
the previous November that Mao cancel it. However, there are some hints that an 
'understanding' was reached between Beijing and Hanoi on the offensive, given 
the fact that North Vietnamese criticism of the turnaround in Chinese foreign 
policy ceased in late 1971. Even without an 'understanding' on the matter, that 
Hanoi was going to make one last effort to resolve the issue militarily, or at least 
on its terms, was widely suspected in Washington and was clear to Beijing. 
14 Kissinger, w.H. Y., pp. 1045,1104. 
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When the Spring Offensive did come, it was rather late in the dry season; this 
could, of course, have been solely designed to take the Americans by surprise. 
However, it is likely that Hanoi decided that it was not in its interests to infuriate 
Beijing by putting Mao's summit with Nixon at risk. If the U.S. President 
responded with a blockade of Haiphong, long recognized as a possible course of 
action, then close co-operation with China would be essential to keep the D.R.V. 
supplied. And however much Mao and Zhou wanted to keep Hanoi onside, it is 
unlikely that North Vietnam would go unpunished for having destroyed, or 
attempted to destroy, Mao's foreign policy triumph. 15 
In the weeks leading up to Nixon's visit, China very publicly exhibited 
diplomatic support for the Vietnamese communists' reaction to Nixon's January 
25th announcement by meeting the North Vietnamese and P.R.G. ambassadors to 
Beijing and issuing official statements in support of the P.R.G. 's stance. 16 But its 
support for Hanoi extended well beyond rhetoric. In January 1972 the P.R.C. 
signed secret agreements with various Warsaw Pact countries on the 
transportation of specialized military materials from these countries across China 
to Vietnam. Further agreements of this kind were signed in March and April. 17 
Kissinger's conclusion that China's "material support for Hanoi was marginal" 
was a little wide of the mark: the C.I.A. estimated that in 1972 China sent $200 
million worth of military aid and $80 million of economic aid to North Vietnam; 
the Soviets estimated that in the same year Chinese aid to the D.R.V. was worth 
$500 million. According to Chinese sources the P.R.C. signed aid agreements 
with the D.R.V. in the 1971-1973 period worth an estimated 9 billion yuan; at the 
official US$:RMB exchange rate this would be an annual average in the region of 
$1.5 billion. 18 However, his own desire not to see the Vietnam War interfere 
IS Garver, 'Sino-Vietnamese Conflict', p. 461; memcon, (extract), Zhou Enlai and Pham Van 
Dong, April 10, 1967,77 Conversations, p. 99; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 
pf' 231-2. 
1 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, p. 620; 'Chou En-Lai Express Support For PRGSV 7 
Point Proposal', NCNA, February 2,1972, Folder 011B0x ISIDPC Unit 04/TVA-TTU; 'China 
Supports PRGRSV Stand on Nixon Plan' NCNA, February 4, 1972, Folder 141B0x 07/DPC Unit 
OS/TVA-TTU. 
17 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', part 2, pp. 31-2. 
18 Ibid.; Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 1104. To put this figure into perspective, total Chinese industrial 
and agricultural output in 1972 was 364 billion yuan, while total state revenue was 77 billion 
yuan. See Van Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade: A History o/the Cultural Revolution, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), p. 412. We do not have exact figures from 
Chinese sources, in financial terms, for the amount of aid China delivered to North Vietnam year 
by year during this period. As noted, Soviet, American and Chinese estimates of Chinese aid 
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with the opening to China, combined with China's "posture of indifference", 
meant that Kissinger opted not to press China further on the matter, "convinced 
they have spoken quite forcefully to Hanoi." In his own words, he "did not press 
China further.,,19 China was being let off the hook. 
In these weeks Kissinger grew bolder in his attempts to enlist Chinese 
help with their Vietnamese friends. A combination of growing confidence and 
growing desperation entered his communications with Zhou Enlai on Vietnam, 
but these were nonetheless swatted away by the Chinese Premier with a certain 
degree of contempt and irritation. China was not going to 'trade in principles', as 
Zhou Enlai had repeatedly stated. The Chinese Premier's entreaties to Kissinger 
to let go of Thieu and settle the Vietnam issue had fallen on deaf ears; as a result 
Beijing knew that another chapter of the war was still to be played out in 1972, so 
there was no point in China wading into the fray with Hanoi until it had had one 
last roll of the military dice. Ironically, the growing inevitability of another 
military push by Hanoi in 1972 necessitated that Nixon largely ignore China's 
role in financing and arming it. He was seeking re-election in November, and 
desperately needed a big foreign policy success: beginning the year with a visit to 
Beijing guaranteed at least one, for its success would simply be that it had 
happened at all. At the same time there existed the possibility that it might help 
with those altogether knottier problems remained to be untied in Moscow and 
most of all in Paris. The President was uncertain, but Kissinger remained 
convinced - Nixon would get something on Vietnam in China. 
vary wildly, due to the intelligence-based nature of foreign assessments and methodological 
problems contained therein. This is further compounded by problems of calculating the monetary 
value of specific items in different economic systems and the artificial exchange rates that existed 
between the currencies in question. All this makes comparing sources very difficult: e.g. C.LA. 
estimates of Chinese aid to Hanoi for 1972 in analogous U.S. prices put it at $280 million; Soviet 
estimates (in roubles then converted at the official contemporary exchange rate) put it at $500 
million. Chinese sources indicate an annual aid budget (military and economic) for the D.R.V. 
for 1971-3 of approximately 3 billion yuan (the official exchange rate at the time was 
approximately 2 RMB to the US$). See '(Est Pub Date) Communist Military and Economic Aid 
to North Vietnam, 1970-1974', January I, 1975, 
www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp?pageNumber= 1 &freqReqRecord=nic vietnam. txt (for the purposes 
of comparison the same report estimated the value of Soviet military aid for 1972 to be $490 
million); Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, p. 231; Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', 
part 2, pp. 31-2; Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao shi, vol. 3, p. 51; 
'Historical Exchange Rate Regime of Asian Countries', International Economics Project, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, http://int1.econ.cuhk.edu.hklexchange rate regime/index.php?cid=8. 
19 Kissinger, WHo Y., p. 1104; Briefing Book for the President, 'Briefing Papers for the China Trip 
_ Book V', NPMPINSC/847/4. 
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'Not a damn thing' 
Nixon was clearly someone Mao felt he could do business with, and had 
reportedly said of the American President that "Although Nixon has a cunning 
side, he is not as bad as the others, for his policy is more open ... ,,20 Likewise, it 
is clear from reading the briefing books that Kissinger's NSC staff put together 
for the President in preparation for his historic visit to Beijing that Nixon 
returned the compliment. A section on "traditional assumptions of Chinese 
politics" particularly caught the President's eye; and while this section had been 
outlined as assumptions that were "rather different from our own", in the light of 
subsequent events it appears that Nixon perhaps shared something of the 
'traditional Chinese' outlook of the C.C.P. Chairman: 
"4. The ruler has a special virtue and prestige, which if maintained 
prolong his rule. Hence face is necessary to power holding, and criticism (as by a 
free press) is at once subversive. 
5. Rule is personal. Law is not supreme, but a tool of administration. It is 
loyalty that supports a ruler. Hence civil rights must be limited and law 
. d I l' ,,21 subordmate to persona re abons. 
As a man who believed that 96% of the bureaucracy was his enemy, 
("bastards who are here to screw us") Nixon also felt common cause with a 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party who had "doubts about the virtue of a 
Party and governmental bureaucracy as instruments of national development." 
Nixon certainly accorded with Mao's view, as reported to him, that "bureaucracy 
thwarts popular initiative, making people passive and dependent on guidance 
from organizational superiors." 22 Despite the gulf in culture, philosophy, 
political system and life-experience, and impossible as it may seem, it is clear 
that President Richard Nixon felt that he shared some common ground with 
20 Memo to the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 'Mao, Chou and the Chinese Litmus Test', 
February 19, 1972, NPMPINSCIHAK Office Files/88/3. 
21 Briefing Book for the President, 'China Visit Readings on Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai', 
NPMPINSC/84712, NPMP (original emphasis). Nixon was obsessed with building up the 
'mystique' of the President. E.g. see Haldeman Diaries entries for July 21 1969, January 81970, 
April 17, 1970. Nixon and Haldeman's perceptions ofloyalty (or more often than not, disloyalty) 
are also constant themes in Haldeman's diaries. 
22 Briefing Book for the President, 'China Visit Readings on Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai', 
NPMPINSC/847/2. 
165 
Chairman Mao Zedong aside from their mutual disdain for the leaders of the 
Soviet Union.23 
It appears, however, that despite his anticipation of a 'meeting of minds', 
Nixon harboured fewer hopes than his National Security Adviser that the Chinese 
could playa useful role in bringing the Vietnam War to a conclusion on terms 
more satisfactory to the United States. On February 14th, only a few days prior to 
the departure of the presidential party for China, Kissinger had received word 
that Le Duc Tho was prepared to meet with him in Paris in mid-March.24 What's 
more, the North Vietnamese had invited Dr. Kissinger to lunch, something they 
had never done before. Haldeman recorded that Kissinger was "particularly 
ecstatic" at this course of events, believing that this was a "significant time ... 
[Kissinger] thinks at the very least this will insure no major offensive as we've 
been fearing." Nixon, on the other hand, was unconvinced "that it wasn't just a 
North Vietnamese ploy", and felt that it was his military posture and 'attacks on 
critics at home that were bearing fruit, rather than his diplomatic manoeuvres 
with the Chinese.25 
Despite all the Chinese were saying to him, Kissinger on the other hand 
could not accept that they were not pushing Hanoi. That is not to say that he was 
ignorant of China's conflicting policy; on the contrary, in his briefing papers for 
the President's visit to Beijing he spelt out unambiguously the reasons why it 
would be disadvantageous to the P.R.C.'s position for Zhou to pressure Hanoi 
into cutting a deal with the Americans. Kissinger stated to his President, "Any 
Chinese attempts to influence Hanoi towards a reasonable settlement with us 
could leave Moscow openings for furthering its influence in Indochina by 
charging U.S.-Chinese collusion." It continued, "[T]hey must be circumspect in 
any promoting of a settlement because of their fear of encirclement by the Soviet 
23 Haldeman Diaries, entries for February 6 and June 29, 1971. 
24 There is a discrepancy between the Haldeman Diaries, which states that the Vietnamese 
proposed March 17th and Kissinger's recollection in WHo Y, which states that the invitation was 
for "a date for any time convenient to us after March 15." Kissinger also fails to record any of the 
excitement Haldeman attributed to him on this occasion. Cf. Haldeman Diaries, entry for 
February 141972, WH.Y., p. 1105. 
25 Haldeman Diaries, entry for February 141972. In Nixon's Vietnam War, Jeffrey Kimball lists 
"the imminent trip to China", in addition to the bombing of South Vietnam and the movement of 
the aircraft carriers, as being factors that "must have had an effect". This was not mentioned by 
Haldeman, although "dealings with the Chinese" were discussed later in the same conversation. 
As can be seen, neither Haldeman nor Nixon makes a direct link between the two issues. Cf. 
Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, pp. 296-7. 
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Union and countries under its sway ... Both publicly and privately therefore 
China has stood closely by its ally, as is to be expected." That "The P.R.C. 
probably does not want to see Hanoi control all of Indochina, since such a bloc 
could be dominated by the U.S.S.R.", and Zhou's admission of Chinese 
culpability in the 1954 Geneva settlement were also duly noted. Thus, the strong 
incentives for China not to intervene on America's behalf were clearly elucidated 
for the president. And yet despite the foregoing analysis and evidence, Kissinger 
drew the opposite conclusion. Ignoring Zhou's explanation to him of the bitter 
history between imperial China and Vietnam, the reminders about Chinese 
mistakes in 1954, China's sense of duty to its smaller ally, and the strategic 
reasons why it would not be in China's interests to antagonise Hanoi, Kissinger 
chose to interpret "Hanoi's extreme sensitivity in its public statements" not as 
another reason for China not to interfere, but rather as evidence that "Peking had 
indeed been talking to it." Of this, he was "convinced".26 
Three factors underpinned Kissinger's assessment: firstly, he correctly 
understood that "the Chinese would like to see Indochina removed as a distortion 
in our relations and as an issue for Soviet exploitation"; secondly, a continuation 
of the war over the longer term would increase Soviet influence in Indochina; the 
third factor was the resurrection of the "inherent quid pro quo" between the 
issues of Taiwan and Indochina. This quid pro quo was, of course, a large step 
back from Kissinger'S original expectation of July 1971 that Chinese assistance 
on Vietnam would be the price Beijing would have to pay for a summit; this 
much more modest trade-off was based on the premise that "Only we can help 
them concerning Taiwan; and they can help in Indochina".27 
On the first point Kissinger was clearly correct, though as has been seen 
his understanding of China's approach to solving this issue was seriously flawed. 
As viewed from Beijing, the best way to limit Soviet influence in Indochina 
would be for the United States to give up on Nguyen Van Thieu. On the second 
point he was correct, though Hanoi's own desire to continue the war into another 
U.S. electoral cycle must be questioned. Finally, Mao's decision to kick the issue 
of Taiwan into touch for the short-term made Kissinger's much-vaunted quid pro 
26 Briefing Book for the President, 'Briefing Papers for the China Trip - Book V', 
NPMPINSC/847/4. (Emphasis in original). 
27 Ibid. 
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quo partially redundant; originally, one of the basic assumptions behind Mao's 
calculation to open to the United States was that Nixon was pulling out of 
Indochina, and in the interim Vietnamization and American troop withdrawals 
had proceeded apace. By promising that two-thirds of U.S. forces on Taiwan 
would be withdrawn after American involvement in the Vietnam War ended, 
Nixon and Kissinger had actually weakened the linkage between the two issues: 
America was on its way out of Vietnam, either through negotiation or a phased 
unilateral withdrawal. Therefore, the withdrawal of two-thirds of American 
forc'es from Taiwan was inevitable; what was in question was simply a matter of 
timing. The withdrawal of the remaining forces was dependent on the state of 
Sino-American bilateral relations, making this the key. 
Furthermore, under the circumstances of the burgeoning strategic 
relationship between the P.R.e. and the United States, the remaining American 
forces represented much less of a threat to China than they had a decade earlier, 
and served as a useful temporary bulwark against Japanese or Soviet 
encroachment into Taiwan. Reinforcing this was the link that Mao and Zhou 
were fostering between Lin Biao's 'coup attempt' and opposition to Sino-
American rapprochement: all genuine concern about, or opposition to, the 
opening could be suppressed as being pro-Lin and therefore anti-Party.28 Thus, 
the pressure was somewhat relieved on the need for Zhou to deliver immediate 
results on Taiwan to satisfy internal doubters. 
In this light, the incentive for Beijing to attempt to persuade Hanoi of the 
merits of a negotiated settlement and dissuade them from launching their planned 
military offensive are much weaker than Kissinger held to be true. Nixon 
appeared to appreciate this fact, and annotated his talking points to emphasize 
that the U.S. did not ask that Beijing exert pressure on its allies, though they 
would welcome, "but do not expect", a constructive attitude from Beijing 
towards their new peace proposals.29 For Mao and Zhou, however, Nixon and 
Kissinger's new peace proposals were of little interest, for the time being at least. 
China's main priority was to maintain its relationship with both North Vietnam 
and the United States at a time when the two belligerents were on course for a 
28 See e.g. Mao's comments to Nixon in Burr, Kissinger Transcripts, p. 61. 
29 Briefing Book for the President, 'Briefing Papers for the China Trip - Book V', 
NPMP/NSC/847/4. 
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military showdown in the spring, although Kissinger, and perhaps Nixon, 
believed otherwise. Nevertheless, the two Americans, like Mao and Zhou, were 
determined not to let the Vietnam War interfere with the burgeoning Sino-
American relationship, and Nixon's first priority when he reached Beijing was to 
cement this new relationship by undoing an insult from the First Indochina War. 
Kissinger had pointed out to the President that Zhou had been "piqued" 
ever since Eisenhower's Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles, had refused to 
shake his hand at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Nixon was determined not only 
not to repeat the mistake, but to make a point of extending his hand to Zhou long 
before he was within reach. On the afternoon of February 21 S\ 1972, Zhou Enlai 
stood on the tarmac rather stiffly, as the President of the United States walked 
towards him, hand-outstretched; naturally, he shook hands with Nixon, but he did 
not emulate the President's enthusiasm. It mattered little however; Nixon had 
made his point. 30 
Seventy-eight year old Mao's health had noticeably deteriorated in the 
wake of the 'Lin Biao affair'. In a spur of the moment decision, in early January 
he had chosen to attend the memorial service for deceased former Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi, but refused to dress properly, wearing his pyjama bottoms 
under a great coat. His health weakened further as a result. Suffering from 
chronic pneumonia, oedema and related heart problems, in the early morning of 
February 12th as his breathing weakened and his nurse struggled to find a pulse, 
the Chairman lost consciousness.3l Nixon had done well to heed the advice of 
former French Minister of Culture, Andre Malraux, whom Nixon had hosted in 
the White House shortly before his visit to China. Malraux had warned the 
President "You may think he is talking to you, but he will in truth be addressing 
Death!,,32 Despite this, in the early afternoon of February 21 st the Chairman was 
feeling up to meeting Nixon, but no-one could be sure how long it would last. 
The result was a meeting between the President and the Chairman much sooner 
than any of the Americans had anticipated. Nixon and Kissinger were rushed to 
30 Nixon, RN, p. 559. 
31 Foreign Relations of the United State, Nixon-Ford Administrations volumes [hereafter FRUS-
Nixon], vol. XVII, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), 
document 161 (editorial note); C.D.R.O., Mao Zedong zhuan, pp. 1612, 1615-7; Burr, Kissinger 
Transcripts, p. 58. 
32 Nixon, RN, p. 557. 
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his residence in Zhongnanhai just a few hours after they had touched down in 
Beijing.33 
It was clear to Nixon and Kissinger that Mao was not a well man, and 
could only speak with "considerable effort.,,34 But if Mao's mental agility was 
impaired by his illness, it did not show, and although it served to emphasize his 
desired perception of himself as a great philosopher, his refusal to engage in the 
discussion of specifics with Nixon helped avoid testing his abilities too much. 
"All these troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much" he told the 
American President. "I think your topic is better - philosophic questions." As a 
result, the war in Vietnam did not surface in any meaningful way, but China and 
North Vietnam's differing interests in who resided in the White House were 
made clear. Mao confirmed to the President what had already been reported: "I 
voted for you during your election" he told Nixon, and implied that he wished to 
see his election victory repeated, half-joking, "[P]erhaps you as an individual 
may not be among those to be overthrown." Beijing and Hanoi's aims could not 
have been more divergent: part of Hanoi's diplomatic strategy depended on 
threatening Nixon's re-election, while Mao wished to see that in no way 
endangered. Then, under condition of confidentiality (after having suggested to 
the American President "that you do a little less briefing") the Chairman made a 
statement that would have caused horror in Hanoi. "If all of you [meaning Nixon 
and Kissinger] are overthrown we wouldn't have any more friends left.,,35 By 
saying this, of course, Mao was simply employing "the cardinal Chinese 
principle in dealing with a non-Chinese ... us[ing] friendship as a halter", but his 
words would have been horrifying to Vietnamese ears nonetheless. 36 
Nixon never did get the private audience with Mao he had wished for 
while he remained President. It mattered little however, for the symbolism of the 
meeting and the strategic direction of the bilateral relationship had been captured 
in that hurried and unexpected encounter. Specifics would be discussed with the 
Premier, and despite North Vietnamese objections a substantial portion of these 
meetings would be devoted to discussing the war in Indochina. In reality, 
33 Kissinger, W.H.Y, pp. 1051-2, 1057. 
34 Kissinger, w.H. Y, p. 1059. 
35 Burr, Kissinger Transcripts, pp. 59-65. 
36 Briefing Book for the President, 'China Visit Readings on Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai', 
NPMPINSC/847/2. The observation was made by John K. Fairbank in 1960. See also Hersch, 
The Price of Power, p.374 fn. 
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though, Nixon had little of substance to add to the record already established by 
Kissinger in his talks with Zhou Enlai the previous July and October, except to 
add his personal and presidential imprimatur. What is most surprising about the 
entire set of discussions, however, is how little Nixon had to say on the topic of 
Vietnam. In their opening, four hour long, discussion on the international 
situation the closest he came to addressing the topic was the reiteration of the 
promise to remove "two-thirds of our present forces on Taiwan ... as the situation 
in Southeast Asia is resolved... And the reduction of the remaining third of our 
military presence on Taiwan will go forward as progress is made on the peaceful 
resolution of the problem." Not wanting to appear like a supplicant, Nixon didn't 
. V· 37 even mentIOn letnam. 
It was Zhou, in fact, who raised the topic of Indochina in his reply to the 
President. He noted that if China and the United States wanted "make some 
contribution to the relaxation of tensions in the world ... the crucial question then 
is the question of Indochina." He prefaced his comments by reminding Nixon 
that "only the Indochinese people themselves have the right to speak, to negotiate 
with you. But as the Indochina area is of concern to us we have the right to raise 
our voice on that matter. What's more we have the obligation to give the 
Indochinese peoples assistance and support." He put the Chinese position in 
much more clear terms than he ever had with Kissinger, and emphasised that the 
current American course of action only benefited the Soviet Union. "I think it 
would be better to take more bold action. Otherwise you will only facilitate the 
Soviets in furthering their influence there ... " Kissinger's recollection was 
largely accurate when he described Zhou's rebuttal as being "more in sorrow than 
anger", and indeed "a masterpiece of indirection". Unfortunately, it was so 
indirect that Kissinger once again missed the point. It is little wonder that Zhou 
inteIjected at one point, "Probably it is not easy for us to make these things very 
I . kl ,,38 C ear qUlC y. 
Zhou's principal argument for ending the war quickly was not, as 
Kissinger later wrote, "that it bogged down the United States and deflected our 
37 Memcon, Nixon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 22,1972, White House Special 
FileslPresident's Office Files/87IMemoranda for the President beginning February 20 1972, 
http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/NSAEBBINSAEBBI06INZ-1.pdf 
38 Memcon, Nixon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 22, 1972, White House Special 
Files/President's Office Files/87lMemoranda for the President beginning February 20 1972, 
http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchivINSAEBBINSAEBBI 06/NZ-1.pdf; Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 1073. 
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energies from more important parts of the globe." It was, rather, that the longer 
the United States took to withdraw, the more Soviet influence would grow, and 
the more likely was the chance that Southeast Asia would become an area of 
contention between the United States and the Soviet Union - "another Middle 
East will develop." He didn't mention it explicitly but Sino-Soviet contention in 
Indochina was also surely on his mind. He downplayed Chinese fear of Soviet 
encirclement in Vietnam, ("we are not afraid of that eventuality") but this was 
clearly behind what he was telling Nixon. He tried to persuade the American 
President that Thieu was dispensable, telling him "That is still your old saying -
you don't want to cast aside old friends. But you have already cast aside many 
old friends." He then went on, "It would be beneficial for the relaxation of 
tensions in the Far East to bring about a non-aligned Southeast Asia." Nixon 
interjected that he believed that would eventually happen, but in one of the few 
occasions the two leaders spoke over each other, Zhou sharply interrupted him. 
"You have this confidence? But if the Soviet Union goes in and you two powers 
contend there, then there can be no talk of relaxation ... You may say that if you 
withdraw your influence from the area a vacuum is created and the Soviet Union 
will fill it up. The fact is the later you move out, the more serious the contention 
there". Zhou was walking a tightrope in what he was telling Nixon. Without 
betraying the Vietnamese comrades' plans or prejudicing its negotiations with 
Kissinger, he was trying to get across to Nixon that they would not be satisfied 
until they had achieved their goals; if in the short-term they went unfulfilled, they 
would pursue them again in the future, relying even more heavily on the Soviets; 
but "if the U.S. government would take a very bold move in Indochina you would 
gain very good feelings on the part of the Indochinese people.,,39 
In further talks with Nixon a few days later, it was once again the Chinese 
Premier who raised the topic of Indochina and returned to his theme of a few 
days earlier. This time he placed even greater emphasis on China's duty "to 
continue our support, not only to Vietnam but to all three Indochinese countries." 
Again he urged America to retreat from its support of Thieu and Lon Not. He 
hinted to Nixon at the probability of the civil wars in Indochina continuing even 
39 Memcon, Nixon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 22, 1972, White House Special 
FileslPresident's Office Files/87/Memoranda for the President beginning February 20 1972, 
http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchivINSAEBBINSAEBBI06INZ-I.pdf 
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after American disengagement, and made clear that China would continue to 
"support the sides which we are supporting." Zhou seemed puzzled that Nixon, 
who had made the breakthrough in relations with China, seemed intent on 
hitching himself to Nguyen Van Thieu's wagon. "Mr. President, for a leader like 
you, who is known for your farsightedness, it would not be beneficial for you or 
for the honor of the United States to leave behind a 'tail' ... The 'tail' means 
American forces. You have already said that if there is no agreement with them, 
then the Air Force bombing and the Navy bombing will continue." Zhou did not 
go so far as to use the phrase "let the domino fall" but that was the essence 
behind what he was telling the American President. He did, however, qualify 
these remarks by stating concern about the possibility of "a certain big power" 
going into other countries of Southeast Asia and setting up "a sphere of 
influence." In other words, leave Indochina, but hold firm elsewhere in Asia.40 
A further, special, session between Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Qiao Guanhua and Kissinger took place late at night on the eve of the 
President's departure. Kissinger recorded in his memoirs that this was "devoted 
to Vietnam"; this was not strictly speaking true. The purpose of the meeting was 
for Kissinger to share intelligence information on the Soviet military with Qiao; it 
was only as an aside that he then turned the conversation to Vietnam. Kissinger 
appeared concerned at Nixon's failure to even attempt to enlist Zhou Enlai's 
support for their endeavours in Indochina, so he used the spectre of Soviet 
encirclement of China as an illustrative device in his efforts at persuading Qiao 
Guanhua. "From your point of view" he authoritatively told the Vice-Minister, 
"it should be desirable that the war ends because any realistic analysis makes it 
clear that we are obviously on the way out of Vietnam ... It is our analysis that the 
reason the war continues is because the Soviet Union encourages its 
continuation ... we believe one purpose of the continuation from the Soviet point 
of view is to complete the encirclement of the P.R.C." Kissinger did not, as he 
later wrote, explain the American negotiating position in more detail than Nixon 
had outlined to Zhou; instead he opted to spin Qiao a tall tale about Soviet 
40 Memcon, Nixon, Zhou et al., February 24, 1972, White House Special FileslPresident's Office 
Files/87/Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972, 
htllJ://www.gwu.edul-nsarchivINSAEBBINSAEBB106INZ-3 .pdf 
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intervention in Hanoi to prevent the North Vietnamese negotiating seriously.41 
Kissinger was, of course, playing both ends off each other, telling the Chinese 
that the Soviets were pursuing the continuation of the war, while telling. the 
Soviets vice versa. That Kissinger resorted to fabrication indicates the position 
of weakness he was speaking from, for the linkage of Taiwan to Indochina had 
proven to be feeble. Nixon realised he had nothing to offer the Chinese in 
Vietnam, and so had sensibly avoided the subject. Kissinger would have been 
well advised to do the same.42 
Unlike his boss, Qiao Guanhua had little time for indirection or subtlety. 
"You don't find it possible to withdraw your air force. Nor is it possible for you 
to withdraw in toto your combat forces. And should a turn take place in the war 
unfavourable to Thieu and his regime, then again you may have to return ... Well, 
speaking rather frankly, our view is that your present line of action cannot bring 
an end to the war. The Soviet Union does have her motives here, but in out view 
what you are doing precisely offers an opportunity for the Soviet Union to 
promote the realization of her motives." Realising that his foray into Vietnam 
was clearly going to lead him nowhere with the Vice-Minister, the National 
Security Adviser attempted to bring the discussion to a close. This meeting was 
not, as Kissinger later recalled, another instance of quiet Chinese acquiescence in 
America's "determination to defeat an offensive by all available means" (partly 
because Kissinger still thought there might be no offensive). It was, in the 
clearest terms yet, a Chinese exhortation to let go in Saigon: "[F]or you to 
maintain the Thieu regime for South Vietnam is not a way OUt.,,43 
As Nixon would later report to his National Security Council, he "didn't 
get a damn thing on Vietnam" during his visit to the People's Republic of China, 
though in reality he didn't try very hard either. Whether this stemmed from a 
realistic appraisal on the part of the President of what was on offer and obtainable 
or was a failure of his personal diplomacy is unclear; but it is evident that 
Nixon's expectations going into the summit were lower than those of his National 
Security Advisor. But in terms of image, so important to the complex and 
41 Memcon, Qiao, Kissinger et al., February 27, 1972, Digital National Security Archive, 
http://nsarchive.chadwvck.com (hereafter cited as DNSA) document KT00451. 
42 Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp. 1041, 1043. 
43 Memcon, Kissinger, Qiao et al., February 27 1972, NPMP/NSCIHAK Office Files/92/I; cf. 
Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 1086. 
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insecure Richard Nixon, he had got what he wanted. China had been extremely 
accommodating of the American President's desire to have live television 
coverage of his visit to the People's Republic. Live television pictures of Nixon 
on the Great Wall and clinking cups of mao tai with the leadership of 
'Communist China' had been beamed into the homes of millions of Americans, 
boosting Nixon's re-election prospects, as both he and Mao had hoped. Perhaps 
Nixon was overly critical of what he had achieved, or failed to achieve, in 
Beijing, for the televised images of the 'Nixon the Peacemaker' in Beijing had 
undermined a major plank in the D.R.V.'s diplomatic strategy: to wrench 
concessions from Nixon by threatening his re-election prospects. China's 
actions, it was felt in Hanoi, had been to throw a lifebelt to a drowning man.44 
Compounding Hanoi's frustration at Nixon's public relations success in 
China was suspicion over the meaning of the Shanghai Communique. The 
communique, which had largely been negotiated by Kissinger and Qiao Guanhua 
during the National Security Advisor's October 1971 visit to the Chinese capital, 
was unusual in that it allowed both sides to state their own position on 
contentious issues (subject to agreement from the other side). The unusual 
diplomatic move had come at Mao's instigation, and a primary motivating factor 
was the preservation of China's international revolutionary image and the desire 
not to alienate China's few purported allies, namely North Korea and North 
Vietnam, by reassuring them that China was not going to collude with the United 
States against their interests. Thus, Hanoi was very much the intended audience 
of China's declaration that "All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations 
should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China 
will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any 
kind." Despite the fact that Nixon had already publicly revealed the existence of 
the secret talks in Paris and that the P.R.G.'s 'Seven Points' of the previous July 
were not actually a basis for negotiating, Mao and Zhou felt duty-bound to restate 
their public backing for them in the communique. Mao's description of these 
sentiments as "no more than firing an empty cannon" rang true, but it served 
China's purpose wel1.45 
44 Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, p. 229; Zhai, CATVW, p. 201; C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu. 
vol. 3, p. 515. 
45 'Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China', 
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For the North Vietnamese however, this was insufficient and they still 
found cause for suspicion and concern in the text of the communique - not on the 
section dealing with Indochina, however, but that concerning Taiwan. Echoing 
their accusations of the previous summer that China was attempting to usc the 
issue of Vietnam to gain entry into the United Nations, this time Hanoi's 
accusation was that Beijing was attempting to make use of Vietnam to solve the 
Taiwan issue. The section of the text that particularly exercised Hanoi was the 
United States' declaration that "it will progressively reduce its forces and 
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.,,46 Zhou Enlai had 
travelled to the North Vietnamese capital to brief and reassure the Vietnamese 
comrades that nothing contrary to their interests had been agreed between him 
and Nixon. He repeated to them what he had told Nixon: the Chinese side 
believed the resolution of the Vietnam problem to be of primary importance and 
that the resolution of the Taiwan issue was a longer term issue. However, it 
appears that his assurances were not taken entirely at face value in Hanoi, and 
suspicions about what had been agreed with Nixon lingered. It perhaps speaks of 
Hanoi's unhappiness about the entire state of affairs that the Chinese Premier was 
not even hosted overnight in the North Vietnamese capital; he arrived on the 
morning of March 4th and left that same evening. Hanoi was deeply uneasy with 
the potential implications ofthe Shanghai Communique.47 
The irony is that had Le Duan or Pham Van Dong eavesdropped the 
discussions between Nixon and Zhou there was little in the sections on Indochina 
they could have found objectionable: Zhou politely, yet consistently and with 
conviction, urged the American that the best policy he could adopt in the region 
was to withdraw at the earliest opportunity, never to return, and· leave the 
Vietnamese to finish their civil war. (Mao on the other hand, with his penchant 
for bombast, provocation and uniquely philosophical persiflage, made several 
remarks to the American President that would have raised Vietnamese heckles.) 
Traditional Vietnamese suspicions of their northern neighbour and the memory of 
1954 worked to override the solidarity felt between the two countries and 
February 28, 1972, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive Index/joint communique 1972.html; 
Chen Jian, Mao's China, p. 232. 
46 'Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China', 
February 28, 1972, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive Index/joint communique 1972.html. 
47 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, vol. 3, p. 515; S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, pp. 40-41; Zhai, 
CATVW, p. 201. 
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communist parties: knowing of Taiwan's importance to China, Hanoi found it 
difficult to believe that Mao had not entered into some sort of trade-off over it at 
Vietnam's expense. Viewed from Hanoi, Beijing was damned which ever way it 
turned, and was suspect whether it upped aid for the D.R.V. or lowered it, 
whether it had a communique with Nixon or whether it did not. Mao had himself 
to blame: the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution had helped to inflate the 
Vietnamese communists' already substantial sense of revolutionary self-
importance. Surely if they were the standard bearers of the world's revolutionary 
peoples then the world's revolutionary peoples should fall into line behind them? 
Even though Mao and Zhou had done all that China's own foreign policy 
requirements would permit in accommodating the Vietnamese comrades, it was 
what they had failed to do that left the strongest impression in Hanoi. 
Off the hook 
In the dying days of March 1972, barely four weeks after Richard Nixon had 
departed from Shanghai, Hanoi launched the Spring Offensive. Unlike four years 
earlier during Tet, there was not the slightest pretence that this military campaign 
was a popular uprising: several hundred thousand regular troops of the People's 
Army of Vietnam poured across the D.M.Z. into the northern provinces of South 
Vietnam. Though such a move had been anticipated in Beijing (and 
Washington), there still existed the possibility that the inherent tension between 
China's policies towards Vietnam and the United States could critically damage 
one or another of the relationships. However, Nixon and Kissinger had little 
leverage with which to coerce Beijing into limiting assistance to Hanoi. Zhou 
had consistently refused American entreaties to intervene with Hanoi on Nixon's 
behalf, and had warned that they would continue to assist North Vietnam in their 
war effort. In the spring and summer of 1972, the United States passively 
accepted this fact, and sought to place the blame for Hanoi's actions with 
Moscow, while largely ignoring China's role. The source of this tactic was 
Kissinger, rather than Nixon. The President, claimed Kissinger, had wanted to 
"lump the purposes of Peking and especially of Moscow with Hanoi's." 
Kissinger, however, persuaded Nixon that it would be better to differentiate 
"pressures against Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi so as to isolate North Vietnam 
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and demoralize it." The net effect of this, however, would be acceptance of what 
Kissinger had earlier described as Chinese "disengagement". 48 Chinese 
disengagement from interference in Washington-Hanoi negotiations was 
certainly an improvement on the situation that had existed for President Johnson; 
but in their attempts to pare Beijing away from its southern ally, Nixon and 
Kissinger also permitted the Chinese to disengage from responsibility for keeping 
North Vietnam supplied with civilian and military materiel during Nixon's 
bombing and mining of the D.R.V. 
The main line of communication for important matters between Beijing 
and Washington was now the new 'back channel' of the Chinese Ambassador to 
the United Nations in New York, Huang Hua. Kissinger met with Huang on 
March 14, and apparently still had hope that there would be no North Vietnamese 
offensive since he made little attempt on this occasion to elicit Chinese assistance 
in preventing one. (A week earlier Hanoi had postponed until April 15th the 
March 20th meeting that had previously given Kissinger so much hope.) In 
response to a Chinese message complaining about alleged American bombing of 
North Vietnam since Nixon's visit to China, Kissinger denied the charges, but did 
however give an undertaking to the Chinese ambassador that the U.S. would not 
increase military operations over North Vietnam unless there was a North 
Vietnamese offensive.49 When the offensive duly began on March 30, Winston 
Lord was dispatched to New York to convey another message to the Chinese 
representatives. Once again Kissinger exaggerated in his memoirs the robustness 
of the American "oral note" - it did .not protest "China's public backing of the 
North Vietnamese invasion".5o It recognised that Beijing was "obliged to take 
positions that support its friends" but noted that "certain of [Beijing's] recent 
comments can only be considered inconsistent with the spirit with which the two 
sides have conducted negotiations." Coming down to specifics, the U.S. side 
complained that the Chinese had made "unacceptable" statements accusing the 
Americans of "sabotaging the talks in Paris", and expressed incomprehension as 
to why the Chinese side continued to publicly support the P.R.G.'s seven point 
48 Kissinger, WH. Y, p. 1104, 1113-4. 
49 Ibid., p. 1106; memo for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 'My March 14, 1972 Meeting 
with the Chinese Ambassador', March 20,1972, NPMPINSC/849/4; memo for HAKlHaig from 
Winston Lord, 'Undertakings with the PRC', March 17, 1972, NPMPINSC/HAK Office 
Files/8717. 
50 Ibid., pp. 1106, 1114-5. 
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peace plan. The note is curious because it made practically no mention of the 
North Vietnamese offensive at all, and the closest it came to being sharp was to 
repeat Kissinger's by now well-worn observation that "any attempt to impose a 
military solution upon the U.S. can only lead to unfortunate consequences" (and 
even this was tempered by the closing statement that "The U.S. also wants to 
reiterate the extreme importance that it attaches to the improvement of its 
relations with the People's Republic of China.,,)51 This would seem to suggest 
that by the evening of April 3rd the extent of the North Vietnamese attack was 
still less apparent to the policy-makers in Washington than Kissinger alleged. At 
the very least, it showed uncertainty as to how to deal with Hanoi's allies. 
Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that the Americans received a reply to 
this message on April lzth; what he failed to mention was being personally on the 
receiving end of the Chinese "stiff reply", as he had requested a meeting with 
Huang Hua in New York to discuss with him the situation in Indochina (in effect, 
another plea for Beijing to use its influence to restrain HanoL)52 As he had done 
in the past, most recently in discussions with Qiao Guanhua, Kissinger conjured 
up the Soviet ghost, telling Huang that it was the application of the same 
principle that underpinned Hanoi's attack on South Vietnam as had driven the 
most recent Indo-Pakistan conflict (i.e. Soviet encirclement of China.) He then 
told Huang that it would be "tragic" if Hanoi's actions jeopardized the 
relationship with China "which is so important for our foreign policy." This was 
not quite a threat, or even a half-threat, simply a recantation of a well-worn 
prognostication; Huang was unlikely to be worried. For his part, the Chinese 
ambassador conveyed the message from Beijing, which expressed the continued 
solidarity of China and which warned the Americans to be "under no 
misapprehension concerning China's principled stand on the question of 
Indochina". It was, nonetheless tempered it with a reaffirmation of the 
importance Beijing attached to the normalization of relations with the United 
States.53 
51 Memo for Henry A. Kissinger from Winston Lord, 'My April 3 Mission to New York', April 3, 
1972, NPMP/NSC/849/4; untitled and undated message, NPMP/NSC 849/4. 
52 Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 1123. 
53 Memo for Henry A. Kissinger from Winston Lord, 'Your April 12 Meeting in New York-
Background', April 11, 1972, NPMP/NSC/849/4; 'Talking Points for April 12 Meeting-
Vietnam', undated, ibid.; memcon, Huang Hua, Henry Kissinger et aI., April 12, 1972, ibid. 
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Aside from Kissinger's obfuscation of their purposes and content, these 
two exchanges of April 3rd and 1th are significant in that they illustrate the 
dilemma that America~ policy found itself in. At the conclusion of the April 3rd 
message, the American side reiterated "the extreme importance that it attaches to 
its relations" with the P.R.C., while during Kissinger's meeting with Huang on 
April 12th , the Chinese likewise reaffirmed their desire to see a normalization of 
relations with the United States. In this respect Kissinger's summation of 
Nixon's China trip is largely correct - he wrote, "[T]he war in Vietnam would not 
affect the improvement of our relations ... North Vietnam would not be permitted 
to override [Beijing's] greater geopolitical preoccupations." And indeed, China 
did opt to keep low the rhetoric on Vietnam in exchanges with the United States 
and not let the issue interfere in their bilateral relationship. When Kissinger 
again came to visit Huang Hua, just before Nixon's trip to Moscow and after the 
announcement of the bombing and mining of Hanoi, he and Huang went through 
formulaic recantations of well-rehearsed positions on Vietnam, before Huang 
commented, "In our view [the Vietnam War] is not a very complicated question. 
But I won't argue with you on this". Wary of damaging Nixon's big foreign 
policy success in an election year, and possessing little leverage over the Chinese, 
Nixon and Kissinger could not push the issue, and chose to believe that the 
formulaic exchanges were indicative of the fact that China was having a 
benevolent influence in Hanoi. On the contrary, however, China was going to 
continue supporting North Vietnam for its own historic, cultural and strategic 
reasons, as can be seen from its reaction to Nixon's LINEBACKER attacks on 
North Vietnam. 54 
As noted, Chinese co-operation for the Spring Offensive had been 
successfully enlisted in the run-up to Nixon's visit. Agreements signed in 
January 1972 with North Vietnam's Soviet and East European allies on the 
transportation of 'special' military materiel were supplemented further in March 
and April. China also agreed to an increase in the number of personnel that were 
permitted to accompany these "special materials". 55 After the Americans 
resumed bombing of North Vietnam, and on the very day that Kissinger was 
54 Untitled and undated message, NPMPINSC 84914 ; memcon, Huang Hua, Henry Kissinger et 
aI., May 16,1972, ibid.; Kissinger, W.H.Y., p. 1087. 
55 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', part 2, p. 32. 
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meeting Huang Hua in New York, Zhou Enlai met with the D.R.V. charge 
d'affaires ad interim in Beijing, Nguyen Tien, and expressed the support of the 
Chinese government and people for the "solemn and just stand" of North 
Vietnam.56 He predicted that the United States would be unable to rescue itself 
from defeat by expanding the war front to North Vietnam, and pledged China's 
support for the Vietnamese people's' Anti-American National Salvation War' 
until the end. At this point, however, China took no specific further action to 
assist Hanoi. That was to change, however, with Nixon's May 8th announcement 
of the mining of Haiphong harbour, when China and North Vietnam entered a 
period of extremely close co-operation, probably not seen since the mid-1960s. 
Rather than separate Hanoi from its sponsors, which was Kissinger's stated aim, 
the American military action created a new era of close co-operation between 
Hanoi and Beijing.57 
Beijing's response to the LINEBACKER blockade was swift. When 
Nixon made his televised announcement at 9 p.m. on May 8 it was already the 
morning of May 9 in Beijing. That same day Zhou summoned a meeting of core 
Foreign Ministry officials to discuss how China should react, and in the evening 
met with Chairman Mao and Marshall Ye Jianying to report on the situation. The 
Foreign Ministry group met again the next day, and later Zhou presided over a 
Politburo meeting to discuss the official Chinese government announcement in 
response to the blockade. When it was issued, on May 12'\ it condemned the 
mining of Haiphong and repeated Zhou's April assurances to Nguyen Tien that 
China would support North Vietnam until final victory. The outline of how 
China was going to fulfil its pledges was already taking shape.58 
On May 9 the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Beijing had met with 
Zhou and requested assistance in mine clearance; the Chinese Premier met with 
navy commanders that same evening and instructed them to make plans to help 
clear mines from the North Vietnamese coast. The next day he met with the chief 
and deputy chief of staff of the Chinese navy to further discuss the proposed 
operations. Two weeks later a Chinese investigation team arrived in North 
56 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p. 519. 
57 Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhonggllo yll Yindllzhina zhanzheng, p. 236. 
58 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/a; nianpll, vol. 3, p. 524; Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-mei hejie', in Li Danhui, 
Zhongguo yu Yindllzhina zhanzheng, p. 236; Zhai, CATVW, p. 203. 
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Vietnam to examine the situation.59 Xuan Thuy, presumably returning to Hanoi 
for consultations, met with Zhou in Beijing on May 13th and 14th, where they 
discussed the problems caused to transportation between China and North 
Vietnam caused by the American bombing. At this meeting Xuan Thuy 
requested that China open its ports to Soviet shipping in order to get around the 
blockade, but Zhou refused this request. He did, however, agree to rebuild 
Vietnamese railways damaged by American bombing, open a concealed shipping 
route, increase military aid as well as supplies of grain and oil, and help in the 
sweeping of mines from North Vietnamese ports.60 
Despite the initial refusal to permit Soviet shipping to unload in Chinese 
ports, the Chinese government took its own unilateral commitments to Vietnam 
seriously, and from May 18th_25 th convened a week-long national conference in 
Beijing in order to plan the logistics for the assistance promised to Hanoi. It was 
no small affair; in attendance were officials from 26 provinces and municipalities 
in charge of industrial transportation and military production, as well as officials 
from the State Council, the P.L.A. logistics and supply divisions and 
representatives from 224 state-owned enterprises. The conference closely 
examined 133 outstanding requests from North Vietnam, as well as 120 new ones 
put forward by Hanoi, and in total agreed to satisfy 190 of these. In order to 
expedite their completion the central government would supply the raw materials; 
if the materials were needed urgently the work unit in question was authorized to 
obtain them on credit, or if this was not possible the central government would 
pay the costs directly. Where production capacity was insufficient the work units 
were ordered to adopt technical innovations, increase workers' shifts and 
improve efficiency. Industry was ordered to prioritise North Vietnam's needs. 
Essentially, key sectors of China's economy were being put on a partial war 
footing to defeat Nixon's blockade.61 
Further bilateral discussions continued through May and into early June. 
It was agreed that two oil pipelines would be laid between Pingxiang on the Sino-
Vietnamese border and Hanoi (there would eventually be a total of five such 
pipelines). China also agreed to rush to North Vietnam 300 trucks and 200 
59 Zhai, CATVW, p. 203. 
60 Shen Zhihua, 'Zhong-mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng, pp. 236-7. 
61 Ibid. 
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tonnes of steel from Hong Kong, along with equipment for repairing bridges and 
Chinese missile specialists who were to serve under Vietnamese command. On 
June 8th a concealed coastal route was agreed upon, and in addition to the one 
hundred 50-tonne vessels requested by Hanoi, China agreed to supply another 
fifty and take responsibility for their supply and maintenance. Thousands of 
trucks were also dispatched to ensure sufficient capacity of overland 
transportation routes. Assisting North Vietnam was an urgent duty that was 
"glorious, important and long-standing", Vice-Premier Yu Qiuli told the 
delegates at the week-long conference, "We must use every means possible to 
completely satisfy their needs.,,62 
There was, of course, still one major area where China was able yet 
unwilling to satisfy Hanoi's needs: Beijing's refusal to allow Soviet shipping 
destined for the D.R.V. to unload in Chinese ports. Zhou's initial refusal of the 
North Vietnamese request was somewhat surprising given the potentially grave 
situation that Hanoi was now facing in the light of Nixon's blockade and 
bombing, particularly as it was clear that Nixon had been emboldened by his 
rapprochement with China to cross the self-imposed limits of the Johnson 
administration. Zhou's explanation of the refusal was tantamount to a fit of pique 
at the Soviets: TASS had reported that the Chinese ambassador in Moscow had 
gone to the airport to see off Xuan Thuy as he travelled to Beijing. Kosygin had 
already written to Zhou requesting the use of Chinese ports, but the Chinese 
Premier was infuriated by the TASS news report, believing it to imply that some 
sort of agreement had been reached between Moscow and Beijing, and that the 
Soviets were using the possibility of Sino-Soviet co-operation to grandstand in 
the direction of the United States in advance of the summit. In a sharp exchange 
with Xuan Thuy on May 14 he asked his Vietnamese comrade, what was the 
Soviet purpose? Did they want to invite American bombing of Chinese railways, 
or were they trying to pressurize China into agreeing to opening its ports? Did 
the Soviets want genuine discussions on this issue, or just drop hints? Ostensibly 
out of pique at perceived Soviet hectoring, Zhou refused Xuan Thuy's request, 
and repeated his refusal one week later to Ly Ban. 63 
62 Ibid.; Qu Aiguo, 'Zhongguo zhiyuan budui', in ibid., p. 101. 
63 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', part 2, p. 33-4. 
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A little over three weeks later, shortly before Kissinger arrived in Beijing 
to brief the Chinese leadership on Nixon's visit to Moscow, China relented. One 
should be careful to note, however, that this deal between Hanoi and Beijing was 
not entirely a gesture of altruism on the part of Mao and Zhou. In the mid-1960s 
China had stockpiled aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Chinese 
territory at the request of the North Vietnamese comrades; in June of 1972, 
fearful that the Soviets would stall on signing an aid agreement for 1973 because 
those for 1972 had not yet been fully implemented (by June more than one 
million out of 1.4 million tonnes of promised aid had not yet arrived), Hanoi 
requested that the Chinese again perform this function and store grain, steel and 
oil from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe on Chinese territory. The Chinese were 
to be free to make use of these goods and replace what they used at such times as 
North Vietnam was able to receive them. Hanoi was particularly eager to ensure 
that the Soviets would deliver on schedule between September and November 
1972 all 260,000 tonnes of grain that had been promised to Hanoi, in case a bad 
harvest would mean the shipment would not be delivered in full. To facilitate 
this delivery the Chinese were instructed to make full use of the Soviet grain and 
other commodities, on the agreement that they would be replaced when and as 
needed by Hanoi. "When it's there [in the Soviet Union]", D.R.V. Foreign Trade 
Minister Ly Ban would later tell his Chinese counterpart, "It's still theirs; when 
it's transported into China, then it's Vietnam's.,,64 The Chinese agreed to the 
proposition, and on June 18th, the day before Kissinger's arrivai, Zhou Enlai 
informed Le Due Tho that Soviet, East European and Cuban shipping could 
unload in Chinese ports. The appropriate protocols for this new supplementary 
economic and military aid agreement were signed on June 28 t \ and included a 
long-term interest-free hard currency loan worth about $100 million.65 
The Chinese volte-face was a reward for Hanoi's decision to re-open talks 
with Kissinger in Paris (a message the American National Security Adviser 
received on June 20th while in Beijing), and it also helped to sow Soviet-D.R.V. 
discord. 66 However, Hanoi's offer that China could make use of whatever 
materials North Vietnam did not presently need also meant that China's already 
64 Ibid. 
65 Liu & Mastny, 'China and Eastern Europe', p. 67; Gilks, The Breakdown, p.87; 'Indochina-
Concession, by James Pringle, Peking, July 12 1972, Reuter', NPMP/NSC/HAK Office Files/98/1. 
66 Kissinger, WH. Y, p. 1303. 
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heavily burdened southern railway network would not be put under further 
pressure, nor would China have to bear responsibility for the storage of hundreds 
of thousand tonnes of aid destined for North Vietnam. Initially, though, 
restrictions were placed on what goods China would accept by sea, and the 
agreement was limited to grain, steel, oil and sugar. Furthermore, the Chinese 
demanded that the Vietnamese provide details of how the goods were going to be 
dealt with before they would allow them to be unloaded: a very time-consuming 
process that provoked complaints from the Soviets and East Europeans. One 
week after the initial agreement, Hanoi requested that in addition to the 600,000 
tonnes of permitted goods that China had agreed to receive, they also received a 
further 300,000 tonnes of iron ore and asbestos tiles. The Chinese side refused, 
but once again relented just over a month later and agreed to accept, with a few 
minor exceptions, all goods, even those which were clearly not essential to the 
war effort, such as chicken incubators. This occurred less than a week after Le 
Duc Tho and Kissinger's July 19th meeting in Paris.67 
China's initial refusal of the North Vietnamese requests, and then the 
reversal of this decision served two purposes for Beijing. In the first instance, 
they were a means of pressuring the Soviets, who were hosting Nixon in 
Moscow, and an attempt to demonstrate to Hanoi who its 'real friends' were. By 
refusing to allow Soviet shipping to dock in Chinese ports, while simultaneously 
mobilizing a large portion of its industrial and human resources to come to 
Hanoi's aid, Beijing sought to increase the pressure on the Soviets to take a hard 
line with Nixon in Moscow, or to take firmer unilateral action to come to the aid 
of the D.R.V. When Zhou reversed this decision some weeks later after the 
Moscow summit, it was a gesture of magnanimity, to be contrasted with Soviet 
weakness. The North Vietnamese government was extremely grateful for the 
reversal of China's position, considering it to be one of the greatest acts of 
assistance in their war effort. 68 This is not to be underestimated: China's change 
of heart came at a critical time in the Spring Offensive, when the P.A.V.N. 's 
advance was beginning to falter and the effects of the LINEBACKER strategic 
bombing were starting to show. And despite the fact that Hanoi provided strong 
material incentives for the Chinese to agree to their requests (and it is possible 
67 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', part 2, pp. 33-36; see also Kimball, Vietnam War Files, p. 233. 
68 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-Su chongtu', part 2, p. 33. 
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that after a trial period the Chinese found the new arrangement to their liking) the 
Chinese moves, which were a major policy reversal for them, coincided with a 
diplomatic offensive by Zhou Enlai designed to bring Kissinger and Le Duc Tho 
together for serious and constructive talks.69 Beijing brandished no stick, but by 
the summer of 1972 was beginning to dangle a few carrots in front of Hanoi. 
As well as Nguyen Van Thieu's armed forces, Zhou Enlai's word, 
Nixon's mettle, and Brezhnev's bottle had all been put to the test in the Spring 
Offensive. The Russian had fared least well. As well as supplying several 
hundred tanks for the invasion, China had responded generously to the dire straits 
imposed on North Vietnam by Nixon's bold move to blockade the D.R.V.; 
Beijing mobilized to ensure that Le Duc Tho brought with him to the negotiating 
table the maximum advantage that was obtainable on the battlefield. Yet, getting 
him to the negotiating table had also become a priority. Despite Kissinger's half-
hearted threats about the negative impact on Sino-American relations, Beijing 
paid no real price for its backing of Hanoi, unlike the Soviets who had their own 
credibility seriously diminished by not cancelling the Moscow summit. The 
Vietnamese were pushed into the closest collaboration they had had with China 
for many years, serving as a useful reminder (from Beijing's perspective) of the 
indispensability of Chinese co-operation and amity for their war effort. 
However, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), with vital tactical 
bombing support from LINEBACKER, had performed surprisingly well; it was 
now clear that the communists were never likely to get a complete victory in 
Vietnam as long as there were U.S. forces to support the ARVN. The time had 
come to let the Americans leave. 
Underpinning this analysis was the belief in both Hanoi and Beijing 
(perhaps mistakenly) that the Vietnamese communists' best hopes for cutting a 
deal with Nixon would come in the period leading up to the American 
presidential election in early November. The Chinese had the additional 
incentive that freeing Nixon from other distractions would permit him to devote 
more time to the business of establishing full diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
The Spring Offensive had failed to overthrow Thieu, and the American 
presidential election was looming against a background of military stalemate. 
69 Gilks, The Breakdown, p. 87. 
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That the North Vietnamese would not win at the negotiating table what they had 
not won on the battlefield was as apt in mid-l 972 as it had been in 1967, so Zhou 
Enlai set about using his influence to create the conditions for a negotiated 
settlement, even if it meant Thieu staying in power. China's policy of non-
interference had come to an end. 
"The goal is to reach an agreement" 
China's new proactive interest in a negotiated settlement was quickly 
demonstrated by Zhou Enlai when Kissinger returned to Beijing to update the 
Chinese on a range of issues, in particular the Presidential visit to Moscow. In 
the first session of talks between the Chinese Premier and the American National 
Security Adviser on June 19t\ Zhou almost immediately enquired of his 
interlocutor whether there had "been any progress in the Paris talks with the 
Vietnamese." The new turn in China's approach was indicated by the specific 
mention given to Vietnam by Zhou, when he told Kissinger, "This time I would 
like to discuss this issue more with you, the issue of Vietnam." Kissinger was 
happy to oblige. And even though the Chinese Premier had had talks with Le 
Duc Tho the previous morning (something he admitted to Kissinger), Zhou 
seemed somewhat excited by comments made by Soviet President Nikolai 
Podgomy upon his return to Moscow from Hanoi, when he suggested that 
hostilities might stop if a ceasefire could be arranged in return for an end to the 
blockade. By the time Le Duc Tho left Beijing, Zhou noted, Tho "hadn't gotten 
news of Pod gorny's statement... Because if what Podgorny said had already been 
accepted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam then it seemed close to what 
you said.,,7o Zhou's interest in bringing an end to the bombing and blockade was 
evident; not only would a cessation of hostilities relieve China of its burden of 
responsibility for keeping North Vietnam supplied, it would also remove the 
danger of American bombing of the D.R.V. accidentally evolving into a larger 
conflagration with China, as evidenced by several stray American bombs landing 
on Chinese territory. As Zhou sagely told his American guest, "[W]ar will 
continue along its own laws of development; there are certain things that cannot 
70 Memcons, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 19, 1972, NPMP/NSCIHAK Office Files/97/4. 
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be decided by human will.,,7l From the very start of Kissinger's fourth visit to 
the P.R.C., Zhou Enlai's tone evidenced China's new tum in policy. 
As Kissinger noted in his report for the President, this set of discussions 
"constituted the first really detailed discussion of Vietnam that we have had with 
the Chinese. We moved beyond historical recitation and formal positions to 
rather precise exchanges on a solution to the war and its aftermath." And while 
Zhou initially concentrated on questioning Kissinger about the opportunitics for a 
ceasefire, the tone and content relating to the political considerations of South 
Vietnam marked a new departure. Zhou's acknowledgement that "it now seems 
that your present Administration is determined to withdraw from Vietnam" was 
in essence a recognition that what had been China's primary objective in Vietnam 
one year previously - an American withdrawal - was on the verge of being 
achieved. Kissinger's error was to underestimate China's new· intcrest in a 
political solution in Vietnam. He correctly noted that Zhou was at pains to 
disassociate Beijing from both Hanoi's offensive and the political aspects of the 
Vietnam negotiations, but this was a means by which Beijing could ensure that in 
the event of a failure to reach a negotiated settlement, China would face no 
fallout (and also a simple recognition of the fact that in the new geopolitical 
environment China could live with any dispensation in Saigon that Hanoi could.) 
However, Zhou now also exhibited an accentuated interest in the viability of a 
political settlement, and the significance of its viability for China.72 
Of primary interest was the long-term outcome and the possibility that the 
United States might re-intervene; not only would this again complicate Sino-
American relations, it would also increase the opportunities for the Soviet Union 
to further entice Hanoi into its orbit. Zhou sought to elicit from Kissinger a 
reaffirmation of the 'decent interval solution' that the American National 
Security Adviser had outlined to him almost a year previously, although he 
conceded that "it will probably be difficult for you to answer that." Kissinger 
accorded with the Chinese Premier that it would be difficult for him to answer 
such a question "partly because I don't want to give encouragement for this to 
happen ... If the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, engage in serious 
71 Memcons, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 21, 1972, ibid. 
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negotiation with the South Vietnamese, and if after a longer [more than four 
months] period it starts again after we were all disengaged, my personal 
judgement is that it is much less likely that we will go back again, much less 
likely.,,73 This statement of Kissinger's contrasted with that which he gave the 
previous July, when he told Zhou that "If [the South Vietnamese government] is 
overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene.,,74 No longer in pursuit of 
a summit visit for Nixon from the Chinese, Kissinger was more mindful of 
making commitments. Nonetheless, the Premier appears to have been satisfied 
by Kissinger's subsequent assurance that he believed "if a sufficient interval is 
placed between our withdrawal and what happens afterward that the issue can 
almost certainly be confined to an Indochina affair;" although this was qualified -
"[I]fthere is no outside intervention.,,75 Ifit proved to be the case that the United 
States completely withdrew all its Armed Forces from Indochina, the Premier 
stated, "I particularly make it a point, to make it clear now we would approve this 
course of action. But we are China".76 
That China would agree to a ceasefire and permit an American 
withdrawal were it in Hanoi's position was the second of Zhou's main themes. 
Inherent in this and similar statements was, of course, an assertion of Chinese 
moral superiority over the Vietnamese. The Chinese could adopt the longer 
view, said Zhou, because they were a bigger country; in fact the C.C.P. had 
accepted a cease fire proposal after the Japanese surrender because "we were 
confident Chiang Kai-shek would break up the agreement." Nonetheless, 
"Vietnam being such a small country, how can we want them to copy from us? 
That would be imposing on them" noted the Chinese Premier.77 Zhou made a 
comparison with China's patience on the Taiwan issue, "For this it is easier for 
our two sides, for our minds to meet on this matter. But you cannot ask the 
Vietnamese to do that. To ask for that would be unfair.,,78 Therefore, concluded 
Zhou, there would have to be some sort of political settlement as well as an 
American military withdrawal. "Since the war in the north and south has become 
one, and the war in Indochina as a whole has become one, [the North 
73 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 20, 1972, ibid. 
74 Memcon, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, July 9th 1971, NPMPINSCIl032/3. 
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76 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 22, 1972, ibid. 
77 Ibid, 
78 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 21, 1972, ibid. 
189 
Vietnamese] would like to see a final solution to the question before they can find 
h I t .. 79 t emse ves a ease. 
It is in Zhou's attitude to such a political settlement that the shift in 
Chinese policy can be discerned. Despite references to the fact that the Nixon 
administration could "shake [itself] free" of the "bitter fruits left over by Dulles" 
by jettisoning Nguyen Van Thieu, Zhou's language was devoid of the doctrinaire 
rhetoric with which he had previously exhorted Kissinger to do precisely that.8o 
The Chinese Premier noted with a little annoyance that "with the tum of one's 
hand the matter could be settled ... and now you are pegged down to a point that 
you say you cannot give up a certain government ... [which] was set up by 
yourself', but appeared resigned to America's commitment to Thieu. 81 
Furthermore, he expressed strong doubts that even were George McGovern 
elected President in November, he would not be able to get rid of Thieu. 82 That 
the South Vietnamese President would have to feature in the political settlement 
for Saigon was now to become a feature of China's approach to the Paris Peace 
Negotiations, and Zhou would seek to persuade Kissinger of the merits of a 
tripartite government in Saigon. 
Unlike in all their previous sets of discussions, Zhou Enlai now took a 
very active interest in promoting a political settlement of the war, not just an 
American withdrawal. The reality was that Zhou believed a return to violence in 
South Vietnam was inevitable if Thieu were not removed from office, but he had 
accepted Nixon's insistence that this was something he would not do. However, 
at a minimum, he felt that the resumption of the revolution in South Vietnam 
could be postponed if the N.L.F. were brought into a coalition government. 
Zhou's analysis was clearly based on his understanding of the decent interval 
solution as spelled out to him by Kissinger, and an acceptance that Thieu would 
have to remain in place during that interval. 83 
79 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 22, 1972, ibid. 
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Ostensibly, Beijing would be content with any settlement that Hanoi 
could agree to, within the now accepted parameter that Thieu was going to be a 
feature of the dispensation and that Vietnam would remain divided for the short-
term. Kissinger and Zhou were in agreement about the desirability of limiting 
Soviet influence on the Indochinese peninsula; however their approach to 
achieving this differed greatly. Kissinger expressed the opinion that, "[I] f we are 
far-sighted in Southeast Asia, both the United States and the People's Republic of 
China have an interest in keeping the region free from big countries." Zhou 
accorded with the general sentiment, but he had a very different vision of how to 
achieve this from that of Kissinger. Firstly, the United States had to cease its 
bombing and blockade, for the reason that "it would be advantageous to us" and 
that it "would help to promote negotiations." American policy was seriously 
mistaken ifit thought that its actions were strengthening Beijing's hand in Hanoi, 
Zhou averred. At the same time he refuted allegations made by the Soviets that 
China was behind the Easter Offensive. However, Zhou also hinted at China's 
acquiescence in the military build-up and the fact that he may have done little to 
dissuade the Vietnamese allies from undertaking one last military effort. "We 
never interfered in either their military actions nor their political negotiations" 
Zhou insisted, "We only get notifications from them and have often received 
them after events have occurred". Remarkably, Kissinger appeared to accept 
Zhou's abdication of responsibility and disingenuous hints that China was mainly 
providing Hanoi with food. Zhou berated him. "And to try to solve the question 
by killing people will not bring about a settlement.,,84 
On July 6th, Zhou Enlai flew from Shanghai to Kunming to have talks 
with Pham Van Dong on the Paris peace negotiations, and to inform Dong of the 
content of his talks with Kissinger: an indication of Beijing's increased eagerness 
to see the war in Indochina resolved, and their need to reassure their Vietnamese 
comrades who were still extremely uneasy about the Chinese opening to the 
United States. The next day Zhou flew all the way from Kunming, in China's far 
south Yunnan province, to Beijing to hold further talks with Xuan Thuy and Ly 
Ban: the most intense round of shuttle diplomacy engaged in by the Chinese 
Premier since he flew to Hanoi and Pyongyang one year previous to inform allies 
84 Memcons, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 21, 22, 1972, NPMPINSC/HAK Office Files/97/4. 
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of Kissinger's secret trip. While putting the onus for progress on the United 
States, Zhou told Xuan Thuy and Ly Ban "whether the war in Vietnam will 
continue or will be solved through negotiations .... Will be determined in the four 
crucial months from July to October this year", the same message he had given to 
Pham Van Dong the previous day. While alluding to military and political 
realities that Xuan Thuy and Ly Ban were certainly aware of (such as the end of 
the rainy season and the upcoming U.S. Presidential elections), Zhou was also 
clearly expressing the P.R.C.'s hope that the war would be ended by October, and 
contrary to Hanoi's preferred outcome, that Nixon would be re-elected. 85 
Five days later Zhou was even more explicit during talks with Le Duc 
Tho, who was presumably passing through Beijing on his way to Paris for his 
July 19th meeting with Kissinger. Just as he had done with Kissinger, Zhou Enlai 
encouraged Tho and the Vietnamese communists to come to a settlement, and 
then bide their time for the duration of the interval until it was certain the 
Americans would not re-intervene. Such a course of action, counselled the 
Chinese Premier, would allow North Vietnam to recover "thus getting stronger 
while the enemy is getting weaker." It would also provide Beijing with the 
opportunity to mend fences with their comrades in Hanoi, and foster links with 
the coalition regime in South Vietnam. This gradualist approach to the 
reunification of Vietnam would provide an opportunity for China to wean Hanoi 
off its dangerous Soviet addiction. American re-intervention would in no way 
help; if all of Vietnam went communist, so be it. "Anyway," commented the 
Chinese Premier, who had recently been diagnosed with the early stages of 
cancer, "I won't see that, because they have already declared that it will be only 
after a certain period of time that Vietnam would seek to be reunified." 86 
America's apparent obsession over the nature of the Saigon government 
continued to puzzle the Chinese Premier, but his solution of a tripartite 
government containing Thieu would prove to be unpalatable to both Washington 
and Hanoi, though for very different reasons.87 
While admitting that "Of course how to solve this problem is your job ... 
as comrades we would like to refer to our experience", he reminded Tho that "In 
85 C.D.R.O., Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, p. 534; P.R.C. For. Min. Zhou waijiao huoe/ong, p. 636. 
86 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Due Tho, July 12, 1972, 77 Conversations, pp. 179-182. 
87 Van and Gao, Turbulent Decade, p. 412. 
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the pro-American force, Thieu is chieftain ... We, therefore cannot solve anything 
if we only talk with other figures in his party rather than him ... no result would 
have been gained if we insisted on talking with Jiang [Chiang Kai-shek]'s 
ministers but not with Jiang himself. ... [W]e have to talk with the chieftains ... 
These are historical facts."gg The Premier was clearly acting under instruction 
from Mao, who just a few days earlier had declared to French Foreign Minister 
Maurice Schumann (and by extension to the Americans) that he was of the 
opinion that Hanoi should talk directly to Thieu. It had become clear that a 
military victory for Hanoi was out of reach for the time being; the broom was 
indeed too short, and the time had come for Hanoi to recognise the fact. In his 
counsel Zhou used an example from China's own Civil War to illustrate the 
soundness of his advice. Recounting Mao's 1945 decision to go to Chongqing to 
have discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou explained how many comrades in 
the liberated areas feared for his safety, but the Chairman told them not to 
consider his safety, but to prepare for battle. Thus, during the talks the 
communist forces managed to wipe out a division of Guomindang troops in 
North China, and the result was that Mao managed to return safely to Yan'an. 
The message was obvious: there was nothing to fear from talking to Thieu, and 
they may be able to tum the situation to their advantage, even if the N.L.F. 
I . 89 proved to be over y cautIous. 
The Chinese continued their 'advice' through August. While Pham Van 
Dong was holidaying in Kunming, Yunnan province, Zhou made another special 
trip there to exchange views on the status of the Paris peace talks, while another 
envoy was also dispatched to transmit to the North Vietnamese Premier the 
opinion of the Chinese Chairman. Mao's opinion was that it was correct to allow 
the formation of a tripartite coalition government, but that they should first and 
foremost allow the Americans to withdraw and have an exchange of prisoners, 
then form the coalition government and have direct talks with Nguyen Van Thieu. 
When "the talks fail, then fight again, when you reckon the American army can't 
come back. As for talks about a coalition government, you should strive for a 
period of transition and after you have rested [then] fight again and finally attain 
88 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho, July 12,1972,77 Conversations, pp. 179-182. 
89.p.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, p. 637; Garver, 'Sino-Vietnamese Conflict', p. 460 ; 
Henri Froment-Meurice. Journal d'Asie: Chine-Inde-Indochine-Japon, 1969-/975 [Asia Journal: 
China-India-Indochina-Japan, 1969-1975] (Paris:L'Harmattan, 2005), p. 82. 
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victory." This was surely also the message passed on to Le Duc Tho when he 
passed through Beijing on August 18th his way back to Hanoi for consultations 
after his August talks with Kissinger, and again transmitted to the North 
Vietnamese ambassador Ngo Thuyen and Ly Ban when they met with Zhou three 
days later.9o 
One must be cautious, however, in drawing too many conclusions about 
the effects of Chinese pressure on Hanoi's negotiating stance, for the fact remains 
that while Beijing and Hanoi were approaching the problem from differing 
angles, their goals were not completely divergent and their analyses were based 
on the same political and military realities; though some of those realities were of 
Beijing's creation and not to Hanoi's liking, a dialectical approach could not 
allow them to be ignored. By the late summer of 1972 it had become clear that 
George McGovern's prospects for defeating Nixon in the presidential election 
were slim. For Hanoi, a second-term Nixon, with a renewed mandate for his 
handling of the war could prove to be a dangerous prospect; ending the war and 
letting the Americans leave, even if it meant compromise on the political 
structure of South Vietnam, was an increasingly attractive prospect. Kissinger 
had indicated agreement to a ceasefire in place, and while the offensive had failed 
to bring down Thieu, it had proved to be a relatively successful land-grab. Under 
these circumstances, Beijing's objective was to permit a second-tenn Nixon a 
clean slate from which to advance the cause of Sino-American normalization. 
And while the Chinese and Vietnamese comrades were by no means as 
close allies as they had been in the heady days of the early 1960s, the two nations 
continued to consult, confer and co-operate closely with each other. Thus, the 
fact that Le Duc Tho agreed that Nguyen Van Thieu could participate in 
negotiations between the P.R.G and G.V.N. two weeks after Zhou Enlai urged 
him to "surprise" the Americans by doing just that is not to be taken as an 
example of Hanoi acceding to Chinese pressure. (It is also important to note that 
Tho was at this point still demanding that Thieu resign after an agreement was 
reached.) Rather, it is more indicative of some traits of the common analysis that 
still existed between the two putative allies; having shared tactics and strategy for 
so many decades it would have been surprising had commonalities not remained. 
90 Li Danhui, 'Zhong-mei huanhe', p. 75. 
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Indeed, although Beijing clearly had its own goals in mind, other than giving 
advice China offered no threats or inducements to Hanoi "to accept anything less 
than the most favourable conditions." Besides, if "Beijing had made such a move, 
a Hanoi diplomat later revealed, it would have fallen 'on deaf ears"', 91 This 
indeed was something that Beijing had been aware of since 1968 and had always 
paid a part in Mao's calculations about how to deal with his southern allies. 
Having risked little, and been forced to bring real pressure to bear on neither, 
Mao and Zhou surely looked on in satisfaction as their two tacit allies edged 
forward towards an agreement through the late summer and autumn of 1972. 
Endgame 
Zhou Enlai had spent the summer pushing the idea of a tripartite coalition 
government containing both Nguyen Van Thieu and the N.L.F. on both 
Washington and Hanoi. Neither had been receptive to the idea, but the two sides 
had moved forward in their negotiations on their own bases. China kept its 
counsel as the negotiating positions of Hanoi and Washington edged closer 
together during September. Zhou met with Le Due Tho on September 8th as he 
returned to Paris for further talks with Kissinger. Three days later the P.RG. 
issued a statement outlining its requirements that the United States must meet in 
order to reach a settlement and which included a demand that the United States 
"stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu stooge administration."n Significantly, 
when the P.RG.'s statement was presented to the Chinese government it was 
Vice-Premier Li Xiannian who received it rather than Zhou Enlai. Not 
withstanding Li's expression of "firm support" (somewhat lower key than the 
normal "resolute support"), the official Chinese media organs ignored the 
statement until the end of the month.93 Clearly Beijing did not wish to attach its 
name to a negotiating position it was aware could well be dropped, nor did it 
want to prejudice the ongoing negotiations between Hanoi and Washington. 
Zhou met again with D.RV. ambassador to China Ngo Thuyen on September 
91 Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 1316; Robert Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 
1999), p. 102; see also Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, p. 235. 
92 'Press Conference: Statement By Minister Madame Nguyen Thi Binh Chief Of the Delegation 
of the PRGSVN', 14 September 1972, Folder I1IBox 16IDPC Unit 04ITVA-TTU. 
93 'Statement of Support for the PRG by Peking', September 1972, Folder 14IBox 07IDPC Unit 
OSrrVA-TTU. 
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21 st, by which stage it seems Hanoi had concluded that Washington was wedded 
to Thieu and would not divorce itself from him - a conclusion that Mao and Zhou 
had reached many months previously. While it is unlikely that Hanoi had already 
informed Beijing of its decision to accept Thieu (it did not even inform the P.R.G. 
leadership beforehand), it seems likely that the Chinese leadership had a sense of 
where the negotiations were going. Thus, on the last day of September, in the 
interlude between Tho's last attempt to force Thieu's resignation on September 
26th and the October 8th 'breakthrough' meeting with Kissinger when he dropped 
the demand altogether, China finally issued its reply to Nguyen Thi Binh's 
September 15th letter requesting support for the P.R.G.'s latest authoritative 
statement. It was less than effusive. In his reply, Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei 
declared "in all seriousness" the resolute support of the Chinese government for 
the "solemn stand of the Provisional Revolutionary Govemment.,,94 In doing so, 
Beijing downgraded the P.R.G.'s proposal from ''just'' to "solemn" and 
effectively rejected it.95 
Kissinger believed that the upcoming October 8th negotiating session with 
Le Duc Tho in Paris had a 50-50 chance of producing a settlement, and in 
anticipation of the meeting he called in on Huang Hua in New York in a further 
attempt to elicit Chinese support. If truth be told, Kissinger was also partly 
working to his own agenda: Nixon was growing cold on the idea of a settlement 
before the election while his National Security Advisor was in agreement with Le 
Duc Tho about the desirability of reaching agreement before the end of October. 
This time, however, it is likely that the Chinese side took seriously his warning 
that the forthcoming offer to Tho was final. Like Kissinger and the comrades in 
Hanoi, Mao and Zhou wanted America's involvement in the Vietnam War 
brought to an end by the end of October. As it turned out, it was unnecessary for 
the Chinese to pass on Kissinger's warning; an hour before Le Duc Tho sat down 
with Kissinger in Paris for the October 8th breakthrough session, in Beijing Zhou 
Enlai was sitting down with D.R.V. Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi who was 
visiting the Chinese capital to update Zhou on the status of the negotiations. 
94 'Chi Peng-fei Reply to Mme Binh Letter ofPRGRSV Statement', 30 September 1972, Folder 
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Demonstrating the still high level of consultation that existed between the two 
communist Asian nations, he informed the Chinese Premier of Hanoi's decision 
to drop the demand for Thieu's resignation. Nghi stayed in the Chinese capital 
for at least three days, and met with Zhou again on the evening of October 10th to 
provide a further update on the progress being made in Paris. Zhou and Li 
Xiannian surely listened with satisfaction as Nghi reported to them the news that 
Tho and Kissinger were edging towards an agreement.96 Finally, on October 15th, 
Le Duc Tho stopped off in Beijing on his way back to Hanoi from Paris and 
updated the Chinese Premier on the status of the talks. Peace was at hand. Hanoi 
was also surely hoping that Beijing would express its satisfaction with the 
outcome through a display of generosity in the 1973 aid agreement that was 
under negotiation at that time; so present at a banquet held in Tho's honour were 
vice-ministers for foreign trade Ly Ban and Nguyen Tien as well as 
representatives of Hanoi and the P.R.G.'s embassies in the Chinese capital. 
Agreement appeared to be only days away.97 
The tale of Kissinger's travails in Saigon with South Vietnamese 
President Nguyen Van Thieu is well known and does not require recounting 
here.98 But of course, the details of Kissinger's troubled time in Saigon were 
unknown to Huang Hua when he received Kissinger in New York the very next 
day after the American negotiator arrived back in the United States from South 
Vietnam. It was surely with horror that the Chinese ambassador to the United 
Nations listened to Kissinger's presentation. Revealing the measure of the dire 
straits he was in, Kissinger announced he wanted "to ask something which we 
have not asked before - and that is whether the Prime Minister might be willing 
to use his good offices in the rather complicated state that our negotiations have 
reached with the Vietnamese." Clearly embarrassed by the situation, Kissinger 
was forced to admit to Huang that "I have to say on behalf of your allies that they 
96 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi, October 8-10, 1973, 77 Conversations, pp. 
189-90. Although this conversation is dated 1973 in the working paper, there is no evidence of 
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10 1972. Cf. P .R.C. For. Min. Zhou waijiao huodong, p. 651. 
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have behaved very correctly and they have made significant concessions. I went 
to Saigon, but it has not proven possible to obtain agreement in every respect." 
Huang listened impassively as Kissinger claimed that "there are some aspects of 
the agreement that have to be slightly adjusted without major changes", while 
there were two issues of substance: the translation of the functions of the 
proposed "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord", and the 
question of the withdrawal of "some forces from the northernmost part" of South 
Vietnam. He failed to mention that he was going to put forward 69 such slight 
adjustments, but pleaded for the assistance of Zhou Enlai "to convince Hanoi that 
this is not a trick. We have kept every promise we have made to you" he told 
Huang Hua, "and we would keep a promise made to them". Confessing that the 
previously agreed to October 30th deadline was now unattainable, he promised 
that only a few more days' negotiation was needed, though time constraints 
meant that a deal would not be reached until after the presidential election. 
Demonstrating his desperation, he made it a matter of confidence between 
Washington and Beijing, pledging that "If they agree to this procedure there 
would certainly be peace during the month of November, and we would make an 
obligation towards them, but also towards you, whose relations we value so 
highly." Huang Hua made little comment other than to promise to convey the 
information Kissinger had provided, along with a copy of the note that the U.S. 
side had sent to Hanoi, promptly to Premier Zhou.99 
Beijing did not have to wait for Huang's message from Kissinger to 
realise that the agreement had floundered in Saigon: that had been made clear by 
Nguyen Van Thieu in a speech on South Vietnamese television on the evening of 
October 24th. Clearly alarmed by. both the tone and content of the South 
Vietnamese President's rhetoric, the next day Zhou summoned officials from the 
Foreign Ministry to discuss the situation and drafted a message for transmission 
to Kissinger. Noting how Thieu had "poured out torrents of vicious abuse against 
northern Vietnam, and even cast reflections on Dr. Kissinger", the message 
reflected Chinese priorities when it stated Beijing's belief that "so long as the U.S. 
side is determined to effect a cease fire and troop withdrawal, it is fully capable of 
halting Saigon's sabotage schemes. Otherwise, failure to resolve at the right 
99 Memcon, Kissinger, Hua et aI., October 24, 1972, NPMPINSC/850/2. 
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moment, to maintain consistency in its stand and to abide by the agreements 
already reached with the Vietnamese side would not only result in losing 
confidence before the world, but may also lead to unforeseeable 
consequences." 100 Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that the Chinese also 
"affirmed their confidence in our good faith"; this is not quite true. IOl Zhou had 
decided to give Kissinger the benefit of the doubt, noting that "Although the 
Chinese side could trust that the difficulties and sabotage come from Saigon, how 
can the world be forbidden to have its doubts?!" It is also clear the Chinese 
Premier was beginning to wonder whether the United States, which Mao had 
long diagnosed as weakening, was in a worse condition than they had previously 
thought. "[W]hy can't the United States manage the actions of that side on its 
own?" Knowing that the upcoming election was all but in the bag for Nixon, 
Beijing urged the U.S. side to "consider the problem in a broader framework, 
take the long view and act resolutely." It was to be disappointed. 102 
On the afternoon of the 26th (local time) Hanoi went public with the 
details of the agreement. It alleged that "the Nixon administration is not 
negotiating with a serious attitude ... All it is doing in fact is to drag out the talks". 
It called upon "the governments and peoples of the Soviet Union, China and 
other fraternal socialist countries ... to wage a r~solute struggle to urge the U.S. 
government to carry out immediately what has been agreed upon". 103 At 
midnight that evening, Zhou received the P.R.G.'s ambassador to Beijing, 
Nguyen Van Quang, and the North Vietnam's charge d'affaires ad interim, 
Nguyen Tien, who presented a copy of the D.R.V. statement to Zhou and 
officially requested China's support for the D.R.V.'s stand, which he duly 
received. Kissinger was clearly concerned that the situation was slipping out of 
his grasp. As an indication of his bona fides, he passed along to Beijing copies of 
all the messages that he was sending to Hanoi in his attempts to resolve the 
impasse, and on October 2ih, in response to the message he had received from 
100 Memo, 'Handed to J. Fazio by Mrs. Shih', October 25, 1972, NPMPINSC/850/2. 
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Zhou, again requested that the Chinese side "use its considerable influence in a 
positive direction so as to help bring about the peace that now is so near."I04 
The Chinese Premier met repeatedly with his Foreign Ministry officials 
and others between October 25th and 30th in order to discuss the seeming 
unravelling of the peace deal and China's response. Zhou's answer, having taken 
account of Kissinger's discussion with Huang Hua and the messages transmitted 
to Beijing, came on October 31 S\ after the passing of the originally agreed 
deadline for signing the agreement. The leaders in Beijing were clearly very 
unhappy with the tum of events, and while they placed the primary blame on 
Saigon for being "bent on sabotaging the agreement", Kissinger and Nixon were 
sharply criticized for being unable to control their ally. While Beijing was 
"willing to believe that the U.S. has the tendency to keep its promises", Zhou 
correctly doubted Kissinger's claims that the issues at stake were '''minor', 
'procedural', and 'do not touch [the agreement's] essence and can all be 
accommodated within its present framework'" and could be resolved in a few 
more days of negotiation. Since Saigon had openly rejected the nine-point 
agreement, the message asked, then how could the U.S. guarantee that the issues 
could be definitively settled with no further changes in just a few days' talks? 
Alternatively, "If the U.S. guarantee is not empty words, it can only serve as 
proof that the U.S. side was able to negotiate and sign an agreement on behalf of 
Saigon in the first place, but it did not wish to do so." Zhou noted that "As Dr. 
Kissinger has said, the Vietnamese side has made very significant concessions" 
and demanded that Washington "put a stop" to Saigon's "creating trouble" rather 
than exerting pressure Hanoi. Linking the Vietnam situation to Nixon and 
Kissinger's China project, the Chinese Premier concluded with a rhetorical 
question. If the U.S. side was unable to put a stop to Saigon's activities, he 
wondered, "then how are people to view the U.S. statements about its 
preparedness to make efforts for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East?"I05 
The great irony in all of this is that through all their many conversations and 
exchanges going back fifteen months, Kissinger had refused to take at ~ace value 
Zhou's entreaties to remove Thieu from office, opting to believe that by not 
104 Memo, 'Handed to Mrs. Shih by Fazio', October 27,1972, NPMPINSC/850/2; P.R.C. For. 
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removing Thieu, China would prefer a demonstration that the United States was a 
reliable ally. Now, as a result ofThieu's actions, the U.S. was being shown to be 
either an unreliable partner, or a weak one, or both. Kissinger needed to salvage 
the situation.106 
In an effort to do so Kissinger again travelled to New York to see I-luang 
Hua. America's National Security Advisor had taken objection to certain 
comments in the Chinese press and by Zhou Enlai that had alleged that he and 
Nixon were engaged in "foul play" or a "crooked game."I07 He wanted to clarify 
the situation with regard to Vietnam for the Chinese "so that if there should be a 
strain in our relationship we will know exactly the reasons and this strain is not 
caused by misunderstanding." Kissinger outlined the main points of the 
negotiation that he wished to see re-negotiated, "so that we could have 
discharged our obligations toward our ally." In his sternest warning yet to the 
Chinese side, he charged that should North Vietnam continue making charges of 
bad faith, this would have the result of "making it a matter of prestige. And to 
the extent the Chinese side repeats these charges this will in time affect our 
relations which as you know have been one of the central elements of our foreign 
policy."I08 As Jussi Hanhimaki has noted: "As a carrot of sorts Kissinger then 
employed the Soviet threat. In the future Washington was ready to restore its 
relations with the D.R.V. and offer reconstruction aid 'to prevent other big 
countries further away from having a foothold.' To sum it all up, Kissinger said: 
'We need some assistance. We are caught between our honour and our intention. 
There is no sense in trying to force us into acting dishonourably. Our interest is 
to normalize relations in Indochina and to accelerate dramatically the 
normalization of our relations with the People's Republic, and we know the two 
are linked. We know they are related ... now we are heading into a new term we 
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don't want to have to begin with a war in Vietnam and disagreements between 
,,, I 09 
us. 
Aside from the Soviet threat, Kissinger had another, perhaps more 
appetizing, 'carrot' up his sleeve, by means of which he sought to both 
underscore the continued seriousness of the Nixon administration's attitude 
towards improving relations with China, and also to remind his Chinese 
interlocutors what was potentially at stake. He informed Huang Hua that "as a 
result of a number of developments" (by which he meant Operation ENHANCE 
PLUS, designed to beef up Thieu's arsenal in advance of a peace agreement) the 
U.S. had borrowed some F-SA fighter aircraft from Taiwan and replaced them 
with two American squadrons of F-4 'So "These are only temporary", he assured 
the Chinese ambassador, "and they will be replaced as soon as we can replace the 
airplanes that we have borrowed. I again wanted to inform your government that 
all the understandings that we have with respect to Taiwan will be rigorously 
carried out as soon as the war in Vietnam is concluded." Demonstrating 
American goodwill, Kissinger noted that the United States would be removing 
other aircraft off Taiwan within a few weeks. The aircraft in question were 
connected with the war in Indochina, but "they will be removed regardless of the 
peace negotiations." Though unprompted, his closing remark was the key to the 
whole conversation. "We will let you have a list of those planes" he told the 
Chinese ambassador, reminding him that in his dealings with Beijing the National 
Security Advisor had always stuck to not just the letter but also the spirit of their 
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agreements. 
It was a masterful display from Kissinger, and he was successful in 
achieving his objective. China stepped back from its heavy-handed charges 
against Nixon and Kissinger, and public criticism ceased in the Chinese press in 
subsequent days (although it did continue to carry critical North Vietnamese 
articles). Though clearly disappointed and irritated at the failure of Hanoi and 
Washington to reach an agreement before the elections, the sour note that had 
entered into Sino-U.S. relations over this issue proved to be temporary, as 
demonstrated by the warmth and cordiality that characterized a dinner between 
109 Hanhimliki, The Flawed Architect, pp. 251-2; ibid. 
110 Memcon, Huang Hua, Kissinger et aI., November 3rd, 1972, NPMPINSC/850/2. The aircraft 
in question were 24 KC-135's, aerial tankers, which been on Taiwan since June. See memo, 
'1117 WL phoned Mrs. Shih', November 11th, 1972, NPMPINSC/850/2. 
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Qiao Guanhua, Huang Hua, Kissinger and New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller on November 13th• Stating his "personal opinion", Qiao expressed 
continued concern over recent positions put forward by Saigon that "make the 
whole situation insoluble." Recalling Zhou's parting comments to Nixon, Qiao 
reminded Kissinger that "Vietnam is a small country and the U.S. should assume 
a high profile ... A high vantage point. I think a country like yours can make 
some concessions" he opined, before adding diplomatically, "Maybe you can't 
accept this. I speak what I think." Despite the disappointment and annoyance of 
late October, by mid-November the P.R.C.'s dealings with Washington on the 
subject of Vietnam retained the character that Zhou Enlai had encapsulated in his 
farewell speech to Nixon: "One should not lose the whole world just to gain 
South Vietnam,',111 
Zhou met with Ly Ban on November 151, during which he urged Hanoi to 
find a compromise with the United States, in contrast with his sharp note to 
Kissinger. It was later claimed by Hanoi that at this meeting, Zhou told "the 
Vietnamese leadership that Vietnam should make concessions on the question of 
withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and the question of North Vietnam 
renouncing military aid, so that the agreement could be signed."l12 It is very 
possible that Zhou did indeed think that the removal of a small number of North 
Vietnamese troops 20 km back across the D.M.Z. a price worth paying to attain a 
peace, although in his message to Kissinger of the previous day he had rejected 
any such change to the agreement as "unreasonable".1l3 The second charge is 
interesting, though under the circumstances unlikely to be true. The question of 
military aid was not a point of contention between Kissinger and Hanoi (as 
recounted to Huang Hua); furthermore, Kissinger himself had made it clear in a 
note of mid-October that the U.S. had accepted Hanoi's demand that there be no 
restrictions on military aid to the D.R.V.114 As such it would have been strange 
for Zhou to urge Hanoi to relinquish it under the circumstances, particularly 
when Ly Ban was in Beijing for the purposes of negotiating an aid agreement 
from China for 1973. Determined to demonstrate to Hanoi that its interests 
III Memcon, Qiao, Kissinger, et aI., November 13t\ 1972, NPMPfNSC/850/2; Kissinger, WH. Y., 
p. 1413; memo, '1117 WL phoned Mrs. Shih', November 11 th, 1972, NPMPfNSC/850/2. 
12 S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, p. 42. 
113 Memcon, Kissinger, Hua et at., October 24, 1972, NPMPfNSC/850/2. 
114 Memorandum for the record, October 16,1972, FRUS Nixon-Ford. vol. £-13, document 168, 
http://www.state.gov/r/palho/frus/nixonleI3/ 
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would be protected after the signing of a peace agreement, and that the struggle 
was merely being paused, not abandoned, the agreement was signed by Zhou four 
weeks later; the size of China's largesse was clearly designed to push Hanoi 
towards being flexible in the negotiations. The provisions within it were the most 
generous ever given to North Vietnam by China, and American estimates 
believed that Chinese economic assistance to North Vietnam in 1973 outstripped 
that of the Soviet Union, this helping Hanoi to achieve its second priority -
rehabilitation of the economy and the consolidation of socialism. Militarily, the 
Vietnamese comrades would receive almost 234,000 guns and 10,000 artillery 
pieces, as well as 120 tanks, and 36 aircraft, presumably MiG-19s, in 1973. 
Beijing was certainly not adopting a mantra of 'swords into ploughshares' in its 
. . hH ·115 dealIngs WIt anOl. 
Talks between Kissinger and Tho resumed on November 20th ; as usual Le 
Duc Tho had stopped over in Beijing on his way to Paris, and it is likely he 
revealed to the Chinese Premier something of his new negotiating instructions. 
Like Nixon, Hanoi too was having problems with their South Vietnamese allies: 
the N.L.F. leadership had furiously objected to the lack of provision in the 
October agreement for the release of political prisoners in Thieu's jails, and Tho 
was returning to Paris with demands of his own for changes in the text. While 
probably sympathetic to their plight, Zhou is unlikely to have been sufficiently 
sympathetic to view this as reason enough to hold up the signing of a peace 
agreement, and it was surely with frustration that he received reports of the lack 
of progress being made in Paris between November 20th and 25th, when Tho and 
Kissinger broke for a ten-day recess. Kissinger called on Huang Zhen in the wee 
hours of the morning of the 25th , in another attempt to get Chinese intervention 
with Hanoi. Kissinger identified the principal problem as being the North 
Vietnamese refusal to withdraw any of their troops across the DMZ. He told the 
Chinese ambassador, "[I]f the North Vietnamese, outside of the agreement, 
would withdraw some troops, or would make some gesture that indicated they 
understood the problem which would enable us to preserve the principle, we 
think we could settle quite rapidly." In effect, Kissinger was asking Mao and 
liS P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou Waijiao huodong, pp. 654, 657; '(Est. Pub. Date) Communist Military 
and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970-1974', January 1,1975, 
www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp?pageNumber=l&freqReqRecord=nic vietnam.txt; Kimball, The 
Vietnam War Files, p. 242; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 136. 
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Zhou to intercede with Hanoi in order to satisfy the demands of Nguyen Van 
Thieu. Huang was having none of it. "Now it seems very clear that you [didn't 
sign the October agreement] in order to suit your own unilateral needs ... the 
Vietnamese side has been carrying on the talks with great flexibility ... they have 
made all the concessions which they can make." However, careful to emphasize 
that events in Paris and Saigon would have no bearing on Sino-U.S. relations he 
added, "I would like to repeat again that since we are friends that is all I want to 
say sincerely about the Vietnam problem to yoU.',116 
When the talks resumed, little progress was made, and Tho withdrew nine 
of the twelve concessions he had agreed to in November. Nixon was threatening 
another round of bombing on Hanoi, and Tho appeared resolute. Kissinger 
concluded that "the only hope of averting a collapse [in the talks] would be 
messages to Moscow and Peking informing Hanoi's communist backers of the 
prospects before them.,,117 With this in mind he paid another visit to Huang Zhen. 
During this meeting Kissinger, as ever, raised the spectre of Soviet hegemony, 
claiming that Tho was demanding Nixon accept the October agreement or a 
worse one. "If North Vietnam maintains its position, we will certainly break off 
the negotiations and we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our 
principles." Somewhat exaggerating, he went on, "[I]f we agree to this position 
of the North Vietnamese it will destroy any possibility for a long term anti-
hegemonial policy for the U.S., and it will destroy the policy and the 
personalities." The American negotiator then warned, "If this opportunity is 
missed, we will face a very grave situation. This is not a manoeuvre. This is not 
a trick. We have proposed a schedule whereby the treaty could be signed by 
December 22", and then concluded with the threat that "If the North Vietnamese 
do not change their position on Saturday morning, I will have to break off the 
talks.,,118 Despite Huang Zhen giving Kissinger the impression that he wasn't 
116 Memcon, Huang Zhen, Kissinger et aI., November 25, 1972, October 24, 1972, 
NPMP/NSC/85012; Kissinger, w.H. Y., pp. 1415-22; P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp. 
655; Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy, pp. 110-1. 
117 Kissinger, w.H. Y, p. 1429. 
118 Kissinger postponed the negotiating session scheduled for the 5th by 24 hours, and not until 
Saturday December 9th as he indicated to Huang he intended to do, ibid; memcon 'Thursday, 
December 7-Friday Dec. 8,1972,11:25 p.m. -12:15 a.m.', NPMP/NSC/850/2. Although this 
memcon is dated December 7th, when one examines its content, such as Kissinger's statement that 
"Last time I was here [in November] there were some changes and there were only four issues 
left ... Today Mr. Le Duc Tho has refused every proposal and withdrawn every change that was 
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even pretending Beijing was doing anything, it appears that the Chinese did in 
fact take Kissinger's threats and warnings seriously, and conveyed them to the 
North Vietnamese. 119 They may have had some effect. On December ih, Tho 
gave back six of the points, including the provision that the release of American 
P.O.W.s would not be linked to the release of political prisoners in Thieu'sjails. 
By the time the talks adjourned on December 13th, the only issue of substance 
remaining was the definition of the D.M.Z. However, when teams of experts met 
the next day the North Vietnamese attempted to make substantive changes to the 
text through the protocols. Two days later they simply "stonewalled". Hanoi had 
decided to wait for the arrival of a new Congress; Nixon, on the other hand, was 
tired of Hanoi's stalling tactics, and wanted to demonstrate to Thieu his resolve to 
enforce the agreement. LINEBACKER II was to be launched, and 36,000 tons of 
bombs would be dropped on North Vietnam. 120 
In order to pre-empt the Chinese reaction to the bombings, Winston Lord 
was dispatched to New York to meet with Ambassador Huang Hua in order to 
update him on the status of the talks (Kissinger had to remain in Washington with 
Nixon). The U.S. side had the previous day sent a message to the Chinese stating 
that they believed the D.R.V. had been supplying them with an accurate account 
of the negotiations, and "If the Chinese side so desires, Dr. Kissinger would be 
prepared to provide an updated, corrected version of these negotiations to 
Ambassador Huang." \21 The Chinese side was clearly interested in hearing 
Washington's version of events, and so Lord lost no time in explaining that the 
U.S. wants "your government to have a true picture of the negotiations and the 
North Vietnamese tactics which represent bad faith and have prevented an 
agreement." Lord then detailed the "obvious North Vietnamese intent to stall and 
delay a settlement", citing such examples as Tho's attempts to add to the text that 
had been agreed upon in November regarding the D.M.Z., the very next day 
agreed to last time" (br~ckets in original) and "I will postpone tomorrow's talk until Saturday", it 
clearly indicates that this conversation actually took place on the night/morning of December 
4th/5th. This corroborates Kissinger's statement in WH. Y. that he contacted the Chinese on 
December 4"', along with the Vietnamese White Book claim that on December 5th Huang Zhen 
"conveyed to the Vietnamese side a warning from Kissinger" that very closely summarizes the 
content of Kissinger's message to Huang contained within this memcon. Cf. Kissinger, WH. Y., p. 
1429; S.R.V. For. Min., White Book, p. 42. 
119 Kissinger, WH. Y., p. 1440; S.R.V. For. Min, White Book, p. 42. 
120 Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy, p. 111; Asselin, A Bitter Peace, p.139. 
121 Cable, 'Fm: Gen. Haig, To: Hood', December IS, 1972, NPMPINSC/850/2. 
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reneging on December 11 th's agreed modalities for the signing of the text, how 
the North Vietnamese were attempting to use the experts' meetings to introduce 
changes in the texts that had already been agreed upon by the principals, and how 
they had attempted to make changes to the substance of the agreements by 
making alterations to their drafts of the protocols. Huang listened impassively, 
though he did ask about the previous u.s. demand that the North Vietnamese 
move some troops back across the D.M.Z. Lord explained that basically this 
demand had been dropped in exchange for no commitment on the status of 
civilian prisoners in Thieu's jails. The ambassador expressed disappointment at 
the delay and promised to pass on Lord's comments to his government. 122 
Tho was indeed, as Kissinger alleged, stalling for time, however given 
new evidence it would appear that the cause of this was a rift in the D.R.V.-P.R.O. 
coalition over the status of civilian prisoners in the South. On December 8th , 
even after Tho had conceded the point again in the negotiations, Nguyen Thi 
Binh demanded that the issue be tied to the release of American P.O.W.'s. 
Robert Brigham's research has shown that many northerners blamed their 
southern comrades for the destruction that was wrought on Hanoi and other parts 
of North Vietnam over the Christmas period of 1972. Given that Tho had already 
conceded on the issue of the release of civilian prisoners, one is forced to 
conclude that Tho's claim that he needed to return to Hanoi for consultations was 
in fact true, and the issue at stake was those civilian prisoners in Thieu's jails. \23 
In this light, what is notable about China's response to the 
LINEBACKER II bombings is the attention that was showered on Nguyen Thi 
Binh when she visited Beijing during the last days of 1972. Beijing's 
condemnation of the bombings was rather pro forma, and pledged the usual 
Chinese support for the Vietnamese struggle "for national salvation until 
complete victory is won", while it publicly blamed Nixon for the continued delay 
in signing the agreement. 124 However, the prominence given to Mme. Binh 
during this visit to Beijing speaks of an effort to reassure the P.R.G. that their 
interests would be protected after the signing of a peace agreement. The P.R.O. 's 
Foreign Minister and her party were treated to two banquets during the three day 
t22 Memcon. Huang Hua, Lord, et al., December 16, 1972, ibid. 
123 Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy, pp. 110-1. 
124 ·P.R.C. Foreign Ministry Statement Condemns Renewed U.S. Bombing', December 20, 1972, 
HAK Office Files/98/l. 
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sojourn, a 10,000 person rally to welcome her and condemn U.S. bombing of 
North Vietnam, as well as talks with P.R.C. Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, a 
separate session with Zhou Enlai, and finally an audience with Chairman Mao 
himself: an honour normally reserved only for those whom the Chinese wanted to 
either wow or woo. Mao explicitly condemned absolutist attitudes the sort of 
which northern comrades later charged the southerners as possessing. He told 
Binh that "Now, some so-called 'Communists" say that you should not negotiate, 
and that you should fight, fight for another 100 years. This is revolution; 
. .. rt'" 125 otherwIse, It IS oppo umsm. Likewise, the next day Zhou Enlai told 
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the D.R.V., 
Truong Chinh, that "It seems that Nixon is truly planning to leave [Vietnam]." 
Perhaps giving some recognition to the charges laid against Tho by Kissinger 
(who had also forwarded on to Zhou the transcripts of the final days' negotiations 
so that he could judge for himself who was serious in the discussions), the 
Chinese Premier told his old Vietnamese friend, "Therefore, this time it is 
necessary to negotiate [with them] seriously, and the goal is to reach an 
agreement.,,126 In a similar vein, on January 3rd, he told Le Duc Tho (returning to 
Paris), "It seems that the U.S. is still willing to get out from Vietnam and 
Indochina. You should persist in principles while demonstrating flexibility 
during the negotiations. The most important [thing] is to let the American leave. 
. . '11 h ., th ,,127 The SItuatIOn WI c ange m SIX mon s or one year. 
And so it would prove to be; but little did Zhou realise that in one year's time the 
situation would have changed to the extent that Nixon would be struggling to 
retain not just control over his Presidency, but to retain his job. It would prove to 
have deleterious effects on Washington's relations with Beijing, but provide a 
boon for Hanoi and its efforts to re-unify Vietnam. But that was for the future. 
125 Memcons (extract), Mao Zedong and Nguyen Thi Binh, December 29, 1972, 77 Conversations, 
p.182. 
126 Memcons (extract), Zhou Enlai and Truong Chinh, December 31, 1972, 77 Conversations, pp. 
182-3. 
127 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp. 659-60; Kissinger, w.H. Y., p. 1454; C.D.R.O., 
Zhou En/ai nianpu, vol. 3, pp. 569-71; 'PRGRSV Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh Visits 
Peking', 27 December 1972, Folder 14IBox 07IDPC Unit 05/TVA-TTU; Wire, 'From: Haig, To: 
Hood', December 22, 1972, NPMPINSC/850/2. 
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For China, 1972 had proved to be an extraordinary year, during which its 
relationships with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States 
became ever more closely entwined in a curious interplay of geo- and cultural 
politics. For reasons of cultural affinity (or more precisely cultural paternalism), 
and with an eye towards a post-war Indochina Beijing stoutly rejected 
Kissinger's entreaties to intervene with Hanoi on Nixon's behalf; Kissinger could 
never quite come to terms with Beijing's continued support for Hanoi. Even as it 
prepared to host the U.S. President in the Chinese capital, the P.R.C. maintained 
its posture of non-interference while its Vietnamese allies geared up for one last 
attempt to swing the military balance in their favour. Beijing had hoped that 
Nixon would see the futility of his insistence on backing Thieu, and opt to "let 
the domino fall". In Mao and Zhou's calculations, such a move, occurring 
against a backdrop of Sino-American rapprochement would accrue long-term 
benefit to both the United States and the P.R.C. Not only would the Americans 
not countenance such a move, however, but also completely failed to understand 
the basic rationale underpinning the Chinese approach. As a result, right up until 
Nixon arrived in Beijing, Kissinger erroneously remained convinced that China 
was leaning on Hanoi. 
Notwithstanding the evident disappointment in Beijing that the war had 
not been concluded in advance of Nixon's visit, both China and the U.S. refused 
to allow the lack of progress in ending the war to interfere in their burgeoning 
relationship, despite the Chinese assertion that it was the most pressing issue 
facing both nations. This was true even to the extent that, rather surprisingly, 
Nixon made practically no effort to introduce the topic into his discussions with 
Zhou Enlai, save to point out that the majority of American forces would be 
removed from Taiwan after the resolution of the Indochina conflict. It was the 
Chinese Premier who wanted to discuss the issue of Indochina, repeatedly 
returning to the theme of the advisability of an American withdrawal; without 
such a move a few months hence South Vietnam would be facing collapse in the 
face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion. 
Despite Beijing's largesse in support of that invasion, Nixon's visit t~ 
Beijing was undoubtedly a fly in the ointment in Beijing's attempts to maintain 
the amity of Hanoi. The North Vietnamese leadership were angry and suspicious 
in equal measure at Mao's policy turn towards the United States, and not without 
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reason: it undennined their political strategy and emboldened Nixon militarily. 
To counter these factors, Chinese aid to North Vietnam continued to reach new 
heights in preparation for Hanoi's Spring Offensive. When the attack came and 
was accompanied by Nixon's blockade of the D.R.V., China rallied its economy 
behind Hanoi, and still there was no diplomatic price to pay with the United 
States. When Kissinger made his oft-repeated claim that there could be injurious 
consequences for Sino-American relations stemming from the Vietnamese 
communists' attack, Huang Hua swatted him away by essentially telling him he 
didn't want to talk about it. It was a remarkable state of affairs and spoke of the 
depth of the commitment of both governments' intent to forge a tacit alliance 
against the Soviet Union. 
As the summer of '72 wore on, however, Hanoi's attack ran out of steam, 
and both the North Vietnamese and Chinese leaderships began to see that the war 
in Vietnam should be settled before the U.S. presidential election in November. 
China's posture subtly changed, and Zhou began constructively urging 
compromise on both sides. Mao, as ever somewhat more blunt than Zhou Enlai, 
also let it be known that he was of the opinion that the time had come for the 
Vietnamese communists to talk directly to Thieu. This aside, the Chinese 
Premier continued to resolutely deny any intercession to facilitate a peace (unlike 
MoscoW). As well as sharing the same military and political analysis as Hanoi, 
however, China did have its own selfish reasons to wish to see the conflict 
resolved. Growing increasingly dissatisfied at the slow pace' towards full 
nonnalization of Sino-American relations, and perturbed by the increasing 
detente between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., Mao and Zhou wanted to see Nixon 
in a strong position in 1973, with the albatross of Vietnam no longer around his 
neck, so that he could proceed with the severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan 
and the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. It is unlikely 
that the V.W.P. Politburo foresaw bright prospects for their cause during a 
second-tenn Nixon presidency. 
A growing sense of frustration fed increasing Chinese impatience with 
both Hanoi and Washington in the last three months of 1972. Nixon's inability to 
bring Nguyen Van Thieu to heel caused consternation and some degree of 
suspicion in Beijing, at a time when the political tide within the C.c.P. was 
beginning to run again with the radical faction of Jiang Qing. And while Zhou 
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continued to blame Nixon for the failure to reach an agreement in October, he 
also became aware of Hanoi's own difficulties with their southern compatriots in 
the P.R.G. Thus, in a rather curious turn of events, Zhou and Mao found 
themselves discretely interceding with Nguyen Thi Binh on behalf of the Hanoi 
Politburo, as well encouraging those same comrades in Hanoi to be flexible in 
their negotiations with Kissinger. 
When agreement was reached, the war in Vietnam was over for a period 
of five to ten years, Zhou estimated, by which time the ailing Premier, and 
presumably his boss, would have "gone to see Marx." They had done their duty 
to their Vietnamese comrades, and the issue of Vietnamese unity would have to 
wait for another generation of leadership to deal with, or so he probably thought. 
China could look forward to its southern border becoming a peaceful area of non-
contention and non-alignment while the P.R.e. would continue to take its rightful 
place on the world stage and counter Soviet hegemony in Asia. All that remained 
was to secure the peace in Laos and Cambodia. 
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Chapter 5 
January August 1973: The Search for Peace in Cambodia 
The conclusion of America's direct involvement in the Vietnam War was received 
with relief and satisfaction in Beijing. China had maintained a conflicting duality in 
its foreign policy for over three years, as it attempted to pursue a rapprochement with 
the United States, while simultaneously continuing to support Hanoi's war. The 
conflict had become increasingly acute in the wake of Nixon's successful visit to 
Beijing and the launch of the Vietnamese Spring Offensive. The communist attacks 
in South Vietnam had, however, run into the ground, despite Chinese support; Hanoi 
was not going to win at the negotiating table what it had not won on the battlefield. 
Thieu was going to playa part in the political dispens~tion in Saigon, at least for the 
duration of the 'decent interval'. As ever, Beijing's analysis was conditioned by' the 
Chinese communists' own civil war experience, and its applicability to the situation 
in the nations on China's periphery. 
Notwithstanding the battlefield realities of South Vietnam, China had its own 
reasons for wishing to see an end to the war in Indochina. America's extraction from 
the Indochinese quagmire freed Nixon to comprehensively address the process of 
Sino-American normalization (and counter Soviet strength elsewhere in the world), 
and stabilized the situation on China's southern frontier. An end to the fighting in 
Vietnam and the release of the blockade of the D.R.V. would also reduce the strain 
on China's economy, southern provinces, ports, and railway system, which would 
facilitate measures to undo the economic dislocation caused by the Cultural 
Revolution. It also meant that Chinese domestic polity could fully address the fall-
out from the Lin Biao incident, in the form of a new Party Congress. And from 
Mao's perspective, the completion of a successful summit visit from Nixon and 
Zhou's careful handling of the Vietnamese comrades in advance of the Paris Peace 
Accords reduced the Chairman's dependence on the diplomatic skills of the urbane 
and sophisticated Premier, whose own position had been strengthened by the events 
of the previous eighteen months, despite his failing health. 
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Viewed from Beijing, the overall situation at the dawn of 1973 looked 
promising. Mao had found in Nixon what he believed would be a reliable partner in 
countering the Soviet menace, while Zhou Enlai had carefully managed the 
relationship with Hanoi, providing the Vietnamese comrades with unprecedented 
levels of material support for their struggle. Nixon's landslide win in the November 
election, surpassing even Lyndon Johnson's 1964 margin of victory in the popular 
vote, established him in a powerful position to advance the full normalization of 
Sino-American relations in his second term. As Zhou Enlai told senior Khmer 
Rouge official Penn Nouth, Thieu would be "dealt with" in time, after the 
completion of the American withdrawal. l The situation in Laos would be easy to 
bring under control, given the Pathet Lao's status as a passive client of Hanoi; and 
while the Cambodian situation was a more complicated tripartite arrangement, since 
all of Washington, Beijing, and Hanoi wanted to see the situation there resolved 
there was a reasonable expectation that it too would be brought under control. A 
new era in the international relations of the Indochinese states was about to begin. 
Hanoi "has to be patient" 
Zhou was officially informed of the initialing of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam when he received the D.R.V. and P.R.G. 
ambassadors at 8 p.m. on January 24th in the Great Hall of the People. 
Congratulating the Vietnamese comrades on their achievement, Zhou reminded them 
that their victory had not been easily won, but as Pham Van Dong had said, "[I]t is 
important to continue the struggle. What is important is that the Americans have 
been driven OUt.,,2 This was indeed what was important to Beijing. Nonetheless, the 
Chinese leadership congratulated the Vietnamese comrades, north and south, on their 
"great victory" in signing the Paris Accords, that would enable them to achieve 
1 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Penn Nouth, February 2, 1973, 77 Conversations, p.184. 
2 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, p.662; Westad et aI., 77 Conversatiolls, p.l83 n.249; 
C.D.R.O., ZhOll En/ai nianpll, p.575. 
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"peace, independence, unity, democracy, and prosperity" in a situation "free from 
external military interference". 3 
Similar congratulations were expressed by Zhou to Kissinger when he visited 
Beij ing on February 15th 1973 to consult with the Chinese leadership on global 
affairs and to discuss the recently agreed peace settlement for Vietnam and the 
international conference intended to guarantee it. During the course of their talks, 
Kissinger reaffirmed the 'decent interval' strategy he had previously outlined to the 
Chinese Premier, telling him that what was important was "that the transition 
between the present and what will work in Southeast Asia occur gradually ... The 
basic problem for us is that the Agreement is kept and that the Agreement docs not 
collapse, or if it does collapse that it does not collapse quickly." His rationale, one 
which Zhou surely agreed with, was that this would affect the ability of the United 
States to carry out its "anti-hegemonical" (i.e. anti-Soviet) foreign policy, "and is 
therefore of world interest", that is to say, Chinese and American interest. To 
emphasize his point he later elaborated. The D.R.V. "can either use the Agreement 
as an offensive weapon in the short term and constantly use it to undermine the 
existing structure, or it can use it in the long term ... in which we both understand 
what will happen but in which the situation is tranquil for a period ... So they have to 
be patient. They have to be somewhat patient.,,4 
The North Vietnamese leadership had good reason to be relatively sanguine, 
and indeed patient, about their prospects in South Vietnam. As a sweetener to 
encourage them to sign the Paris Accords, and to ensure that they would not be 
waiting interminably to unify their country, Chinese aid continued to pour into North 
Vietnam. Chinese aid to North Vietnam in 1973 was roughly equivalent to that 
delivered the previous year, which in itself had been by a large margin the greatest 
amount of military aid from China to the D.R.V.5 During the course of 1973, NOlth 
Vietnam would receive from its northern neighbour almost 10,000 ultillery pieces 
and mortars (up 7% on 1972),2.2 million artillery shells (no change), 234,000 guns 
3 C.D.R.O., Mao wengao, vol. 13, pp.341-3. 
4 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 16, 1973, DNSA/KT00647. 
5 For a note on the problems of estimating the value, in dollar terms, of Chinese aid to North Vietnam 
please see ch. 4, fn.IS. 
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(up 24%), 120 tanks (100 fewer than the previous year) and 36 aircraft (probably 
mostly MiG-19s; China had delivered 14 in 1972).6 A C.I.A. intelligence report 
from early 1975 incorrectly concluded that Chinese military aid to the D.R.V. in 
1973-4 was "well below" that of 1972. This underestimate notwithstanding, the 
American intelligence analysts still concluded that Hanoi had been able to "replace 
the losses accruing from the [1972 Spring] offensive, and expand and modernize 
their armed forces ... by mid-1974 the North Vietnamese had developed their most 
powerful force ever in the South, and aid has been sufficient to enable Hanoi to 
maintain this force." While overall military aid to Hanoi from China fell by 
approximately one third between 1973 and 1974, this clearly did not have a 
deleterious effect on Hanoi's fighting ability. Furthermore, when the total value of 
China's military aid did decrease in 1974, Chinese economic aid to the D.R.V. 
boomed, largely as a result of Vietnamese dependence on overland supply ii'om 
China stemming from Nixon's May 1972 mining of Haiphong harbour (see table 
below).7 
During the course of their discussions the previous June, Zhou Enlai had 
remarked to Kissinger that after the conclusion of the Vietnam War China hoped to 
be able to send its MiG-19s to Pakistan instead of Vietnam. Kissinger, once again 
seeking hidden meaning and nuance in Zhou's utterances, had taken this to be 
Zhou's "complicated way of saying that they will sharply reduce aid", as he told the 
South Vietnamese President's Foreign Policy Assistant, Nguyen Phu Due, when 
trying to sell him the merits of the peace agreement. Duc expressed skepticism about 
Kissinger's faith in allusory Chinese statements. Kissinger, however, had "more 
confidence in the Chinese elliptical statement than the Soviet direct statement" that 
6 Zhai, CATVW, p.136. 
7 '(Est Pub Date) Communist Military and Economic Aid to North Vietnam, 1970·1974', January I, 
1975, www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp?pageNumber=1 &freqReqRecord=nic vietnam.txt. The accunlcy 
of these estimates is, of course, questionable; however, C.I.A. estimates of economic aid figures were 
certainly more accurate than those of military assistance since practically all imp0l1s from China and 
the Soviet Union were gratis or credits. Despite doubts over the absolute accuracy of the numbers 
provided, for purposes of comparing aid from China and the Soviet Union the relative trends should 
stand reasonably robust scrutiny. 
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he had received from Brezhnev on reducing military aid to Hanoi.s His confidence 
would prove to be misplaced. 
Figure 2 
Economic Aid to the DRV (CIA estimate) 
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When he visited Beijing in February 1973, Kissinger pressed the hinesc 
Premier on this issue. He expressed his hope that there would be "some constraint 
about the importation of arms by all countries in Indochina ... we are not saying that 
there should be no armaments sent into North Vietnam. We recognize that some wi ll 
be, but now the war is over we believe that some restraint in the sending of 
armaments would contribute to the tranquilizing of the situation." Zhou initia ll y 
attempted to skirt around the issue; he then deflected blame onto the oviet Union 
before finally implying to Kissinger that ifhe had wished to restrict arms supplies to 
North Vietnam he should have negotiated it into the Agreement. "We support the 
Agreement, but it is quite another matter for North Vietnam because when they need 
weapons the emphasis is not here in China. You Irnow this very clearly" replied the 
8 Memcon, Kissinger, Due, et aI. , December I, 1972, PMP/ S /859/ I' Memcon, Zho u, Ki ssinger et 
aI. , February 16, 1972, D AIKT00674. 
§ .B. "The imputed value of imports - based on international prices - surged forward more rapidl y 
in 1974 than in any previous year as a result of unusually rapid worldwide inflation . The 30 percent 
increase in vol ume was considerably outdistanced by a near-doublin g in va lue from les than $600 
million to about $1 .1 billion." Ibid . 
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Chinese Premier. "Because for ordinary weapons, they were easily worn out, but as 
far as those sophisticated weapons, we don't have them." The American National 
Security Advisor realised that he had miscalculated, and for the first time in his many 
hours of discussions with Zhou Enlai, a tone of exasperation crept into his comments. 
"I am not talking about the Agreement. I'm talking about acts of restraint and there 
is no formal agreement on that. I think the Prime Minister understands our general 
intention, and this is all I want to get across." Zhou's response was to cut him off. 
Kissinger was not going to obtain in Beijing what he had failed to obtain at the 
negotiating table in Paris. 9 
Zhou never did return to the issue, nor would promises of restraint on allies 
outside of the Agreement make it into the Act of the International Conference on 
Vietnam that was concluded in Paris on March 2nd• By mid-April, as the North 
Vietnamese introduced an extra 400 tanks (120 of which Beijing would replace) and 
200 pieces of heavy artillery into South Vietnam, in Washington D.C. the Watergate 
storm began to darken the Oval Office; the strongest protest about this Kissinger 
could offer Huang Hua was to state his strong belief "that it would be useful if the 
friends of the other side would also use their influence and not give them the means 
to start another offensive." Having long since laid bare before Zhou Enlai his 
envisioned "decent interval" solution, Kissinger was now requesting that China deny 
Hanoi the tools with which to achieve it. Huang Hua's response was telling: 
"Premier Zhou Enlai stated clearly the Chinese position during his talks with Dr. 
Kissinger last February." Kissinger had made the assumption that China's self-
interest paralleled that of the United States, and that it would sharply reduce military 
aid to Hanoi after the agreement was signed. Zhou Enlai, a diplomat of many years' 
more experience, demonstrated to Kissinger that assumptions occupy a precarious 
position in diplomacy.lO 
To be sure, China would certainly not have welcomed an immediate, or even 
quick, return to all-out war in South Vietnam. Zhou was serious when he envisioned 
a period of about five years before hostilities erupted there again. This would give 
9 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et a\., February 16, 1972, DNSA/KT00674. 
10 Memcon, Huang Hua, Kissinger, Bruce, et aI., April 16, 1973, DNSA/KT00703. 
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Nixon sufficient time to establish formal diplomatic relations with China before the 
middle of 1976, as promised by Kissinger, by which time a new leadership in Beijing 
would probably have had time to settle in. Nonetheless, during this envisioned five-
year period of protracted struggle, Zhou promised continued support for Hanoi at the 
current level of around 2.5 billion yuan per year. In discussions on China's 
gratuitous aid for the D.R.V. for 1974, signed on June 81h 1973, the Chinese Premier 
made the point of reminding the other Chinese colleagues the five year pledge he 
was making. He stated his hope that "all other comrades present here will remember 
this, because I may not be here when that time comes. I do not mean that after five 
years we will not help you [Vietnamese] any more. We will, but the amount may be 
reduced." In the same conversation with the Vietnamese comrades he promised the 
supply of another missile battalion for the D.R.V. "We do not have to fight any 
more, so it will be all the same if the fourth battalion is placed either in China or in 
Vietnam."ll Under Zhou Enlai's stewardship, China was ready to back Hanoi's 
preparations for the end of the 'decent interval' .12 
Zhou's position in the early part of 1973 was thus to encourage the 
Vietnamese comrades to be patient, while simultaneously keeping up aid to North 
Vietnam in order to replace the wastage and losses suffered by the PA VN during 
1972, and rebuild the damage suffered by the D.R.V.'s economic infrastructure. III 
with cancer and knowing that under such a timetable he would probably be dead 
when the question of Vietnamese reunification arose again, this policy suited his 
purposes well. He would die having fulfilled his personal duty to the Vietnamese 
comrades, but without prejudicing the policy alternatives for his successors. As the 
Chinese Premier would plaintively tell Le Thanh Nghi one year later from his 
hospital bed, "I have fulfilled my duty as far as handling the support to Vietnam is 
concerned. Now I am not in good health". A fence-sitter to the end, Zhou would 
II Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi, June 5,1973,77 
Conversations, pp.184-8. 
12 P.R.C. For. Min., ZllOu waijiao huodong, p.675; Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegllo 
waijiao shi, vol. 3, p.51. This latter source states that the provision of 2.5 billion yuan in )974 was 
the largest amount of aid given by China to Vietnam in anyone year. This allegation is contradicted 
on the same page by the statement that in the 1971-73 period, Chinese aid to Vietnam surpassed 9 
billion yuan, and by other sources that indicate that aid to Vietnam in 1971 was 3.6 billion yuan. Cf. 
Shen Zhihua 'Zhong-Mei hejie', in Li Danhui, Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng, pp.232-3, 
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actually live to see a communist victory in South Vietnam; however by mid-1975 his 
illness and Mao's machinations had debilitated him to the extent that he was no 
longer responsible for directing foreign policy.13 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the foregoing that through the end of the summcr 
of 1973, despite tactical differences that existed between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese comrades, both essentially shared the same vision with rcgard to the 
development of the situation in South Vietnam. China continued to prcpare North 
Vietnam to take advantage of objective realities in the South, whcn they prescnted 
themselves, through an enormous supply of military aid, despite Kissinger's 
protestations. The Sino-Vietnamese aid agreement of June was supplcmcnted by 
another agreement on the supply of military equipment in October. Furthermore, 
and contrary to Kissinger's beliefs, both Hanoi and Beijing were working towards 
similar ends with regard to the situation in Cambodia, i.e. securing a ceascfire. 14 
However, profound changes had occurred within the secretive Khmer 
communist movement in the three years since the ouster of Sihanouk, and few 
outside of the upper echelons of the Cambodian, Chinese, and Vietnamcse 
communist movements were aware of them. Kissinger expended much time and 
energy in his discussions with Le Duc Tho in Paris on securing for the Khmer 
Republic a ceasefire similar to that achieved in Laos, in the belief that, as with the 
Pathet Lao, Hanoi was the puppeteer pulling the Khmer Rouge strings. And while it 
was clear that Beijing had considerable influence over Sihanouk, there was little 
recognition in Washington that the greatest hope of obtaining Khmer communist 
acquiescence to any peace proposal also came through the auspices of Zhou Enlai. 
As shall be seen, however, the Chinese Premier's diplomatic skills would face a 
severe test from the shadowy and clandestine leader of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, the as yet internationally unknown Pol Pot. 
Co-operation on Cambodia 
13 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi, August 3, 1974, 190-1. 
14 Lian Zhengbao, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao dashiji, vol. 4, p.l 00. 
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At the time of the signing of the Paris Agreements, however, Zhou was at the height 
of his authority. Domestic economic reforms implemented under instruction frol11 
Mao but on Zhou's authority that were designed to undo the damage suffered during 
the years of the Cultural Revolution were beginning to show positive results; 
likewise new policies with regard to education, science and technology. While the 
impetus had come from the Chairman, Zhou had successfully handled the issue of 
Sino-American relations, agreed an understanding on the issue of Taiwan, and 
negotiated for Mao a summit visit to Beijing from the President of the United States. 
Zhou had established a framework in which the U.S. and the People's Republic of 
China could, in Mao's words, "work together to deal with a bastard" - the Soviet 
Union. IS As part of this framework the Premier had overseen an American 
withdrawal from Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had agreed to orchestrate a 
ceasefire in Laos through their Laotian communist clients, the Pathet Lao; all that 
remained to be settled was an agreement on Cambodia, where China held a much 
stronger hand than in Laos, and where China had long been cultivating deposed 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk to playa key role. 16 
Ever since the Cambodian Head of State had been overthrown in a coup led 
by Lon Nol in March 1970 and established his national front (FUNK) and national 
unity government-in-exile (GRUNK) in alliance with the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese 
government had invested large amounts of both political prestige and hard cash in 
promoting Sihanouk's legitimacy as the head of the Cambodian nation. $10 million 
in used dollar bills went to the GRUNK each year - half for Sihanouk's government 
in Beijing, and half smuggled down the Ho Chi Minh trail into the Cambodian 
interior for the Khmer Rouge to buy weapons with. In no small part through the 
efforts of Zhou and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, by early 1973 Sihanouk's 
government was recognized by more than 30 countries. In August 1972 the GRUNK 
delegation was recognized as an official member of the Conference of the Foreign 
Ministers of Non-aligned Nations; in a clever tactical move the motion to admit the 
GRUNK had been paired with the admission of the South Vietnamese P.R.G. in one 
15 Memcon, Mao, Kissinger, Zhou et a\., February 17, 1973, DNSA/KT00677. 
16 Van and Gao, Turbulent Decade, pp.407-412. 
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resolution. Of the 57 nations represented, however, only three - Malaysia, Laos and 
Indonesia - walked out of the conference in protest at the proceedings. Such was the 
P.R.C.'s interest in gaining recognition for Sihanouk's GRUNK that Chinese 
observers at the conference even went to the extent of personally removing the 
literature of Lon Nol's delegation from the other delegations' boxes in an effort to 
prevent it being recognized. 17 
The Cambodian situation, along with the ever-present Soviet threat, 
doininated the discussions between Zhou and Kissinger in February 1973. Zhou had 
outlined to Nixon one year previously his belief that if the war in Indochina was 
stopped "that is to say a reversion of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk, then the North 
Vietnamese will surely withdraw.,,18 He had further elaborated to the President's 
National Security Adviser his vision for post-war Indochina during Kissinger's visit 
to China in the summer of 1972. "[N]ot only are we not a threat to you - take the 
case of Indochina. If an end can be put to the war then in Cambodia Sihanouk will 
ultimately be the head of state. And in Laos the head will be King Vatthana ... And 
in both these countries their characteristic of neutrality will be more pronounced and 
in South Vietnam at least for a time it will be neutraL.. And that area will become in 
a certain sense a kind of buffer.,,19 The Premier also voiced approval for a wider 
zone of neutrality in Southeast Asia, involving Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and 
the Philippines, referring to the envisioned Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPF AN) proposed by Malaysia in 1971 at a meeting of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur, reversing China's long-
standing hostility to that organisation. ZOPFAN was designed to be, in the words of 
Sheldon Smith, "something of a security model for the Association that, if realized, 
would serve as an alternative to competitive military buildups within Southeast Asia 
and the countervailing military activities of such external powers as the United States 
17 Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao slri, vol. 3, pp.74-77; 'Sihanouk TelIs of 
Chinese DolIar Financing', 24 October 1972, Folder II1Box 04/DPC Unit ISITVA-TTU; Philip Short, 
Pol Pot, p.202; briefing book, 'Cambodia (and Laos) Discussions with the PRC', undated - ca. 
February 1973, NPMPINSCIHAK Office Files/98/2. 
18 Memcon, Nixon, Zhou, Kissinger et a\., February 24, 1972, White House Special Files/President's 
Office Fileslbox 87/Memoranda for the President Beginning February 20, 1972, NPMP. 
19 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., June 21, 1972, NPMPINSC/HAK Office Files/97/4. 
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and the Soviet Union.,,20 In Zhou's mind, while perhaps not a formal member of 
ZOPF AN, Cambodia too would playa part in this zone of neutrality. 
At first glance, this task appeared not easy. Sihanouk's GRUNK issued a 
statement on January 26th, 1973, reaffirming its stance as contained within 
Sihanouk's March 23rd 1970 five-point statement, and was further emphasized by a 
joint statement from three Khmer Rouge GRUNK ministers in the interior of 
Cambodia.21 That statement had demanded the liberation of Cambodia "from the 
enslavement of the reactionary fascists led by Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Cheng 
Heng", and called for "struggle against the American imperialists - who are the 
aggressors against Indochina".22 This did not bode well for an American-facilitated 
negotiation between Lon Nol's government and the GRUNK. Likewise, Zhou 
forcefully rejected contact between his own government and that of Lon No!. He 
also reprimanded Kissinger - "You should also not deal with such a man who carries 
on subversive activities against the King ... we think it not very - it is not fair for you 
to admit [recognize] Lon Nol." China's disdain for Lon Nol was not entirely as a 
result of affection for Sihanouk, it should be noted. The Soviet Union had 
recognised Lon Nol's government; getting rid of him and undermining the Soviet 
.. I ~ . Zh' I I' 23 position was a cntlca lactor In ou s ca cu atlOns. 
Undeterred by Zhou's initial obduracy, Kissinger proposed finding "an 
interim solution that is acceptable to both sides". Aware of Sihanouk and the Khmer 
Rouge's recent public disavowal of the Paris Peace Agreement, and their declared 
resolve to persevere against the Lon Nol government, Zhou expressed his conviction 
that neither Sihanouk nor the "Khmer resistance in the interior area in Cambodia" 
would agree to enter into negotiations with Lon Nol. "Well, it doesn't have to be 
Lon Nol himself. It could be somebody from that government" volunteered 
20 Simon W. Sheldon, 'China. Vietnam, and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarization', Asian S"rvel', vol. 
19, no. 12 (December 1979). fn. J, pp.1171-2. . 
21 These 'three phantoms' as they were known were Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and lIu Nim. Their 
very existence was subject to intense speculation as it was rumoured that Sihanouk had had them 
executed in the late 1960s. They were widely thought to be the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (C.P.K.). whereas in fact even Samphan only became a Central Committee member in 
1971, and merely an alternate at that. Short Pol Pot, pp.451-3. 
22 Briefing book. 'Cambodia (and Laos) Discussions with the PRC', undated - ca. February 1973, 
NPMP/NSC/HAK office files/98/2. 
23 Memcon. Zhou. Kissinger et aI., February 16, 1973, DNSAlKT00674. 
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Kissinger. Zhou was clearly interested by this suggestion, and unlike his previous 
persistent and finn refusals to act as an intermediary between Kissinger and the 
Vietnamese during the American's quest to end the war there, the Chinese Premier 
casually stated that "Of course, since Sihanouk is in China we cannot but tell him 
your opinion in our wording, but of course, we have our own position on this 
question.,,24 Despite Zhou's protestations that they still supported Sihanouk's Five 
Point Declaration, some fonn of Chinese mediation was in the offing.25 
When Kissinger returned to the issue one day later, he was told that Zhou did 
not have an answer yet for him because the question "is still under consideration. ,,26 
On the 18th, Zhou returned to the issue, but only to tell his American guest that "[I]t 
seems this time during this visit it will be difficult to make further progress ... 27 Zhou 
had been consulting intensively with various interested parties, including Sihanouk's 
Prime Minister Penn Nouth, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Ieng Sary in 
advance of Kissinger's arrival, but it appears that the temperamental Prince refused 
to meet the Premier while Kissinger was in the Chinese capital. Zhou did however 
hold talks with Sihanouk, Penn Nouth and Ieng Sary the day after Kissinger's 
departure, as well as with Hanoi and the P.R.O. And despite the Prince's 
grandstanding, in whichever form Zhou conveyed the essence of his discussions with 
Kissinger to Sihanouk 'in his own words', it grabbed Sihanouk's interest - for 
around this time the Prince officially proposed on behalf of GRUNK and FUNK 
"that he might have without any preconditions, some contact with the U.S. side, to 
study together a solution to the problem of Cambodia." While rejecting talks for a 
ceasefire, he announced he was willing to discuss "the question of ending U.S. 
interference in Cambodia", essentially aping the tactics of the D.R.V. in 1968.18 If 
the U.S. agreed to ditch Lon Nol and enter into talks with Sihanouk, the door to 
. . 29 
negOtIatIOn was open. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (London: Phoenix Press, 1982), p.343. 
26 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 17, 1973, DNSA/KT00675. 
27 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 18, 1973, DNSAI KT00678. 
28 'Wire story - NCNA Reports Sihanouk Press Conference on Inspection Tour', 16 April 1973. 
Folder 18/Box 04/DPC Unit IS/TVA-TTU. 
29 P.R.C. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp.662-5. 
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Similarly, there seems to have been a fairly rapid evolution in Chinese 
thinking over this period. The previous October Zhou had asked Le Thanh Nghi to 
encourage the Khmer comrades to take advantage of any possibility for talks. In a 
rather curious request for intervention, the Chinese Premier had asked the 
Vietnamese to encourage the Khmers to negotiate, because China was worried about 
losing influence there ifit did so. "We are not in a position to do so because we have 
talked with them a lot about fighting and encouraged them to fight. We suggest the 
Vietnamese Workers' Party find a suitable moment to tell them.,,30 In early February 
Zhou was still concerned that the resolution of the situation in Cambodia be kept 
separate from the Vietnam issue, and that Beijing, not Hanoi, be the arbiter. As a 
result he was reticent to convey a conciliatory message to Penn Nouth. During 
discussions the Chinese Premier implicitly emphasised the importance of the military 
struggle while attending a mass rally to celebrate the signing of the Paris Accords. 
Conveying Mao's verdict on the agreements to the Cambodian Prime Minister-in-
exile, he emphasized that "At this point the United States made concessions. If there 
had not been victories on the battlefield, there would not have been gains at the 
negotiation table.,,31 Such advice was unlikely to encourage the Khmer comrades 
into compromise until the balance of forces had tilted in their favour. Yet barel y two 
weeks later, Zhou was telling Kissinger that a coalition government was desirable in 
Phnom Penh. "Because it is impossible for Cambodia to become completely red 
now. If that were attempted, it would result in even greater problems.,,32 Until he 
was certain of success and the centrality of a role for China, Zhou did not want to 
risk alienating the Cambodian resistance.33 
What Zhou meant by the 'problematic' nature of attempting to attain a 'red 
Cambodia' was that continued fighting in Cambodia to attain a complete victory 
would create an even more complicated situation, one in which the American 
bombing of Cambodia would continue and Nixon would still be distracted by his 
30 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Le Thanh Nghi, October 8-10, 1973,77 Conversations, p.190. 
See ch.4, fn.96 for comments on the date of this conversation. 
31 P.R.e. For. Min., Zhou waijiao huodong, pp.662-5. 
32 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et a1., February, 18, 1973, DNSA/KT00678, 
33 Memcons, Zhou, Kissinger et a1., February 17, 18, 1973, DNSA/KT00675, KT00678; Kissinger, 
Years o/Upheaval. p.343. 
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continued travails in Indochina from dealing with the Soviet Union elsewhere in the 
world. Furthermore, China's influence on the outcome in Cambodia would be 
greatly reduced by any formula that removed Sihanouk, and there existed every 
possibility that the Khmer Rouge would cast him aside when his usefulness had 
expired (as Sihanouk publicly admitted in a newspaper interview). Finally, in early 
1973 the full extent and extremes of the platform of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea were probably still not well known. Over the previous two years 'Viet 
Khmers' had been returning from Hanoi to take part in the Cambodian revolution. 
Their influence on the future direction of the c.P.K. 's own revolution was still 
unclear; furthermore as the prospect of power grew closer tension between the 
'returnees' and the Pol Pot faction were likely to intensify. All in all, it was not an 
auspicious time for the GRUNK to carryon their war in the face of the power of the 
USAF. As Zhou explained to Kissinger, "So if we wish to see Southeast Asia 
develop along the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security 
system, then Cambodia would be an exemplar country.,,34 
In late February, less than a week after Kissinger left the Chinese capital and 
after having consulted with GRUNK leaders and the Vietnamese comrades, Zhou 
confirmed the intentions of the Chinese government in a note sent to the Americans 
concerning the upcoming international Paris conference on Vietnam. Its first point 
was that "The Chinese side fully agrees to the provisions regarding Cambodia and 
Laos in Article 20, Chapter VII,' of the Paris Agreement." These provisions called 
for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from these two countries, a point that 
would later be further emphasized by Zhou in discussions with the head of the U.S. 
Liaison Office in Beijing, David Bruce. The February note welcomed the agreement 
on a ceasefire in Laos, but restated China's opposition to the Paris conference 
discussing Laos and Cambodia: Vietnam was to be the sole topic. Zhou's fear was 
that an agreement on Cambodia would be reached in an international conference at 
which both the Soviets and Vietnamese played a major role - clearly he much 
preferred a deal in which China was the main broker. To be sure that the message 
had been understood, referring to the ongoing discussions in Paris between Kissinger 
34 Memcon, Zhou, Kissinger et aI., February 18, 1973, DNSA/KT00678. 
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and Le Duc Tho on a joint communique on implementing the agreement, in his 
inaugural discussions with David Bruce the Chinese Premier insisted that the 
question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. Zhou was making clear that he 
was the only person that could deliver Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.35 
Attempts at resolution of the Cambodian issue stalled during March, as Zhou 
was forced to take two weeks' leave to undergo treatment for his cancer and 
Sihanouk disappeared off into the Cambodian jungles to visit the 'liberated' areas. 
Upon his return in early April, at a grand state banquet to mark the occasion hosted 
by Zhou Enlai, the feisty prince triumphantly showed film footage of his visit to 
Cambodia. During his speech to mark the occasion he defiantly rejected both 
ceasefire and compromise: "If the U.S.A. does not stop its interference in Cambodia 
we will go on fighting." However, he publicly reaffirmed his February offer of talks 
with the U.S. (which had already been repeated by Xinhua on March 23rd ) thcreby 
not ruling out the possibility of a negotiated settlement. As Zhou reaffirmed the 
support of the Chinese government for Sihanouk as Cambodian head-of-state, and 
condemned the American "wanton bombing" of his country, listcning in the 
audience were many of the top leadership of the P.R.C., including several of the 
numerous Vice-Premiers. Among them, one name stood out: Deng Xiaoping, who 
had been officially rehabilitated by the Politburo less than two weeks previously and 
who was on his first public outing since then. It was an event that would have long-
term implications for China and its relations with Vietnam.36 
Four days later, Kissinger met with Huang Hua in New York, a few days 
after the American side had passed on a note expressing "extreme disappointment" at 
Zhou's remarks during the banquet for Prince Sihanouk. Contrary to his claims in 
his memoirs, it was Kissinger himself who made the running during the meeting with 
35 Note, untitled, February 24th, 1973, NPMP/NSC/HAK Office Files/94/2; memcon, Huang Hlia. 
Kissinger et aI., May 27, 1973, DNSA/KT00739. 
36 C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, pp.583-6; Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, pp.578, 580; 'Wire 
story - NCNA Reports Sihanouk Press Conference on Inspection Tour', 16 April 1973, Folder 
18IBox 04/DPC Unit 15ITVA-TTU; Donald Kirk, 'Cambodia 1973: Year of the "Bomb Halt' .. , Asian 
Survey, vol. 14. no. 1 (Jan. 1974), p.96; Tie Ji, 'Deng Xiaoping de "fuchu'" [The Re-cmcrgcnce of 
Deng Xiaoping] in An Jianshe, ed., Wannian de Zhou En/ai [Zhou Enlai in his Later Years] (Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian, 2003), p.337; 'Peking rehabilitates deposed leader', The Times, April 12, 1973; 
Lian Zhengbao, Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegllo waijiao dashi}i, vol. 4, p.75; C.D.R.O., Mao Z .. dong 
zizllan, p.1653. 
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regard to Cambodia. The American National Security Adviser proactively offered to 
give up Lon Nol, not in response to Huang Hua's condemnation of American policy 
and support for the Phnom Penh government but to pre-empt it, tel1ing Huang that 
"Our objective in Southeast Asia seeins to us not totally dissimilar from yours." By 
this, of course, he meant excluding Soviet influence.37 
In his reply, and speaking in a "personal capacity", Huang Hua reminded 
Kissinger that "the Chinese position is consistent and has been made public ... Last 
February Premier Zhou Enlai again advised the US side not to intervene in 
Cambodian internal affairs any longer so that the Cambodian people could resolve 
the problem by themselves." He also subtly emphasized the independence of the 
Khmer Rouge from the Vietnamese by reminding the American National Security 
Adviser that "the Cambodian People's Liberation Forces are fighting absolutely 
alone without the aid of the North Vietnamese troops or of the South Vietnamcsc 
National Liberation Forces." He condemned U.S. policy in Cambodia by noting that 
Sihanouk was ready to negotiate with the U.s. side, but "[T]he U.S. side has not only 
refused to negotiate, but has intensified the bombing of Cambodia... [I]t will only 
hamper the solution of the Cambodian question, and at the same time will affect 
adversely Sino-US relations." However, as Kissinger later noted, Huang Hua's 
condemnation was "aimed at an individual and not a structure ... [It] left open the 
prospect discussed in Beijing in February of including other elements of the Phnom 
Penh government in a coalition without their present chief." It was a prospect 
Kissinger was not going to pass Up.38 
Kissinger's flexibility on the issue of the leadership in Phnom Penh did not 
stem, in the main, from a desire to keep the Soviets out of Cambodia, whatever he 
told Zhou Enlai. If there was one thing that historically united France, Vietnam, and 
America, it was a casual disregard for the fate of Laos and Cambodia when 
compared to the larger strategic prize of southern Vietnam. In this light, the growing 
sense of urgency with which Kissinger was addressing the problem of Cambodia was 
largely fuelled by a report he received from General Alexander Haig's tour of 
37 Memcon, Huang Hua, Kissinger, Bruce et aI., April 16. 1973, NPMP/NSC/HAK Office Filcs/94/3. 
38 Ibid.; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.350. 
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Southeast Asia in early 1973. Haig reported that "Under Hanoi's hegemony 
Cambodia disrupts the basic security premises upon which the Paris Accords were 
accepted. The uncovering of South Vietnam's entire western flank ... would pose a 
real and psychological threat to the Thieu government which it could not withstand." 
This "must lead inevitably to the near term collapse of South Vietnam with all the 
political, psychological and strategic implications that such a collapse forebodes." 
Most worryingly of all, Haig stated: "Without an immediate broadening of the 
current regime in the Khmer Republic, the viability of the government and the armed 
forces must be limited to 3 to 6 months". To most of the leading actors, with the 
possible notable exception of Pol Pot, the prospect of some degree of co-operation 
between the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists seemed likely, if not assured. 
With this in mind, it was little wonder that Kissinger was so eager to discuss a 
formula for getting Sihanouk in place and potentially forestalling the fall of - not 
Cambodia - South Vietnam. 39 
Eager for progress, Kissinger pursued this theme in a written message passed 
to Zhou on April 24th, where he expressed the willingness of the United States to 
contemplate "a settlement which includes all political forces, including those of 
Prince Sihanouk." He hoped that the Chinese would follow up the matter with David 
Bruce when he arrived in Beijing, which Zhou duly did. The Chinese Premier 
confirmed that the United States and China both sought a Cambodia that would be 
"more peaceful, neutral, and independent than ever before.,,4o This clearly precluded 
Vietnamese control, and even in the short-term a total Khmer Rouge victory. 
Encouraged by Zhou's words, but growing impatient and increasingly concerned 
about the prospects for Cambodia, Kissinger decided to back down on the U.S. 
refusal to talk to Sihanouk and made a formal proposal to the Chinese. His hand was 
being forced; three days before David Bruce met with Zhou Enlai, the House of 
Representatives, in its first ever vote to restrict military operations in Southeast Asia, 
39 Memo for: Henry Kissinger, from: General A. M. Haig, April II, 1973, DNSA/KT 01240. 
40 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.351. 
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had voted for an amendment to prevent funds from an appropriations Bill being used 
to bomb Cambodia.41 In a meeting with Huang Hua in New York he told Huang that: 
We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw 
the very small advisory group we have there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon 
Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States. In return we would like a 
cease-fire - if necessary, say for ninety days - a negotiation between the Sihanouk 
group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on 
in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador 
Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking ... But it is a process that has to be extended over 
some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into account our 
own necessities.42 
In return, Huang Hua had a message for Kissinger from Zhou. It reiterated Zhou's 
message to Bruce, re-emphasizing the Chinese Premier's personal involvement, that 
"the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. It is imperative that the two 
sides [North Vietnam and the United States] respect the sovereignty of Cambodia." 
This message also emphasized that not only Sihanouk, but also "the resistance forces 
at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side." Zhou's goals were 
clear: a North Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, an end to American bombing 
and a coalition government with Sihanouk at its head. This was to be the first 
concrete test of Sino-American co-operation; in exchange for Kissinger ending the 
bombing and agreeing to the removal of Lon Nol from the scene, Zhou would bring 
Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge into the coalition. Once achieved, they could 
achieve their mutual goal: the withdrawal of North Vietnam from Cambodia.43 
China responded speedily to Kissinger's May 27th proposal. On the 
afternoon of June 4th, the National Security Adviser hosted Huang Zhen in his White 
House office. 44 Huang, who had jus~ taken his place as the head of the P.R.C. 
Liaison Office in Washington D.C., had two messages for Kissinger: the first noted 
that "President Nixon's desire to visit China again. Chairman Mao welcomes 
41 Robert Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp.l88-9. 
42 Memcon, Huang Hua, Kissinger, et a!., May 27, 1973, DNSA/KT00739; Kissinger, Years 0/ 
Upheaval, p.351-2. 
43 Memcon, Huang Hua, Kissinger, et aI., May 27, 1973, DNSA/KT00739; Kissinger, Years 0/ 
Upheaval, p.351-2. 
44 In his memoirs Kissinger recalled this meeting as being between himself and Huang Hua in New 
York. See Years o/Upheaval, p.352 
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President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate time." The second message was of 
more substance and significance. It confirmed that the basic Chinese stance was that 
which had been outlined by Zhou in his discussions with David Bruce, and 
emphasised "respect [for] Cambodia's sovereignty." Zhou asserted that while China 
would convey to Sihanouk Kissinger's general analysis, Beijing would not negotiate 
on his behalf and Washington would have to conduct direct talks with the prince. As 
an indication of the seriousness with which Zhou was taking the American initiative, 
the message took the unprecedented step of repeating verbatim "the U.S. tentative 
thinking", requesting that "If there are any inaccuracies in the above, it is expected 
that the U.S. side will provide corrections.45 
As Kissinger correctly observed, this was an unmistakable sign that Zhou 
was personally engaging himself in the resolution of the Cambodian issue on the 
basis of Kissinger's proposal. Likewise, "he would not act as an intermediary unless 
he expected to succeed.,,46 The message was delivered on the day that Le Duan and 
Pham Van Dong arrived in Beijing for an official visit; this served to emphasize that 
Zhou would be working both sides of the equation to ensure that all parties 
concerned should 'respect Cambodia's sovereignty'. Nonetheless, Zhou clearly 
believed that he could deliver Sihanouk, a ceasefire and eventually a coalition 
government in return for America ditching Lon Nol, direct talks with the Prince and 
a cessation of bombing. In fact, the Premier of the P.R.C. was staking his personal 
. . 47 prestige on It. 
The collapse of the plan 
The situation in Cambodia was unclear and uncertain, for Mao and Zhou as much as 
Nixon and Kissinger. The Americans believed that Hanoi was pulling at least some 
of the strings of the Khmer Rouge, and that a victory for Saloth Sar (though 
Washington was only beginning to become familiar with that name) would mean 
45 Memcon, Huang Zhen, Kissinger, et aI., June 4, 1973, DNSAIKT00745; Kissinger, Years of 
Upheaval, p.352. 
46 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp.352-3. 
47 P.R.C. For. Min, Zhou waijiao huodong, p.674; C.D.R.O., Zhou Enlai nianpu, pp.597-8. 
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doom for South Vietnam. Beijing was obviously much more aware that the 
Vietnamese were not in control of the situation in Cambodia, and the Chinese had 
banked large assets through the careful cultivation of Sihanouk, but the future 
direction of C.P.K. policy was impossible to tell. It was as yet too early to gauge the 
impact of the Cambodian communist 'returnees' - Khmer cadres from the Viet Minh 
days who had regrouped to Hanoi - who were now returning to their homeland in the 
wake of the Paris Accords. Likewise, it was probably in Hanoi's calculations that 
these returning Khmer communists, who accepted Vietnam's lead role in the 
Indochinese revolution, would find it easier to make their voice heard in a peaceful 
environment rather than in a war-zone. So despite their differing perceptions, as Le 
Duc Tho told Ieng Sary, "China, Vietnam, and the United States all want to solve the 
Cambodian problem soon." Unfortunately none of them was in a position to solve it 
without the acquiescence of a narcissistic Cambodian Prince, and a secretive and 
xenophobic Khmer communist; not for the first time, the vicissitudes of Cambodian 
politics would test Zhou Enlai's diplomatic skills to the limit.48 
For all Zhou and Kissinger's careful choreography, nothing could happen 
without the danseur noble, the elusive Prince Sihanouk. The Prince, basking in the 
glory' of his trip to the 'liberated areas' of his homeland had set off on an 
international tour, with the aim of cultivating votes in support of a GRUNK 
challenge for Cambodia's United Nations seat at the annual session of the U.N. 
general assembly in the autumn. The process was ostensibly paralyzed without him, 
and it is likely Zhou dared not attempt to communicate such important matters to 
him while he was thousands of miles away and, more dangerously, within the earshot 
of dozens of international journalists and beyond the natural limits imposed by his 
residence in the Chinese capital. 49 Zhou may have been grateful for the respite, 
nonetheless, as he awaited the results of Kissinger's negotiations in Paris with Le 
Duc Tho on the full implementation of the Paris Accords; article 20, calling for the 
48 'Excerpts from some minutes of the meetings between Ieng Sary, a representative ofthe Cambodian 
Communist Party's Central Committee, and several leaders of our Party's Central Committee'. I am 
very grateful to Christopher Goscha for supplying me with this translated document. 
49 The Chinese infonned Kissinger that Sihanouk had not been infonned of his offer by the time he 
returned to Beijing on July 5th • Memcon, Huang Zhen, Kissinger et aI., July 6, 1973, DNSA/KT00769. 
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removal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and Laos, was of particular interest to 
the Chinese Premier. 
While in Paris, aside from once again engaging in frustrating negotiations 
with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger took the time to call on the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji 
Pengfei, who was visiting the u.K. and France at the time. Kissinger's eagerness t~ 
implement the steps he had outlined to the Chinese was evident, and he urged Ji to 
act upon them. The Foreign Minister pointed out, however, that "There is only one 
problem, that Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is not now in China and it is difficult to 
contact him." Kissinger's impatience was growing, fuelled by his awareness that the 
passing of the Case-Church amendment in the Senate (which would cut off all funds 
for military operations in Indochina) meant that the window of opportunity to close a 
deal in Cambodia was rapidly shutting. He enquired if Ji knew when the volatile 
Prince would return to China. "He was supposed to be back by the end of June" 
laughed the Foreign Minister, "But you know his temper, and he likes to add 
countries when he is happy." "Maybe we should depress him!" interjected Kissinger, 
only half-joking. 50 
Kissinger also refrained from sharing with the Chinese Foreign Minister the 
details of the secret understandings on, Cambodia he had reached with Le Duc Tho 
during the course of their discussions in Paris, preferring to wait until the next day to 
share them with the approved channel for such communications - Huang Zhen. The 
reticence is not surprising, nonetheless, as so secret were the understandings that the 
American National Security Adviser had refused to share them with Lon Nol's 
personal adviser, or the Cambodian President's special representative to the 
International Conference on Vietnam, with whom he had met a few hours after his 
conversations with Ji Pengfei. Kissinger told his Cambodian visitors that "What we 
really want to tell you is that the phrase in the Communique is not the whole story". 
Despite everything he remained hopeful "based on my conversation with the 
Chinese ... We must await the return of Sihanouk to Peking. But after that, there will 
,,51 be some progress. 
so Memcon, Ji Pengfei, Kissinger et aI., June 13, 1973, DNSAIKT00752, 
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Time pressures created by the Congress notwithstanding, Kissinger had 
reason to feel somewhat optimistic. Zhou Enlai was committed to delivering talks 
among the Cambodian parties if Kissinger agreed to meet with Sihanouk, and in the 
three secret protocols agreed to in Paris, Le Duc Tho had committed Hanoi to 
reaffirming Article 20 of the Paris Agreement. Specifically Tho had affirmed that 
"foreign troops, military advisers, and military personnel shall be withdrawn as 
required by Article 20 (b) of the Agreement." Furthermore, Tho had promised that 
the D.R.V. would, along with the United States, "exert their best efforts to bring 
about a peaceful settlement in Cambodia.',s2 Despite Kissinger's belief to the 
contrary - what he later categorized as "North Vietnam's imperial ambitions" -
Hanoi was in fact interested in achieving a settlement in Cambodia - even if on a 
temporary basis.s3 Tho himself had urged Sihanouk's Khmer Rouge 'minder' Jeng 
Sary just four days after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords to "'consider the next 
step; you must take the initiative; maybe they will meet your demands, maybe they 
will not. But if we prepare to step forward, we will have more initiative ... ' and he 
asked Jeng Sary: 'why do you still hesitate in your country?",54 Sensing that the 
Cambodian comrades were preparing to dig their heels in, two weeks later Tho 
proposed that Pol Pot come to Hanoi for discussions on the issue. "It will be better if 
Brother Hai [Pol Pot] discusses with both us and the Chinese comrades the situation: 
the fighting, the solution and also the experiences of diplomatic fighting. Among 
Cambodia, Vietnam and China, we should be of the same mind about how to fight 
and how to negotiate in Cambodia in order to push America down." Pol Pot 
declined Tho's invitation; contrary to Kissinger's belief, Pol Pot and his Khmer 
Rouge were the puppets of neither Hanoi nor Beijing, and were determined to pursue 
their own chosen course. However, what Zhou Enlai and China could deliver to the 
Cambodians, and which the Vietnamese could not, was an American bombing halt; 
52 Memcon, Kissinger, Le Duc Tho et aI., June 13, 1973, DNSA/KT00753. 
53 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.332. 
54 'Excerpts from some minutes of the meetings between Ieng Sary, a representative of the Cambodian 
Communist Party's Central Committee, and several leaders of our Party's Central Committee'. 
Translated copy in author's possession thanks to Christopher Goscha. 
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whatever his misappraisal of the influence accorded by Vietnamese forces in 
Cambodia, on this Kissinger was correct.55 
"We can't reiterate enough that the key element in Indochina is now 
Cambodia, and everything else will be easy once that is settled" Kissinger told 
Huang Zhen back in Washington on June 14th. While perhaps rather over-optimistic 
that "everything else will be easy", Kissinger was correct that Cambodia was now 
key. Nixon's position was weakening by the day as a result of Watergate, and the 
threat of U.S. military action to uphold the Paris Agreement becoming less credible. 
The only cards that Nixon and Kissinger held were those of Cambodia and 
reconstruction aid for the D.R.V., and they were a pair: Kissinger needed Congress 
to at least hold out the possibility of aid for Hanoi in order to secure a Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia; at the same time, successful implementation of article 
20 of the Paris Agreement held out the possibility of dollar-induced leverage over 
Hanoi. Without the pair, Kissinger and Nixon held nothing, and their bluff would 
surely be called; such a situation would cause Beijing to have to reappraise the 
P.R.C.'s whole Indochinese strategy. But for a period Kissinger seemed to have 
overcome this challenge. He was "on the homestretch" to a cease-fire and 
Sihanouk's return, just a few steps away from salvaging the situation in Phnom Penh 
and securing an extra prop under Thieu's western flank at a time when Watergate 
was causing others to wobble. 56 
Aside from Sihanouk's travel plans, the other factor that had the potential to 
disrupt Zhou and Kissinger's plan was the U.S. Congress. On May 31 S\ by a 
majority of 69 to 19, the Senate had approved the Eagleton amendment, a measure 
far stricter than that which had been approved by the House of Representatives two 
weeks earlier. Sen. Eagleton's measure proposed to cut off all funds '''heretofore' 
used to support military action 'in, over or from the shores of Cambodia or Laos.,,57 
Unsurprisingly, Nixon vetoed the bill, but Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, 
promised to attach the Eagleton amendment to every bill that came before the Senate 
55 Ibid. 
S6 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.355. 
57 'U.S. Senate cuts off White House funds for continuation of bombing in Cambodia and Laos', The 
Times, May 31, 1973. 
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until Nixon was forced to sign it into law. Kissinger made a bid for time on two 
fronts: he appealed to Nixon's Counsellor for Domestic Affairs to try and make an 
arrangement with the leadership of the House of Representatives to hold up the 
offending amendments in order to allow his Cambodian plans to proceed. To 
provide further impetus on the Chinese side, on June 19th Kissinger committed 
himself to meet with Sihanouk during his planned visit to Beijing in early August -
not just meetings between their respective representatives - if a ceasefire were in 
place by the time of his arrival. The prospect would surely be very tempting for the 
Cambodia's exiled leader.58 
For a period at the end of June, despite the increasing pressure coming from 
Congress, pronouncements from the Prince indicated that there was still hope of a 
deal. Speaking in Bucharest on June 22nd, the GRUNK leader announced that his 
"government" (of which the Khmer Rouge was a part) had "formally proposed to the 
U.S. government to hold bilateral negotiations in the pattern of the 'Washington-
Hanoi' talks with a view to putting an honourable end to the present war in 
Cambodia, with no victor or loser." Nixon, continued the Prince, "refused 
categorically and definitively our proposal by repeating that we should negotiate 
with the clique of the puppet and traitor Lon Nol". The solution was simple, he 
added. "This problem will be solved and peace will return to Cambodia ... once the 
United States stops giving military aid and air protection to the puppet Lon Nol 
regime." While resolute, Sihanouk's position was not irreconcilable with that which 
Kissinger was putting forward; though he did not know it yet, his demand for direct 
meetings had been acceded to, subject to a ceasefire. The issue left at stake was the 
Indochinese version of the 'chicken and the egg question': the sequencing of the 
talks and the bombing haltlceasefire. While there was still room for hope, nothing 
could yet be settled until Sihanouk returned to the Chinese capital. Unfortunately for 
Zhou and Kissinger, this left the U.S. Congress with an extra few weeks to settle 
definitively the vexed issue of which came first. 59 
S8 Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, p.189; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p.359; memcon, 
Kissinger, Huang Zhen, June 19, 1973, DNSA/KT00760. 
59 'Wire story. NCNA Reports Sihanouk's Activities in Albania', 26 June 1973, Folder 02/Box 
OS/OPC Unit lSITVA·TTU. 
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By the time Sihanouk returned to Beijing the issue had been resolved. Nixon 
was beset by scandals on several fronts: allegations were being made that he "may 
have fiddled his house purchases, his Government-paid improvements, his income 
tax and even his rate assessments." On June 25 th, former White House counsel John 
Dean began his testimony before the Senate inquiry into the Watergate scandal and 
directly implicated the President. As The Times noted "Failing clear substantiation 
of the charges of criminal action against the President. .. it looks as if Mr. Nixon 
risks being, in Mr. Stewart Alsop's cruel phrase, 'a paraplegic President'''. And if 
that wasn't enough to make Nixon feel sick, BREAKFAST, LUNCH, and DINNER 
were coming back to bother the President. Senator Howard Hughes's investigation 
into the 1969 secret bombings of Cambodia were revealing an organised campaign 
of deception, including the falsification of bombing co-ordinates, designed to keep 
from Congress the actions being undertaken by the U.S. Air Force. To many 
members of Congress, legislating a cessation of the bombing of Cambodia was no 
longer merely about ending what Kissinger described as "bombing the bejesus" out 
of the Khmer Republic; the issue was now totemic "for the balance of power 
between the Congress and the President - as well as for its effects in cutting off 
bombing raids in Cambodia." Realising that he held no cards, the expert poker 
player Nixon folded and agreed a cut-off date of August 15th • 60 
In his efforts to persuade Congress that an end to the bombing was an unwise 
move and one that undermined the diplomacy of the administration, Kissinger had 
been forced to hint at what was in the offing under Zhou's auspices. Likewise, State 
Department officials, perhaps overly confident of success, had conducted a little too 
much of the 'briefing' that Chairman Mao had warned Nixon about the previous year, 
and highlighted the anticipated role of China. 61 Furthermore, articles appeared 
explicitly linking Kissinger's planned August visit to Beijing with a negotiated 
settlement in Phnom Penh; at the same time, however, denials were issued that 
Kissinger would be meeting with Sihanouk. This time Kissinger had over-played his 
60 'Watergate fall-out is weakening whole areas of policy making in Mr. Nixon's seventh crisis', The 
Times, July 5th , 1973; Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, pp.l88-9; 'Rogers: Compromise on 
Bombing', 30 June 1973, Folder 07/Box 27/DPC Unit OIITVA-TTU. . 
61 'Chinese Prime Minister to visit United Nations in October and hold meeting with Mr. Nixon', The 
Times, July 5,1973; 'The U.S. Turns to the Prince', Time, July 16,1973. 
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hand. A few days before Sihanouk returned to Beijing, Zhou transmitted a message 
for Huang Zhen to deliver to the White House. It complained about the stories 
appearing in the press that had "enraged [Sihanouk] all the more." Charitably, 
Beijing put the blame for the circulating stories on the "Lon Nol clique ... spreading 
the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with 
the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the 
Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens ... The Chinese side is of the view that 
such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the 
Cambodian question and will even cause trouble." 62 When Sihanouk touched down 
in Beijing, trouble indeed it had caused. 
On arrival, Sihanouk announced that it "is useless to talk to Kissinger. There 
is no time for talk. Now it is too late. We will continue our armed struggle.,,63 The 
Prince announced his fear that along with Lon Nol, he too was to be cut out of the 
agreement. It appears he had gotten wind of the press speculation just before he left 
Bucharest to return to China. Mentioning his Chinese hosts in unusually negative 
terms, he announced that "Neither Moscow nor Peking nor Paris have [sic] the right 
to settle our fate in secret.,,64 The next evening, July 6th , he spoke in Beijing, as 
defiant as ever. He made repeated references to the August 15th bombing cut-off, 
and was now concerned that the 'Nixon Doctrine' meant that the United States 
would simply transfer responsibility for the bombing of Cambodia to South Vietnam 
_ a prospect that had been raised by official spokesmen for the Saigon government. 
Anticipating the response that these actions would illicit from his Khmer Rouge 
allies in the 'interior', Sihanouk roundly condemned the "old fox" Nixon and his 
"genocide" against the Cambodian people in whose name the Prince significantly 
denounced "the hypocrisy of the U.S. Government which claims that 'negotiations 
are under way and yielding results' concerning the solution of the Cambodian 
62 Memcon, Huang Zhen, Kissinger et aI., July 6, 1973, DNSA/KT00769. 
63 'The U.S. Turns to the Prince', Time, July 16, 1973. 
64 'Sihanouk Will Never Accept Division of Cambodia', 06 July 1973, Folder 08/Box 27/DPC Unit 
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problem.,,65 Zhou and Kissinger's desired outcome in Phnom Penh, so recently 
almost within grasp, seemed to be slipping out ofreach.66 
In his own speech Zhou made no mention of the bombing halt; in fact, while 
offering the standard expression of "firmly support[ing] the just stand of the 
Cambodian people" Zhou significantly highlighted "Sihanouk'~ historic five-point 
declaration" as "the clear direction for a settlement of the Cambodian question." 
Furthermore, he pointed out that Sihanouk and the GRUNK "have again and again 
demanded that the United States immediately stop its bombing and military 
intervention in Cambodia.,,67 The clear implication from this was that now that this 
prospect was imminent, the Cambodian issue could indeed be settled on the basis of 
Sihanouk's March 23rd 1970 declaration - up until that point the declared basis for a 
settlement. By contrast, Sihanouk did not even make reference to this "historic" 
statement in his reply; rather he laid out three demands "which constitute and will 
constitute unalterably the only solution of the Cambodian problem: 
-First, complete and final cessation of all military (air and other) interventions by 
the U.S.A., its satellites in Bangkok and Saigon and other hostile countries. 
-Second, complete elimination of the traitorous, illegal, anti-national, anti-
popular, fascist and utterly corrupt "Khmer Republic". 
-Third, total, unconditional and irreversible withdrawal of all U.S. and pro-U.S. 
military personnel and all non-Cambodian personnel serving U.S. imperialism-neo-
colonialism from Khmer territory.,,68 
In a similarly defiant vein, he made a call for "arms and particularly 
ammunition, again ammunition and always ammunition ... so as to help them prevent 
the extermination of the Khmer country and people and regain national 
independence." By contrast he again reiterated that China was "our No 1 
supporter".69 Through these comments he was clearly taking aim at North Vietnam 
who had been reducing their arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge since the signing 
65 'Wire story - Text ofSihanouk Speech at Banquet Given by Chou En-Iai', 09 July 1973, Folder 
03/Box OSIDPC Unit IS/TV A-ITU. 
66 'Constitutional crisis in U.S. over Nixon veto of bombing ban', The Times, June 27, 1973. 
67 'Wire story - Chou En-Iai Gives Banquet Congratulating Sihanouk', 9 July 1973, Folder 03/Box 
OS/DPC Unit IS/TVA-ITU. 
68 'Wire story - Text of Sihanouk Speech at Banquet Given by Chou En-Iai', 9 July 1973, Folder 
03/Box OSIDPC Unit IS/TVA-ITU; 
69 Ibid. 
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of the Paris Peace Accords. As Le Duan had told the Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi in 
April, "[O]ur support and help to the Cambodian friends is decreasing and its scale is 
now insignificant.,,7o It is unclear to what extent Sihanouk was acting on his own 
initiative in an effort to get out ahead of what he anticipated to be the Khmer Rouge 
response, or whether he was acting under pressure from the 'interior'. If it was a 
case of Sihanouk predicting which way the political wind was going to blow it was a 
good judgement: at some point in July at a C.P.K. Central Committee meeting Pol 
Pot declared that there would be absolutely no negotiations.7! 
While at this point Zhou had clearly not given up hope of being able to 
arrange a negotiation, he was manifestly annoyed at the tum of events in Washinbrton 
and the Congress-imposed bombing halt. Earlier in the day he had met a 
congressional delegation led by Senator Warren Magnuson, during which Sen. 
Magnuson had discussed, at length, the situation in Cambodia and the role of 
Congress in forcing Nixon to end the bombing. While Zhou had offered the standard 
Chinese condemnation of U.S. actions in Cambodia, Magnuson - a 'dove' on 
Vietnam who had voted for both the Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield 
amendments - had "stressed the role of Congress in cutting off the bombing and 
repeatedly urged Zhou to 'Be patient. It'll be over soon.'" According to David 
Bruce, "Zhou had been visibly angered by Magnuson's attempt to engage him with 
the Congress against the President." 72 The timing of the collapse was most 
inopportune for the Chinese Premier. 
As the c.c.P. prepared for its Tenth Party Congress (called a year 
prematurely in order to exorcise the ghost of Lin Biao, whose inscription into the 
party constitution at the Ninth Congress in 1969 still haunted Mao) differences began 
to emerge between the Party Chairman and the face of Chinese diplomacy the very 
day Sihanouk arrived back in China. Mao began criticizing his Premier's poor 
understanding of the international situation, complaining to Wang Hongwen and 
Zhang Chunqiao, two of the members of the 'Gang of Four', that the Foreign 
70 Short, Pol Pot, p.250. 
71 Dmitry Mosyakov, 'The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: History of their Relations 
as Told in the Soviet Archives', Searchingfor the Truth, number 19, July 2001, p.38. 
72 Memcon, Kissinger, Scowcroft et aI., July 19, 1973, DNSA/KT00778; Kissinger, Years of 
Upheaval, pp.363, 368. 
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Ministry (operating under Zhou's aegis) "doesn't discuss important matters, while 
daily reporting trivial issues; if this shift is not changed they will inevitably engage 
in revisionism, and if they do it can't be said that I didn't predict it." In almost the 
same breath, he spoke of his disapproval of criticism of the first Qin Emperor, and 
his belief that both Lin Biao and the Guornindang were cut from the same cloth: they 
"esteemed Confucius and opposed the Legalists.,,73 Thus, even before Sihanouk had 
arrived in Beijing, Mao had planted the seeds of the 'Criticize Lin; Criticize 
Confucius' campaign that would lead to Zhou's eventual fall from grace at the end of 
the year.74 Jostling for position between 'radicals' and 'moderates' intensified in the 
lead up to the Congress, and by the end of the first week in July even its exact start 
date was as yet undetermined; it now appears likely that it was brought forward by 
some weeks. 75 It was almost certainly as a result of this and not, as Kissinger 
presumed, the failing proposals for Cambodia that Huang Zhen was called back to 
China at this time.76 Beijing requested a slight delay in the announcement of the date 
of Kissinger's visit until such times as Huang had arrived back in the Chinese capital. 
The soon-to-be nominated Secretary of State, however, took fright. He had leaked 
so much to the press about the expected August 6th visit and the anticipated results 
on Cambodia that a failure would deprive Nixon of a hoped-for foreign policy 
success at a time of great domestic difficulty, and closer to home might even give 
Nixon cause to reconsider moving Kissinger to take control of the State Department. 
His insolent response, as he later admitted, was "the defence of the weak.,,77 
He immediately dispatched his National Security deputy, Brent Scowcroft, to 
express Kissinger's "surprise" at the delay of the August trip announcement, and 
warned that as Kissinger was the "'sole architect' ofU.S.-P.R.C. normalization, ifhe 
is embarrassed over the Cambodia issue it could jeopardize the U.S.-P.R.C. 
reconciliation. What would HAK be able to bring back from Beijing regarding 
73 C.D.R.O., Mao Zedong zhuan, p.1656. 
74 C.D.R.O., ZIIOU Enlai nianpu, p.605. 
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Cambodia?" 78 Kissinger got his reply to what he could expect to bring back 
regarding Cambodia one week later, in the most stark of terms. On July 18th the 
Chinese delivered a note definitively terminating the proposed intervention; 
Sihanouk, and more likely Pol Pot, could not be delivered. "[T]he Chinese side 
holds that it is obviously inappropriate to communicate to Samdech Sihanouk the 
tentative thinking on the settlement of the Cambodian question as set forth by the 
U.S. side in late May. The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of this with 
fi kn ,,79 ran ess. 
Zhou had called time on the proposed intervention in Cambodia because 
Kissinger had made its successful realisation a prior condition to his arrival in 
Beijing in early August. To emphasize the point, the following day another message 
was delivered informing the National Security Adviser that the proposed visit date in 
early August was now "inconvenient". The Chinese would, however, welcome 
Kissinger on August 16th, the day a~ter the bombing halt came into force. There was 
little anger expressed in the note, however, unlike that of the previous day that had 
referred to Cambodia, where the Chinese had advised that "If the United States truly 
desires to settle the Cambodian question, the ... demands raised by the Cambodian 
side should be acceptable to it. It is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious 
consideration to this and translate it into action." The two issues were being 
divorced: Zhou could not deliver on Cambodia by August 6th ; however Kissinger 
was still welcome. As with Vietnam before it, Zhou was determined not to let 
Cambodia interfere with Sino-American relations.80 
It is clear though that Zhou's refusal to pass on Kissinger's May 2ih offer 
was in many respects as much an admission of China's own weakness in regards to 
Cambodia as it was an expression of frustration over the turn of events in both that 
country and the U.S. Zhou's inability to manipulate a scenario to the mutual benefit 
of both China and the United States was frustrating, but was by no means an 
irrevocable blow to the burgeoning partnership. For that reason the two separate 
78 Richard H. Solomon, 'U.S.-P.R.C. Negotiations. 1967-1984: an annotated chronology', December 
1985, DNSA/CH00757; Kissinger. Years oJUpheaval, pp.364. 
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Chinese messages had essentially separated the issues and vowed to move on 
irrespective of the failed initiative. In this manner and even at this late stage Zhou 
did not give up on the prospect of coming to some sort of negotiated settlement in 
Cambodia: as late as August, 16th, the day after the U.S. bombing of Cambodia 
ended and on which the Chinese had proposed Kissinger arrive in Beijing (serving as 
a subtle riposte to his 'insolence'), Zhou was in consultation with Ph am Van Dong 
opining that it would be "unwise" if "these chances [for negotiation] are not 
exploited."sl By this stage, however, the Khmer Rouge had forced Hanoi's hand. 
They had continued their assault on Phnom Penh throughout July and August, in the 
face of the most intense campaign of aerial bombardment the world had ever seen. 
By doing so, the K.R. had forced Hanoi to recommence their supply of Pol Pot's 
forces. In the latter half of 1973, in recognition of the implacability of the Khmer 
Rouge military assault, force majeure compelled Beijing, just as it had Hanoi, to 
throw its weight behind the forces of the C.P.K. and their search for an outright 
military victory in Cambodia.82 
Ultimately the situation in Cambodia developed in a way that neither China nor 
North Vietnam anticipated, and the manner in which it was misunderstood by all of 
Washington, Beijing, and Hanoi speaks of the unpredictability of the Khmer Rouge, 
their secrecy and the lack of control that either of their patrons held over them. Just 
as the Vietnamese tail had to a large extent wagged the Russian and Chinese dogs, 
the Khmer Rouge had managed to force both its major sponsors in Beijing and Hanoi 
to support their chosen course of action, despite the bigger nations' preferences. 
Beijing and Hanoi had been working towards the same goal in the first half of 1973 -
a negotiated settlement in Phnom Penh. Neither principal actor was in control of the 
situation however, and the combination of the cessation of u.S. bombing and the 
concomitant Khmer Rouge decision to eschew a negotiated settlement threw into 
confusion Beijing and Hanoi's strategies for a post-U.S. withdrawal Indochina. The 
removal of North Vietnamese forces to take part in the Easter Offensive, In 
81 Memcon (extract), Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, August 16, 1973 in West ad et aI., eds., 77 
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combination with the intense American bombing of Cambodia had created a boon 
opportunity for the Khmer Rouge that no-one had anticipated or was in a position to 
control. Ironically, both Hanoi and Beijing were left groping for levers of influence, 
but in reality neither had any effective means of control over Pol Pot and his 
followers, the outlines of whose brand of Khmer nativist radicalism was only 
beginning to become clear in the summer of 1973. The greatest irony is that, 
ultimately, both Hanoi and Beijing ended up backing the wrong horse. Mao and 
Zhou had anticipated that their best interests would be served by a coalition in 
Phnom Penh with Sihanouk as its fulcrum; Hanoi, though not averse to a political 
solution, anticipated that a strong Khmer Rouge presence in Cambodia would help 
keep the pressure on Nguyen Van Thieu. Nixon and Kissinger, and most outside 
observers shared this view, but Pol Pot would throw the conventional wisdom on its 
head. 
The unheralded rise of the Khmer Rouge as an independent force in 
Indochina would prove to be a decisive factor that turned a fractious alliance 
between Beijing and Hanoi into one of hostility and ultimately conflict. When the 
Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975, their anti-Vietnamese proclivities forced China 
into making a choice between backing them or accepting an alternative regime that 
by its very definition would listen more sympathetically to the ear of a Hanoi now in 
control of all of Vietnam. Moreover, Pol Pot's victory, when it came, coincided with 
the second rise of Deng Xiaoping, a Chinese leader who had given short slu-ift to 
Vietnamese pretensions a decade earlier, and who in 1979 would demonstrate to 
Hanoi a brutal form of Chinese pedagogy. In the middle of 1973, however, the 
prospect for direct armed conflict between Hanoi and Beijing, and particularly 
between the two fraternal communist parties, in less than six years could barely have 
seemed real. And while the summer of 1973 was by no means the peak of the 
relationship between the two, it was much improved on two years previously when 
Zhou had had to explain to the Vietnamese cOnU'ades Nixon's planned visit to the 
People's Republic of China. In the immediate aftermath of the Paris Accords 
agreement and co-operation defined Sino-Vietnamese relations; both parties were 
actively working towards a resolution of the Cambodian problem, while Chinese aid 
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continued to pour into North Vietnam. To be sure, the relationship between these 
'comrades plus brothers' had had its peaks and troughs over twenty-five years, but 
the two sides had ridden it out together on the basis of intimacy and necessity. By 
the time of Ph am Van Dong's visit to Beijing in August 1973, China and North 
Vietnam appeared to have entered a period of relative stability, where a major source 
of mutual irritation had been eviscerated. This plateau was not to last however, and 
what's more, its end did not mark a return to the ups and downs of the previous eight 
years. The plateau of the summer of '73 would actually prove to be the edge of a 
dO\\-TIward slide that would lead to rock-bottom. 
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Conclusion 
The war had been the glue that had held the Sino-Vietnamese partnership together, 
papering over the degree to which China and North Vietnam's strategic priorities had 
diverged in the interim. The American withdrawal harshly exposed those differences. 
For Mao, the Vietnamese revolution had in the 1960s had represented the 
embodiment of his vision of the anti-imperialist struggle, carried out by a nation on 
China's periphery and with Chinese support. The Vietnam Workers' Party had 
charted its own path through the minefield of the Sino-Soviet split; and while it 
differed with Beijing on several important matters of ideology, both the c.c.P. and 
the V.W.P. were united on the touchstone issue of resistance to imperialism. Even 
after 1966, when Mao deliberately completely cast his party adrift from the rest of 
the communist world, the ability to make revolution still overcame differences that 
had driven wedges between the C.C.P. and other fraternal parties such as the 
Japanese and North Koreans'. Abroad, as at home, Mao believed that the process of 
making revolution would in itself demonstrate the perils of revisionism. On this 
point, just as with his dreams for the Cultural Revolution, he was badly mistaken. 
The irony is that by charting a course for the c.c.P. in the early 1960s 
independent from the Soviet Union and by firmly supporting Hanoi's struggle from 
mid-1962 onwards, Mao maintained the close relationship between his party and that 
of Ho Chi Minh that history and experience had forged. It was that same path in the 
1970s that drove a wedge between them. The Vietnamese had always charted an 
independent course in ideological affairs, at times differing with both China and the 
Soviet Union on particular issues; yet, the V.W.P. had always stressed the unity of 
the world communist movement. This emphasis on cohesion was not simply a 
device for maximizing material assistance for their nation from all the countries of 
the communist camp, but is indicative of the place that the Vietnamese comrades 
saw for their nation and revolution in the larger global arena. The Vietnamese 
revolution had been as much a repudiation of the China-oriented past that had proved 
so ineffective at arriving at modernity, as it was of French and American imperialism. 
Socialism offered the Vietnamese comrades the opportunity to step out from China's 
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shadow and take its place among a community of equals; and while it may not have 
been possible for Vietnam to effect its revolution had China not joined that 
community of socialist states, the history of the P.R.C. and the D.R.V. in the 1950s 
was one of renewal, of enjoying shared experiences and common'alities, but a 
repudiation of the past, and a celebration of socialist, fraternal equality. 
When the Sino-Soviet split occurred, the Vietnamese had come down on 
Beijing's side in reaction to Khrushchev's peaceful co-existence policies, which 
were anathema to the completion of their revolution. When the post-Khrushchev 
Soviet leadership began to provide support to their revolutionary struggle against the 
United States, Hanoi did not move to a more central position in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute; rather Moscow moved to align itself with the Vietnamese position. And 
while Mao's Cultural Revolution had caused irritation in the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship, it was a result of China's "over-enthusiasm" for revolution, rather than 
a departure from fraternal revolutionary solidarity. That changed after the summer 
of 1968. 
The origin of China's Vietnam policy was ultimately tied up with Mao's 
perception of himself and his vision of revolution, and China's position in the world 
in general and in East Asia in particular. The instinctively paternalistic attitude of 
many Chinese towards the states on their periphery was a trait that Mao struggled to 
shake off, despite his reinvention as a proletarian internationalist. For traditional 
China, and for Chairman Mao, Vietnam and Korea were part of China's 'cultural 
universe'; nations whose pasts and futures were tied to that of China on the basis of 
historical ties, and to whom China had obligations. The failure of socialism in either 
of these two countries, or even a permanent schism in Beijing's relations with them, 
would not just be a strategic disaster for China but also a moral failure of both Mao's 
project and China's leadership role. The P.R,C.'s efforts to defend the integrity of 
North Vietnam and its revolution reflected this, as well as the strategic imperatives 
for China's national security. 
The Vietnamese revolution also afforded Mao the opportunity to deal with a 
threat far more dangerous than an American military presence in Indochina: Soviet-
style revisionism, The victory of People's War in Indochina would demonstrate to a 
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skeptical world the applicability of the Chinese (Mao's) version of revolution. The 
inherent fear of nuclear war that ostensibly stood behind peaceful coexistence had to 
be shown to be mistaken, and pleasingly (or perhaps inevitably) the place where it 
had become possible to demonstrate that was in Vietnam, with whose Communist 
Party the C.C.P. had the most long-standing and intimate relationship. Indeed, it was 
as a result of that intimacy that Ho Chi Minh's war against the French had proved 
successful; simultaneously, however, it was the closeness of the Sino-Vietnamese 
alliance that had enabled Zhou and Mao, ironically fearing another (perhaps nuclear) 
war with the United States, to persuade Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong to accept 
the temporary partition of their country at the 1 i h parallel. With surprising candour 
Zhou Enlai spoke of China's national and his personal responsibility for being 
deceived in 1954; the defence of the revolution in South Vietnam, so imperiled in the 
years following the Geneva Accords, thus became an issue that transcended simple 
notions of communist ideology. 
The Vietnam War also infonned Mao's perception of his own, Chinese, 
revolution, and influenced how he remedied the maladies he saw afflicting it. The 
American intervention in Indochina, and particularly the initial Soviet reaction to it, 
convinced Mao of the necessity of engaging in another attempt to radically overhaul 
Chinese society. Not only that, but it also enabled him to do so, by providing a 
catalyst for domestic mobilization. The war beyond China's southern borders 
engendered rampant paranoia about the threat from imperialism; Mao was then able 
to transfonn that into paranoia about revisionism and radicalize the populace, casting 
aside his enemies within the Party in the process. Aside from the enonnous damage 
caused to Chinese society, the Cultural Revolution years also severely damaged 
China's foreign relations, including those with North Vietnam: China repeatedly 
refused co-operation with the Soviet Union, when united action would have 
manifestly helped Hanoi's war effort. However, what is most striking about the 
impact of the c.R. on Sino-Vietnamese relations is the apparent degree of amity that 
persisted between the two parties and governments, despite the excesses of the C.R. 
However, the appearance of Chinese irredentism that was produced by paranoia 
about Soviet intentions meant that Hanoi eventually tired of Chinese diplomatic 
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intervention to prevent peace talks, and failed to consult with Beijing over its 
decision to enter into the 'negotiating while fighting' stage of their struggle. Mao's 
approval eventually came, but only at a time when Beijing and Hanoi's strategic 
visions began to diverge dramatically. 
Nonetheless, the degree of close co-operation between the two nations, and 
the extent to which China went to safeguard the integrity of North Vietnam requires 
a re-examination of many of the basic premises upon which our understanding of the 
dynamic in Sino-Vietnamese relations have been based. We now know that China's 
military support to the D.R.V. was much greater than previously known: 320,000 
Chinese soldiers rotated in and out of North Vietnam between 1965 and 1970. China 
also went to great lengths to convey to the United States the seriousness of its intent 
to intervene if North Vietnam was subject to a land invasion or if China came under 
any sort of attack. Aside from an array of verbal messages to Washington through a 
variety of channels, the P.R.C. moved large numbers of its forces into the provinces 
bordering Vietnam to avoid being caught out by an American land invasion, as they 
had been in Korea. While Soviet technology was responsible for bolstering North 
Vietnam's air defences against ROLLING THUNDER, it was China that 
safeguarded the D.R.V. against a land invasion. 
Furthermore, it was not until 1969 that the value of aid from the Soviet Union 
outstripped that from China. To a certain degree, by focusing on the differential in 
the monetary value of military aid supplied to North Vietnam from its two major 
sponsors, we have been blinded to its origins, quantity, and intended purpose. 
Because Soviet missile technology was so expensive, for most of the war Soviet 
military aid was estimated to be about twice that of China's. However, not onl y was 
China's economy much smaller than that of the Soviet Union (and shrinking during 
the 1966-1969 period), China did not possess such high-end weaponry: it could not 
supply what it did not have. Nonetheless, those military items the P.R.C. was 
capable of manufacturing were supplied to Hanoi in abundance; in the five years 
between 1965 and 1969 Hanoi was furnished with over 850,000 small arms and 
almost 25,000 pieces of artillery, along with the necessary ammunition. Much of this 
was channeled to the N.L.F., whose arsenal consisted almost entirely of weapons 
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captured from the ARVN or were of Chinese provenance. The P.R.C. was also to a 
large extent bank-rolling the operations of the N.L.F. in the 1960s, sending vital hard 
currency to the organization to the tune of several tens of millions of dollars per year. 
In contrast to Soviet aid, which in the 1960s was largely defensive, Chinese military 
aid to the Vietnamese was of an offensive nature, and was more in accordance with 
the Vietnamese guerrilla strategy that was prevalent until the N.L.F. was decimated 
during the Tet Offensive. 
China did not expect the N.L.F. to engage in a permanent war of attrition: we 
now know that the Chinese leadership, like the Vietnamese comrades, saw 1968 as a 
key year for turning the war in Hanoi's favour. Chinese opposition to peace talks 
during this period stemmed, in part, from the fear that defeat would be snatched from 
the jaws of victory. Similarly, the initial Chinese reaction to Hanoi's acceptance of 
peace talks in April 1968 after the Tet Offensive had its origins in the view that 
Hanoi appeared to be easing the pressure on Johnson instead of increasing it; 
compromising its position and that of the N.L.F. Furthermore, the Vietnamese 
comrades had not informed Beijing in advance of the decision - something that 
undoubtedly caused grave offence to both Chinese paternalism and Beijing's sense 
of solidarity with an ally who they had stoutly backed for more than four years. 
Beijing had underestimated the psychological impact of 'Tel' in the United States, 
and was later forced to admit that Hanoi did, in fact, have a better grasp of the 
situation than the Chinese leadership had given them credit for, and perhaps indeed 
than the Chinese themselves, caught in the vacuum of the Cultural Revolution, 
understood. 
As the summer of 1968 wore on, the Chinese criticism became more acute, 
but the origins of that criticism had evolved: Hanoi was now accused of throwing a 
lifeline to Lyndon Johnson (which is ironically precisely what Hanoi later accused 
Mao of doing to Nixon). This in itself raises questions about just at which point Mao 
made the decision, in his own words, to "vote for Nixon", and re-emphasizes the 
importance of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its consequences for Mao's 
global outlook. It now appears that by the autumn of 1968 Richard Nixon's 'cold 
warrior' reputation was viewed by Mao as a potentially useful bulwark against 
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Soviet social-imperialism, setting Chinese strategic policy off in a direction at 
variance to that of the Vietnamese comrades: Beijing wanted Nixon elected, while 
Hanoi wanted to squeeze concessions out of 10hnson and Humphrey. The pattern 
would be repeated four years later, with even more deleterious consequences for 
Sino-Vietnamese solidarity. 
There has also existed the strong temptation to view the reduction in Chinese 
aid to North Vietnam in 1968-1969, and the accompanying withdrawal of Chinese 
support troops from North Vietnam, as a crude attempt to punish Hanoi for entering 
into negotiations. Once again the reality is rather more complicated. In these two 
years the Chinese economy was in tatters after the damage caused by the Cultural 
Revolution; furthermore, the P.R.C. was in the shadow of a potentially catastrophic 
war with the Soviet Union. This compounded the fact that Hanoi, unlike for 
example North Korea, had been in full support of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia that had so concerned the C.c.P. And while Chinese military aid 
did drop back in 1969, it was to an amount roughly comparable to that of 1967; 
likewise Soviet military aid in 1969 was down on that of the previous year as a result 
of reduced fighting in the wake of the Tet Offensive, and 10hnson's bombing halt. 
Chinese aid, like that of the Soviets, followed the contours of the battlefield, as well 
as political exigencies. The most significant reduction in Chinese aid occurred from 
1969-70 (despite, as previously noted, Hanoi's apparent satisfaction with the aid 
package agreed in 1969), and this stemmed not from Chinese objections to Hanoi's 
'fighting while negotiating' strategy, but from China's own national security needs: 
the P.R.C. reduced military aid to Hanoi in the period when it was on the brink of 
war with the Soviet Union. When the immediate Soviet threat subsided, Chinese aid 
rebounded. 
This subsequent increase in aid to Hanoi was enormous: the number of 
artillery pieces supplied was up 250% on the previous year, the number of shells to 
use in them up 400%; there were 40% more sinall arms, and an injection of 80 
Chinese tanks and 4 new aircraft into the D.R.V. 's arsenal. And while this went in 
parallel with Mao's moves towards rapprochement with Richard Nixon, these 
changes cannot be viewed in isolation from the situation on the battlefield in South 
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Vietnam. The tactical disaster of the Tet Offensive had practically eliminated the 
N.L.F. as a fighting force - the burden of carrying on the war would now be passed 
onto the PA VN. Similarly, Nixon's Vietnamization plan meant that Hanoi's tactics 
were going to shift in the direction of taking on the ARVN in more conventional 
battles: for while the United States might tire and extricate itself from the war in 
South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government would not. Both of these factors 
would necessitate more men, and more heavy weaponry than the 'People's War' 
tactics of the 1960s had. As a result, compared to 1966-8 the 1971-3 period saw the 
supply of 11 % more small arms, but 87% more artillery pieces, and 672% more 
tanks (although there were admittedly 23% fewer Chinese aircraft involved). 
Hanoi's tactics and needs shifted in relation to the changing circumstances in Saigon 
and Washington; so too, in response, did the nature, of Beijing's aid. 
Of course, these changes in Chinese aid policy did not exist in a vacuum from 
Mao's own changing strategic priorities and the manoeuvres towards rapprochement 
between China and the United States. During the Cultural Revolution era Mao's 
ideological impulses had demanded that the United States be humiliated in Vietnam, 
and that a revolutionary, developing nation tackled the might of imperialism without 
precipitating a nuclear conflagration. By the early 1970s, however, China simply 
sought the complete removal of American forces from Indochina, 'leaving no tail 
behind'. Mao made Sino-American rapprochement contingent upon the continued 
American withdrawal from the Indochinese peninsula, while the Sino-centric 
analysis of the Beijing leadership believed that improved Sino-American relations 
would hasten the process. Simultaneously, Beijing increased its aid for Hanoi, in 
anticipation of another offensive in 1972 should the peace talks in Paris fail to 
deliver a settlement in advance of the presidential election year's dry season: it could 
do nothing else without being accused of an even greater betrayal. It was on this 
point that Henry Kissinger most acutely misunderstood Chinese intentions, 
interpreting Zhou Enlai's entreaties to abandon South Vietnam as indications that he 
was urging restraint on Hanoi. 
A negotiated settlement in the latter half of 1971 was the best possible 
outcome of the Vietnam War for China. Were Washington to yield on the future of 
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Nguyen Van Thieu in the period between Kissinger's secret visit and Nixon's 
summit, it would demonstrate to the Vietnamese that it would be under the Chinese 
aegis, and not that of the Soviets, that their revolution would be triumphant. The 
failure to arrive at an agreement meant that one last attempt would be made by the 
Vietnamese comrades to break the military stalemate, and with it the inherent 
contradiction in Beijing's policies towards America and Vietnam would also come to 
breaking point. It was now understood between Kissinger and Zhou, and Mao and 
Nixon, that the Vietnam War was also the Vietnamese' war, and the U.S. President 
was freed from the constraints of his predecessor when it came to the application of 
air power. China protested perfunctorily, but it was understood on both sides that 
there would be no confrontation between China and the United States. And yet 
despite this, Beijing rallied its resources to help North Vietnam survive the blockade 
imposed by Nixon and push on with its attacks in the South. Both Hanoi and Beijing 
knew that there existed an October deadline to reach an agreement between 
Kissinger and Le Duc Tho; the difference was that while Hanoi desired it, Beijing 
demanded it. 
Full Chinese support for Hanoi continued until such times as it became clear 
that the Vietnamese communists were incapable of removing the South Vietnamese 
leader by force, and that Nixon resolutely refused to do it for them. By July 1972, in 
Mao's view, Hanoi had had its chance, and now had to accept the reality of the 
situation. The C.C.P. Chairman's analysis was, as always, informed by his own 
experience and that of the Chinese revolution. As he and Zhou Enlai repeatedly 
reminded visitors in the latter half of 1972, the C.C.P. had been forced to negotiate 
directly and compromise with Chiang Kai-shek in 1945. After having defeated a 
foreign invader, a period of regroupment and consolidation had been not only 
necessary, but to the communists' advantage. So too, preached Mao, was the case 
for Vietnam in 1973. To support the Chinese case, aid continued to pour into North 
Vietnam from China in 1973 and 1974, to the value of around RMB 5.5 billion for 
these two years. Simultaneously Zhou began a process of subtle mediation to try and 
ensure the Vietnam War was over for the second term of Richard Nixon's presidency. 
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China's continued aid for North Vietnam in the wake of the American 
withdrawal indicates that Beijing believed that it could - or perhaps had to - manage 
the relationship with Hanoi, and more importantly that it was by no means 
irreparably damaged by the events of 1972. It is as yet impossible to gauge the 
degree to which Hanoi blamed the Chinese for LINEBACKER, but it is clear that 
Nixon felt unburdened by the fear of war with China that had caused Lyndon 
Johnson to impose limits on the operation of ROLLING THUNDER. And while it 
was Chinese help that enabled North Vietnam to withstand the blockade and mining 
of Haiphong, it was the 'Christmas bombings' of LINEBACKER II that gravely 
damaged the industrial capacity of the D.R.V., and came at no diplomatic cost to 
Nixon from a China that was almost as eager to see the war in Vietnam ended before 
the start of Nixon's second term as the U.S. president himself was. Beijing wanted 
to see Nixon start a new term with a clean slate and a strong mandate that would 
enable him to navigate the rocky road to full diplomatic normalization that lay ahead. 
For this, Hanoi held Beijing in part responsible for the damage wrought on the 
industrial capacity of the D.R.V. by LINEBACKER II. This is indicated by the 
nature of the aid package that they requested from Beijing in early 1973: an 
enormous 8.1 billion yuan. Beijing was unwilling, or unable, to agree to such a 
package; nonetheless, the Chinese still signed agreements worth 2.5 billion yuan, 
accompanied by a promise from Zhou Enlai that Chinese aid would continue at that 
level for five years. It was a promise that would ultimately be unfulfilled. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would write off almost all of Hanoi's outstanding debt 
to it, and provide resources for the reconstruction of North Vietnam that Beijing 
could never match. 
It was, undoubtedly, the Chinese move towards a rapprochement with the 
United States that had the most deleterious impact on its relationship with Hanoi. 
Mao's burgeoning relationship with Richard Nixon did not simply hamper Hanoi's 
diplomatic strategy to end the war on its terms in 1972, but the tacit Sino-American 
alliance against the Soviet Union represented China's break with the broader global 
movement that Hanoi had increasingly come to view as both integral to its revolution 
and a path to modernity. Zhou Enlai's assertion that there was no longer any such 
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thing as the communist camp was something that Hanoi resolutely rejected, for the 
alternative was a return to being in thrall to China. China's response was to, within 
limits, attempt to hasten the completion of the Vietnamese revolution to ensure that 
Vietnam· did not become an 'Asian Cuba' on its southern flank, dominating 
Indochina. And while the Chinese continued (admittedly declining) efforts from the 
signing of the Paris Peace Accords right through until Saigon surrendered, it was 
becoming increasingly clear that the efforts had failed. Beijing, now under the day-
to-day leadership of Deng Xiaoping, had begun to focus on its own domestic 
economic needs, as well as on more effectively using its foreign aid budget as its 
overseas activities increased. China was never going to be able to match the 
economic might or technological advances that the Soviet Union could provide 
North Vietnam, but it was able to maintain some leverage through the supply of rice 
to Hanoi, and by satisfying the impulses of the 'revolutionary' elements in the 
V.W.P. through the continued supply .of weaponry for the ongoing struggle in the 
South. The surrender of food-rich South Vietnam in April 1975, much sooner than 
anyone had expected, cut off both these levers. By November 1975, China had 
effectively decided to cut Hanoi adrift. 
What permitted China to take such drastic action, and effectively write off the 
half of its total foreign aid budget that had been spent on Vietnam and leave that 
nation to fall into the Soviet orbit, was the unheralded rise of the Cambodian 
communists as a force in their own right. Zhou Enlai had originally hoped to put a 
neutralist government into power in Phnom Penh with Sihanouk at its head, and 
reacted with irritation at the U.S. Congress' termination of the bombing of Cambodia. 
However, from the summer of 1973 onwards the radically anti-Vietnamese outlook 
of Pol Pot's agenda became clear, as did his forces' determination to push on until 
victory at more or less any cost. This ran completely contrary to the expectations 
that had existed in Beijing and Hanoi until at least 1971, where it was anticipated 
that the revolution in Cambodia, as in Laos, would be secondary to, and dependent 
upon, the successful conclusion of the Vietnamese revolution. Barely a fortnight 
before Saigon surrendered, Khmer Rouge forces entered the Cambodian capital; the 
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need for China to pander to a Hanoi increasingly working in tandem with the Soviet 
Union was abrogated. 
Ironically, while Kissinger may have continually misinterpreted Zhou Enlai's 
admonitions regarding America's Vietnam policy, he was ultimately correct about 
the future danger to China of a strong and unified Vietnam. It is also true, however, 
that Nixon's policies made his warnings something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: had 
Washington given up Thieu in 1971 , Sino-Vietnamese relations would have been 
spared the trauma of the events of 1972. The final irony is, however, that it was the 
actions of the U.S. Congress in ending the bombing of Cambodia that ultimately 
provided China with a counter-weight to Hanoi, should it need it. Unfortunately, 
Kampuchea would prove to be an unstable ally for China, and a provocative 
neighbour for Vietnam; it destabilized Indochina in a manner that Zhou Enlai had 
sought to avoid. And while many particular factors from 1973 onwards would 
contribute to the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, its origins can be 
traced to Sino-American rapprochement, and from Beijing and Hanoi's diverging 
interests in the occupant of the White House that emerged in the wake of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
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